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A'm Q MID A ri M 
The population of the Marvdasht plain form 
the subject matter of this thesis. The plain is located 
in central Fars province, north of the provincial 
capital of Shiraz. The population is diverse in origin 
reflecting the heterogeneous character of regional 
society, with its complex mix of sedentary and nomadic 
elements. Until the execution of a supposedly radical 
land reform programme in the 1960s much of the plain 
was under the control of absentee landlords. In the 
thesis attention is focused on a particular part of the 
plain, the Ayub valley, and in particular on the village 
of Chamaniý a newly settled village containing Persian, 
Luri, and Turki speakers. Parallel to this the activities 
of both landlords and villagers are traced out from 
the village into the region in which they are 
contextualised, and features of other villages in the 
plain are also emphasised. 
The first three chapters serve to set the 
scene. After an introductory description of the 
provincial environment and of major features in the 
social organisation of the province, attention is 
directed to an examination of the inter-relationship 
between nomadism and sedentarism, because a large 
proportion of villagers were former pastoral nomads and 
still maintain significant relationships with the 
nomadic sector. It is hypothesised that, rather- than 
looking at nomadism and sedentarism as separate types 
of social organisation, it is perhaps more useful 
to regard them as variations on a small number of 
themes. Chapter III elaborates this point, through 
an examination of tribal organisation which has often 
been equated with nomadism, and which is still used 
as a means of identifying and labelling certain groups 
of people. 
Rather than separate nomadic from sedentary 
or tribal from non-tribal it is suggested that the 
social organisation of the Marvdasht plain may be more 
adequately interpreted through an analysis of the 
changing patterns of land use and control over time. 
Thus, after a brief overview of the Marvdasht plain, 
the historical development of relations of production are 
outlined with special attention being given to the 
period before land reform. This is intended to put the 
land reform programme into an historical context and 
thereby facilitate an interpretation of it and of the 
different sorts of relationships that have been 
constructed between landlords and peasants in the plain. 
Chapters VII and VIII examine the varied 
nature of local production, using the village of Chamani 
as a base. An attempt is made to Confront some of 
the established stereo-types through which village 
organisation in Iran have been interpreted. 
The final four chapters investigate the ways 
in which alliances have been constructed, and the 
changing relationships of inequality and authority that have 
resulted from the differential incorporation of people 
into changing forms of production; the results of an 
extended and variable association with western 
capitalism. Beginning with relationships within the 
household, the analysis is extended out to finally 
examine the changing nature of relationships bezween 
the state and villagers. 
Throughout the thesis emphasis is pla--ed 
on the continuity of social organisation over time. 
Despite the execution of a major land reform programme 
and its association with the 'white revolution of the 
shah and the people', it is m, intained that 'familial' 
netwo-ks of control, and 'tribal' associations are 
still important in the regulation of action and 
interaction, and that the supposed transition from 
non-capitalist to capitalist is an extremely complex 
process which neat categorisations into 'traditional' 
and 'modern' do little to illuminate. 
LP 
Tarikh Aiyne gozashteh ast va dars-e-hal 
"History is a mirror of the past 
and a lesson for the present" 
ii 
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The fieldwork on which this thesis is based ý, -as carried 
out during 1970 and 1971. It does however reflect work carried 
out in Iran since that time which I believe has broadened and 
deepened my understanding of social organisation in the 
Marvdasht liain. Inevitably the conceptual framework with 
which I initially began work has changed considerably; the 
results of the field experience itself, as well as involvement 
in different intellectual traditions since then. In addition 
circumstances in Iran have changed dramatically since my last 
visit there in 1977. 
This work does not attempt, except in the most cursory 
manner, to deal with the changing relationships between the 
Muslim clergy and the state (as well as the changing nature of 
both). For the Shila clergy to assume control of the state 
apparatus is in itself unique as traditional Shila Islam has 
eschewed involvement in secular government. 
Scattered reports from Fars since the revolution would 
appear to indicate that the flexibility which was. such a 
feature of much socio-economic and political organisation, in 
terms of the maintenance of the lagro-pastoral combine' and 
the 'web' system of political organisation, remain as major 
foci for action. Leaders of the Qashqai tribe for example 
have returned from exile and obtained places in the new 
Iranian parliament. But, without reliable information it is 
impossible to construct anything but hypothetical accounts of 
the effects of these changes on the Marvdasht plain. Those 
. 1-; - 
who had placed their reliance on a single specialised interest, 
or job were likely to be most affected, while those who could 
command a wide variety of resources probably fared less badly. 
I 
My research in the Marvdasht plain was financed by a 
research studentship received from the Social Science Research 
Council. If they had demanded production at the end of the 
three year period of the award this thesis would have taken on 
a very different form. It was because of their attitude that, 
not only was I able to reflect on my work of that period but 
also to extend and, I feel, enrich my experie-nce and my research. 
At the end of that three-year period I was hardly in a position 
to synthesise my material. The tradition which assumes that 
one goes into the field to test already worked-out hypotheses 
gives little room and little time for changes in those hypo- 
theses. And yet pressures do necessitate a compromise and a 
definition of one's work in ways which, if it is to reach 
written form, remain only partially satisfactory. 
The public language of a preface invites the somewhat 
invidious listing of those who have figured most prominently 
in the construction of the work to which it is pre-faced. 
This has the inevitable result of excluding many who remain 
unmentioned. To those who remain hidden I extend my warmest 
thanks. To the people of the Ayub valley, the 'objects' of my 
Vi jj 
study I am also indebted. By the very nature of this type of 
research they are not in a position to respond to my inter- 
pretations of their activities. This inevitably increases the 
subjectivity of these interpretations. The research worker is 
in an analagous position to a photographer, in that villagers 
who object to photographs because., they argue, the camera 
captures their 'soul', are justifiably apprehensive of the 
research worker who tries to 'capture' their lives. The trust 
that they extend must therefore be handled with great caution 
lest it be used as a manipulatory tool against them. 
Initially my research woTk was supervised by Professor 
Philip Mayer who was responsible for its inception and, in a 
number of penetrating ways, through his own work on tribesmen 
and townsmen in southern Africa, provided one of the found- 
ations from which I worked. Professor Eric Sunderland has 
taken an active interest since stimulating, first, my interest 
in anthropology, and secondly my interest in Iran through his 
own work on the. human geography of that country. 
Parallel to them my thanks go to my supervisor, David 
Brooks, and his wife, Marianne who have, over thý years 
supported the various stages through which this work and my 
thoughts have developed. Research of this nature is a very 
solitary affair and, much more than others, they have been 
sympathetic to the problems of working in Iran as well as to 
the nuances of interpretation of very complex data. They have 
both been extremely tolerant of my many demands on their time 
and patience. 
ix 
The Depýrtment of National Development and Sociology of 
what was Pahlavi University in Shiraz provided a basis for my 
studies in Fars and to the staff, in particular Ismail 'Ajami, 
and the students I owe a great deal. Of many friends and 
colleagues in Shiraz who helped me in my research I would like 
to single out Jalal Sadeghi and his wife, Ann Betteridge, 
Habib Ghavami, Ali Shushtari, Hosein Khan Farsi Madan, 
Manuchehr Shiva, Feridun Darreshuri, and Shahbaz Khan Kashkuli. 
While in Iran I was fortunate to have the support and 
encouragement of a number of foreign scholars themselves 
wrestling with interpretations of the Iranian scene. Bruce 
Livingstone, Bill Royce, Richard Salzer, Bill Sumner, Lois 
and Sam Beck, Judy Goldstein, Nico Kielstra, Grant Farr, 
Mary-Ellen Page, Charlotte Albright, Bill Beeman, Shirley 
Jarman and Brian Beeley were of particular importance. I must 
also thank the British Institute of Persian Studies, and its 
director, David Stronach, for their support and for providing 
a haven of the 'known' in the middle of the unknown. Through- 
out my stay in Iran the Institute provided a welcome source 
of intellectual stimulation and friendship. 
The Centre for Development Studies at the University 
College of Swansea has, over the past four years, supported 
and encouraged my interests and indeed contributed substan- 
tially to the final. form that this thesis has taken. Colleagues 
in Swansea have allowed me to bounce my ideas off them and have 
also given me time to devote to the completion of this thesis 
in the face of very demanding teaching schedules. I would 
x 
like to thank in particular Gavin Kitching, Chris Gerry and 
Charlie Gore. Thanks finally to Anthea Thomas who at a 
particularly busy period was able to type my manuscript and 
deal with my last minute alterations. 
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Explanatory notes 
Transliteration: In transliterating Persian I have followed 
the system utilized by Lambton (1953, pp. x-xii), which is 
based on that adopted by the Royal Asiatic Society. This is 
not, however, rigorously followed and for proper names and 
place names the most common English form is used. I have 
adopted the following system. 
a 
b 
p 
t 
th 
ch 
h 
kh 
d 
dh 
r 
Z 
s Lr 
Z. 
sh J, 
s op 
z 
t 
z 
gh 
f 
q 
k Joo 
g 
i j 
m r 
n U 
v (vowel sound loul) 
h 
(vowel sound Ii') 
Y 
Chronology: Iran uses the Muslim calendar which dates from 
the flight (hejra) of the prophet Mohamad from Mecca to Mediný 
in A. D. 622. For civil purposes a solar calendar is used. 
This begins on lst Farvardin, the spring equinox. Thus the 
year 1349 corresponds to the year running from 21st March 
1970 to 20th March 1971. In the middle of the 1970s the shah 
tried to introduce a new calendar which dated from the found- 
ation of the Achamenian dynasty, 2,500 years before the 
coronation of. Reza shah in 1925. Thus the year 2545 corres- 
ponded to the year running from 21st March 1970 to 20th March 
1931 - This was abandoned in 1979 with the overthrow of the 
Pahlavi dynasty. 
Currency: The official unit of currency is the rial. In the 
early 1970s there was considerable fluctuation in its value 
as against foreign currencies. In 1969 the exchange rate 
stood at 180 rials to A sterling. This, had fallen by 1975 
to 120 rials to 4tl sterling. A more common form of reckonin 
was in tomans: one toman equals 10 rials. 
Weights and measures: While officially weights and measures 
were metric, the mann was commonly used. This unit of weight 
varied from place to place, but the mann-e-marvdashti was use 
as equivaleTit to 3. '2 kilogrammes. 
I 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Most of the intensive research for this thesis was under- 
taken in and around the village of Chamani in the Marvdasht 
plain, north of the regional capital of Shiraz, in the southern 
Iranian province of Fars. It is from this base that inter- 
pretations of the complexities of social organisation in the 
Marvdasht plain have been constructed. 
As an. inexperienced post-graduate student, inspired by 
the work of such people as Barth 
1 
and English, 
2 
my initial aim 
was to undertake a traditional piece of anthropological field- 
work concentrating on problems of social change which were 
accompanying a rapid modernisation programme in Iran in the 
late 160s. I arrived in Shiraz in the late spring of 1969 
with some rather general questions as to the nature of city/ 
village inter-relationships and nomad/peasant inter-action. 
The next few months were occupied with attempts to focus my 
study. In the early summer I spent several weeks in*the 
rather unusual village of Ghalat, north west of the city of 
I 
Shiraz, half way between that city and Ardakan. I was the 
guest of the resident medic and of the small Anglican community 
which had established a small church in the village (the onlý 
one of its kind in Fars, and used by the missionary community 
in Shiraz as a summer retreat). While there, learning Persian, 
1. Barth, F. 
2. English, 
(1964), Nomads of 
P. W. (1966), City 
South Persia, 
and Village in 
London. 
Iran, Madison, Wisc 
ol 
2 
I concentrated my work on a study of the giveh (cloth-shoe) 
industry ihat was very important in the village economy. 
Because of their wide trade links with other parts of the pro- 
vince, this seemed a good place to start an analysis of region- 
al networks. It became very obvious, however, after only a 
short stay that, not only did Ghalat appear as unrepresentative, 
but my association with the Anglican community would not aid 
in my attempts to live as a 'neutral' observer in a Irepresen- 
tativel community. 
returned to Shiraz and embarked on a survey of one of 
the food-processing factories in Shiraz with the aim of build- 
ing up a picture of the networks constructed by migrant workers 
employed there. My aim throughout was, however, to find a 
village which would be suitable for my as yet only half-formu- 
lated hypotheses. I travelled extensively in the Marvdasht 
plain and in central Fars province at this stage, looking for 
the 'right' village. Retrospectively this 'right' village 
was characterised by criteria which were extremely subjective 
- not too distant from the major urban centre of Shiraz, and 
yet isolated enough rLot to have been irreparably'altered by 
recent changes. With a conceptual framework which put 'tribes' 
on the margins and urban areas at the Icentrel, 'my' village 
was to be halfway between, reflecting and interacting with both. 
The reason for concentration on a settled community rather 
than a nomadic one at this stage was conditioned by the pre- 
vailing difficulties that foreign scholars were having in the 
late 160s in obtaining permission to travel and work in tribal 
3 
areas. Pragmatically I could not afford to spend several 
months in Tehran waiting around for that permission to be 
granted. I was anxious to get out into the 'field' and start 
work. Both Tehran and Shiraz were not perceived as having any- 
thing to do with this 'field'. I managed to circumvent the 
necessity of obtaining formal permission by attaching myself 
to the Department of National Development and Sociology at what 
was then the Pahlavi University in Shiraz. In return for mini- 
mal contributions to their teaching programme I was able to 
obtain an identity card which allowed me to travel relatively 
unhindered in central Fars. At that time I was unable to visit 
except informally many of the more isolated 'tribal' areas of 
the province. The Department had a field centre just outside 
Marvdasht at which I was a frequent visitor and from which I 
was able to visit many villages in the Marvdasht plain, over 
several years. 
In the autumn of 1969 1 was introduced to a landowner in 
the Marvdasht plain who was prepared to let me work from one 
of his villages in return for helping him to speak English. 
This landowner was Mustafa Abdulahi, who figures prominently 
in this thesis, and the village was Chamani. He took me with 
him on a variety of occasions to his other estates in central 
Fars and allowed me to live in his courtyard in Chamani. 
Between the early spring of 1970 and the late summer of 1971 
most of my work was focused on this village and the villages 
around. My major aim was to analyse the impact of land reform 
in the Marvdasht plain and this has remained the core of my 
research work. I spent several weeks at a time in Chamani, 
and while in town, where I retained a base with my wife, spent 
much time with Abdulahi, as well as helping with the research 
work of students in the Department of National Development, 
in rural development projects and in the study of shanty towns 
in and around the city. 
After a year in England I returned to Fars in the late 
summer of 1972 to take up a post as lecturer in the Department 
of National Development and Sociology. In addition to my 
teaching I was involved in research among pastoral nomads, more 
particularly both the Farsi Madan section of the Qashqai, and 
also the Kurushi camel herders who were attached to the Qashqai. 
While occasionally visiting Chamani I did no more concentrated 
work there. The reasons for this were various. Firstly, I 
felt that my association with the landlord (Abdulahi) had com- 
promised my associations with the villagers and that the infor- 
mation that I had obtained from there was biased because of 
that. Secondly because of the nature of the population of 
Chamani it seemed important to look at other face, ts of the 
regional population. I wanted to redress the imbalance that 
I felt my work in Chamani had created in my understanding of 
the situation in Fars; I wanted to work with 'ordinary' people 
without being necessarily compromised in their eyes through 
associations with urban-based landlords and agents of the 
State whose interests oftened seemed contrary to those of 
villagers. 
5 
Between 1972 and 197S I travelled widely throughout the 
whole of Fars, and over a period of eight months in 1973 
worked intensively with one group of the Farsi Madan. This 
provided me with important comparative data, but led me away 
from the initial foundations on which my research had been 
based - Chamani. Again, retrospectively it appeared as an 
attempt to find the 'true' 'field' where my anthropological 
analysis would be uncompromised by associations with urban- 
based, westernised Iranians. It was not until I was able to 
see both Shiraz and Abdulahi as part of that 'field' that the 
material I had collected began to make any sense. 
Despite its physically distinct appearance, the village 
boundaries of Chamani did not circumscribe the activities of 
its inhabitants in ways in which functional accounts of middle 
eastern villages suggested as they concentrated on notions of 
'peasant' society. Questions were very soon raised in my mind 
as to the nature of the commitment of villagers to their place 
of residence as well as to a search for other criteria which 
might help explain their varied activities and the boundaries 
of social control operative within the village. One aspect of 
Chamani's distinctiveness was its division into two discrete 
parts, one occupied by the landlord, the other by the majority 
of the inhabitants of the village. This posed questions about 
the reasons for and the nature of, the separation of the int- 
erests of the large landowner and the majority of the villagers, 
5 
and led into an analysis of the organisation of production 
in the village. 
Chamani also seemed to be divided along 'ethnic' lines 
involving the coexistence in one place of three different groups 
speaking three different languages (Turki, Luri, and Persian). 
This posed questions as to how people were identified with 
particular places and as to the mobility of populations in the 
plain. It also raised questions about the boundaries that 
villagers. themselves used in the organisation of their lives, 
and in their reactions to forces that impinged on their lives. 
Such perceived distinctions within Chamani led to an 
examination of features in the wider environment, both in 
neighbouring villages and in the regional environment; the 
nature of tenurial relationships and their change over time, 
and the nature of ethnic identity within southern Iran. This 
in turn implied an acquaintance with the social history of the 
area and an investigation of the inter-relationships between 
nomadic and sedentary communities which was such a visible 
feature of the Marvdasht plain. In moving along such a path 
I 
however, I was taken further from the empirical basis on which 
the thesis was constructed; the Ayub valley. Further problems 
were posed as to the interpretation of social organisation 
and the premises on which such interpretations were built. 0 
The boundaries of the analysis extended as the boundaries 
of the community were also extended, and it became increasingly 
wide-ranging. A point was reached when epistemological 
questions about the construction of 'reality' associated with 
I- 
( 
the supposed collection of 'objective II facts I, became more 
important than an examination of the actual data collected in 
the villages in the Marvdasht plain. As Ennew has pointed out: 
fleven apparent empirical knowledge of the world is 
theoretical, constructed in concepts and language 
that are themselves thought objects and not concrete 
objects 
(Ennew 1976, p-44) 
The search for interpretative schema, to 'explain' acti- 
vity in the Marvdasht plain involved a critique of the analy- 
tical boundaries used to isolate supposedly distinct groups 
such as 'villagers' or 'tribes', and led to an examination of 
the intellectual premises which scholars had used in construct- 
ing such categories. Firstly there were those premises, a 
critique of which finally became an intellectual exercise 
within a western philosophical tradition - the fact that the 
object of analysis was a middle eastern society was of little 
consequence. Secondly there were the premises that the villa- 
gers and others used in their construction of organisational 
forms rooted in 'the socio-historical and physical conditions 
of existence in which they were obliged to operate. 
Ultimately the scholar's perception of reality remains, 
importantly, rooted in his/her environment and in the intel- 
lectual traditions which have formed his/her analytical prem- 
ises - Comments and interpretations of the actions of others 
are necessarily coloured by this. Nevertheless meaning is 
given to the world through interpretation of that world and the 
construction of viable categories that help in its manipulation. 
8 
The theoretical premises that one adopts, explicitly or 
implicltly, colour not only the conclusions which one formu- 
lates, but also the very nature of the facts that one collects 
in the pursuit of a particular hypothesis. These in turn are 
colouredly the nature of one's exposure to 'reality' in the 
'field'. The results of a particular piece of research are 
then the encapsulated energies of the actors involved, both 
researcher and researched; a defined record of a transient 
moment in time. As such, any piece of research abstracts from 
a very complex reality and transposes the 'facts' out of the 
history in which they are contextualised. 
I Chamani is a relatively newly settled village and as 
such exhibits features that distinguish it from older villages 
in the plain. The fact that the village is divided between 
the interests of the large landowners and the villagers, and 
that the inhabitants of the village exhibit heterogenous 
characteristics, provide the starting points for the analysis. 
A major feature of the Marvdasht plain is the juxta- 
position of a nomadic population with permanently settled 
villages. Traditional interpretations have tended to perceive 
the two as discrete, in social, economic and political terms. 
But closer analysis suggests that such discreteness is not 
necessarily reproduced in actual organisation within the plain. 
Such interpretations appear to be predicated on an evolution- 
ary scheme which perceives change in terms of progression 
from a 'tribal' to a more sophisticated organisational form, 
so that 'tribes' were perceived as residual and archaic social 
0 
forms. More functionalist interpretations tended to see the 
relationships between 'tribe' and 'villager' as a product of 
specialisation, and stressed the symbiotic nature of the inter- 
actions between them. The former has been considerably al- 
tered, not only because of the more obvious features of its 
ethnocentric bias, but also because the evolutionary path, 
associated with Imodernisation' was by no means as straight- 
forward as Imodernisation' theorists might have imagined. 
The latter has also been revised because it tends to avoid 
history and select abstract features out of that history. 
The pivot of land reform provides the perspective from 
which to look at the process of change characterised by the 
expansion of capitalism; the individuation of property rights, 
and the active ýnarginalisationl or 'peripheralisation' of 
so-called 'pre-capitalist' or Inon- capitalist I elements, both 
physically and intellectually. This process involves the 
expansion of a developing state structure and an analysis of 
the often prescriptive categories by which that state dealt 
with the problems and aspirations of villagers. 
In examining change in the Marvdasht plain then, one 
must situate it in a broader context; the village is only one 
part of a very complex equation. The diverse origins of the 
villagers, as well as the nature of control over productive 
resources take one outside the narrow confines of the village. 
Initially it is necessary to situate the plain in the physical 
context of southern Iran. This is the object of Chapter 
which looks at the different physical regimes which make up 
10 
this ecologically varied region. This is essential. for an 
understanding of the movement of people between areas and thus 
for an understanding of the various types of agricultural and 
nomadic regimes that are to be found in the region. Through 
such it is hoped to present a framework in which some of the 
features that are to be found in the Marvdasht plain may be 
more comprehensively evaluated. The physical environment serves 
as a basis from which to analyse the social environment and the 
nature of interaction between urban, rural and nomadic pppu- 
lations, all of which are represented in the plain. 
Such an introductory overview provides a framework for an 
examination in Chapters IV and V of changing tenurial relation- 
ships as well as changes in the distribution of power. The 
central theme in this examination is the continuing importance 
of a form of delegation of authority in which political office 
was combined with control over land. It is paralleled by a 
discussion of changes associated with the expansion of capital- 
ist relations of, production and the changing character of 
state control. 
The land reform of the 1960s was hailed as a major break 
with tradition. Closer inspection suggests that it served the 
interests of those already established in power. It had the 
effect of polarising the interests of the large landowners 
from those of the majority of the peasant cultivators, and 
aided in the expansion of individual, commercialised agricul- 
tural production. The forms of cultivation after the reform 
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are analysed in Chapter VII. This is followed by an examin- 
ation of occupational differentiation within the village of 
Chamani. It is emphasised there that changes in occupation 
cannot necessarily be viewed as indicators of more comprehensive 
changes, but may reflect the intellectual categories that 
observers have brought to the analysis of rural production. 
major aim of the thesis is to examine the nature and 
characteristics of changes that have been felt in the Marvdasht 
plain bot4 preceding land reform and following, in order to 
put the reform programme into its historical context, as the 
necessary accompaniment of a trend whose effects were being 
felt long before. 
Parallel to such an analysis is an examination of the 
inter-relationships between villagers and others in a changing 
environment; the nature of the alliances they construct in 
the pursuit of their different goals. Proceeding from an 
examination of the household economy (Chapter IX) through an 
investigation of the nature of marital alliances, attention 
is then focused on the alliances constructed between house- 
holds, in what has been termed the lagro-pastoral combine'. 
Finally, attention is focused on the changing patterns of 
inequality and authority, firstly through an investigation of 
the nature of Abdulahi's alliances and then to those con- 
structed between villagers and the state. 
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CHAPTER II 
ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND 
Physical environment 
The Marvdasht plain is located in the province of Fars. 
This province straddles the southern section of the Zagros 
mountain chain in south-western Iran; from the coastal plains 
of the Persian Gulf to the plateau areas bordering the inland 
deserts. 1A great variety of environmental conditions are to 
be found, and this variety provides the backdrop for many 
different forms of social organisation. 
The main lie of the Zagros mountains in this area is 
NW-SE, and there is a gradual reduction in elevation as one 
moves southwards and eastwards: 
"towards the south the ridges become more widely 
spaced almost as fingers of upland within a plateau 
rather than serried ranks of ridges and valleys. " 
(Fisher, 1968, p-27) 
The higher, more inaccessible areas are to be found in the 
north and west, where Mount Dena, the highest peak in the 
southern Zagros, range, rises to an impressive 4,276 metres 
(see 
As one travels westwards from the provincial capital of 
Shiraz towards the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr one descends 
1. The present provincial boundaries of Fars are the results 
Qf relatively recent administrative reforms. The province 
covers an area of 133,298 sq. kms. and is one of 14 such pro- 
vincial divisions within Iran. It is bordered on the north 
by the province of Esfabin, on the west by the Governorate 
(FarmAndarikol) of Kuh- Giluyah and the province of Khuzestan 
and, since its creation in the late sixties by the coastal 
province including all the coastal areas on the northern side 
of the Gulf from Khuzest5n in the north to Sist5n and 
Baluchistdn in the south east. Fars province is administered 
from the provincial capital of Shiraz. 
', 
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dramatically from the Iranian plateau in a number of distinct 
physical steps, to the shoresof the Gulf; alternating steep 
drops and broad plains take one through a series of very 
different climatic regimes and through some of the most diffi- 
cult terrain in Iran. As one moves from higher to lower alti- 
tudes rainfall gradually decreases and temperatures gradually 
increase (see Fig. 2). In July and August, the hottest months, 
the average temperatures in Shiraz are 36'C, at a height of 
1490 metres, whereas in Kazerun, at a height of 737 metres 
I 
above sea level they are about 70C. hotter at 43'C. Further 
north and west of Shiraz summers are cooler, but reliable 
information is not readily available from these more isolated 
i 
areas. On the other hand winters at lower altitudes are much 
warmer than at higher ones. Average January temperatures in 
Kazerun are about 100C. higher than corresponding temperatures 
in Shiraz. 
On the basis of these broad topographic and climatic 
variations the region may be roughly divided into three 
zones. These zones represent broad ecological divisions 
where the physical environment offers very different oppor- 
tunities for the pursuit of diverse economic activities. 
The first zone, known as the garmsir, or warm zone, co! n- 
prises the lower lying areas towards the Gulf. 
1 Here summers 
1. The term garmsir refers to any warm area but was also 
used as the proper name for that area south of Shiraz, west 
of Larestdn and east of Tangestdn and Dashtestan. Tangestan 
was located between Kazerun and the Gulf port of Bushehr, and 
Dashtestan was located between Bushire and Arabestan at the 
head of the Gulf. 
Perry refers to Garmsir as 'the lowlands of the Persian Gulf 
littoral betiýeen Bushire and Bandar 'Abbas' (1979, p. 331), and 
seDarates it from Fars (ibid., p-86). 
15 
Fig. 2. Climatic characteristics of selected stations 
in Fars province. 
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are very hot. Climate restricts settlement and agriculture 
and much of the terrain is barren and uninhabitable except 
for a few months of the winter and early spring when it can 
support large flocks of sheep and goats that are seasonally 
pastured in the area. Where irrigation water is available 
rice and wheat are grown and citrus fruits and dates are the 
major tree crops' Wheat and barley are also dry farmed in 
places. Many of the long-range pastoral nomads who are to 
7 be found in the region spend their winter months in this area. 
There is a small permanent population living in isolated 
villages and cultivating the small areas of surrounding farm 
land. 
The second zone, known as the sarhad, or cool zone, com- 
J 
prises the mountain areas of the upper reaches of the Zagros. 
Here winters are very cold and the higher valleys may be cut 
off by snow for up to five months in the year. Summers, 
however, are relatively cool and the area provides summer 
pastures for large flocks of sheep and goats. As in the 
garmsir there is a small permanent population which derives 
a livelihood from the cultivation of hardier cereals and tree 
crops such as walnuts and apples. Summer creals are also dry- 
farmed. Many long range pastoral nomads spend their summer 
months in this zone. 
The third zone delimits the more continuously fertile 
areas of the province in which climatic conditions are not 
as severe as in the garmsir or the sarhad and in which 
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relatively large plains with sophisticated irrigation net- 
wori,,.,, -., support a 
large proportion of the regional population 
and provide much of the agricultural surplus necessary to 
support the major urban centres. The major centres for 
agricultural production in this zone are around the provin- 
cial capital of Shiraz and thý regional centres of FiruzdbZid, 
Kdzerun, Neiriz, Dardb, Jahrom, Fasa and Estahbanat (see fig-1). 
Nomadism and sedentarism 
I 
The cultivation of cereal crops and the raising of sheep 
and goats provide, together, the basic means of gaining a 
livelihood for the majority of the population of the region, 
despite recent expansions in commercial and industrial enter- 
prises and the growth of urban centres. Agricultural and 
pastoral activities are everywhere combined in varying pro- 
portions, although locally either one or the other may be 
-1 dominant, and certain areas of the provinces are more suited 
to the provision of extensive grazing. At the local level it 
would appear that the co-operative interests of the extended 
family which bridge the pastoral and agricultural sectors 
still provide the desired combination of resources and flexi- 
bility of response in attempts to deal with variable physical 
and socio-political conditions. 
1 
This combination of agricultural and pastoral interests 
gives rise to a wide variety of organizational adaptations to 
very different ecological conditions. Because of the 
1. The division between kh5ki (people of the soil) and b9di 
(people of the wind) reflects this dual interest in the com- 
position of tribal groups. 
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f 
unpredictability of rainfall from year to year, month to 
month, and place to place, the availability of pasture lands 
and the yields from dry farming remain uncertain in most 
areas (see Fig. 3). Thus a combination of agriculture and 
pastoralism appear to have provided the most viable opportu- 
nity for minimizing risks and'securing the basic means of 
livelihood within the traditional economic structure. In 
recent years the availability of wage labour in industry and 
x 
the urban centres has provided an additional source of income 
i 
and it is not unusual to find families in which some members 
are sedentary agriculturalists, others are pastoralists and 
others are industrial wage labourers. 
The census figures for 1966 do not record the actual 
0 
numbers of pastoral nomads although 144,735 individuals were 
classified as 'unsettled'. This represents under 10 per cent 
I 
of the total population of Fars province. Because of the 
nature of movement in the region it is difficult to isolate 
those who move from those who do not, and this 10 per cent 
probably represents a conservative estimate. 
major feature of the region is the complex movement 
of people and animals over widely scattered geographical areas. 
At one extreme there are the long range pastoral nomads who 
take advantage of widely separated summer and winter quarters 
and move as much as 500 kilometres in their twice yearly 
migrations. At the other extreme there are very local move- 
ments of village flocks of sheep and goats to higher ground 
adjacent to the village in the summer months. The broad macro 
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Fig. 3. Average yearly rainfall characteristics 
for Shiraz. (in millimetres) 
(Dottea line inaicates limits of unirrigated wheat) 
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21 March 1964 to 20 March 1965, and the year 1350 
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Sources: 1) Plan Organisation, 'Salnameh Ama:; re-ye-Kesh-ý-ar 
Tehran 1351. 
2) Ganji M. 'Climate' in: Fisher W. B. (ed) 
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Cambridge, 1968. 
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division of the province into garmsir and sarhad is reproduced 
at the micro-level where movements of people and animals take 
advantage of local ecological variations and the seasonal 
availability of local pastures. 
This movement of different types of pastoralists often 
involves multiple access to . pasture land, and areas that are 
used by village flocks may well be used by different sorts of 
nomads at various other times of the year. 
1 Many of the long 
range pastoral nomads have to pass through areas that are now 
largely devoted to intensive agriculture in the more fertile 
plains and find grazing land along the route. They take advan- 
tage of areas that are grazed by village flocks in the spring 
on their upward migration and of village stubble in the auftA.. 
on their downward migration. Similarly areas that are dry 
farmed in one year may revert to grazing in subsequent years. 
The overall picture is one of considerable complexity and any 
neat division of the region into pastoral and agricultural 
zones ignores this complementarity between agricultural and 
pastoral activities, and is in danger of producing discrete, 
timeless, divisions between nomads and sedentarists. It 
ignores the fact that pastoralism and agriculture are types of 
productive activity rather than the bases for different types 
of society and disguises the actual social relations of pro- 
duction by which surpluses have been traditionally extracted 
1. For a discussion of multiple access to pastures see Barth 
1960. 
21 
from both types of activity to support a predominantl)- urban 
elite. 
1 
At both the local and regional levels the divisions of 
labour between those engaged in animal husbandry and those 
tilling the soil often give the appearance of separated 
interests. At the local leve shepherds may be away from the 
tparent' settlement for several months of the year. Village 
animals may often be entrusted to long range pastoral nomads 
under a variety of circumstances, ranging from close, mutually 
supportive kinship links, to more formal contractual arrange- 
2 
ments. Many of the animals over which the nomads have control 
are not their own. The long range pastoral nomads for their 
part retain agricultural intere sts in summer and/or winter 
quarters where land that they have control over may be culti- 
vated by sedentary agriculturalists in those areas. Similarly 
1. For an important discussion of the relationships between 
'pastoral nomads' and 'sedentarists' see Asad 1978. Asad 
criticises the creation of a separate 'nomadic mode of pro- 
duction' by such people as Anderson(1974). Here a similar argu- 
ment is put forward; i. e. that nomadic activities take place 
within a complex unity of social action which includes seden- 
tary activities. Without entering into the 'mode of production' 
debate it is maintained that a modeof production cannot neces- 
sarily be delineated by the nature of activities themselves but 
rather by the processes which legitimate and facilitate the 
transfer of resources; these are the social relations which 
govern production and which are legitimated by religious, kin- 
ship and state ideologies. 
2. For a discussion of animal ownership and shepherding 
contraCts among the Qashqai see Beck 1980. 
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they establish various sorts of relationships with people in 
the areas through which they move; for access to grazing land, 
the provision of commodities which they themselves do not pro- 
duce, and contracts for the shepherding of village animals. 
This involves a very complex inter-relationship between urban, 
rural and nomadic sectors of the population within a closely 
knit regional economic structure. It is much more than merely 
the construction of 'links' bet-, ýeen supposedly isolated sectors. 
At the regional level this separation of interests is 
more visible because migration routes of the long range pas- 
toral nomads take them through the heavily populated and 
intensively irrigated central plains. This is where loppo- 
sition' between Inomad'and 'peasant' gains its perceptual 
clarity and conflicts over land and between different groups 
I are at their most/intense. It is perhaps under such circum- 
stances that the myths of the warlike pastoral nomad, threat- 
ening the interests of the 'civilized' world are perpetuated 
and the ideas of a separate nomadic society, different from 
the stratified agricultural society begin to take shape. This 
reified separation of nomadic and agrarian societies involves 
the isolation of characteristics that are supposed to be res- 
tricted to each type of society. Nomadic societies are 
supposedly characterised by a tribal structure, a kinship 
idiom to express inter-relationships between groups and an 
essential egalitarianism. 
1. The most prominent migration routes are illustrated in 
fig. 4 P. 58 . 
2 
Agrarian societies are supposedly characterised by sub- 
mission to a hierarchically organised, urban dominated, state 
structure which is essentially inegalitarian. But such a sep- 
aration ignores the fact that both nomadic and agrarian popu- 
lations share many common cultural features, from common 
languages to common religion, "and are engaged in the same 
overarching political framework which incorporates all groups 
within a regional polity. 
One way of dealing with the separation between nomadic 
and sedentary life styles has been to concentrate on the 
different techniques involved in animal husbandry and seden- 
tary agriculture and to suggest that it is on the basis of 
human adaptation to the environmental demands of both animals 
and plants that organisational forms are predicated. As 
such it is not movement or settlement that is of crucial 
importance but rather the differences in what Barth has termed 
the 'systems of production' of pastoral and agricultural 
regimes. 
2 He suggests that there are special features about 
both agricultural and pastoral regimes reflected in the differ- 
ent management inputs and investment decisions that are 
required for either plants or animals. He goes on to state 
that agriculture is labour intensive while pastoralism is - 
capital intensive and that: 
1. Studies which have taken such an approach include Vander- 
vert 1972, Rubel 1969, Spooner 1971, Afshar Naderi 1971. 
2. Barth 1973, p. 12. 
24 
"the time required to extract value from land is 
great in agriculture, so control of land is 
essential, while the time required by grazing is 
minimal, so control may well be precarious and 
ad hoc. " 
(ibi -, p. 13) 
It may well be the case that pastoral and agricultural 
regimes require different sorýs of management, investment 
and labour inputs. But surely this is more a product of the 
specific forms of production than the requirements of either 
plants or animals; under certain circumstances agriculture 
too may be capital intensive and pastoralism may be labour 
intensive. People make decisions in response to particular 
perceptions of what they consider optimal, and these change 
over time. In additioný, different sorts of inputs required by 
both 'productive regimes' may very often be provided by a 
single productive-unit - the extended family group-. 
Rather than focus analysis on their presumed separation 
it is perhaps more useful to concentrate on those relations 
of domination under which both productive systems are subsumed 
and which have been undergoing considerable change as a 
result of the spread of a western economic rationale. The 
different techniques involved in the adaptation of populations 
to the different environmental demands of plants and animals 
may be reflected in different management and investment 
decisions, as Barth has sugge&ted, but this does not 
take us very far in an analysis of the political conditions 
under which such decisions might be made nor in an under- 
standing of the distribution of power within local and 
regional contexts. 
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Thus rather than make movement or settlement the object 
of attention and set up what may be an urr lirranted dichotomy 
between peasant and nomad, it is necessary to look at the 
ways in which resources can be transferred between pastoral 
and agricultural activities, through what Black has termed 
vagro-pastoral combines, 
' 
and also at the ways in which 
they are systematically transferred out of the hands of both 
into those of an urban elite. The shifts in emphasis, from 
7 
pastoral to agricultural interests at both local and regional k 
levels, which Barth sees in terms of some timeless oscillation 
'long term pulsations ... between pastoral and agricultural 
roles 12 and which have involved significant sedentarisation 
in recent decades represent changing relations of production 
-0 
and changing patterns of control. 
The style of analysis which presupposes an undifferentiated 
population making investment decisions in response to unchanging 
and essentially ahistorical circumstances produces an ideal 
typology and cannot countenance structural change. It ignores 
the particular circumstances under which groups gain their 
identities and their associations with particular activities. 
Asad has pointed out that: 
"The important economic point about nomads, surely 
is not that they move about in order to care for 
their animals, or that animal husbandry is subject 
to a range of biological. and environmental constraints, 
but that their political and economic organisation 
may be based on production for subsistence. " 
(Asad 1978, p-58) 
1. Black 1972. 
2. Barth 1973, p. 14. 
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It also ignores the internal differentiations within 
populations whereby wealth is accumulated in the hands of 
some. Irregardless of whether wealth is accumulated from 
pastoralism or from agriculture those with power are parts of 
a single urban-based elite. Barth seems eventually to recog- 
nize this when, after the construction of a relatively elab- 
orate analysis of the nature of nomad-sedentary relations and 
of what amounts W an ideal typology, he states, at the very 
end of his article: 
"it should be noted that the modernization of a 
regional economy through full monetization of the 
factors of production, and the introduction of new 
investment alternatives, so changes the picture as 
to completely eliminate the patterns that have 
dominated the Middle East till now, and that have 
been the focus of this exploratory analysis. "(emphasis added) 
(Barth, ibid., pp-20-21) 
This raises questions about the whole nature of this sort 
of analysis which does not take sufficient account of the 
political and economic history of the region and which presumes 
a complete break with the past. The reality is much more com- 
plex. While the processes of modernization have involved 
changes in the ways in which both pastoral and agricultural 
activities have been perceived, it is analytically unacceptable 
to suggest that one type of organization has been completely 
eliminated through the substitution of another. It is on 
such bases that the divisions between nomadic and sedentary 
societies, between 'non-capitalist' and 'capitalist' social 
formations', and between tribe and state, are erected. It is 
not only the nature of the 'transition' from one to the other 
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which it is important to investigate, but also the naming 
process which identifies one set of cultural characteristics 
as being 'before' and another as being 'after'. 
It is not merely the fact that some of the more physically 
isolated and environmentally poor parts of the region are 
incapable of supporting little but production for subsistence, 
but also that both peasants and nomads are actively impover- 
ished under certain conditions of production. One of the 
results of the recent land reform programme for example, has 
been effectively to push villagers onto lands, which exclude 
them from participation in some agricultural enterprises 
except as wage labourers. 
As control has been increa§ngly centralized under a 
strong national government, supporting the expansion of com- 
f mercial agricultural production, nomadism as a type of produc- 
tive activity has been pushed into the more physically isolated 
parts of the region. Former pasture lands have been taken over 
for the cultivation of crops as populations and settlements 
have expanded, and as private control over land has increasing- 
ly restricted access. Much land in the central areas that 
once could only be dry farmed or used as pasture land, has now 
been irrigated through the installation of motor pumps tapping 
the groundwater. Pasture land particularly in and around the 
central plains has been progressively restricted to more long 
range pastoral nomads as pressure on land has intensified. 
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Increased use of the more marginal pastures in both the 
sarhad and the garmsir has led to considerable over-grazing 1- 
The long range nomads are increasingly confined to what Barth 
refers to as the 'Il rahl or migration route which, rather 
than being a stretch of territory through which they move at 
particular times of the year.. ' and whose boundaries were 
defined, is now confined to major roads or very narrow bands 
of countryside through which they are allowed to move, usually 
in haste. 2 It is as if the nomads were being squeezed out of 
the central areas and into the more remote areas: as if recent 
developments were in fact creating longer-range pastoral 
nomadism. Their 'traditional' rights to use of land in the 
central areas are being contested by landowners with changing 
ý11 
attitudes to ownership and control, backed by a government 
which has associated nomadism with dissidence. During the 
1970s, prior to the revolution in 1979, large areas were taken 
by the Ministry of the Environment to be devoted to national 
parks and conservation areas, and the government nationalis- 
ation of pasture land began to be enforced. 
3 
1. In a study of the Farsi Madan section of the Qashqai 
carried out under the auspices of the Plan organisation in 
1973-4 it was calculated that approximately 20% of traditional 
grazing ground had been lost to the inroads of urban and 
village agriculturalists (see Ajami et. al 1974). 
2. Trucks were increasingly used in the early 1970s to trans- 
port animals from garmsir to s'arhad. 
3. The nationalisation of pasture lands was one of the original 
provisions of the 'White Revolution of the Shah and the People' 
initiated in 1963. Beck in her recent article suggested that 
prior to 1979 there was an increasing restriction on use of 
land which involved payment for pastures which had traditionally 
been used by nomads and increased corruption as bribes for use 
became more common (ibid., p-342). 
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Population and Administration 
According to the 1966 census Fars province was inhabited 
by slightly more than 1.5 million people. 60.2 per cent of 
the population was classified as rural (living in places of 
less than 5,000 inhabitants) - Of the urban population of 
6301646,35.7 pe'r cent (225,1S9) lived in twenty settlements 
of between 5 and 25,000; 17.8 per cent (112,265) lived in 
three places of between 25,000 and 100,000. The remaining 
46-S per cent (293,222) lived in the city of Shiraz. Accord- 
ing to the two censuses of 1956 and 1966 there was an increase 
in population of 58 per cent. Estimates of rural/urban ratios 
suggest that, although populationjin the countryside has not 
significantly declined the proportion is 50/50 rather than 
60/40 as it was in the 1966 census. In 1974 it was estimated 
that the population of Shiraz had grown to approximately 
400,000. 
Despite the rapid growth of Tehran and the Central pro- 
vince associated with the rapid changes in the late fifties 
and sixties Fars province ranked fourth in terms of modern- 
ization in 1966.2 Recent years have witnessed a rapid increase 
in the growth of all urban centres. But figures seem to indi- 
cate thatthe majority of migrants to the larger cities have 
not come from predominantly rural areas, but rather from other 
3 
urban centres. Of the 27% of the population of Shiraz that 
1. All census material is taken from: National Iranian Census 
1956 and 1966, National Statistical Centre, Tehran. 
2. See Paydarfar 1974, p-6. 
3. See Hemmasi 1974. For information on demographic trends in 
Iran as a whole see Behnam 1968, Clarke B. D. 1972 and Firoozi 
F. , 1968. 
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was classified as migrant in 1966 almost three-quarters were 
from other urban areas, and half of these were from urban 
areas outside the province. 
Traditional forms of migration, as practised by pastoral 
nomads within the province, who occupy an important minority 
position in the provincial po'pulation, cannot be dealt with by 
formal census techniques. Thus no definite figures are record- 
ed in either Iranian census. Estimates suggest that perhaps 
10% of this provincial population is predominantly nomadic. 
Paydarfar estimates that there are "more than 200,000 primarily 
nomadic tribesmen living in the tribal territory"-' 
But the division of society into tribal, rural and urban is 
problematic 
Significant sectoral. interests and movements-of people 
transcend the administrative boundaries erected by the state. 
Demographic data recorded in the 1956 and1966 censuses tended 
to reinforce a static picture of provincial activities, by 
failing to record movement within and between local and pro- 
vincial administrative boundaries. The administrative divis- 
ions prior to the revolution in 1979 emerged during Reza Shah's 
regime in attempts to rationalise national administration. 
Fars province (ostan) broadly corresponded to that area, 
traditionally administered from Shiraz and known in the 19th 
century as mamlekat-e-Fdrs. Regional administration was under 
the control of the ostdndar (governor-general). The ostandar 
was directly appointed by the Shah. Under strong central 
1. Paydarfar, op-cit., p-6. 
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government there was a tendency to rotate the persons holding 
this office in order that they might not build up local 
support which might challenge the centre. During the 19th 
century it was usual for the Shah to appoint a close relative 
to the position. 
1 
It is howev 
N 
er misleading to use the present administrative 
boundary of the province to identify the area. It was not 
called ostan during the 19th cen tury and the context of a uni- 
fied nation state in which the term is embedded does not pro- 
vide the most informative framework with which to deal with 
an historical development of administration. 
2 Fasali talks 
of layalat' in reference to the government of the area. Haim 
3 translates this as 'state', as in United States of America. 
The ayalat is described in terms of the person 
appointed to 'state' government. Thus Fas5li speaks of the 
ayalat of Haji Ebrahim Khan who was appointed to rule Fars in 
4 1791, under the soltanat of Khaghan Fath Ali Shah Qaja-r - 
Haim translates khaghan as a Turkish word, 
referring to 'Emperor of China or of Chinese Turkestan. ' 
5 
1. For a detailed account of provincial government in the 
19th century see FasdIi 1895, the first part of which now 
exists in translation as Busse 1972. 
2. de Groot (1977) for example in her study of 19th century 
Kirman suggests that it is misleading to regard the various 
parts of Iran as being integr4ted into a modern nation state 
at this time., and that a more useful form of analysis should 
take a regional perspective with variable relationships with 
the national polity. 
3. Haim., 1975, p. 64. 
4. Fasali, op-cit., vol-i, p. 245. 
S. Haim, op-cit., p-255. 
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A term no longer used, it can perhaps be assumed 
that it referred to a central Asian political hierarchy 
representing an administrative structure of the steppes. 
Subsequently the Qajar rulers are referred to as soltan (cf. 
Soltan Mohamed Sha Qajar, Fasa'i 1895, vol-i, p-290). ' 
Throughout the nineteenth c entury, terms, which reflect the 
mixture of Turkish, Arabic and Persian origins, are employed 
involving different attitudes to the nature of government, and e 
illustrating the very diverse influences that the populations 
of the Iranian plateau have 'been subjected to. 
Of 18 who held the aydlat-e-Fars between 1795 and 1881, 
12 were either the sons or brothers of the soltan (cf. Busse, 
k 
1972, p-422). It was never given to a local person. Parallel 
to this appointment was that of the vazir who appears to have 
been appointed by the grand vazir (loosely translated as prime 
minister) and was primarily entrusted with day-to-day adminis- 
tration and the collection of taxes. 
2 Between 1795 and 1881 
1. The terms aydlat, velayat and mamlekat reflect Ottoman 
administrative divisions and the close associations between 
Iran and the Moslem world further west. 
2. The office of vazir no longer exists but the duality 
between the office of ostAndar (governor general) and the 
provincial administrative bureaucracy remained until the 
revolution of 1979. Each ministry maintained a provincial 
office which was answerable only to Tehran and knew little of 
what the other offices were dding even in related fields. 
Each was under the individual leadership of an appointee of 
the shah.. 
there were 24 holders of this office, according to Fasa'i, 
most of whom were not natives of the area but proteges of 
the grand vazir or of the princes who governed the mamlekat- 
e-Fars and who usually brought numbers of retainers with 
them, including their own armies. In Fars the major except- 
ions to this are Mohamad Ali Moshir-ul-Molk and his son 
Abu'l Hasan Moshir*ul'Molk who together served nine terEs in 
this office between 1828 and 1876 (ibid., p-423). 
Local administrationýseems to have been based on the 
urban centres where the kalantar (chief civil administrator) 
was in charge of the various districts (nahieh or mahallah) 
of the city, each with their own iKadkhoda or 'ward leader'. 
N 
In the countryside the various districts (bolukdt) were under 
the control of a zabet, an Arabic term, which Haim translates 
as bailiff, executive officer. 
1. During the early QajAr period the Moshir ul-Molk's family 
was able to build up considerable local power, (allied to the 
royal family of the governor through marriage) which was trans- 
ferred from father to son. This inherent tendency to insti- 
tutionalise personal control with office was apparently regar- 
ded as normal by Fasali who stated: 
I'Mirsa Mohamad 'Ali Moshir ul-Molk died at the age of 
more than eighty years (1846). Hosein Khan Sahab 
Ekhteyar (then governor) transferred the title Moshir 
ul-Molk and the vizierate of Fars to Mirza Mohamad 
'Ali's son Mirza Abull Hasan Khan, in accordance with 
the laws of inheritance and merit; he was to adminis-' 
trate this office for no less than thirty years. " 
(Busse 1972, p-276) 
2. Lambton translates the term kalantar as "overseer of the 
wards of a city (obs. ); overseer of the trade guilds (especially 
in Isfahan; Safavid to Qajdr periods); head of a tribal sub- 
group (larger than that under a kadkhoda)" (Lambton 1953, p. 431). 
It is in this latter context that it has been used by anthro- 
poloýists in recent years. For more information on the office 
of K lantar see Lambton 1963. Kadkhoda is translated as 
"village headman; head of a clan or tribal sub-group; head of a 
craft guild; (obs. ) head of a mahalleh or ward of a town"(ibid., 
p. 430) - 140-145 3. Cf. Haim 1972, p-466. Also see below, pp. 
Fasali seems to indicate that the boluk was controlled 
from a ghesbeh or central village and that the boluk con- 
tained a number of gharieh. (villages) (Fasali 1895, ii, 214) - 
There also seems to have been a separate administrative 
structure created for the various ilat. The ilat, governed 
by khans or chiefs, perhaps reflected the special position of 
these groups which were predominantly nomadic and provided 
military supporttD the provincial and national rulers. It is 
perhaps possible to talk of an ecological niche occupied by a 
previously military elite which reflected the Turkish organi- 
sational hierarchies established in central Asia and reimposed 
2 through the Turkish mig-. ýation in to Fars. 
The distribution of offices and the nature of the hier- 
archy of control has been subject to complex changes over 
f 
time in response to changing conditions and perceptions of 
the nature of government, reflecting the complex movement of 
different peoples over the long history of Iran. Without a 
1. Ilat (the plural of il) is usually translated as 'tribes'. 
2. See below, ChaRtEr 3 It would appear that the title 
'khan' was bestowe y the Qajdr monarchs on provincial 
leaders. Fasd1i comments that Haji Ebrahim was given the 
title of khan by Agha Mohamad Shah in 1791. Haji Ebrahim - 
was an urban merchant who had been lord mayor of Shiraz until 
the fall of the Zands. He was head of the Qavam family. It 
is more usual to restrict the term khan to tribal leader but 
it cannot be so easily restrictedinvolving, especially in 
the nineteenth century a particular relationship to government 
as interpreted by the Turkish Qajar rulers. 
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detailed historical analysis of the ways in which various 
terms are used and their relationships to these changing 
ideas of government it is difficult to do more than hint at 
the development of the formal administration of the area. 
But the point to be made is that the present administrative 
divisions are a yery recent phenomenon, reflecting a particu- 
lar perception of government. They cannot be considered apart 
from their historical context an_d, as will hopefully become 
apparent, despite changes'ýin the forms of administration, the 
nature of the regulation of relationships between governor and 
governed, still appears to reflect the personal nature of 
delegated authority characteristic of a 'tax farming' system 
and a 'tribal' system which was perhaps reflected in the 
nature of the last Shah's regime. 
1 
Under the regime of the former Shah, the governor-general 
I 
of the province appointed the various far-manddrs (governors) 
for each of the shahrestans of the province. 
2 Authority 
1. Despite the 
, 
disbanding of a separate administrative struc- 
ture for the 'tribes' under Reza Shah and attempts to incor- 
porate them into the emerging nation state, under Mohamad Reza 
Pahlavi (1941-1979) there was a separate Tribal Affairs Dep- 
artment of government and an emerging Tribal Education office. 
Tribal levies were abolished under Reza Shah as a regular arry 
was established but the tribes were treated separately, and 
the Tribal Education office in particular was concerned, not 
just with the provision of mobile schools but with more general 
welfare and administrative affairs. From trying to completely 
destroy the tribes, the Pahlayi regime eventually adopted a 
policy which attempted to isolate them as cultural minorities, 
by reifying their cultural distinctiveness. 
2. Shahrestan is here translated as 
meaning that administrative area around a town. There are 11 
shahrestans in the province of Fars viz: Shirdz, ýbadeh, 
Ldr, Kazerun, Mamasani, Jahrom, Fasa, Darab, FiruzAbad, Neiriz, 
Estahbanat. 
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over these various urban centres appears to have fluctuated 
over time, reflecting the strength or weakness of the provincial 
government and, in the 19th century in particular., the powers 
of the government in Tehran. Being in the gift of the gover- 
nor of Fars these offices were often given to relations of 
this person. 
1 At other times those who held de facto control 
were confirmed in their offices so that during most of the 
19th century the governships of such a centre as Firuzabad, 
which came to be known as the Qashqai winter capital, was in 
the hands of the Qashqai Il Khans and Darab and Fasa, in those 
of the Qavam family. 
2 
i 
With the rise of the nationalist government of the 
t 
Pahlavis supporters of that regime were rewarded with provin- 
cial office. Attempts appear to have been made to profession- 
alise each provincial administration through the creation of 
a 'neutral' civil service but the appointees to office in 
Fars appear to have been those personally loyal to the Shah 
who gained their position through association with him. 
The shahrestans are divided into bakshs .3 The Shirdz 
shahrestdn for example has five such bakhshs .4 The bakhsh 
1. Farman Farmd, governor of Fars in the 1820s and son of 
Fath 'Ali Shah, managed, for example, to place his sons as 
governors of Darab, Mamasani and Kuh Giluyeh and his nephew as 
governor of Fasa and many other relatives in provincial admin- 
istrative posts. 
2. These local governorships were still in the gift of the 
provincial governors and the length of the appointments of 
people to these offices reflected the political fortunes of 
their appointers. 
3. Bakhsh or nahieh, is translated as Idepart- 
ment'. 
4. These are: Ardakan, Shiraz, Mamdasht, Kherameh and Sarvestan. 
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1. 
I 
is under the control of the bakhsh dar, who is appointed by 
Bill' they have traditionally been uneducated and corrupt and 
the farmdndar in consultation with the ostandar. According to 
1 
the office has usually been filled by incompetents and locally 
I 
influential landowners. Re. cent attempts have been made to 
fill the office with specially trained professionals but for 
a variety o reasons entrenched local interest groups have 
successfully resisted this (see below, p. 421 
The duties of the bakhshddr were mainly associated with 
the execution of development programmes and civic functions 
in the areas under their jurisdiction. The various ministries 
have usually circumvent6d the bakhshdar in their dealings 
, ý7 
with the local inhabitants. 
The bakhsh is further sub-divided into dehestans 
2 
The dehestan consists of a set of villages irrigated by the 
same system or occupying a physically distinct area. There 
are for example eight dehestans in the bakhsh of Marvdasht, 
of which Ramjerd is one (together with Morghab, Kamin, Ponirdn, 
Khafrak-e-Olia, Abarej, Humeye-Marvdasht). The dehestdn is 
not under the administration of a single officer but the 
villagers supposedly select representatives to a dehestan 
council which channels development programmes and acts as a 
1. Cf. Bill, J. A., The Politics of Iran, Columbus, Ohio, 1972. 
2. Dehestan- is translated as 'district' 
and appears to be roughly equivalent to the Qajar administra- 
tive division of boluk or 'valley'. 
38 
consultative assembly. In Ramjerd however the council rarely 
met and during the time of fieldwork the council did not meet 
at all and was never mentioned as being of any importance. 
The interests of the national government were formally 
channelled into individual villages through the village head- 
I 
man (kadkhoda) who together with a council of elders (or 
rish sefidan , lit.: 'white beards') dealt with the day-tor"'day 
activities of the village, collection of taxes, conscription 
to the army, minor disputes, relationships with the gendarmery 
and administration of development programmes. Since the land 
reform programme of the 1960s this office has been replaced by 
a more formal anjuman with a leader and officials formally 
elected by landowning villagers 
Linguistic diversity 
A variety of languages are spoken in the region. Persian 
as a lingua franca is now spoken everywhere. The urban centres 
and the older settled villages in the central areas are pre- 
dominantly Persian speakers. But towards the Gulf, at lower 
altitudes, many people speak a variety of Arabic. The so- 
called 'Arab' tribes in the east of the province, around 
jahrom Lar and Lake Neiriz also speak a variety of Arabic. 
In the higher regions of the Kuh-Giluyeh area there are Luri 
speakers and throughout the region there are Turkish speakers, 
who speak a variety of Azerbaijani Turkish. They have been 
traditionally associated with the nomadic populations of the 
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province and some are presumably the descendents of those 
Turks who came into Fars in the 13-15th centuries A. D. It 
would be unrealistic to identify any linguistic group with 
any exclusive occupational division as all four are to be 
found throughout the region. The Qashqai tribe, one of the 
most important tribal groups in Fars, for example, have been 
described as being Turkish but this disguises the Luri, Persian 
and Arabic elements within this. 1tribel. Similarly the 
Kha mseh tribe, another important tribal grouping, have been 
classified as Arab speakers but the important Turkish speaking 
Ainallu and Baharlu were from the foundation of this 'tribal 
confederacy', integral parts. Soýwere the Persian speaking 
Basseri. 2 The construction of 
-ethnic 
categories on the basis 
of linguistic criteria is extremely problematic and it is 
necessary to examine in detail the circumstances under which 
the various languages entered the region. This implies an 
understanding of the nature of political developments over the 
course of Iranian history, from the early invasions of Persian 
speakers, to the Arab conquest and the Turkish invasions of 
the area. 
1. The Qashqai have been the subject of a number of Iranian 
and foreign studies. The Persian studies by Peyman 1968 and 
Bahmanbegi 1945 are relatively general although the former'does 
contain a large amount of statistical material. A major part 
of the latter is reproduced in Monteil 19S9. 
For anthropological studies of some of the groups which 
constitute the Qashqai see: Beck 1977 (Darwshuri), Salzer 1974 
(Kashkuli, Kuchek), 'Ajami, Sadeghian and Marsden 1974 (Firsi 
Madan). For a general account of the Qashqai see Marsden 1974. 
The history of the Qashqai is dealt with in detail in Oberling 
1974. 
2. For a seminal account of the Basseri see Barth 1964. No 
anthropological studies of other groups within the Khamseh 
appear to have been made. 
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"I 
Re lig ion 
One of the major unifying features of the region is 
I 
religion and with the revolution in 1979 the religious 
hierarchy has emerged as the major formative political group 
in the country as a whole. Most inhabitants of the region 
are Shila Muslims and the organisation of religious life has 
I 
had very important effects on the nature of social organisation 
in the region. Because of the nature of Islam it is very 
difficult to separate religion from secular activities. Fun- 
damental features of law and political authority areall imbued 
with religious connotations. This is not the place to enter 
into a discussion of the, importance of Islam, especially in 
providing legitimation for secular authority, and also chan- 
nelling the expression of: political hierarchy; the relation- 
ships between subjects and rulers. Such a discussion is 
extremely complex and problematic. According to Scarcia it 
is the clergy which has provided the"still fresh national 
voice of Persian Islam"(quoted in AlgCLr, 1969, p-21). Accord- 
ing to recent observers and to advocates of the late Shah's 
policies on the other hand the clergy have been, together with 
the tribal aristocracy, one of the major reasons for the lack 
of progress in Iran's modernisation. Many studies of Iranian 
society in the"50s and .9 60s teiýded to treat the clergy as resi- 
dual, ignoring the overriding importance of Islamic traditions 
in the activities of much of the population. 
1. For a discussion of the importance of Islam in Iranian dev- 
elopment see in particular Algar 1969, Keddie 1972, Lambton 
19S4,1956, Spooner 1971, Binder 196S. 
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The growth of the state and of secular nationalism 
implied a separation between state and clergy. Bill mentions 
the split as having been widened and formalised during the 
Safavid era (1500-1732) in which Shila Islam became much more 
widespread. The opposition b6tween the sadr and the mujtahidin 
appears to have 'continued down to the present with the state 
appointed sadr gaining increased importance. The title Sadr 
7 
was replaced by the office of Imam-e Jume'eh but the content 
of the office appears to have remained the same, presumably 
until the revolution against the Shah. It is tempting to 
% speak of Shi'a Islam as being adopted as a state religion but 
this is to oversimplify and distort. The precepts of Shila 
Islam became entrenched in the legitimation of authority in 
formal chains of command (selseleh) and in the legal system 
and were to influence considerably developments under the 
QdjArs and the Pahlavis. The'spiritual chains of command 
which linked disciples to religious masters and ultimately to 
the imams and god were mirrored in the secular chains of 
command(selseleh) which joined the raliyat to the arb5b and 
-2 ultimately the soltan. 
1. According to Bill the sadr was the leading member of the 
group which included the"sayyid, ulama, mudarris, shaikh-ul- 
Islam, pish-namaz, qadi, mutavalli hafiz" (ibid., p-21). He 
uses Minorsky's Tadhkirat al-Muluk in his account of Safa. id 
religious offices (cf. Minorsky 1943). 
2. The raliyat (or subject) was bound to the arbab (or lord) 
in the same way that the latter received authority and power 
from the soltan or shah. 
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The split became apparent within the religious community 
when the Safavids (1500-1732) adopted Shilism as a national 
religion: 
"During the Safavi period, lines of tension were 
drawn between two groups in the religious system who 
were represented by the sady and the mullabashi 
(chief muitahid) .... (The I sadr) was the chief religious figure bound within the administration and he wielded 
important power in the area of secular law and endow- 
ments. The mujtahids on the other hand, were theore- 
tically the most important group in Shili society in 
the sense that they had the right to interpret the 
sharilat. They wereconsidered by all believers to 
De the closest to the hidden Im9m. " 
(Bill, 1972, p. 21) 
Ithnalashari Shilism as practised in Iran today by the 
vast majority of its population, has as its most dominant 
theme the concept of the Imamate: 
"an institution of a succession of charismatic figures 
who dispense true guidance in comprehending the eso- 
teric sense of prophetic revelation. " 
(Algar, 1969, p-S) 
There were twelve such charismatic figures, the first of 
which was 'Ali, the son-in-law of the prophet, and the last 
disappeared. as a young boy in AD-874. The imams were human 
intermediaries between man and god, and when the twelfth imam 
disappeared the chain of intermediaries was halted until such 
time as he shall return to earth as the Mahdi, to issue in-the 
dawn of a new era. The disappearance of the imam marked the 
beginning of a passivist position in which, although legiti- 
macy was denied to secular authority, the existing regime was 
seen as a necessary evil to be endured until such time as the 
Mahdi would return and present a legitimate alternative. The 
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adoption of Shilism as the religion of the Safavids was a 
turning point and it is only then that one sees the emergence 
of a body of administrative clerics. But the necessary and 
inescapable illegitimacy of the secular state was a constant 
belief, even though temporarily obscured in Safavid times and 
again in Pahlavi times. Sýi I ism gave birth to: 
"something like an official clergy, exclusively con- 
cerned with legality and jurisprudence, to such a 
point that original Shilism in its essence gnostic 
and theosophic, has, so to speak, to hide itself. " 
'(Corbin, 1960, p. 69 - in Algar 1969, p. S' 
In that the clerics fulfilled a practical function for the 
community they commanded significant authority. In that they 
were the beneficiaries of charitable endowments they joined 
the ranks of the large landed proprietors. 
In the absence of the hidden Imam the religious body of 
clerics, 'lead by the mujtahidin, and known as the lulama, 
became the intermediaries between man and god. The mujtahidin 
were chosen from among the religious community through rigid 
selection criteria, and these provided: 
fta living source of reference and leadership for the 
Shili community .... The mujtahidin came to person- ify the leadership of the community and this was one 
of their chief sources of political and social 
influence in Qajar Iran. " 
(Algar, 1969, p-6) 
The mujtahidin provided guidance in all affairs, and it was 
obligatory to follow the directions of an individual rujtahid. 
The mujtahidin were entrusted with such things as the 
estates of minors, orphans, the certification of legal deeds 
and with the collection and distribution of alms. They were 
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also administers of religious endowments (ouqaf). But perhaps 
more importantly they were involved in the administration of 
justice in that they were the interpreters of the large body 
of religious law or sharl. Common law ('urf) during much of 
the Qajar period was not codified and appears to have been 
administered rather arbitrarily. The two quite frequently 
overlapped and the sharl court quite often became a court of 
appeal. The religious courts were radically divested of much 
of their authority in the Pahlavi era, as the state arrogated 
that authority to itself. 
During the nineteenth century there was a growing tradi- 
I 
tion of inherited clerical prominence which resulted in a 
great increase in the wealth of the 
_Iulama, 
acquired over 
generations. As the sharl courts gained in importance and 
institutionalization within the secular administrative system 
a more formal clerical hierarchy appears to have emerged. 
Theoretically there was a lack of hierarchical stratification 
within the religious community but the increase in inherited 
prominence led at times to themergence of powerful clerical 
leaders who could command their own private armies-' 
An Imam-e Jumleh was appointed to lead the Friday prayers 
in the main mosque of the urban community. And a Shaykh_ol- 
Islam was appointed to head the Sharl court. Below these two 
were a host of mullahs or 5khunds, lesser members of the 
1. For a discussion of the power of the 'ulamd in 19th 
century Iran see Algar op. cit. 
45 
religious classes who, in a period when education of any formal 
nature was religious education, held great influence over the 
masses. In more general terms the title mulldh or akhund was 
applied to anyone who was learned or even literate. The 
mullahs were involved in numerous administrative and teaching 
functions at the local level. In addition there was a large 
number of sayyids, descendents of the prophet, who thereby 
gained a certain amount of legitimacy for the local authority 
they often held. 
The religious learning 'ladder' was a major way for an 
I 
ordinary individual to gain legitimate authority, because of 
the former's monopoly of the existing educational insitutions. 
Parallel to this was the elaborate pilgrimage system to impor- 
tant Shili shrines, the most important being those at Mecca 
and Karbala, and the tomb of the eighth imam at Mashhad. 
Persons having visited these places were traditionally accorded 
respect which was always important in legitimizing daims to 
authority and status, translated in terms of titles such as 
Hdji (one who had made the haj), Kerbalali (one who had 
visited the sacred shrines in Kerbala), and Mashdi (one who 
had visited the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashad). 
The Pahlavi regime attempted to wipe out the power of 
the mujtahidin as leaders of the community, but the religious 
leaders retained considerable influence. This is illustrated 
by Bill when he quotes from an interview with one religious 
leader in 1967: 
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"The people accept this struggle as inevitable - as dunya versus din (the secular versus the relig- ious). What becomes unacceptable to them is when 
one side tries to destroy the other side .... In Land Reform for example, the mujtahidin were not 
even consulted nor was the Islamic method ever con- 
sidered. Thus the opposition of mujtahidin was not to the idea of Land Reform, but rather to the manner in which it was implemented. 
(Bill, 1972, p-24) 
The mosque (masji and the local shrine (imamzadeh) pro- 
7 vide important foci for religious activity throughout the 
region. They are visited as often as possible and at major 
religious festivals. Local shrines attract pilgrims from 
widely scattered areas. Some, such as the shrine to Shah 
Cherogh, in Shiraz, command more importance in the religious 
'I table of merit, than others and are nationally important. 
The building of mosques and bath-houses (hammd ) are popular 
means of gaining such merit and appear high on the 'develop- 
mental shopping list'. Others, such as the Imamzadeh Ayub in 
I 
the Ayub valley, while attracting significant numbers, remain 
only locally important. 
Prestige and status are derived both from religious prac- 
tice and the exercise of secular power, but not in isolation. 
Religious observances, pious acts and charitable works are 
however more easily undertaken by those with more resources 
than others and provide one ot the legitimating stamps for 
the control of some by others. Until the formal separation 
of secular office from religious office with the emergence of 
a nationalistic state administration religious merit and 
official office were very closely interwoven. Pilgrimages 
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could be translated into honorific titles as could religious 
learning or descent from the prophet. The terms haji, mashdi, 
kerbalai are all used to denote religious standing achieved 
through pilgrimage. The terms mullah and sheikh denote reli- 
gious learning and are also used as honorific titles by some 
in positions of 'authority. The seyyid because of his claimed 
descent from the prophet also possessed religious merit. 
In the major urban centresUewish, Armenian, Zoroastrian 
and Bahali religious minorities are to be found. In the south 
of Fars there are also significant numbers of Sunni Moslems. 
Despite the formal separation of religion from adminis- 
tration and secular power, the two remain very closely inter- 
related and the most recent events in Iran testify to the 
remaining importance of Islam as a mobilizing force. 
/ 
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CHAPTER III 
TRIBAL ORGANISATION IN FARS: AN OVERVIEW 
The Marvdasht plain lies on the edge of the summer quarters 
of a number of nomadic pastoral groups. The river Kor forms a 
major divide between the inteýsively cultivated areas of the 
plain and the largely dry-farmed pasture lands to the north 
and west. The old bridges at Jashnian and Pol-e-No were major 
channels for the twice yearly migrations of these nomads, and 
for contacts along the summer routes to the north. The juxta- 
position of nomadic and sedentary populations provides one of 
the distinctive features of the area and, at times when centra- 
lised sedentary authority was minimal, much of the plain was 
used as both summer and winter quarters by pastoral nomads. 
As pointed out in Chapter II the division of the provincial 
population into those who are nomadic and those who are settled 
agriculturalists is problemaiic. Everywhere animal husbandry 
and agriculture are combined. This is also the case in the 
Marvdasht plain. But this division has also given rise to the 
parallel division of the population into those who are suppos- 
edly tribally organised, using a kinship idiom of patrilineal 
descent to express political relationships between groups and 
maintaining an essentially egalitarian ethos, and those who are 
subordinated to a complex hierarchy which is exercised by a 
centralised state operating from the urban centre. 
Given the doubts expressed about the separation of these 
two forms of organisation, it is necessary to investigate both 
that form of activity which is normally acknowledged as tribal 
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I 
I 
as well as that which is not. This involves, not only an anal- 
ysis of the ways in which tribes 
by the indigenous population, as 
interpreting events in this part 
to root present divisions of the 
development of the region. This 
VI. The purpose of such an exer 
have been characterised both 
well as by foreign scholars 
of Iran, but also an attempt 
population in the historical 
is taken up in Chapters V and 
cise is to attempt to provide 
e a unifying framework for an analysis of social organisation 
in Fars province, and to relate the development of the Marv- 
dasht plain to the wider environment in which it is contextual- 
ised and which it has helped to shape. It is here suggested 
that the isolation of one particular form of social organisa- 
tion ('tribalism'), disguises the fact that it is only defined 
in terms of the non-tribal cortext in which it is situated, and 
that recourse to tribal affiliation was a form of political 
organisation which was available to many sections of the 
regional population, and arguably still is. Tribal affiliation 
still appears to, be important in Fars province as a means of 
organising people. The separation of tribe from state accord- 
ing to the different forms of production associated with noma- 
dism and sedentarism prevents an understanding of why recourse 
is made to tribal affiliations at particular times. 
The variety of activities*and people found in the Marvdasht 
plain provides an important starting point. The population 
reflects the flux of personnel within the province. It contains 
large numbers of former nomadic pastoralists. It is still 
extensively used as pasture land by pastoral nomads among others. 
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Many of the inhabitants still maintain tribal affiliations, 
i. e. claim membership in some wider tribal framework. Many of 
the villages in the plain, especially the newly settled ones, 
contain significant numbers of Turki speakers who have tradi- 
tionally been associated with. the Qashqai confederacy of tribes. 
A distinction is' frequently made between these Turks, and the 
'native I Persian-spea k ing population; between Turk and Taj ik. 
This distinction has given rise to a classification of villages 
into those predominantly occupied by 'peasants' and those occu- 
pied by 'tribes 1. 
This distinction between 'peasant' and 'tribe' is confusing 
r 
and misleading. Many villages in the Marvdasht plain contain 
mixtures of both Persian and Turkish speakers, as well as Luri 
and Arab speakers, and although the linguistic differences 
between people are readily apparent, the social differences are 
less obvious. It is argued-in Chapter VIII that many of the 
villages represent more the interests of the large landlords 
and do not automatically figure as prom-inently in the indigen- 
ous categories used by village dwellers themselves. In the 
villages which are more recently settled this discontinuity 
between place of residence and organisational affiliation . 
appears more evident. People do not necessarily feel as though 
they belong to a particular 'Community', expressed in terms of 
place, but perhaps to a 'community' expressed in terms of 
kin- 
ship affiliations. 
51 
It would be convenient to utilize a 'modernisation' 
approach which stressed the evolution of one form of organi- 
sation ('tribal') into another form ('peasant') as a movement 
along the path from traditionalism to modernity to explain 
the distinctions that supposedly exist between 'tribes' and 
tpeasants'. Such an explanation has, however, only limited 
validity. It does not account for the selective recourse that 
is often made to 'tribal' identity in the modern world. Nor 
does it realistically see the two forms of organisation as two 
sides of a single coin. Tribal organisation in southern Iran 
has been traditionally associated with norpadism. But it is 
not sufficient to root explanations in appeal to some tradit- 
ional 'tribal' structure represented by groups that are still 
nomadic and then subsequently try and demonstrate how such a 
structure has been mystically transformed into one involving 
peasant agriculture as populations have been settled (or 
Idetribalised'). The distinction between 'tribe' and 'peasant' 
ignores the fundamental unity which underlies the many cultur- 
ally diverse manifestations of social organisation in the 
region. It ignores the fact that one is dealing with social 
relations of production which appear to be similar in both the 
nomadic and sedentary contexts and which point to a unified 
mode of production rather than the existence of isolable and 
separate 'nomadic' and 'sedentary, modes. Some of the more 
recent literature on the transformation of modes of production, 
associated with the expansion of western capitalism, may offer 
more suitable tools with which to analyse this complex inter- 
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relatinnship, but they are also fraught with difficulties. 
In some contexts it might be said that tribal organisation 
has become stronger, not weaker, as a result of modernisation, 
and the loosening of the hold of the landlord on village pro- 
ductio4, especially after land reform. A recent article by a 
Japanese anthropologist working in the village of Kheyrabad in 
the Marvdasht plain sets out to demonstrate just that. Lashdni 
tribesmen were induced to settle in Kheyrdbdd by the landlord 
but, after land reform, when 'its villagers were liberated 
from the malek-raliyat system ... the Lashani did not los(-- 
time in unanimously electing their khan as kadkhudd, thus pre- 
paring for adventurous post-reform days'. 
1 But this analysis 
also seems to be based on a priori category presumptions about 
the nature of tribalism within the Marvdasht-plain. In the 
village of Chamani, within the Ayub valley, where most detailed 
analysis for this thesis was undertaken, a significant propor- 
tion of the population is Turkish speaking, the descendants 
of former pastoral nomads who consider themselves to be members 
of the same family (oulad) (see below, Chapter XI). To all 
1. Ono 1968, p-461. The L ashdnis were, according to Oberling's 
informants, one of the Lek tribes that had formed the Praetorian 
Guard of the Zand rulers. They had subsequently been dispersed 
and absorbed by the Qashqai confederacy. Fasali divides them 
into two groups, one of which was sedentary, living in Khafrak. 
They were notorious for their raiding activities along the 
summer route north to Isfahan. Sykes calls them 'the most 
notorious robbers in Southern Persial(Sykes 1951, Vol-2, p. 482). 
Oberling states: "Though the Lashdnis are still regarded as 
being somewhat intractable, they have apparently lost all co- 
hesiveness and tribal organisation. Most of them have turned 
from agriculture and have a reputation for being wretchedly 
poor" (Oberling 1960, p-112). 
Does Ono's account thus indicate 're-tribalisation" 
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intents and purposes they are no different from many other 
families within the plain. They do possess certain distinct- 
ive features, such as their near monopoly over the production 
of carpets within the village, their use of Turkish as a first. 
language, and their ability to resort to a rich tribal history 
that immediately connects them to a regional tribal framework 
as members of the Gerali sub-section (tireh) of the Baharlu 
tribe (taifeh) which was traditionally part of the Khamseh 
confederacy of tribes. But is this distinctiveness anything 
more than the superimposition of a particular view of reality 
on to the local scene by the visiting anthropologist, and 
various observers over time? 
1 
One way of explaining this distinctiveness between 'tribal' 
groupings and others is to resort to the heuristic device of a 
'structure in reserve', as Salzman does-, 
2 
that is, a whole set 
1. The Turks in Chamani saw their ancestors as 'Qashqai' in a 
situation where 'Qashqail had become synonymous with 'Turk'. 
The Baharlu tribe, however, traditionally has been affiliated 
with the Khamseh (see Oberling op. cit., pp-123-133). Prior to 
the establishment of the Khamseh, they had been 'loosely affil- 
iated to the Qashqai Confederation' (ibid., p-127). Their ori- 
gins are obscure but it would appear thatthey came from N. W. 
Persia where they were members of the powerful Qara Qoyunlu 
Confederation (ibid., p-123). Accounts of their sub-divisions 
vary from the 11 recorded by Bahmanbegi (1953, p. S5) to the 41 
recorded by Field ( 1939, p. 216). Pelly writing in the middle 
of the nineteenth century comments that the Baharlus 'are very 
mischi6vous and a set of robbers, who by killing each other have 
put an end to themselves and their ketkhodas, and all that 
remains of them are some horsemen who wander about plundering 
everyone that comes in their way (Pelly 186S, p-183 - quoted in 
Oberling, op-cit., p-131). 
2. Salzman, P., 1978, "Lineage ideology is, during times of 
stability, a social structure in reserve". (p. 627) 
of cultural categories that can be re-activated when and if 
the time is right. Such an explanation is again predicated in 
an assumption that this framework is something that is a relic 
from the past, preserved in the minds of the population. As 
may be apparent the 'tribal' organisation of such groups as 
the Lashdnis and the Gera'i Turks is part of their cultural 
repertoire for dealing with the situation now, and there is 
no reason to believe that this is somehow aberrant, or contrary 
to the ways in which they normally express themselves and their 
inter-relationships; their 'tribal' distinctiveness is their 
distinctiveness, not something they have rigged up for anthro- 
pological tourists. 
Another explanatory tool is provided by Gellner when he 
speaks of change from a 'traditional segmentary structure' to 
a 'patronage network'. 
' The terms must be interpreted extremely 
cautiously, and appeals to a Weberian rationality will tend to 
take us out of history again and into the realms of idealism 
and a priorism, -in favour of a narrow circumscription of 
reality behind inhibitive boundaries. Gellner maintains how- 
ever, that the concept of segmentary lineage systems has been 
downgraded and misplaced and that it can indeed be of value in 
interpreting societies in the middle east. As Bourdieu has 
1. Gellner states that: 'The theory of the mechanics of a 
segmentary society hinges on the fact that there is no center 
at which the means of cohesion are concentrated and which can 
impose its will on other groups"(1973, p-4), and also that: 
"An anthropologist who receives his informants in a villa in a 
town will note that they talk segmentation but fail to practise 
it; they act patronage (ibid., p-6). 
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maintained, predicating analysis in terms of the isolation of 
tribal 'groupings' involves a danger of allowing the group to 
define the agents and their interests rather than allowing the 
agents themselves, the actual social actors, to define groups 
in terms of their own interests. 1 
An analysis in terms of groups already presumed to exist 
imposes an order on to the ethnographic material that may not 
be warranted. An analysis of the actual behaviour of what 
Bourdieu terms lagentsImay provide very different results and 
demonstrate how and when recourse to kinship inter-relation- 
ships, which are presumed to be of central importance in 
tribal social organisation, are made. As Leach has pointed out: 
"if anthropologists come to look on kinship as a 
parameter which can be studied in isolation they 
will always be led, by a series of logical steps, 
to think of human society as composed of equili- 
brium systems structured according to legal rules. 
Economic activities come to appear of minor signi- 
ficance and the study of social adaptation to 
changing circumstances is made impossible. " 
(1961 , p. 8) 
The methodological holism used to define tribal groups, 
(or, for that matter, village 'communities') migýt be replaced 
by a methodological individualism that traces individual net- 
works into the wider society. 
2 This has the advantage of 
Bourdieu 1977, p-32. 
2. Alavi comments: "A transition in social anthropology to 
methodological individualism, which is the polar opposite of 
structural-functionalist holism has come about with a shift in 
the focus of interest from 'simple', 'primitive' societies to 
'complex' societies such as peasant societies or urban situations" 
And, "In comparison with the approach of structural functional- 
ism, methodological individualism falls into the opposite trap, 
in focusing on individual action outside the matrix of the 
social whole. Instead of defining social roles, attention is 
directed to the actual behaviour of individuals in societv. The 
methodological tradition of Durkheim vields to that of Weber and 5penetT it -tA 1 avi-1-9,7 \3, 
pp-40-41). 
56 
increasing awareness of 'outside' contacts and inter-relation- 
ships, and of breaking down the functionalist perspectiý-e 
which isolates small communities, and regards them as inte- 
grated through relationships of balanced reciprocity. But it 
suffers from the fact that it gives rise to a fragmented 
approach which concentrates on social transactions, rather 
than examining their contextual place within the overall 
social and historical environment. 
Tribal Organisatign 
Godelier has pointed out that the use of the term 'tribe' 
is distinctly problematic, and has* demonstrated that it 
cannot necessarily or conveniently be used to refer to an 
'earlier stage' of human evolution. 
1 Neither -can it be used to 
refer to some unified group which is based on common cultural 
or linguistic criteria. The boundaries by which tribes have 
been isolated are more projections based on particular intel- 
lectual and poli, tical traditions. It is as such that they are 
perceived as discrete units rather than as expressions of par- 
ticular historical processes. As already indicated, the terms 
1. "It seems that the concept of 'tribal society' covers a 
group of external features found in the functioning of many 
'primitive' societies, the 'segmentary' character of elementary 
socioeconomic units, the real or apparent nature of 'kinship 
groups' in these socioeconomic units and the 'multifunctional' 
nature of these kinship relations. The vagueness of these 
criteria is such that we could apply this conceptto a vast 
number of primitive societies inxtaposed in large congeries 
without clear boundaries I (Godelier 1977, p-89). 
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'tribe' and 'nomad' are often used interchangeably and the 
simplistic d; chotomies between 'tribe' and 'state' between the 
'desert' and the 'sown' or between 'periphery' and Icentre' 
are erected on which have hung many of the myths that have 
bedevilled research in this part of Iran and which veil an 
understanding of the history of the various forms of social 
organisation in the area. 
Divisions of regional society into distinct groups which 
are, for example, enshrined on the map which displays the 
territorial distribution of various nomadic pastoral tribes 
(fig. 4), disguise the conditions under which such divisions 
arose and preclude an historical understanding of the reasons 
for their isolation. It is paradoxically very informative 
that the areas which are the foci for political power are 
conveniently left blank as the isolation of the 'tribes' is 
enhanced. 
The increasing control exercised by a central government 
I 
committed to modernisation and claiming a monopoly of legiti- 
mate authority has served to strengthen a dualistic interpre- 
tation of regional society in which tribe and state appear as 
two opposing categories. It is , however, often 
forgotten that 
the most important tribal chiefs have always been members of an 
urban elite. The tribes are often characterised as 'archaic' 
forms of society, no longer particularly relevant to the 
interests of economic advancement. Just as nomadism appears to 
have been pushed out of the central areas, so 'tribalism, might 
be said to have been pushed out of the central political space 
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that ij supposedly traditionally occupied. But, with the 
1979 revolution, the Qashqai chiefs, for example, leaders of 
what was the most powerful tribal confederacy in Fars, have 
quickly come back from exile abroad to reestablish their control 
over the Qashqai, whose mem. be, rs appear to have also expanded 
considerably. Aý report in 19 80 put their numbers at 400,000 
as opposed to Beck, who put their numbers at 250,000 in the 
early 1970s. 
2 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to enter into a 
detailed discussion of the historical evolution of the various 
social organisational forms which have been 'found' in the 
region and identified as' 'tribes'. But it is necessary to 
briefly discuss the features that have been selected, both by 
central government and foreign scholars to characterise these 
as 'tribal societies'. This is important to an understanding 
of the principles which have 'guided the construction of the map 
and official attitudes towards tribal populations, as well as 
in terms of expl-aining the supposedly different social organi- 
sations 'found' in 'non-tribal' areas, such as the Marvdasht 
plain. 
It has already been pointed out that it is indeed difficult 
to support any categorical distinction between nomadism and 
sedentarism. But it is frequently stated that: 
"The basis of tribally organised society in 
Iran was pastoral nomadism". 
(Tapper 1976, p-38) 
1. New Internationalist, No. 91, September 1980. 
2. Beck, L., 1977. 
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Once such a position is adopted one runs into the endless 
dilemma of the exception and the rule and into the problems of 
Itotalising' often very different forms of social organisation. 
Endless discussions about what 'pure' nomadism is are count- 
ered with claims that most tribes have settled components and 
some indeed may be totally sedentary. Similarly, once the 
basis of tribalism is rooted in pastoralism it is but a short 
step to examining the reasons why pastoral nomadism has given 
rise to particular forms of I society. 
Tapper, following Barth, 
has argued that: 
"The basic corporate interests of nomads ... lead to certain forms of social and political organisation". 
(ibid., p-21) 
This can be seen as a variety of environmental determinism and 
one only has to point to sheep ranchers elsewhere in Iran to 
show that very different forms of social and political organi- 
sation are possible. 
1 
It is thus problematic to talk of 'nomadic societies' I 
perceived as being 'encapsulated' (Fazel 1973), or 'enclosed' 
(Rawton, 1974), and to confl. ate nomadism and tribalism. 
Although descriptively useful, the various different sorts of 
movement that have been isolated ('vertical', 'horizontal'-, 
1. Asad makes a similar point: "An undue concern with 
rehearsing the biological and'environmental constraints of 
animal husbandry ... gives the misleading impression that 
technique in the narrow sense is an independent variable, 
always deternining and never determined by social relations in 
the development of social formations" (1978, p-58). 
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Itranshumantl nomudism (Johnson, 1969)), or the 'constricted 
oscillatory nomadism', which Salzer uses to describe the 
Qashqai (Salzer 1974), can hardly be used as explanatory tools. 
An environmental determinism which isolates the 'natural I 
habitat, its remoteness from centres of civilisation and the 
specific characteristics of nomadism is, as Tapper suggests) 
superficial and oversimplified. 
1 
It is supposedly because of mobility and the poverty of 
natural resources in a pastoral habitat that the so-called 
'tribal problem' has been generatedý both are seen to encourage 
raiding. Such an explanation does not address the fact that 
N 
nomads have not always been restricted to these poor habitats, 
nor that it is from so-called nomads that many of the dynasties 
in the region have emerged. It could also be suggested that, 
while ecological conditions within the region have formed the 
basic foundation for different sorts of movement, political 
circumstances have been at least as important in defining 
that movement. 
Because of the close association between tribalism and 
nomadism which has been built up in the literature, it is often 
also implied that sedentarisation of nomads has led to detribal- 
isation. In a comprehensive article which accumulates and 
attempts to synthesise much av-ailable evidence about tribes in 
Iran, Tapper suggests that: 
1. Tapper, op. cit., p-20 
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"Where nomads settled as landless individuals in 
peasant villages, they very quickly lost their 
tribal identity. " 
(1976, p-37) 
He does, however, recognise that the 'detribalisation' process 
is more complex than this. But the legacy of Barth's sedent- 
arisation model, constructed for the Basseri, still retains a 
strong hold. 
An insistence on the inter-relationship between tribalism 
and nomadism gives rise to often very complex discussions of 
1! 
ý the reasons why nomadism has produced particular types of 
society. For example, an 'explanation' for why nomads have 
a military tradition is 
% 
rooted in 'the vulnerability of noma- 
dic dwellings and animal property'. 
' An 'explanation' for the 
emergence of supposedly distinct cooperative groups is rooted 
in the need for 'efficient herding'. An 'explanation' for 
constant sedentarisation of certain nomads is rooted in the 
instability of the pastoral econo mY3 and in the healthier life- 
style of nomads which results in the constant shedding of 
'surplus population'. It is also rooted in the supposed 
'critical' size of4locks needed to support an independent life- 
style. 
4 
All these 'causes' for a separate nomadic society can be 
countered. Village dwellings and land have been equally vul- 
1. Ibid., p-21- 
2. Ibid., p-21- 
3. Ibid., p-25- 
4. Ibid., p-26- 
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nerable to the depredations of others. Efficient herding, like 
efficient farming, may or may not require cooperative labour; 
it depends on the prevailing nature of production. The 
'instability' of the so-called 'pastoral economy' would appear 
to be as much a product of the prevailing political conditions 
which oblige pastoral nomads to move into more marginal areas 
to exploit land in which risks of failure are greatly increased. 
To state that nomadism is healthier ignores the fact that it 
is usually the rich in both nomadic and sedentary contexts who 
enjoy the best health. The 'true nomad' is likely to be a 
poor nomad and because of poverty is likely to suffer dispro- 
portionately from the diseases associated with poverty. Rather 
than revealing the instability of a pastoral economy, the 
necessity of shedding a 'surplus population' surely points 
towards the success of a pastoral life style if it can be said 
to point anywhere. Arguments about 'critical' size of fiocks, 
below which nomads lose their independence, do not necessarily 
imply sedentarisation, but often appear to have increased 
dependence within both nomadic and sedentary environments, 
as persons with minimal resources are obliged to enter into 
'cooperative' relationships with others. 
The point is that all the features which have been iso- 
lated for 'nomadic societies''are just as applicable for 
, sedentary societies'. They are based on the abstraction of 
particular features. As Godelier maintains, this sort of 
analysis produces: 
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"'abstract' concepts made up of descriptive resumes 
of traits abstracted from the whole to which they 
belong. " (1977, p-90) 
The ascription of causal importance to environmental fac- 
tors in the generation of 'tribal nomadic' societies is paral- 
leled by emphases on different principles of incorporation 
which separate nomadic from sedentary societies. Kinship pro- 
vides a basis for explaining the difference. Van Bruinessen's 
m 
generalisation about the Kurdish tribe is applicable to many 
other interpretations that have been made of Iranian tribes: 
"The Kurdish tribe is a socio-political and gener- 
ally also territorial (and therefore economical)unit 
based on descent and kinship, real or putative, with 
a characteristic internal structure. It is naturally 
divided into a number of sub-tribes, each in turn 
again divided into smaller units, etc. " 
(1978, p-40) 
Sahlins has isolated several characteristics of 'tribal' 
societies. Firstly he recognizes that in tribal societies all 
elementary social units are multifamilial groups which collect- 
ively exploit an area of common resources and form a residen- 
tial unit for most, if not all, of the year. These are the 
'primary segments' of what comes to be known as the 'segmentary 
tribe' or the 'segmentary, acephalous tribe'. Secondly, he 
isolated the multifunctional characteristics of kinship rel- 
ations which operate with economic, political and 
ideological 
relations and mean that kinship relations, rather than 
funct- 
ioning as ideological features of the superstructure, cannot 
be separated from the economic infrastructure and the mode of 
production. Thirdly he maintains the 'structural equivalence' 
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of the primary segments, i. e. they are functionally equivalent 
and relatively autonomous 
1 
From these characteristics emerges a generalised model of 
the segmentary tribe used to underpin discussions of tribal 
organisation in which, not only the emergence of the primary 
segments, but also the legitimacy of leadership is 'explained'. 
This, as Godelier suggests, leads to the characterisation of 
any primitive society as tribal and lumps together many differ- 
ent forms of social organL,; ation. . 
The model may be conveniently 
represented as below: 
Fig. 5 Segmentary lineage structure 
A 
I F1 ILaA 
AAAAA 
i. Sahlins , 19 68. 
66 
As Van BrLiinessen maintains, it may be used in at least two 
different ways. Both of which in the final analysis are div- 
orced from actual historical circumstances. Firstly, the model 
may be interpreted as a temporal representation of spAial 
inter-relationships, in the. way in which Bohannan utilizes 
it to justify relationships among the Tiv. The groups at the 
lowest end of the 'tree' represent structurally equivalent seg- 
ments, descended from a common ancestor and occupying distinct 
territories. Secondly, the'model can be used to represent 
levels of organisation within atribal polity. The first inter- 
pretation supports the second. 
1 
But authors such as Barth have noticed the discontinuity 
I 
-I between the 'lower levels' of tribal society and the higher 
levels of leadership. 
2 Salzer in his work on the--Kashkuli 
section of the Qashqai speaks of two classes; the ruling chiefs 
(khans) together with the tri, bal aristocracy, as opposed to the 
broader mass of tribal subjects (raliyd). 
3 Van Bruinessen has 
1. Bourdieu comments: "The genealogical tree constructed by the 
anthr, )pologist, a spatial diagram that can be taken in at a 
glance, uno intuitu, and scanned indifferently from any point 
in any direction, causes the complete network of kinship rela- 
tions over several generations to exist as only theoretical 
objects exist, that is, tota simul, as a totality present in 
simultaneity. " (Bourdieu, op-cit., p-38). 
2. Barth, 1964, p. 49. 
3. Salzer, 1974, p. 9. 
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commented that the role of kinship is more obvious at the 
1 bottom level than at the top, . and that there are little or no 
kinship links between the tribal leaders and their followers. 
The 'structural equivalence' of sections of the tribe is not 
supported by the existence of'. this separate I tribal aristocracy' - 
In addition \ to this discontinuity between model and reality, 
there is also a great deal of confusion about what the various 
levels within this 'segmentary' 7structure are. Such confusion 
might be blamed on an inadequate understanding of society, but 
there is also considerable confusion within indigenous inter- 
pretations. This perhaps suggests that people do not know to 
F 
what groups they belong 'or the actual functions of these groups, 
which is an untenable conclusion. Rather, it would seem that 
an historical analysis of the ways in which categories have 
been employed is required in order to get behind the veil that 
the categories themselves produce, and while not necessarily 
dissolving them at least place them in a more relative context. 
There are various often confusing interpretations of not 
only what the tribes are, but what their sub-divisions consist 
of. Tapper states that it was 'often convenient' for the chief 
of an Iranian tribe to recognise sections of his tribe andlto 
appoint headmen. He states that the tribe was the basic poli- 
tical group 
2 
and distinguishesý this from 'the pasture holding 
groups' which were 'usually based on descent from a common 
13 paternal arcestor He also makes a distinction between what 
1. Van Bruinessen, op-cit., p. 40. 
2. Tapper, op-cit., p. 23- 
,;. Ibid.. 1D. 22. 
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he terms 'moral communities'. 
' The first of these 'communities, 
is identified as the main camp group and by implication does 
not appear to be political. 
2 The second community 'coincides 
with a political group under some kind of leader'. He hypo- 
thesises that these 'two kinds of moral community may have 
been the basic constants of tribal nomadic society in Iran'. 
3 
Leadership was saTftioned by 'moral ties' which legitimated the 
leader's authority. and these moral communities were held to- 
gether by 'group feelings'. 
4 This suggests that the tribe has 
a sense of common commitment and of common purpose with the 
tribal leaders, which is often belied by available evidence. 
Tapper himself suggests'that: 
"A chief had duties to both government and his 
followers, and his position was close to that of 
a feudal lord. " 
(Ibid., p-29) 
The nature of this 'group feeling' and of the 'moral ties' 
which legitimated control by tribal chiefs over their follow- 
ers and which maintained the myth of equality among tribal mem- 
bers, cannot be taken for granted. The traditional relations 
which existed between chief and follower were tempered by the 
former's ability to extract surplus production from the latter. 
If the relationship became recognisably exploitative, then the 
chief lost his followers. As Tapper points out, if the chief 
1. Ibid., p-23- 
2. Ibid., p-23- 
3. Ibid., p-24- 
4. Ibid., p-24-- 
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could not adequately reward his followers, 
"they might abandon him and support a rival, even the chief of another tribe". 
(Ibid., p-28) 
So much for 'group feeling' and 'moral ties I and cultural 
identity! 
Production for livelihood by both the nomad and the peasant 
involves the production of a surplus for use by leaders. This 
may be perfectly compatible with an ideology which stresses 
the continuance of 'independent' small-scale production and of 
a broad-based egalitarian and communal ideology. Such an 
ideology can be manipulated to legitimise relationships which, 
in fact, involve domination and the transfer of resources from 
small producers to others. As-always, such legitimization 
minimizes, or even makes redundant, the use of force to facil- 
itate such a transfer. In the domestic environment for 
example both women and chil-dren produce goods over which they 
have little control. Similarly, the various taxes offered up 
to the 'natural' leader are seen in terms of bonds of mutual 
support; wealth produced by I tribal I subjects () whether 
nomad or peasant is systematically transferred into the hands 
of a privileged elite. Tribal relations at this level appear 
as extensions of kinship relations and are used to justify 
the control of some by others. Black in his study of Luristan 
has shown how an ideology of freedom, independence and equality 
disguises the actual relations of domination in which 'the 
rich stay rich and the poor inherit the poverty of their 
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parents. ' He states that such an ideology was 'at the very 
best' fostered by British Anthropologists but this does not 
allow for the fact that it is also fostered by Luri social 
ideals which maintain that spatial mobility and a nomadic life 
offer freedom from the tyranny of sedentary landlords(who may 
be tribal chiefs) and that life is superior to that enjoyed 
by the peasant. 
Asad makes the point that: 
"The notion that spatial mobility of nomads ... makes 
them relatively immune to being exploited is thus 
merely the outcome of a confusion between economic 
exploitation and political incorporation. It is clear 
that states and empires can exploit autonomous popu- 
lations without having to incorporate them politically. " 
(1978, p-61) 
As long as the myth of autonomy, and relatedly, of volun- 
tary co-operation between equals can be maintained, the actual 
relations of dominlation remain disguised. Such a myth is 
enshrined in Barth's model of the sedentarisation process in 
which only the poor and the rich settle. This supposedly leaves 
a nomadic population of similar socio-economic status and con- 
veniently ignores the fact that nomadic populations are still 
controlled by chiefs who possess disproportionate amounts of 
resources and thatnot only are there very poor shepherds within 
a nomadic context but that those poor nomads who do settle 
usually appear to remain closeýly involved either directly or 
indirectly with nomadic activities. 
1. Black, 1972, p-617. 
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The changing nature of production associated with the 
spread of capitalism does however appear to involve changes in 
the nature and types of exploitation, and consequent changes 
in political relations. Such changes take place initially in 
terms of established relations of production, so they are per- 
ceived as extensions of these relations and as such are accepted. 
Centralised tribal power and increasing control over resources 
I evolve within the traditional framework. But such extensions 
have the effect of revealing the .. objective nature of exploit- 
ation, as the social distance between direct producer and priv- 
ileged elite increases and as more and more intermediaries or 
i 
'middlemen' are interposed between them. The traditional 
'primordial loyalties' which are rooted in kinship begin to 
disintegrate. Godelier states: 
"beyond a certain limit, kinship relations no longer 
correspond to new social conditions. They evolve up 
to the point where, outside of kinship, new social 
relations are built, which in the long term will play 
the dominant role once held by kinship relations. " 
(1977, p-123) 
Lambton in her analysis of tribal areas, makes parallel points: 
"The influence and power of the tribal khans depends 
largely on the personal element. " 
(Lambton 1953, p-267) 
Many were confirmed in their position by central govern- 
ment, or gained their recognition through opposition to that 
government. To speak of 'hereditary' leaders is to confuse the 
ideological justifications for the establishment and mainten- 
ance of authority with the actual nature of economic and poli- 
tical domination. Leadership appears to have been invariabl-,, ý 
", 
contested. It would appear that with the spread of trade and 
the expansion of western influence certain individuals became 
entrenched in their positions, which were translated into here- 
ditary grooves by theirincreasing ability to manipulate res- 
ources. Lambton comments: 
"Where the'tribe is semi-nomadic and tribal organis- 
ation is relatively strong the khans enjoy very con- 
siderable powers. Tribal affairs are directly admin- 
istered, and since the personal position of the khans 
depends largely on the support they receive from their 
followers the extortion they practice is limited by 
the need to retain the loyalty of their followers. 
Where, however the tribes are settled or partly 
settled, the tribesmen have little possibility of 
attaching themselves to a rival leader if they are 
dissatisfied with their own leader ... the khans ... 
take on more the character of large landed proprietors. " 
(Ibid. , pp-288-9) 
Surely this points towards constructing an analysis which 
incorporates 'tribal khans' and large landed proprietors into 
a unified framework and to an analysis which examines why such 
'tribal' divisions have been'perpetuated. 
The question of land ownership has similar sorts of con- 
notations to the questions posed by the nature of leadership 
and the two are by no means unconnected. The possession of 
particular stretches of land often did become traditionally 
associated with particular families. But these were always 
subject to negotiation. To talk about traditional ' rights' 
of usage is problematic. Lamýton maintains that: 
"In the Qashqai different sections and individuals 
of the tribe appear to have traditional rights in the 
pasture lands owned by the tribal leaders or khans. 
These rights are not registered or absolute although 
they are sometimes based on documents going back 200 
-Z 
years or so. The practice is for the khan to allot 
these pastures to his followers every year. In fact 
the same person is usually given the same pasture, but the formality of allotment is carried out every 
year in order to prevent the tribesmen acquiring an indisputed title and so that the holder can be turned 
out if he commits some act of insubordination. "l 
(Ibid. , pp-284-5) 
The ability to maintain possession of pastures or of 
land was ultimately in the gift of the ruler but continuity 
through generations is perhaps more the ability to negotiate 
from previously accumulated strength rather than through claims 
to a public language of hereditary ownership. Succession was 
nowhere automatic and the partible inheritance laws of Islam 
ensured a continuing struggle for status and power. 
k 
'Rights I to land, particul. 4rly pasture land, are often 
said to be I communal but I communal I property ownership only 
exists in contradition to 'private' property ownership. If it 
is appreciated that to call any property I communal I property 
supports an ideology of egalitarian access to resources and 
disguises great inequalities of wealth. Ability to defend a 
particular stretch of territory while giving de facto control 
did not confirm de jure title. Even where de jure title was 
obtained through recourse to state or religious legitimation, 
it was never indefinite and always personal. It is the process 
by which de facto control is translated into de jure title 
that is important to investigate. 
1. This yearly formal ceremony of allegiance is paralleled bý- 
similar ceremonies carried out at New Year by the imperial 
salaams held under the former shah -a tradition rooted in 
particular relatinnships of authority analysed in chapters V and 
VI below. 
As property has become increasingly individuated, people 
have either been excluded from participation in certain sorts 
of activities or from use of land over which they had 'tra- 
ditional' access, negotiated through time, or they have been 
increasingly subordinated to the dictates of the owners of the 
land. 
To talk in terms of private property cr 'traditional com- 
munall rights ignores the fact that relationships between direct 
producers and those who appropriated the surplus from that pro- 
duction were always negotiable and the 'exploitation of both 
peasants and nomads was always relative to the individual bar- 
gaining abilities of parties to the negotiations. 
Such a negotiation is also to be seen in discussions of 
what constitutes a tribe. Attempts have been made to fit the 
tribal groups in Fars into the convenient divisions offered by 
the model of the segmentary tribe. Several major tribal groups 
with some sort of ethnic/cultural identity associated with par- 
ticular areas and whose sub-divisions represent relatively 
stable named groups with particular allegiances binding leaders 
to followers in some sort of moral community, are identified 
in Fars - And these are considered as separate from 'sedentary 
societies'. 
The terms which are used in Fars to describe 'tribal' 
groups differ little from terms used in other parts of Iran. 
The most common terms employed are 'ghabilehl, lashayerl, 'ill, 
Ita-ifeh' and 'tireh'. These have been used at different times 
and under different circumstances to identify different divisions 
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and groups of people. The terms themselves appear to ha-ý-e a 
very complex history which itself demands a detailed analysis. 
shayer ghabileh' and 'taif eh I are Arabic in origin 
is a Turkish word. Only 'tireh' appears as a Persian word. 
Without going into the etymology of the different words and 
when they entered into common usage, certain differences in 
usage immediately emerge to confound attempts to functionally 
circumscribe them. It would indeed be convenient if the terms 
could be made to f it the categories of I tribe clan' and 
'lineage' and postulate some model of tribal society in which 
they all interlock in a pyramid of unified action and reaction 
based on the processes of fission and fusion. Their different 
linguistic origins surely point to their employment as differ- 
ent interpretations of reality at different times and by 
different people. 
Studies of tribes in Fars, by both foreign scholars and 
Iranians have attempted to limit and make explicit their use. 
Thus Barth, in his study of the Basseri has little difficulty 
in identifying tireh as meaning 'descent' group. He recognises 
one other level above that of the tireh which he called 'tribe' 
(il) and which encompassed the whole of the Basseri. He also 
states that: 
"An intermediate level of segment often referred to as 
Taife which is found among the Arab tribes of the area 
does not exist among the Basseri, who regard the term 
Taife as an uncommon synonym for Tire. I 
(Barth 1964, p. 50) 
Fazel on the other hand, reporting on the Boyr Ahmad, a 
'nomadic society' in the Kuh Giluyeh area of north-western 
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"Structurally, the Boyr Ahmad are divided into six 
major sections or sub tribes (tireh) each made up 
of a number of sub-sections (taifeh) ." 
(1972, p. 12) 
Presumably implying that the Boyr Ahmad are a tribe, although 
he never provides us with an indigenous term. Peyman in his 
study of the important Qashqai tribe in Fars, identifies them 
as an fill, divided into various 'taifehs', which are further 
divided into tirehs, bonkuhs and khanevadehs. 
1 Salzer, in his 
study of the Kashkuli kuchek, while recognising problems asso- 
ciated with the use of the term 'tribe', nevertheless states 
that the term 'ill is 'Generally used for a tribal group larger 
than the taifeh, as in il-e-Qashqall. 
2 He defines the term 
Itaifehl as "tribe, group, clan, family", which "Usually refers 
to a smaller tribal group than an il", 
3 
and identifies the 
Kashkuli Kuchek as a Itaifehl which he equates with 'tribe'. 
The Qashqai for example is "a tribal confederacy of which the 
Kashkuli Kuchek tribe is a part". 
4 Bahmanbegi, in his post-war 
description of the 'ashayerl of Fars, describes the Qashqai as 
an il, together with others lilat', such as 11-e-Ma masani, 
5 
il-e-Khamseh. But, in a compilation of the various groups by 
the Tribal Education Office, over which he had control, in the 
early 1970s the Qashqai are described as lashaver' and such 
groups as the Kashkuli Kuchek, Darreshuri Farsi Madan are des- 
cribed as lils', sub-sections of the ash5ye -e-Qashqai, divided 
into various 'taifehs' and 'tirehs'. 
6 
1. Peyman, 1347. 
2. Salzer, op. cit., p-238. 
3. Ibid., p-240. 
4. Ibid., p-239. 
S. Sahmanbegi 19S3, p. 56. 
6. Composition of tribes of Fars, published by Tribal Educatio'' 
not! "0 1071 
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Fasa'i, in his late-nineteenth century history of Fars, 
refers to the Qashqai as an il and recognises at least 19 other 
divisions of the population by that name. 
1 His description of 
these ilat indicate that they were divided into named tirehs. 
The Qashqai il was divided into 66 tirehs of which the 
Darreshurý Farsi Maddn and Kashkuli are but three. This des- 
cription is preceded by a lengthy account of the various 
bolukat of Fars. These are localised areas, such as the boluk 
of Ramjerd, which seem to have been units for administrative 
purposes. The term is translated as 'district' by Lambton. 2 
She states that it is now no longer used as an official term 
but 'corresponds broadly to the modern dihistan'. Peyman on 
the other hand, in his extended analysis of the il-e-Qashqai, 
uses the term boluk to indicate a group of people who work 
together and live together. He uses boluk and obeh synony- 
mously. 
3 
Fasa! i constructs a separate section in his account in 
which he explicitly uses the term Itaifehl, 
4 but it is not clear 
whether this refers to particularly constituted groups or merely 
to vaguely identified groups outside the more formal boundaries 
of regional administration, and it is worthwhile translating 
the Farsi text at this point because of the use of a number of 
terms to identify specific groups in later works. 
1. Fasali, 1895, vol. 2, pp. 313-4. 
2. Lambton, 1953, p. 425. 
3. Peyman, op-cit., p. 152- 
4. Fasali, op-cit., vol-2, pp-330 ff., entitled "scattered 
talfehs of Fars". (This is preceded by a separate section 
entitled Sahrah-haye Mamlekat-e-Fars. ) 
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"Taifeh ghabileh ra guyand ke az tireh-hay6 ilät 
nabäshad va dar yek boluk tughaf namayand khavah 
dar chädour-e-siah va khavah dar dehat zendegani 
konand. " 
33 0) 
which loosely translated reads: 
"The Taifeh is called ghabileh which is not from 
the tirehs of the ilat and which is settled in one 
boluk and lives either in black tents or in villages. " 
It would seem here that taifeh and ghabileh, both Arabic terms, 
are separated from tireh and il (Persian and Turkish words 
respectively) 
The term il presumably entered the region with the immi- 
gration. of Turks from Central Asia and reflected central Asian 
organisational interpretations of relationships between leaders 
and followers elaborated under very different ecological and 
historical circumstances to those in Fars. Both terms are now 
deemed to be officially obsolete. In the nineteenth century 
when troops were provided from -tribal levies and one could still 
speak of a military tribal aristocracy, then the ilat appear 
to have been dealt with in a different way from other sectors 
of the regional population. 
'Tribal' entities appear then to be the products of parti- 
cular historical circumstances, and not given organizational 
forms in some external empiricist-constructed world. It is 
perhaps important to give a brief historical account of the 
Qashqal, one of the most important tribes in Fars, to illus- 
trate this process. 
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The Qasqhali; a brief history 
According to Fasa'i, the first mention of the name Qashqai 
was as a personal, family name. 
1 Amir Ghazi Shahilu Qashqai, 
a supposed relative of Ismail Shah (1501-24) helped the latter 
establish the Shili sect as the official religion of Iran. 
He was buried in Semirum in the north-west of Fars province, 
where the Qashqai family had their 'ancestral' lands. A des- 
cendant of Amir Ghazi, Jani Agha Qashqai, served as a lieutenant 
to the later Safavid monarch, Shah-Abbas (1581-1629). 
2 He was 
given responsibilit-ies in Fars by the latter, but it is not 
clear what these were. It may perhaps be assumed that ,e was 
charged with the collection of taxes and the recruitment of 
soldiers in the expanding political framework of the Safavids. 
Fasali states that Jani Agha's son, Ismail Khan, fought 
against the Afghans when they invaded Fars in- 1724, and also 
3 
took an active part in Nadir Shah's invasion of India in 1738. 
But he apparently ran foul of Nadir Shah, the family and its 
followers being exiled to Khorasan. With the ascendancy of the 
Zand monarchs the Qashqai were reinstated in their lands around 
Semirum. Fars province became politically much more important 
when the Zands moved the court to Shiraz from Isfahan. The 
Qashqai family seems to have consolidated its position during 
this period (1750-95) and Ismail Khan apparently held an import- 
ant position at the court of Karim Khan Zand (1750-79) - but 
this may only be conjecture. 
1. Fasali, op-cit., vol. 2, p. 11S. 
2. Oberling, op-cit., p. 202. 
3. Ibid., p-202- 
ýý 
The Zands were ultimately defeated by the Qajars. Many 
of the followers of the Zands, who had moved into Fars from 
north-west Iran, were incorporated into the local population, 
and some seem to have fallen under the general control of the 
Qashqai family. 1 It is only in the nineteenth century that the 
name Qashqai begins to appear in western literature. 
2 In 1818 
Jani Khan, Esmail. Khan's son, was invested with the title 
Ilkhani, a title reflecting central Asian nomadic hierarchies, 
but, according to Fasali until that date: "Nobody in Fars had 
been called by the title 'ilkhani"'. 
3 This would appear to be 
a revival of the term because Fasali adds: "The heads of the 
4 
tribes of Khorasan used to be called lilkhanil" (my emphasis) . 
From Jani Khan's time, until it was abolished in 1956, there 
were eight other holders of the title. 
The development of the Qashqai should be seen in the con- 
text of the development of Iran during the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries, the increased penetration of Western powers, 
the rise of nationalism, and the attempts by the Qajar monarchs 
to consolidate and maintain national power. 
British interests became entrenched in the 
ýouth during 
the nineteenth century, but their presence had been increasing 
1. Ibid., p-211. 
2. The first mention of the name, according to Oberling, was 
that made by Dupre in 1819 (df. Dupre 1819, vol. 2, p-463). 
3. Noted in Busse, 1972, p-160. 
4. Ibid., p-160- 
81 
from at least Safavid times, as had the influence of merchant 
families. During the reign of the Zands the Qavam family was 
important in the civil administration of the city, and Haji 
Ebrahim Qavami was made Kalantar-e-Mamlekat-e-Fars, or 'Chief 
civil magistrate of Fars', by Jalfar Khan Zand (1785-89). 1 
He was highly instrumental in the ultimate downfall of the 
Zand monarchy, and in turning Shiraz over to Agha Mohamad Khan 
Qaj ar , the f irs t of the Qaj ar monarchs (see below, Chapter V) . 
Such a move was perceived by observers as a defeat for 'tribal' 
2 power upon which the Zands relied. Haji Ebrahim was rewarded 
by being given the post of 'prime minister'. The Qavam family 
maintained its influence at court until Agha Mohamad died. His 
successor, distrusting the power wielded by the family, had all 
the males but one killed or blinded. The one remaining male 
heir, however, prospered, and by 1811 he had become kaldntar 
(chief civil administrator) of Fars, and by 1840 was made 
begldrbegi of Fars. 
3 
The nineteenth century was characterized by the polarisatior 
of the conflict between the Qashqais and the Qdvams. This can 
only be considered a simplistic abstraction, given the complex- 
ity of forces operating in southem Iran to shape historical 
1. Oberling, op. cit., p-216. 
2. Malcolm, 1829, vol-2, pp-116-7. 
3. The exact meaning of the term beglarbegi is obscure. Lambtor 
translates the term as "title held by provincial governors or 
governors general (Safavid period; kind of chief police officer 
or military governor (Qajar period) (Lambton, 1953, p-424). 
" 
development. It appeared initially as a confrontation between 
different 'tribal I confederacies (Qashqai/Khamseh) , but even- 
tually seems to have been transformed into a confrontation 
between 'tribe I and 'state I. with the former being increasingly 
treated as a marginal phenomenon as the latter's hegemony 
increased. 
In 1862 the Khamseh confederacy of 'tribes' was created 
under the institutionalized leadership of the Qavam family, 
to specifically counterbalance the increasing power of the 
Qashqai. It consisted of an amalgamation of Farsi, Arabic and 
Turki speaking groups who had previously been affiliated to the 
Qashqai, presumably in the latters ' capacity as Il khans of 
Fars -1 The Khamseh has sometimes been treated as if it was an 
indigenous product of physical and social environmental circum- 
stances. But it is much more realistic to consider it as the 
historical result of political developments in southern Iran 
which preceded its foundation, in the second half of the nine- 
teenth century. , 
Over the years there have often been different reports of 
the groups affiliated to the Qashqai confederacy. It has al- 
ready been noted that Fasali lists 66 named tirehs; Bahmanbegi, 
the former head of the Tribal Education Office, lists five major 
groups with eight minor ones which he calls taifeh. 
2 Oberling 
lists nine. The most recent 'definition', from the census 
1. Oberling, op-cit., p-243. 
2. Bahmanbegi, op-cit. 
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conducted by the Tribal Education Office in 1972, identified 
only six major divisions (ýls): the Kashkuli Bozorg, the 
Sheshboluki, the Kashkuli Kuchek, the Farsi Madan, the 
Darreshuri., and the 'Amaleh'. 
Studies of 'tribal' populations are still cauched in terms 
of their discreteness and separation from the rest of regional 
society. Shafili for example states that: "The Qashqai tribe 
live in tents and depend mainly on the pastoral income based 
on livestock husbandry, and supplemented by occasional culti- 
vation of wheat and barley" (1977: 152). Additionally, 
Paydarfar maintains that: "in addition to the urban and rural 
populations located in Iran, it is estimated that between 2 
and 3 million Iranians are pastoral and live in tribal societies" 
(Paydarfar 1974, p. 15). 
The present 'tribal' framework is the product of a very 
distinct historical process which has, especially in the past 
50 years, reified a particular positivist view of the nature of 
'tribes', and in-doing so has helped to push particular groups 
of people into pre-established moulds, and polarise society into 
the three groups that Paydarfar, for example, thinks he sees. 
After a brief geographical introduction, the next chapter exam- 
ines the historical process in terms of the changes that have 
occurred in the Marvdasht plain with the aim of providing a 
foundation on which present social organisation might be inter- 
preted. Rather than there being a break with the past as Barth 
argued, it is hoped that the continuity that exists between the 
present and the past will be emphasised. 
S4 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MARVDASHT PLAIN 
General Characteristics 
It is in this general context that the '. %, Iarvdasht plain 
is situated. Located in the central zone it lies at approxi- 
mately 1,500 metres above sea level, and ýbout 45 kilometres 
north of the provincial capital of Shiraz. The plain covers 
an area of approximately 140,000 hectares and is drained by 
two riverý, the Kor which enters the plain from the north 
west, and the smaller Sivand, which enters from the north. 
Both eventually flow into the inland drainage basin of Lake 
Bakhtegan, but not before their waters have been used to 
intensively irrigate a large proportion of the plain. 
The plain extends from the recently completed Dariush 
Kabir dam, near the village of Dorudzan, above the village 
of Shahrak, to Lake Bakhtegan (see fig. 6 The river Kor 
is incised into the plain to a depth of about 50 metres but, 
until the completion of the Dorudzan dam, periodic flooding 
of the surrounding plain did occur; the last such occasion was 
in the winter of 1968/69. Except where bridges have been 
constructed, communication between north and south banks of 
the river is extremely difficult. The fact that the river is 
incised has necessitated the construction of a series of 
barrages over time, and the extraction of water from points 
far removed from those of consumption. Most feeder canals 
between Marvdasht and Dorudzan have their origins at extraction 
noints within the district (de, hestan) of Kamfiruz, behind the 
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modern dam. The barrages at Band-e-Amir and Band-e-Feizabad, 
south-east of Marvdasht provide water for areas downstream 
between there and lake Bakhtegdn. Today the supply of irri- 
gation water for the whole plain is under the control of the 
dam authorities., who have built a much more modern network of 
feeder canals to replace the former, but still largely oper- 
ational system, of slow-moving, winding irrigation channels. 
The riverine deposits of clay and clay loams provide the 
basis for an increasingly intensive agricultural exploitation, 
which has not however been totally beneficial, as witnessed 
by the rather large salt flats recently forming in various 
parts of the plain. Most agriculture is now supported by 
irrigation, but a significant portion of the plain which is 
above the level of the irrigation water is still dry farmed 
and/or used for pasture. As in most other parts of the 
region the major staple crops are wheat and barley, the latter 
usually being dry farmed. Where water is plentiful rice is 
cultivated. In'recent years there has been an increased 
tendency to produce cash crops , of which sugar beet, cotton, 
opiurý, melons (jali sesame seec',, corn and alfalfa are the 
most important. A number of small orchards are to be found 
scattered throughout the plain, but more especially on the 
southern facing northern foothills, especially in the district 
of Khafrak, where walnuts, apples, grapes, pomegranates, 
1. For a description of irrigation in the plain see Kortum 
1976. 
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quince and peaches are grown. (Further south and at lower 
elevations citrus fruits and dates are the most common tree 
crops. ) Because of its relative closeness to the provincial 
capital, the Marvdasht plain has been the object of consider- 
able attention at the hands of large landowners and merchant 
capitalists interested in increasing agricultural production 
through the employment of progressive agricultural techniques 
which are now everywhere evident, side by side the more tra- 
ditional farming techniques. 1%'ith the building of the dam at 
Dorudzan it has also attracted a great deal of attention from 
government agricultural offices. 
The plain's administrative centre is the rapidly expand- 
ing town of Marvdasht, a place that has grown froi-,,, a small 
number of dwellings around the newly completed sugar-beet 
refinery some 3S years ago, to a settlement of over 30,000 
(census figures for 1966 indicate a population of 25,498). 
Most of the service functions once provide6 by Band-e-Amir 
and Zarghan have now been transferred to Marvdasht. There 
are no other centres of comparable size in the plain. 
Other 
settlements are rather large, specialized villages or smaller 
agricultural settlements and hamlets. It is 
difficult to 
calculate the exact number of settlements but 
it is estimated 
that there are between 300 and 400, ranging in size 
from 
fewer than 30 inhabitants to villages with a population in 
excess of 1,000. According to the 1966 census the average 
size of settler. -Lent is about 2SO persons. 
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The dehestdn of Ramierd 
To the north and west of the town of Marvdasht lies the 
dehestdn of Ramjerd (see fig. 7), bounded to the north bý- 
the river Kor which was formerly bridged at Jeshnian and Pol- 
e-No - These bridges were in use until the beginning of this 
century when they were destroyed by villagers to increase 
their isolation from marauding tribesmen. Prior to this time 
and the construction of the modern metalled road which 
bridged the Kor at Pol-e-Khan just south of Marvdasht, the 
summer route to Isfahan was carried by these bridges before 
climbing into the mountainous sarhad. The dehestan of Ramjerd 
comprises some S9 settlements and according to the 1966 census 
had a population of 13,722, which implies that the average 
settlement size was about 229, but this hides considerable 
variation as can be seen from figure S. Settlements range in 
size from under 10 persons to over 1,000. (The census iso- 
lates individual households, but very small settlements are 
usually attached administratively to larger, adjacent ones. 
If these former are combined with their 'mother' settlements, 
the average size of settlement increases to 263. ) The 
average household size was 5.24, slightly larger than the 
average recorded for the whole of Iran in 1966.1 
1. The census defines a household as: 'a group of individuals 
who share living quarters and their principle meals'. A sample 
survey of household heads was carried out in Ramjerd in 1968 
quite independently of this research by an Iranian investigator 
(cf. Paydarfar 1974). Although much of the information is of 
limited value some characteristics identified by that survey 
may be illustrative. 
cont. overleaf 
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Fig. 7. The dehestan of Ramjerd 
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Utilizing information gle%ned from the 1966 census, the 
dehestan covers 37,211 hectares, or approximately one quarter 
of the total area of the plain. 91% of this is cultivable 
land, and the amount under cultivation in 1966 was 15,63S 
hectares or 46%, leaving 45% fallow. The major crops are 
similar to those cultivated throughout the area. 
Land under irrigated wheat 
Land under dry wheat 
9,562 hectares 
1,593 hectares 
71% of all 
cultivated 
1 and 
Land under irrigated barley 
Land 'under dry barley 
Land under irrigated rice 
Land under other crops 
Fallow land 
Cultivated wasteland 
Non-cultivable wasteland 
1 617 hectares 
1,012 hectares 
329 hectares 
1 393 hectares 
18,249 hectares 
1 420 hectares 
1,745 hectares 
17% of all 
cultivated 
land 
2% )of all 
9% )cultivated 
)land 
Rice was only cultivated in 14 of the 59 settlements and the 
main crops other than wheat, barley and rice, were cotton, 
sugar-beet and melons. The majority of the inhabitants 
practice mixed farming and the census figuresindicate that 
Note 1 cont. from previous page: 
53% of the sampled population was 15 years of age & under 
85.2% of all households sampled consisted of nuclear familieE 
31.2% of the sampled population had not been born in the 
A 'I'k el C- + "; ý 
65.9% of the sampled population were farmer owners/ 
operators 
79% of the sampled population was completely illiterate 
40% of the sampled population owned radios 
61% of the sampled population used kerosene for lighting 
49% of the sampled population used animal dung for heating 
Much more statistical information, including such tdngs as the 
number of beds per household, as well as reactions to children's 
misbehaviour is given in this study, where an attemýt is made to 
compare urban, rural, and tribal conditions, under he assumption 
that there is a continuum between them and that place of resi- 
dence is of major import in determining the effects of exposure 
to change. The issues involved are mucb morg, cgmglex than 
Paydarfal a"ýjiaqc n4d__Jhe hyp9theses under wc was working 
serve, to mYsti fy social organisation 
rather than clarify it. 
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the villagers owned 26,534 sheep and goats , as well as 2,070 
horses and donkeys and 4,315 cows. On average this means 
something like 440 animals per settlement. Some villages 
appear to have over 1 500 sheep and goats and only those 
small isolated settlements of a family or two around a pump 
or a coffee house were without. These figures do not include 
the large herds of the absentee landlords, nor those of pas- 
toral nomads who periodically use the plain. Unfortunately 
comparable figures from earlier years are not available to 
allow detailed comparison and to hint at processes of change. 
Even the 1966 figures should be treated with caution, and 
serve as guides rather than quantitative statements. Although 
a national census was taken in 1956 figures at the village 
level are not available. 
Limited figures are available from 1950 
2, 
when the number 
of inhabitants of the dehestan was calculated at 6,392 dis- 
tributed among 43 settlements. The average size of settle- 
ment was then only 149. If these figures can be believed 
there has been a 53% increase in population between 19SO and 
1966 involving a 35% increase in the overall siz6 of settle- 
ment, as well as an absolute increase in the number of 
settlements from 43 to 59. Only four settlements (Uanjan, 
Chamani, Ramjerdi and Shahian) have experienced decline in 
population over this fifteen year period, whereas others such 
1. See fig. 8 for the size of settlerrents in the dehestan 
of Ramjerd. 
2. Razmard, Vol-6,19S4. 
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Fig-8. Size of settlements in the dehestan of Ramjer 
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as Esfardran have more than trebled. Fasai records 35 
settlements in the 'boluk' of Ramjerd towards the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
1 
Razmiira mentions that in 1950, four of the settlements 
were inhabited by Turki-speakers and one by Luri-speakers, 
the remainder being Farsi speakers. These figures consider- 
ably under-estimate the mixture of languages and supposed 
ethnic distinctions among the inhabitants of the dehestan. 
In addition to these more permanent occupants there are 
seasonally resident groups of pastoral nomads and wandering 
gypsies and tinker groups (ghorbat and ahangar respectively) 
taking advantage of the available pasture and practising 
their specialist skills. Villagers also move about the 
dehestdn and into other parts of the province on a seasonal 
basis. Thus far from being homogeneous, the area presents an 
amalgam of groups, occupations and interests that bind it to 
the rest of the plain and to the whole southern Zagros region. 
Within the 'past 20 years considerable investment in food- 
processing industries, requiring unskilled labour, has pro- 
vided additional employment for villagers. The sugar-beet 
refinery at Marvdasht, a chemical fertilizer factory, road 
and dam-building projects, the construction of a large meat- 
marketing complex and a biscuit factory have all contributed 
to the diversification of the economy of the area and to the 
opportunities available to villagers. Urban expansion, 
1. Fasa'i 1895, Vol. ii, pp-214-21S. 
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particularly in Marvdasht and Shiraz has increased demands 
for building labourers, and large numbers of people tempor- 
arily leave their villages to take up these opportunities. 
The Ayub valley 
The Ayub valley is relatively isolated from the main 
asphalted road that now links the Dorudzan dam with the 
main Shiraz-Isfahdn highway at Pol-e-Khan. Although not 
necessarily typical, the villages in the valley do provide a 
comprehensive cross-section of activities and interests. 
Buraki and Esfardran and Pol-e-No-e-Bozorg are old villages 
and were recorded by Fasali in the late nineteenth century. 
Chamani, Domafshdn and Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek are of more recent 
origin. Physical form varies quite considerably. Older 
established villages tend to be fortified and of the ghalleh 
typ e such as Chamani and Pol-e-No-e-Bozorg, with strong 
retainer walls and a series of alleys connecting the buildings 
inside. 1 More open settlements such as Domafshan and Pol-e- 
No-e-Kuchek appear as series of half-open courtyards (see 
Figs. 9& 10). 
The Ayub valley contains seven relatively small villages 
whose occupants are engaged in a variety of activities from 
cereal cultivation to animal husbandry and carpet production. 
They are closely tied into the nomadic pastoral and the urban 
sectors of provincial society. A great deal of land in the 
1. For a discussion of settlement types in Iran see de 
Planhol 1958 and 1968. 
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valley is not cultivated by the villagers themselves, but is 
owned by large absentee landowners who have managed to escape 
the execution of a supposedly radical land reform programme. 
Both the landowners of Chamani and Esfardran are engaged in 
animal husbandry on a fairly intensive scale, each owning 
upwards of 2,500 animals which are seasonally to be found in 
the valley. The interests ofthese large landowners bring 
them into contact with many other parts of the plain and of 
the province, where they own or administer other stretches 
of land. 
Types of settlement 
The most common form of settlement in the Marvdasht plain 
is the fortified village or gha'leh. This Consists of a high 
mud brick, usually square enclosure with towars at each corner 
and one main gate. Within the enclosure the courtyards of 
the villagers take up most of the space although a central 
open area is often to be found. Under the gateway the village 
shop is normally to be found and above it the store of the 
landlord. The individual courtyards consist of an open space 
surrounded by a series of rooms in which the individual fami- 
lies live. Many of these ghallehs were built during Safavid 
times on the foundations of earlier villages and were construc- 
ted to provide defensive facilities during times of insecurity. 
Their size varies considerably and they tend now to be the 
larger villages in the plain with anything from 200 to 1,000 
inhabitants. Until recently there was very little settlement 
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outside the walls. These villages tend to be dominated by 
Persian speakers although recent increases in population mean 
that others, such as Arab, Turki and Luri speakers are 
frequently found in them. 
In the last 50 years, as political security has been 
increased, there has been considerable expansion outside the 
walls of the ghalleh. Public buildings such as mosques, bath 
houses, schools and community buildings have largely been 
erected just outside the walls. Members of the village have 
also constructed houses outside the walls, and increasing 
pressure on space within the ghalleh has prompted others, 
especially newly-married couples to build outside. Chamani, 
despite its modern construction, illustrates this traditional 
design. Pol-e-No-e-Bozorg illustrates in addition the 
expansion of building outside the ghalleh (see fig. 10 ). 
Some of the new settlements built between the 1920s and 
1940s were based on the traditional ghalleh type, but more 
commonly they are open in plan. They consist aE a series of 
inter-connected courtyards (see the plans of Domafshdn and 
Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek). The need for the constructi6n of elabor- 
ate defensive settlements diminished considerably during this 
period. Such settlements are usually smaller than the 
ghallehs and are located, either on the more marginal land in 
the plain or on the talus slopes of the surrounding hills. 
Many contain substantial numbers of former pastoral nomads, 
obliged to settle in the plain during Reza Shah's sedentar- 
isation programme - 
Chamani 
Domafsh5n 
Buraki 
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In addition to these two dominant forms of settlement 
there are also scattered semi -subterranean stone enclosures , 
now largely abandoned, which formed the foundations for the 
seasonal dwellings of pastoral nomads who used the plain during 
the winter. In the summer numbers of black goat hair tents 
are scattered throughout the plain and the surrounding hills, 
occupied by pastoral nomads or village shepherds. 
As security has improved and commercial production expan- 
ded there has also been an increase in the numbers of indivi- 
dual dwellings away from established villages. Here motor 
pumps have been employed to irrigate land which could not 
otherwise be reached by river water networks. A small stretch 
of land is irrigated by these pumps and provides the basis for 
the construction of a family courtyard and the intensive 
cultivation of vegetable crops. These are frequently 
enclosed by mud retainer walls. 
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CHAPTER V 
CHANGING PATTERNS OF LAND USE AND CONTROL 
History of land use and settlement 
Since pre-historic times the Marvdasht plain has 
occupied a central position in the history of southern 
Iran. The Elamite city of Anshan was recently located 
in the neighbouring dehestan of BeiZa, adjacent to the 
modern village of Malian. The ruins of Persepolis, 
f 
the centre for Achamenid 
1. During the early 1970s an archeological team from 
Pennsylvania State University under the directorship 
of Dr: W. Sumner was excavating the site. 
e, 
'Il 
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rule (550-330BC) are located on the northern foothills of 
the plain. From here the Achamenid rulers commanded an empire 
which stretched from the Nile to the Indus. 2 
Little is known about the pattern of land use and settle- 
ment in this early period, but numerous pre-historic mounds 
from both this period and much earlier bear witness to one of 
the lengthiest occupations in the history of the civilized 
world. Prior to the Achamenids, who derived their power from 
control of land, Lambton notes that: 
"the people were grouped in tribes and the village 
of a clan formed the model according to which the 
new settlements were arranged and settled. " 
Ni 
(1963, p-10) 
By Achamenid times a land-holding aristocracy had emerged 
which was in control of agricultural production. -- 
The pattern qf control achieved by them was developed by 
the Parthians who succeeded them (25OBC-224AD) and Lambton 
notes that: 
"They were invested with large landed property ... 
Between them and the peasantry was an intermediary 
class holding sub-fiefs. " 
(Ibid., p-12) 
It was continued under the Sassanids whose empire was also 
centred in what is now Fars province, 
3 
and who ruled from 
2. A great deal of archeological work has been undertaken in 
ihe plain. See in particular'Hansman, J. (1972), Herzfeld (1968), 
Nicol, M. B. (1970), Stein, A. (1940) , Wilber, D. 
N. (1969). 
3. Major Sassanid ruins are to be found outside the provincial 
towns of Firuzabdd and Kdzerun. 
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226AD to 651AD. The large landlords were the represen- 
tatives of the government vis-a-vis the peasantry. The 
latter were obliged to perform labour services and were sub- 
ject to recruitment into the army of the rulers. Taxes, which 
seem to have formerly been as'eessed in produce were re-assessed 
on the basis of land. This re-assessment formed the basis for 
taxation in the later Arab period. 
1 This had important imrli- 
cations for the nature ofýcontrol of the land and for the 
forms of exploitation 
2 
of the peasantry. 
Throughout its extended history the plain has been sub- 
ject. to major fluctuations in itsi fortunes. As a basis for 
irrigated agriculture it has been at the centre of many 
power struggles. As cent,, ral government has weakened, the 
conditions under which the land could be effectively irrigated 
were also weakened. Insecurity reduced the amount that was 
cultivated presumably because of the peasants I justified 
fears that it would not be harvested by the same people who 
Lambton 1953, p-15- 
2. The concept 'exploitation' is highly problematic. It is 
here used to mean that process whereby resources are trans- 
ferred out of the hands of the direct producers, and thus also 
includes the ideological mechanisms which are employed to legi- 
timate this transfer. As such it may not necessarily be con- 
sciously perceived as exploitation. Lorrain has pointed out in 
a recent work The Concept of ýdeology (1979) that ideology 
hides 'the true relationship between classes by explaining 
away the relations of domination and subordination. Thus, 
social relations appear harmonious and individuals carry out 
their reproductive practices without disruption"(p. 47). 
Godelier speaks of 'forms of appropriation' (1977, p. 17), the 
ways in which the products of nature are appropriated and 
monopolised by a minority. 
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had ploughed it. Much land would seem to have reverted to 
pasture land at these periods and was used by the large num- 
bers of pastoral nomads in the area. It may be that some of 
these pastoral nomads extended their control from the mountain- 
ous areas into the plain but it is also highly likely that 
those peasants who abandoned cultivation themselves invested 
more resources in sheep and goats. The irrigation networks 
contracted, expanded or fell into complete disrepair according 
to the general levelof authority exercised by central govern- 
ment 
"The just ruler maintains himself and the state by 
means of the army, which in turn is maintained by 
regular revenue, which is derived from a prosper- 
ous economy from contented subjects, a goal which 
can only be secured by justice" 
(Ibn Balkhi quoted in Perry, 
p. 227) 
but as will be emphasised, the very nature of this rule seems 
to have prevented such a state of affairs from surviving for 
very long, because of the inbuilt contradictions associated 
with the forms of remuneration for government servants and 
the tendency for these servants to exercise an independence 
from that same government. 
Four barrages on the Kor river provided the irrigation 
water for the whole of the Marvdasht plain. All of these 
appear to pre-date the Arab conquest in the 7th century AD. 
And all but one were in use in the early 1970s. The one 
which is not now in use has been replaced by the much larger 
Dariush Kabir dam which was built during the 1960s. It stands 
on the site of the former Band-e-Mu-ijardd, adjacent to the 
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modern village of Dorudzan and at a spot in the river which 
can be successfully forded. 
1 Water from this barrage originally 
supported agriculture around Persepolis and traces of an 
Achamenid. irrigation network run along the northern edge of 
the plain. Much of the landin the dehestan of Ramjerd was 
irrigated by water from this barrage. The second barrage is 
located at Band-e-Amir, south-east of Marvdasht (see fig. 6 
where the former major winter road north from Shiraz crossed 
the Kor. The other two, Band-e-Feizabad and Band-e-Mavur, 
irrigate lands in the dehestan of Korbal. 
The Arab conquest does not appear to mark a major break 
)' 
in the nature of control of the plain although the introduction 
of Islami(. practice seems to have considerably changed the pre- 
vailing attitudes towards I authority. 
2 However, it would seem 
that between the 7th and the 10th centuries security 
gradually worsened and cult - iVation declined considerably. 
3 
1. This ford was the centre for large concentrations of pas- 
toral nomads, especially in the spring, on their way up to 
summer pastures. 
2. See Lambton, op-cit., p-16, who maintains that although the 
Arab conquest marked the evolution of a new theory of the state 
the changes in local administration were less marked. She 
stat es that: 
"Fars which had under the Sassanians been in the hands 
of the landed aristocracy preserved its 'feudal' cha-- 
racter into Islamic times. As late as the fourth/ 
tenth century it appears that the g reater part of the 
province was still in the hands of the old landed 
proprietors" (op. cit., p-33). 
3. Lambton states: "In areas where the caliphs control 
was weaker and campaigning between rival governors 
and local leaders was a frequent oc currence ' the 
tendency was for the population to be subject to 
frequent levies and much extortion" (op-cit., p-47). 
ICIS 
The Arab practice of recruiting mercenaries to their armies, 
to cater for their rapidly expanding commitments, created 
considerable problems. At first soldiers were assigned the 
rents from land but as payment became irregular they were 
increasingly granted or too'k, usufruct of the land itself. 
This led to increased extortion of the actual cultivators. 
Soldiers were not the only ones who were demanding payment, 
an expanding administrative group were also increasingly paid 
off in this way. 
During the 10th century AD the Buyid rulers in FArs 
which was now controlled from the major urban centre of 
Shiraz, made considerable efforts to increase the area under 
irrigation. Azud-ud-Dowleh: 
"cleaned out blocked up canals, built mills on 
them, mended, holes in the dams, and settled 
bedouin from Fars and Kerman in dead lands". 
(Ibn Miskaiwah, in Lambton 
PP-cit. p. 51) 
Writing of the fertility of the plain at that time 
Petroshevsky notes: 
"The district of Kurbal (below the barrage) con- 
sidered one of the most fertile , watered by canals from the river Kur ... yielded about 700,000 kharvars (ass loads) of grain under the Buyid Azud 
ud Dowleh (947-983AD). "l 
(1968, p. 491) 
1. Kharvar: a unit of measurement equivalent to an ass-load. 
This was standardised in 1926 as equivalent to 300 kilogrammes 
or 100 mann (see Lambton, Op. cit., pp-406-7). 
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From being members of the mercenary armies of the Arabs 
the Seljucý Turks eventually succeeded them as rulers (1066- 
1287AD). ' They were responsible for repairs to all four of 
the barrages in the Marvdasht plain. Using the account of 
the historian Ibn Balkhi, Le, Strange notes that the Band-e- 
Mujjardd was repaired by Fakhr ud Dowleh Chauli in the begin- 
ning of the 12th century and the district of Ramjerd was 
apparently very productive. 
2A 
problem for the Seljuqs at 
this time was the incorporation of the primarily pastoral 
groups of Turks who had moved into Iran from central Asia. 
But in Fars at least it would appear that it was in the sub- 
sequent period of the Mongols that large numbers of Turks 
entered Fars to form a permanent feature of the provincial 
3 
population (from that time. They now figure prominently in 
the villages of the plain, and many of the pastoral nomadic 
tribes are Turki-speaking. Minorsky claims that the division 
between Turk and non-Turk (or Tajik) is 'one of the basic 
Lambton states: "The work of the Seljuqs is of importance 
because it decided the main lines along which the system 
was to develop, and the system lasted in its essentials 
through the Middle Ages down to the twentieth century". 
(Ibid., p-53) 
2. Le Strange, G. , lIbn al Balkhi. Description of the 
province of Fars in Persia at the beginning of the 12th 
century AD', Asiatic Society Monographs, 14, London 1912, p-65. 
3. See Lambton, op-cit., p-57. 
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facts in the social and political organisation of Iran'. 
1 
The distinction is still maintained in the jalain where, 
because of its association with tribalism and pastoral nomaG- 
ism, 'turk' is imbued with ideas of dissidence and freedom 
from central control. 'Taj, ik, l on the other hand (a term 
that villagers would never use of themselves), implies ser- 
2 vility and subjection to authority. 
Fars province was spared th 7e initial devastation of the 
Mongol invasions by the timely payment of tribute. 
3 But 
throughout the early Mongol period production appears to have 
steadily declined once more. 
4 These nomads brought with them 
a tribal organisation based on the conditions of the Steppe 
in which nomadism and pastoralism were the most important 
activities. Land was perceived as being primarily for sheep 
1. Minorsky 1943, p-187. Lambton notes that: "There were 
... two major problems-which the Seljuqs had to solve, both of which closely affected land tenure and land 
revenue administration; first, how to incorporate 
into the structure of their empire a large nomadic 
... element.... and secondly, how to pay their mili- 
tary forces" (op-cit. , p. 56-7) o 
The reason that Lambton advances to explain why the 
Seljuqs did not enter Fars until the Mongol period was that 
the region was already populated by ser. i-nomadic groups 
(op-cit. , p-57). 
2. Lambton suggests that the military were mainly Turks and 
the civil administration probably mainly non-Turks (op. cit., 
P. 59). 
3. Op. cit-, p. 77. 
4. Op. cit., p-77. 
log 
and goats. 
' Much land was initially confiscated and made over 
to the rulers who at least in the early years of their rule 
seem to have maintained a nomadic life style. Petroshexský, 
notes the deline in productivity when the rulers in Shiraz 
had become vassals of the Il Khans: 
"under the 'atabeg Salid b. Abu Bakr, a vassal of the 
Il Khans, the annual harvest about the year 1260 fell 
to 300,000 khavars and before the reforms of Ghazan 
fell even further, and the Kharaj (land tax)of Kurbal 
consisted of only 42,000 khavars of grain". 
(1968, p-491) 
1. Like the Seljuqs before them the Mongols looked upon the 
conquered lands as "the yurt of the Mongol ruling family in 
which their flocks and those of their followers grazed; 
the conquered population was not regarded as having 
any rights vis-a-vis the Mongols. It does not appear, 
however, that in the early., period the Mongols regarded 
themselves as the proprietory owners of the soil". 
(Lambton, op-cit., p-77) 
and 
"The Seljuq leaders were the leaders of their people 
but not originally territorial sovereigns. They 
conceived of their rule in all probability, as exten- 
ding wherever their people roamed, and not, at first, 
in any case, as being tied to, or confined to, any 
given area. In the steppe each tribe had its own 
grazing ground or yurt, over which the leader of the 
group, as the representative of the tribe, exercised 
dominion, probably alloting, in the case of the 
large tribes, specific pastures in it to the various 
sub-groups .... The kingdom was conceived of as the 
personal estate of the ruling khan, held by him on 
behalf of his people, although he could dispose 6f it 
within certain limits as he wished. It became the 
established practice for him to assign different parts 
of the kingdom to minor members of his family, sons. 
brothers, and others. " 
These assignments did not carry with them any permanent rights: 
"the malik merely held the area ... at the will of 
the sultan who could, and frequently did, revoke the 
assignments. To what extent the malik had jurisdic- 
tion over his iqta' to the exclusion of the sultan 
is not clear. " 
(op. cit., p-60) 
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During the Mongol period (1260-1500AD), the Turkish 
I 
migration into FarS continued. Fasali mentions that the 
Ainallu and the Baharlu tribes entered Fars at this time. 
In the late nineteenth century he records that their summer 
pastures were in the districts of Ramjerd and Marvdasht. 
Similarly the leaders of the Qashqai confederacy of tribes 
claim that they came into Fars during this period. 
2 
From the Arab conquest of the 7th century and the intro- 
k 
duction of the caliphate and Islam, through the Seljuq and 
Mongol periods and the introduction of the khanate, to the 
establishment of the absolutist state of the Safavids and 
Shi 'a Islam as the official religion of that state, there 
'-7 
developed a system of land tenure which has influenced the 
nature of the rural social organisation until the 20th century. 
"3 
This is the iqtal, the forerunner of what became known as 
tuyul under the Safavids. Its developments and its major 
features provide the framework for an analysis of prevailing 
relationships of authority within Iranian society; the rel- 
ationships that have governed the extraction of surpluses 
from the direct producers. Present perceptions of power and 
authority in Iran have their origins in the development of. 
the iqtal system. 
1. Fas5li, 1895, Vol-2, p-309. 
2. Oberling, 1960, p. 175. 
3. The iqta' or land assignment system should be separated 
from the feudalism which developed in western Europe: "the 
element of mutual obligation inherent in the nexus of feudal 
tenure in INestern Europe is notably absent"(Lambton, op-cit., 
p. 54). 
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Iqta' and tuyul are terms which are no longer used in 
referring to land tenure arrangements in the Iranian country- 
side. They refer to systems of tax farming and land assign- 
ments which appear to have been first developed from the dem- 
ands of the Arab conquerors for increased funds. Grants on 
the revenue of land were given to servants of the state in 
lieu of salary. As conditions worsened these grants on revenue 
seem to have developed into grants on the land itself. Land 
which was not already owned but had either been abandoned or 
confiscated was made over to soldiers in payment for services 
to the government. Administrative officials instead of 
receiving a salary were. 1given rights to secure the revenue 
from land. These were theoretically servants of the rulers 
rather than of the public. To secure official office meant 
I 
control over land'and it was expected that those who held 
official position would attempt to enrich themselves from 
their office. Offices were held up for auction to raise money 
for the state, and the result was, not only the development 
of a system of administrative control, but also one which 
tended towards the increasing exploitation of the peasantry. 
Authority was delegated from the ruler, rather than held in 
trust from the people. 
Frequent military conquests coupled with the partible 
nature of Islamic inheritance laws did not encourage the 
emergence of a landed aristocracy, but those who were granted 
land tended to usurp personal rights over it when and if the), 
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could, and convert it into 'individuated' property. The result 
was often the ruin of the land, especially when those given 
control of it did not consider it to be a permanent investment 
over which they would have permanent control. In addition the 
granting of land to the military and to administrators often 
meant that in times of weak central government they were able 
to exercise semi-autonomous rule over the areas under their 
jurisdiction and employ private armies for their own use. 
They were thus also able to'refuse to support or defend the 
central government that had initially given them control over 
that land. 
The development of the land tenure system is, of course, 
much more complex than this brief overview implies. Different 
sorts of grants on land and its revenue emerged, but the 
essential features seem to have been the association of land 
grants with the administration of the country. Grantees formed 
with their supporters the government of the areas they con- 
trolled. There was thus a constant tension between the centri- 
fugal tendencies which were necessitated by the need to pay 
officials and delegate control, and the centripetal tendencies 
which, at least theoretically, tied the holders of official 
posts to the central government. 
The Mongol period (1260-lSOOAD) was, according to 
Lambton, one in which there was: 
"an increase in large landholdings, and, on the whole, 
a decline in productivity. The hostility between the 
peasantry and the ruling classes was heightened and 
the gulf between them widened. " 
(Lambton, 1953, p-99) 
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But the patterns of land tenure and rural organisation seem 
to have continued. Minorsky remarks on the persistence of 
administrative traditions from the 14th to the 17th centuries 
(quoted in Lambton1953, p. 101). 
The system of repaying s, ervice to the state through tax 
farming and land grants was continued under the Safavide 
(1500-1722). 
"The old institutions moulded by Islamic practice in 
the early centuries,, ýand modified by the practice 
of the Steppe were infused with new drive by the 
absolutism of Shilism. The conception of the 
Safavid monarch differed from both that of the 
caliph and that of the ruling khan. " 
(Ibid. p- 105) 
Under the Safavids the theory of the state implied that the 
Safavid rulers claimed sole ownership of the land for the 
state, but in practice land tended to become private property 
in many areas as in earlier periods. Much land came under 
the control of religious inst'itutions or was made over as 
endowments (ouqaf) which ensured a certain continuity of con- 
trol over land as the possessors, as mutavallis, were able to 
secure the products from the land for themselves and their 
descendents. 2 At least some land in the Marvdasht plain was 
1. "Politically (the rise of the Safavids) sees the emergence 
of Persia as a nation state in the modern sense of the term" 
(Lambton 1953, p. 105). And Perry notes: "Iran today is essen- 
tially the creation of the Safavid shahs" (Perry 1979, p. 1. ). 
2. Vaqf (pl. ouqaf) is land immobilised for charitable or 
other purposes. Two kinds may be recognised; these are: 
1) vaqfi lamm or charitable vaqf, and 2) vaqfi khass or personal 
vaqf, such as property placed in trust for the settler's 
descendents. The former was used for example to support the 
building and maintenance of a religious institution such as a 
mosque (masjid) or a religious college (madrasseh). The vaqf 
were administered by a mutax-alli ajqyjuaHý ihosen frorn 
y af 
w0own 
the fam" --the settler 
( ee Lam tp er 
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vaqf land at this time. 
1 
As in earlier times the increasing 
expenses incurred by the central government meant that pay- 
ments to both administrators and the military, in the form of 
land grants continued under a system known as tuyul. 
2 In 
late Safavid times this meant,,, increasing autonomy from central 
government, as the power of the latter decreased. 
It was during the Safavid era that the first major con- 
tacts with western merchant capitalists occurred, first the 
Portuguese and then the Dutch, French and British. These 
established trading bases on the Persian gulf, the most import- 
ant of which was at Bandar 'Abbas. The Safavid era is charac- 
I 
terised by increased commerce and relative stability especially 
0 in the early years. Roads, caravanserais and bridges were con- 
structed. The bridges at Jashnidn and Pol-e-No, in the 
dehestan of Ramjerd, now abandoned, were built during this 
period. Another bridge at Pol-e-Khan was also established to 
carry the winter road north to the capital from Shiraz. 
3 
1. Lamb ton 1953, ff - p-131 - 
2. The term tuyul is here translated as 'land assignment' but 
this disguises the various types which were in existence. For 
further information see Lamb, ton, op-cit. 
3. This latter bridge has now been replaced by an iron bridge 
just south of the present town of Marvdasht which carries the 
only metalled road north to Isfahan. The metalled road 
follows largely the old winter route to the Safavid capital. 
The summer route was through the present district (dehestan) 
of Abarj and into the Sarhad-e-Chahar-Ddngi. This is now only 
used by certain groups of pastoral nomads in their twice 
yearly migrations. 
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Little is known about the conditions of the peasantry, but a 
large number of walled villages which are still occupied appear 
to date from this time so it can perhaps be assumed that cul- 
tivation expanded rapidly. 
Following the fall of the Safavids a period of insecurity 
prevailed, alleviated for a short time by the establishment 
of the Zand regency which controlled western Iran from its 
centre in Shirdz. The Zands originally came from the vicinity 
of Malayer and are variously described as Kurds or Lurs. 
1 They 
brought with them to Fars other tribal groups as parts of their 
military following, and ruled for most of the second half of 
the 18th century. According to Perry the roads were secured 
and trade expanded considerably -. Y Althoughlittle information 
is directly available froM the Marvdasht plain at-this time 
it can perhaps be, assumed that settlement and cultivation 
prospered. Merchants and art-isans were attracted to Shirdz by 
the ruler, and his tribal army was settled in and around the 
city. In 1763 the British concluded an agreement to set up a 
trading post at Bushehr and the Bushehr-Kazerun-Shiraz highway 
provided the most important ar. tery for their trade with the 
interior. It was the politics associated with the control of 
1. For an excellent account of the Zand regency see Perry, J. R. 
'Karim Khan Zand', Chicago, 1.979. In discussing the origins 
of the Zands., Perry states that the Zand tribe were: 
"a minor pastoral people of the Zagros foothills 
centered on the villages of Pari and Kasnazan in 
the vicinity of Malayer"(op. cit., p. 17) 
and that in the early 18th century Mahdi Khan Zand was a local 
bandit (op. cit., p-18). The : and tribe had been transported bý, 
Ndder Shah to Khorasdn and it was only after Ndder's death that 
they returned to their home area. 
2. Perry, op-cit., pp-246-271. 
I'I 
this road, and the trade which it carried, which were to 
determine much of the course of 19th and early 20th century 
regional affairs, as western capitalism expanded and social 
organisations were transformed. 
1- The road from Bushehr to Shiraz was often precarious for 
traders and the journey took from one to three weeks, depend- 
ing on the safety of the roads (op-cit., p-257). Armed tribes- 
men exacted levies (rdhddriý from the passing caravans in 
return for providing them with safe conduct over that stretch 
of road over which they exercised control/were given responsi- 
bility. These levies were relatively standardised during 
periods of effective central government. At other times many 
local tribesmen exacted their own levies. Certain tribal groups 
were considerably enriched through exacting such levies and it 
would appear that those who received benefit from them were 
better able to expand their power and influence. The road ran 
through the winter quarters of some of the Qashqai tribes, 
particularly the Kashkuli and the migration routes of several 
groups crossed the road., at various points. Chick in a Memorandum 
to the British Consul in Bushire (Sir Percy Cox) in 1912 
(Memo. N0279) saw the rahddri. question as of fundamental impor- 
tance. He pointed out that prior to 1900 few tribesmen were 
armed but since the turn of the century weapons began to filter 
in from Muscat on the other side of the Gulf. The right to 
exact levies appears to have been put up for auction to the 
highest bidder in the same way as public offices and land 
assignments were. As trade-expanded during the 19th and early 
20th centuries the road acquired an increasingly important 
role as tribal chiefs vied for control of a share of the con- 
siderable profits that could be made from the levies. 
Chick reports that: 
In March 009 Soulat-ud-Dowleh (Il khdn of the Qashqai) 
undertook from certain Persian merchants in Shir5z and 
the government of Fars to guarantee the safety of 
merchandise sent via Firuzdbdd and his own tribal 
country for a monthly payment of 1,000 tomans. 
This would appear to considerably underestimate the amounts 
that were to be made from levies along the road. 1,000 tomans 
represented a levy of only 21/2 krans per mule. - 
(The krdn or 
giran is sometimes used as equivalent to the rial, 
10 Tials 
1 toman, cf. Lambton 1953, pp.. 409-10. ) 
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The period of insecurity which both preceded and followed 
the consolidation of power by the Zands was marked by contin- 
uous campaigning by rival contenders for power. This seriousl)ý 
disrupted village production. Troops fed off the countryside 
through which they passed. Scorched earth tactics destroyed 
crops. Large numbers of people were killed. In August 1754 
4,000 local men were massacred by Afghan troops near Persepolis 
in the Marvdasht plain. Contingents of soldiers, often far 
removed from their homelands, and disgruntled because of long k 
service and poor pay, rava ged the countryside. 
2 The effects 
of these insecure periods were to enhance the movement of 
people as peasants fled their homes, merchants migrated and 
soldiers from widely scattered areas moved around the country- 
ý4 
side. 
1. Azad Khan Afghan invaded Fars in 1754 in an attempt to 
defeat Karim Khan Zand. "He met resistance in the neigh- 
bourhood of Persepolis-from some two thousand men of 
the Lashani, Mal-e-Ahmadlu, and Korbal tribes under 
the leadership of 'Abd ul-Mottaleb Korbaii; but they 
were enticed out of their fortress and heavily 
defeated on the Marvdasht plain. The Afghans 
allegedly massacred four thousand people in their 
now poorly defended stronghold. " 
(PerrY, op-cit., p-58) 
2. Perry,, op-cit., p. 62. 
11 1E 
Nineteenth century conditions 
By the end of the eighteenth century the strength of the 
merchants in Shirdz appears to have expanded considerably, 
partially as a result of increasing security during the reign 
of Karim Khan Zand; and parti ally as a result of expanding 
trade with agents of western companies. Powerful merchant 
families, such as the Qavams and the Moshiris, were able to 
translate their wealth into control of public office and of 
k1 
large stretches of territory within the province. As govern- 
ors of various districts, representatives of central government, 
and large landed proprietors in their own rights, they exer- 
i 
cised considerable influ'ence throughout the course of the 
nineteenth century. 
2 ý0 
This increasing power of the merchants, led in the late 
eighteenth centur' by Haji Ibrahim Qavam, 'lord mayor' y 
I (kalantar) of Shiraz appears"Ito have been decisive in the 
defeat of the Zand dynasty. It was Haji Ibrahim who denied 
Jafar Khan Zand, the last of the Zand rulers, access to Shiraz, 
his capital, and delivered it up Agha MohaTnad Qajar, the first 
of the Qdjdr monarchs. 
3 The decisive battle in this final 
campaign of the Zands was fought on the Marvdasht plain in 
1. For a brief history of the Qavam family see Oberling, op. 
cit., pp-216-219. The activities of this family are also 
dealt with in Fasali, op. cit.; vol-2, pp-47-49. 
2. A great deal of information for this discussion of nine- 
teenth century conditions is based on the account of the Q5jar 
historian Hasan-e-Fasali, who wrote the Fars Nameh Nasiri, pub- 
lished in Tehran in 1895. Parts of this have appeared in trans- 
lation. The first volume of this work appears as Busse, H., 
ia under Qajar rule, New York 1972. Parts of the 
second volume form the basis for Demorgny, D. (1913), 'Les r6f- 
ormes administratives en Perse: les tribus du Fars', in La Revue 
du Monde Musulman, vols-22 & 23, June 1913. 
3. See Perry, 2p. cit.. p-300. 
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July 1791. 
The presence of both the Qajar and Zand armies in Fars 
exacerbated the deteriorating conditions in the countryside. 
Fasa'i notes: 
"in the last three or four years (1789-92) the locust 
plague was spread in Fars and the farmers were 
reduced to misery by the coming and going of the 
Zand and Qdjar armies. " 
(Busse 1972, p-Sl) 
The rise of the Qajdrs and the consolidation of their I 
hegemony over the greater part of Iran was not however accom- 
panied by a rapid regeneration of agriculture in the plain. 
British travellers who visited the Marvdasht plain in the 
first quarter of the nineteenth century were struck by evidence 
of depopulation. Portier, writing in 1821 notes: 
"The number of villages we passed in over a day's 
march is hardly credible. In some we found 
inhabitants, but most of them were entirely 
deserted, yet, wherever the trace of human dwell- 
ings presented itself, the evidence of past 
agriculture was also discernable in the shape 
of kanoughts. " 
(Portier 1821, p. 685) 
And Morier, writing in 1818 notes: 
"The fact that depopulation is its greatest evil. 
At very distant intervals the sameness of the view 
is broken by a field of corn. A soil which in other 
countries would be a delight of the agricultural- 
is ts here 1i es waste -" 
(Morier 1818, p-83) 
Plague and famine seem to have been regular occurrences in 
Fars throughout the nineteenth century. Fasali records locust 
plagues in 1805 and other plagues in 1857 and 1869. He also 
records widespread famine in 1822,1866 and 1872. 
1. See Buss6, op. cit., p-S2. 
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According to Lambton: 
"The Qajar period sees in some respects a return to 
the Seljuq practice of government by the ruling khan and his family. " 
(1953, p-13S) 
But the increasing influence of the western powers, Russia 
in the north and Great Britai In in the south, was instrumental 
in transforming an essentially tribal form of government into 
an absolute monarchy which was more reminiscent of the earlier 
I 
Safavid rule in the powers which it claimed for itself. 
Administration and local government were largely in the hands 
of absentee land owners who, together with their supporters, 
maintained control over the various districts (bolukat). They 
had responsibility for tax collection and recruitment to the 
'0 
army. They also administered crown land (khaliseh). Through- 
out the course of the nineteenth century, as the expenses of 
the Qdjdr court rose, these crown lands were increasingly 
offered for sale and converted into private property. Many of 
the buyers belonged to the expanding merchant classes. 
1 
As a result of depopulation much land in the plain rem- 
ained uncultivated and was used as pasture land by nomadic 
and village flocks of sheep and goats. 
2 Much land was owned 
by large absentee landowners who employed bailiffs (mobashirs) 
See Lambton, op-cit., p-152. 
2. A customary way of defusing opposition was to move the 
more truculent tribes to distant corners of the country. 
Oberling reports that on the victory of Tgha Mohamad he moved 
2,000 Qashqai families to the territory of the Chahar Langs 
(Bakhtiari) and 5,000 more to the Veramin region and to 
Mazanderan (1960, p-210). The various tribes who came with 
the Zands from Luristan were scattered throughout Fars (op-cit., 
p. 211). For an account of these various movements in the 17th 
and 18th centuries see Perry 1975. 
1 
to administer their holdings, and visited them perhaps once a 
year at harvest time, accompanied by their own troops, to 
collect taxes and supervise the distribution of the harvest. 
Both the Qavams and the Moshiris controlled large sections of 
the plain. The latter converted much of their holdings into a 
personal vaqf (vaqf-e-khass) of which they remained the admin- 
istrators and thus the prime beneficiaries. The Qavams 
retained significant holdings in the plain throughout the 
twentieth century. 
The overall result of developments in the nineteenth 
century seems to have been the entrenchment of those who held 
provincial and local power in their positions. Keddie comments: 
"The traditional ruling classes generally increased 
their local power as well as their economic position 
in the nineteenth century. There was an end to an 
earlier relative division of functions between land- 
ownership and the administration of law and taxes. 
Local administration and judicial processes increas- 
ingly became the monopoly of the same men who owned 
villages and received feudal dues. " 
(1972, pp-368-9) 
This increasing control appears to have resulted in an increase 
in the claims made on the peasantry. Both Keddiý and Lambton 
suggest that the standards of living of the peasantry declined 
during this period. 
2 
1. This vaqf was known as Vaqf-e-Moshir-ol-Soltaneh and was 
administered in the twentieth century by the Mo'addel family 
(see below, p. 
2. Lambton, op-cit., p-143, Keddie 1972, p. 365. 
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The system of tax farming and land grants was continued 
in essence under the Qajars, but with important qualitative 
changes as western influence favoured the development of mod- 
ern private property. Whereas previously an inherent instab- 
ility, associated with constant oscillations in government 
fortunes and the partible inheritance laws of Islam, implied 
frequent transfers of control (and interminable disputes 
between rival claimants about rights to control) , the changing 
nature of government associated with the rise of the nation 
state, and the support received by the Qajars from foreign 
powers, meant that those already in power were able to com- 
mandeer increased resources for themselves and thereby entrench 
their position. But this change of emphasis, from tribal khdn 
to hereditary shah involved the emergence of major contra- 
dictions between traditional autocratic, personal control 
legitimated through a tribal ideology, and changing expect- 
ations and perceptions of state control which accompanied the 
rise of a bourgeois rationality. During the nineteenth cen- 
tury two major families increasingly dominated provincial 
politics in Fars, the one, the Qashqai family, with 
its support 
drawn from largely Turkic speaking nomadic tribes in the pro- 
vince and organised into the powerful Qashqai confederacy 
of 
tribes, the other the Qavams, who controlled large stretches 
of land in the central parts of the province and maintained 
throughout much of the nineteenth century administrative con- 
trol of the provincial capital. The latter also became 
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leaders of the Khamseh confederacy of tribes on its found- 
ation in 1862 as a counter-balance to the increaseing power 
of the Qashqais. 1 
Relations between those who actually worked the land and 
those who controlled the land did change considerably, espec- 
ially during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
2 The 
development of notions about private property, far from rep- 
lacing various forms of 'feudal tenure', as Keddie maintains, 
seem rather to have enhanced the control of landlords over 
peasants. 
3 Large landed proprietors increased their holdings 
but an inevitable result of this was also an increase in the 
numbers of officials interposed between them and the actual 
cultivators; social and ecunomic distance between rich and 
poor widened considerably. This increasing-polarisation faci- 
iitated greater exploitation as the various officials attempted 
to derive as much as they could from village production. 
4 
There was little expansion of settlement in the plain until 
after the first World War. 
1- See Oberl ing , op. cit. , part 6f or a his tory of the Qashqa Ii 
and Khamseh confederations. 
2. "In Marvdasht, the Shiraz and Kavar plains, and Firuzabad, 
the cultivators are mostly tenants of large non-resident arbabs- 
The pay two-thirds of the crop, or its equivalent in money" 
(Stack 1882, ii, p-253). 
3. Lambton notes that the: "tendency to extend the jurisdict- 
ion of the local landowner and tuyuldar and to concentrate all 
power in their hands continued in Qajar times" (op-cit., p-176). 
4. "The governors also recruited lower officials on the basis 
of promised monetary returns. Since officials at all levels 
retained a profit from collected taxes, the peasants were forced 
to support an increasingly oppressive official hierarchy, whose 
main duty, in turn was to fleecethem. " Keddie, op-cit., 
pp-366-67. 
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In addition to the large landed proprietors who were 
increasingly divorced from production, there were also smaller 
landowners who largely owed their position to their relation- 
ships with the arbdbs or large landed proprietors. Subordinate 
officers were given villages in lieu of salary or for services 
rendered, or they were given rights to the revenue of parti- 
cular villages. There do not appear to have been many small 
independent owners of land in the plain. Continuity of 
ownership over time seems to have been exceptional. Partible 
inheritance rules and prevailing political insecurity ensured 
the continuous division of estates while also ensuring a con- 
tinuous struggle for control of land. The situation at the 
close of the nineteenth century was one of considerable confu- 
sion as political instability reduced the amount of land under 
cultivation in the plain and allowed local leaders to exercise 
de facto control. 
The Twentieth century 
The constitutional revolution of 1906-11 ma; ks a signifi- 
cant change in the course of Iranian history, together with 
the eventual overthrow of the Qajar dynasty and the rise to 
national power of Reza Shah (1921-41). But it did not mark 
any immediate changes in conditions in Fars. One of the first 
provisions of the new constitution was to recognise the 
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sanctity of private property' 
-2 
and to abolish the practice of 
tUyuis. - It marked the formulation of a new relationship 
between landlords and tenants, but it did not address itself 
to major changes in that relationship. 3 
The supporters of the constitution came from a wide 
cross-section of the population, not just merchants and intel- 
lectuals desirous of promoting western style economic and 
political changes, but also from tribal and religious leaders 
jealous of their privileges which were being eroded by the 
expanding nation state. 
4 
As such the constitution appears to 
have embodied the contradictions, which were to remain import- 
ant features of Iranian social history, between the modernis- 
ing groups and the traditional ruling classes. Until the coup 
dletat of 1921 which brought Reza Khan to power local leaders 
were able to maintain their relative autonomy and the provis- 
ions of the constitution remained unfulfilled: 
1. Lambton, op-cit., p. 178. 
2. Ibid., p. 194. 
3. Ibid., p. 209. 
4. On the constitutional revolution see N. R. Keddie, 'The 
Origins of the Religious-Radical alliance in Iraý. ' , Past and 
Present, 34 (1966) ; 'Iranian politics 1900- 190S: background to 
revolution', Middle Eastern Studies, V, 1,2,3 (1969); Religion 
and rebellion in Iran: the tobacco protest of 1891-1892, 
fondon (1966). See also Algar, Religion and State in Iran 
1785-1906, Los Angeles (1969), Lambton, A. K. S. 'Secret societies 
and the Persian revolution of 1905-61, St. Antony's Papers, 
vol. 4 (London, 19S8). 
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"Power ... continued to be for the most part in the hands of large landowners and the tribal khans who were able to devote a considerable proportion of the proceeds of their estates to the maintenance of irregular troops, and when necessary to defy the 
government -" 
(Lambton, 1953, p. 179) 
Reza Shah, like Atatu-rk, was intent on modernising Iran 
and during his regime significant changes occurred within the 
Marvdasht plain. Kortum reckons that the number of settle- 
ments in the plain increased from 211 to 353 between 1900 and 
1966.1 Mqny of these were established during the period 
1921-41 During this period land which had fallen into dis- 
use was brought back into cultivation. Villages expanded and 
new villages were created as the old irrigation networks were 
extended. Many of the new cultivators leased unus6d land from 
the old arbabs, or usurped rights to land over which title was 
unknown or subject to dispute, and employed nomads who had 
been obliged to settle as a result of the sedentarisation pro- 
gramme of Reza Shah. 
2 In addition there was a considerable 
1. Kortum 1976, p-153. 
2. Reza Shah believed that the rOOt of Irar Is problems lay in 
the 'tribal problem' and that in order to create a national 
consciousness he had to get rid of these alien cultures. he 
regarded them as traditional and the only solution was to dis- 
band and settle them, (see Oberling, op. cit., p. 320). Garrod 
comments that the sedentarisation policy was: 
"barbarous, ruthless and shortsighted" (Garrod 1946, p. 298). 
The shah's sedentarisation programme was perhaps more acutely 
felt in Fars because many of the migration routes brought the 
tribal nomads through the central areas., unlike for example 
the Bakhtiari. 
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influx of migrants especially from the more marginal areas to 
the north-west of the plain. This particular form of expan- 
sion utilised existing relations of production in the main. 
It was not until the advent of widespread mechanisation and 
the installation of motor pumps however that the most rapid 
expansion occurred and relations of production were signifi- 
cantly transformed. 
Reza Shah created for the first time a relatively effi- 
cient national army, instead of relying on irregular, largely 
tribal levies. 2 He suppressed opposition to his regime through 
a series of punitive expeditions against various tribes, whom 
he considered to be the cause of much of the unrest in Iran. 
The expansion of communications and the strengthening of the 
rural gendarmery enabled him to considerably extend the con- 
trol of the central government. He attempted to reform the 
land revenue system and regularise ownership of land by re- 
quiring owners to register their interests. Conflicting 
claims were resolved in favour of the de facto controllers. 
The land registration laws of 1928/9 gave de jure ownership to 
those powerful enough to have their claims regist ered. 
3 Taxes 
1. By 'existing relations of production' is meant that pro- 
duction was extended using traditional contractual relation- 
ships between landlords and peasants whereby each party entered 
into an agreement and received a share of the harvest. 
2. Although Oberling notes that in the early years of Reza 
Shah's reign Qashqai levies were still used against recalci- 
trant elements in Fars (Oberling, op. cit., p. 324). 
3. Lambton, op-cit., p-183. 
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which had long been withheld were collected and gradually 
local administrative reforms accompanied by the expansion of 
a state bureaucracy regularised control of administration in 
the hands of state employed officials. 
Lambton comments: 
"The general trend of events since the grant of the 
Constitution in 1906, beginning with the abolition 
of tuyul and continuing with changes in the admin- 
istration, has been in fact to alter the status of 
the large landed proprietor from that of a petty 
territorial prince to that of an ordinary landowner. " 
(1953, p-260) 
But, while opposition from these 'territorial princes' was 
largely removed, as the state arrogated to itself a monopoly 
of political authority, the relationship between the actual 
cultivators and the landowners was not drastically changed. 
In fact many of the reforms of the 120s and 130s codified for 
the first time the riglis that landlords had over peasants 
engaged in the cultivation of their lands. 
"Tenants were legally liable for keeping harvests at 
a certain level and for carrying out the terms of 
share-cropping agreements, regardless of obstacles. " 
(Keddie, 1972, p-372) 
And village headmen (kadkhodas) became legally týe Irepresen- 
tative of the landowner ... responsible for the execution of 
laws and regulations referred to him by government' as the 
result of a law passed in 1935.1 Informal tradition that had 
guaranteed the peasant a certain degree of flexibility in the 
face of the arbitrary exercise of personal authority was 
1. Lambton, op-cit, p-190. 
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formalised through such laws and bound the peasant even more 
to the landowner who became the government's representative 
in the village. Reza Shah himself became the largest land- 
lord in Iran by the end of his reign, 
1 
and much of his support 
came from the urban and semi-urban middle class. 
It is difficult to unravel the complexities of land- 
ownership in the plain during this period, partly because of 
a reticence to discuss questions of ownership at the time of 
fieldwork, and partly because of the confusion between owner- 
ship and control. 
2 Much of the land in the plain was regis- 
tered as the property of the large landed proprietors, but 
they were rarely involved directly in production. They dealt 
with their properties in a variety of ways. Some were directly 
administered by bailiffs (mobdshirs) and some were rented out, 
normally to urban rentees (mustajers). As pressure on land 
increased, the result of settlement of former pastoral nomads, 
immigration from other areas, and from merchants for access to 
land, areas which had remained uncultivated were either rented 
Lambton comments: "In certain cases, notably in Fars, there 
appears to have been some difficulty in deciding -ownership, 
owing to the fact that several people exercised rights over a 
property concurrently .... there were estates 
in which the 
holders reaped the crops and exercised certain rights of owner- 
ship, disposing of the property in various ways while at the 
same time paying a fixed sum according to agreement or 
local 
custom to the real owners, who, while confirming the above- 
mentioned powers on the occupants, received their ownership 
dues. " (Ibid., p-186). 
2. Lambton, 1968, pp-49-50. 
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out, or more normally, because of the expenses incurred in 
bringing them back into cultivation, partly sold. Much land 
which remained unirrigable had to wait until the widespread 
introduction of motor pumps in the 1950s before it could be 
brought into use and large areas of the plain were left un- 
cultivated. Bailiffs and rentees among others were able in 
some instances to have their claims to title of disputed land 
upheld by the land registration laws, because of the confusing 
pattern of possession of land and appropriation of rents. 
The removal of much land from the gift of a patronage 
network controlled by 'territorial princes' widened the num- 
bers of people who could invest in it. 
1 Security of tenure 
was guaranteed by the state and investment in land was there- 
by encouraged. In addition to the large landowners who were 
increasingly divorced from agricultural production there were 
small landowners; owners of single villages or parts of 
villages, who had gained awhership through purchase, inheri- 
tance or gift. Many were city dwellers who entrusted the 
administration of their holdings to others. Some were rich 
peasants who worked for larger landowners. Others were rel- 
ations of the larger arbabs. 
The actual organisation of production was largely divorced 
from land ownership although as absolute property rights were 
1. The Qavdms, for example, as important territorial rulers, 
divested themselves of much land in the plain by transferring 
, ownership' to others, notably relations, while still retain- 
ing residual over-lordship. 
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increasingly exercised the pressures on the peasantry who 
actually cultivated the land increased, and their 'traditional 
rights' were ignored, as landowners pushed for increased pro- 
duction. Because ownership of the land was still largely tied 
up with the traditional village production system the owners 
were limited in the ways in which they could use the village 
lands. It was not until the widespread use of mechanisation 
and of motor pumps that new land could be individually opened 
up and cultivation rapidly expanded. And it was not until the 
land reform programme of the 1960s that attempts were made to 
rationalise agricultural production and release the landlords 
completely from their residual obligations to support the 
peasants. 
Despite the complexity of formal ownership and the fre- 
quent dispersal of holding over several villages, the organi- 
sation of the production process remained remarkably uniform; 
the so-called 'mdlek-raliyat' system, or that system which 
controlled the extraction of surpluses by the landlords 
(malekin) from the peasants (raliya') was the same through- 
out the plain although crop-sharing agreements varied slightly. 
The period between 1921 and 1941 does not appear to have 
helped the peasantry. It is even suggested that conditions 
were worse at the end of Reza Shah's reign than they were at 
the beginning: 
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"By the time of the outbreak of IN'orld War II, the 
economic position of the average Iranian was con- 
siderably and chronically worse than it had been 
in 1925.1' 
(Cooke 1952, p-238 - quoted in Keddie 1972, p. 375) 
His support for the landlords and the consequent entrenchment 
of their position tied the peasantry increasingly to village 
production as dictated by the landowners. 
The disturbances occasioned by the second world war, 
the abdication of Reza Shah and the invasion of the country 
by the British and the Russians, threw the nation into the 
same sort of confusion as was experienced during the first 
world war. Post-war reconstruction involved the tighter 
control over internal affairs by neo-colonial powers competing 
for the country's large oil reserves. The struggle between 
the U. S. and Great Britain resulted in the defeat of the 
latter and the emergence of the former, backing a conservative 
government sympathetic to the west and supporting the growth 
of commercial production. Until at least the middle '50s 
there does not appear to have been much expansion of agricul- 
ture and a great deal of under-employment is repqrted in the 
rural areas. 
1 Drives for mechanisation in the 150s, while 
bringing new land into cultivation and increasingly involving 
urban merchants, bureaucrats and army officers as land owners, 
had the effect of further alienating the peasantry. This was 
more noticeable on unused land where capital intensive culti- 
vation techniques could be employed without seriously 
1. Keddie, op-cit., p-377- 
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disrupting traditional agricultural production. Land which 
had formerly been dry farmed by the peasantry or used as pas- 
ture land by nomadic and village flocks of sheep and goats 
was alienated from their use. Commercial production also 
expanded on village lands as landlords attempted to consoli- 
date their individual estates, but this process remained limi- 
ted until the land reforms of the 1960s. Many landlords, 
especially in the older settled villages where traditional 
relations of production restrained the development of commer- 
cial agriculture, remained little concerned with investment in 
agricultural machinery, being content to extract as much as 
they could under traditional crop-sharing agreements. 
Developments in the first half of the 20th century con- 
tinued the formalisation of relationships between landlords 
and peasants as the former were sanctioned in their control 
of village production by state legislation which made them the 
legal representatives of the government in the villages. Tra- 
ditional, relatively autonomous village production was sub- 
ject to varying control from urban landlords. Because of the 
system of tax-farming and land grants there rareiy developed 
a unity of interest between landlord and peasant. But with 
increased interest in the control of production, especially 
by urban merchants, a closer involvement in agricultural pro- 
duction gradually emerged. Villagers became increasingly tied 
to agricultural production both as legislation tied them to 
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the land and the interests of the landlord, and as attempts 
were made to increase the production of cash crops. Reza 
Shah's regime saw the formal separation of tax collection 
from rent collection with the expansion of an administrative 
bureaucracy of civil servants, but it was the landlords, con- 
firmed in their control of villages and in their support for 
the regime, who were used to ensure collection and obedience. 
In this respect little had changed for the village cultivators, 
apart from the fact that control was regularised and reinforced 
by state officials who usually worked for or on behalf of the 
landlords, and attempts were made to increase production on 
village lands. Such attempts do not appear to have primarily 
benefitted the village cultivators. 
While the forms of tenure have changed considerably over 
the years two major features might be observed. Firstly the 
method of administration, characterised by land grants and 
tax farms has changed little; forms of control still very 
reminiscent of those exercised by governments in earlier years. 
The form of government by decree involving the personal and 
often arbitrary exercise of power remained. Secondly westeriý 
influence, the 'individuation' of property ownership, and the 
expansion of commercial production have served to 
increase 
the gap between landlord and peasant. If we examine the 
nature of developments within the Ayub valley, a small section 
of theW-Prdasht plain, these two conflicting 
features will be 
highlighted. While 'modern' productive techniques are 
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employed and juridicial weight is thrown behind the moderni- 
sation of agriculture 'traditional' forms of control continue 
to be exercised. The contradictions inherent in these two 
tendencies remain to be resolved, as the ideological super- 
structure which legitimates the state and legal apparatus are 
called into question as a result of changing forms of pro- 
duction over a considerable length of time. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE MARVDASHT PLAIN 
A history of land ownership in the valley is almost 
impossible to construct, because of the problems of separa- 
ting de facto control from de jure title. At the time of 
fieldwork (soon after the execution of the land reform pro- 
gramme in the plain) there was considerable reticence to 
I 
discuss questions of ownership because some land was still 
subject to dispute. Similarly, frequent changes of 
title in a period of considerable change, made a detailed 
discussion of ownership very confusing, and perhaps in 
the final analysis unimportant. Such a discussion is 
largely divorced from the actual organisation of 
production within the village, and disguises an 
1- One of the first public offices to be destroyed after 
the revolution in 1979 was apparently the land reform 
office in Shiraz, in which records of ownership and title 
were kept. Public access to these records was limited 
and permission to consult them was never obtained. 
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underlying uniformity in that organisation which seems to 
have been rigidified by the reforms of Reza Shah. This 
uniformity has been described under the heading of the 
-Imalek-raliyat 
system' or the arbabi system. 
1 Under these 
reforms attempts were made to regularise the relationships 
that governed those who had rights to extract products from 
agricultural production, through their control of land and 
water (the malekin) , and the actual agricultural producers 
(ra I iyii) . 
Distinctions between large landed proprietors (lumdeh 
malekin) and small landowners (khordeh malekin) have been made 
in the literature on land tenure in Iran, which tend to take 
the category of land ownership and see the distinction between 
the two primarily in terms of the separate problems associated 
with the ownership of different amounts of land. It ignores 
the complex Hstory of control of land and conveniently con- 
flates ownership with control, assuming that the type of 
ownership has somehow remained constant over an extended 
period of time. The terms malek and arbdb are conflated as 
representative of some 'traditional' or 'feudal' regime, and 
the Imalek-raliyat/arbab-raliyat systern' is seen to character- 
ise this regime. 
2 
1. See 'Ajami (1970) Sheshdangi: -pajuheshi dar zamin-e jam'e 
shenasi_rustali, Pahlavi University Press, 1970, pr-67-71- 
'Ajami isolates 
- 
four production systems (vis. the mechanised 
system, the arbabi system, the dehghan system, and the tulumbeh- 
kar system) , all operating within the confines of the one village 
(Sheshdangi) - This village5slocated immediately to the north 
of the Marvdasht. Sheshdangi is a fictitious name. 
2. Both Lambton (1953, p-267) and Keddie (1972, p-380) stress 
the fact that the terms are confusing and that distinctions in 
terr-s of ownership of land which are then used to refer to 
differqnt-social-TsITata must be treated with some caution. 
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The practice of tax farming (tuyul) was formally abolished 
with the promulgation of the new constitution at the beginning 
of the 20th century. 'Full property rights' involving indivi- 
dual ownership of land were increasingly exercised. Lambton 
maintains that large landlords were shorn of many of their 
functions as 'territorial princes' during the reign of Reza 
Shah, as the power of the state increased. 
1 But it should be 
emphasised that in many instances these 'territorial princes' 
were supporters of the national government, and maintained 
their indirect control over land and resources, under the aus- 
pices of the expanding nation state. The Q-avam family, for 
example, who controlled much land in the Marvdasht plain, 
formally divested themselves of much of that land in the first 
part of the century by transferring title to relatives and 
supporters, by renting more land to others, and by selling yet 
more - It was unusual for them to sell whole villages, but 
rather parts of those villages to people who would manage the 
remainder for them. Despite this distancing from direct in- 
volvement in the control of land, they still maintained their 
position within the regional hierarchy. Ahmad Q avam was 
-, 2 head of the national government in 1947. Lutfali Moadell, 
whose family were administrators (mutavalis) of the large 
1. Lambton, op-cit., p. 260. "The general trend of events 
since the grant of the Constitution in 1906 ... has been in 
fact to alter the status of the large landed proprietor from 
that of a territorial prince to that of an ordinary land- 
owner-" 
2. Ibid., p-209- 
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Moshiri vaqf, with considerable holdings in the Niarvdasht 
plain, was a deputy to the national assembly in the 1950s. 
The large landed proprietors do not, as Lambton intimates, 
appear to have been transformed into Tordinary landowners'. 
Rather they have transferred their interests elsewhere, to 
investment in urban and industrial fields. The 'ordinary 
landowners' are to a large extent the former's proteges and 
appointees. The categories I, umdeh malekin' and khordeh m5lekin, 
by concentrating on land ownership tend to take attention away 
from the history of the process whereby a large number of 
'territorial princes' have managed to gain control over the 
instruments of national government. Rather than losing their 
control over land they would appear to have consolidated that 
control at another level. It is beyond the-S-cope of this 
thesis to investigate this exceedingly complex process which 
implies an analysis of the emergence of the modern nation 
state, but it would appear that the public language of state 
control serves to disguise the actual nature of domination, 
and to veil the continuing power exercised by the former 
larbabs' in the wider system. 
2 It also points to'wards an 
understanding of how the 'government, could successfully pro- 
mulgate a land reform programme, based on abolishing the 
1. Lambton, 1969, p. 53. 
2. For general analyses of this process see in particular 
Cottam 1964, Bill 1972, Binder 1972, Keddie 1971, Zonis 1971, 
Halliday 1979 and Jazani 1980. 
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power of the 'feudal landlord' because these 'feudal landlords' 
were no longer dependent only on the direct control of land 
for their power. Lambton maintained in 1953 that: 
"there are still many rich men (who own land) , but their fortunes do not, as a whole, unless they are 
supplemented from other sources, compare favourably 
with the fortunes made by contractors and big mer- 
chants in recent years. " 
(1953, p-264) 
Thus, in the Ayub valley, for example, prior to land 
reform, in the middle 160s there were a number of different 
landed proprietors with interests in the land. They illus- 
trate the major changes that had been taking place in relation- 
ships towards land over the preceding half century or so. 
Until about 50 years ago large tracts of the valley remained 
uncultivated and were used as pasture for the flocks of 
villagers and pastoral nomads. According to Fasa'i there 
were only three settlements in the valley at the end of the 
nineteenth century (viz. Pol-e-No, next to the Safavid bridge, 
Esfardran and Buraki 
2 )- 
At the time when Fasali was writing the Icentrel (ghasbeh) 
of the 'district' (boluk) of Ramjerd was in Jashr. lan, near 
the Safavid bridge which carried the main summer route north 
from Shiraz to Isfahan. But it had not always been there. 
1. I. e. the power bases of these former 'feudal landlords' 
had shifted and the political opposition to a land reform pro- 
gramme could be successfully contained. 
2. Fasali does not actually mention Buraki in his account, but 
refers to Chamani as the third settlement. Buraki; however, is 
much older than the modern ý, illage which is now known as Chamani. 
There are very close associations between the two villages, and 
it can perhaps be assumed that the name was transferred from 
the old village to the new village because the compound which 
housed the landlord's representative was located next to the 
latter. 
I 
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On the transfer of control to Haji Safar Khan Ramjerdi the 
centre was moved to the village of Ramjerd, from the village 
-1- of Zargharan. Fasali's account is revealing for the light 
it throws on the nature of control over the district. He 
states: 
"ghasbeh va zabet, -neshin-e-in boluk, vaghti-ke 
zabeti dar selseleh-ye Mahrpud Khan Ramjerdi bud, 
gharieh-ye Z. 2aghardn-ra ghasbeh-ye Ramjerd migoftand, 
va chun zdbeti be selseleh-ye Haji Safar Khan 
Rainjerdi rasid, gharieh dbddeh-ye Ramjerd-ra, ghasbeh 
migoftand, ke khaneh-ye in do selseleh dar in do 
gharieh bud, va. chand sal ast ke zabeti az ahle 
Ramjerdbirun rafte-ast. Gharieh Jashnian-ra zabet- 
neshin-e-in boluk gharar dadand. " 
(Fasa'i, Vol. ii, p. 214) 
This, roughly translated means: 
"the most important village in which the controller 
(zabet-neshin) resided was, during the time when 
control was in the hands of (be-selseleh-ye) Haji 
Mahmud Khan, the village (gharieh) of Zargharan. 
But when control fell into the hands of (be-selseleh 
... rasid) Hdji Safar Khan Ramjerdi the most import- 
ant village (ghasbeh) was said to be the settlement 
(abadeh) of Ramjerd. The houses of these two lines 
of controllers (selseleh) were in these two villages 
(gharieh). It is now several years since the control 
(zdbeti) has moved out of (az ahle) Ramjerd. The 
village (gharieh) of Jashnian became the centre for 
control, (i. e. the seat of the zabet). " 
Control was received (rasi ) by the bailiff (zabef) , from whom 
we are not told. This control (zabeti) was perceived as 
being in the hands of (dar-selseleh-ye) not one person. The 
term Iselselehl is translated by Haim as meaning 'chain, series, 
dynasty, or hierarchical order'. 
2 Van Bruinessen in his study 
of the Kurds uses the term to indicate 'spiritual pedigree'; 
1. Fasd'i, op-cit., vol-ii, p-214. 
Haim, 1975, p. 404. 
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it was the chain of transmission of the (mystical 
path) - 'A Sufj. master's silsila thus is the spiritual pedigree 
linking him to the founder of his particular pedigree I-1 
Perhaps in terms of the control of the district it is more 
appropriate then to speak of the 'chain of command' of the 
bailiff (zabet) with those below and above him. Lambton 
translates Izabet' as 'revenue collector; controller, 
bailiff. 2 
These terms cannot be simply translated because they imply 
particular perceptions of what places are and what was in- 
volved in relationships of authority. The labels used to 
identify them have their own historical positions within the 
context of relations of control. To move beyond their appar- 
ent meaning and a naive translation, it is thus necessary to 
examine them within this context. This is of course very 
difficult given the paucity of written sources. They are 
taken as read by Fasali who is much more interested in the 
physical distances between places and in the history of the 
province in terms of its 'big men', than in the mundane inter- 
actions between villagers and officials. Only a'minimal 
reconstruction of the nature of this inter-relationship can 
be attempted. Further investigation of Islamic legal codes 
might provide further insights. 
1. Van Bruinessen 1979, pp. 264-5. 
2. Lambton, 1953, p. 443. 
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Thus gharieh, an Arabic word, is translated by Haim as 
'village' and as equivalent to the Persian term Idehl. I Why 
then did Fasa'i not use the latter term? Perhaps the con- 
ception of the role and place of the village has changed? 
The term Ighasbehl, also Arabic, is translated by Haim as 
'borough, small town'; two different conceptions one indicating 
function, the other indicating size. 
2 In terms of Fasali's 
account it is the function that appears to be important, but 
a translation of this term as 'borough' hides and distorts 
the role of this 'central place' within the boluk, which 
apparently served as the base for the revenue collector. It 
can perhaps be assumed that within the boluk the zabet, while 
acting as a revenue collector over the district, also had 
closer ties with certain lands in the same boluk. 
The relationship that the various bailiffs had with the 
places from where they exercised control is not however clear, 
nor is the reason for the movement of the central place in the 
district from Zargharan, to Ramjerd, to Jashnian. But it can 
perhaps be assumed that the change was associated with the 
varying fortunes of the families involved. Rathýr than 
'central place' it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of 
'central persons' as there would appear to have been little to 
differentiate between the villagesin the district. Fasdllls 
account is predicated in terms of the 'big men' of the district, 
1. Haim, op. cit., p-544. 
2. Ibid., p. 545. 
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I 
but he gives no indication of where they came from or for whom 
they were bailiffs; They had responsibility for the collection 
of taxes (mdliat) within the district' They were responsible 
for maintaining the irrigation networks, and Fasali mentions 
that every year a proportion of the melak (revenue) and 
several thousand 
_'amaleh 
(servants) from the raliya workedto 
repair the system and partition the land for cultivation-' 
Prior to land reform there were two major landholding 
families i. n the Ayub valley, neither of which were directly 
involved in agricultural production. The Dehghan family 
owned the village of Jashnian, the former ghasbeh of the 
boluk of Ramjerd. The family was of some importance in Shirdz. 
In the early 1970s one brother sat on the city council, and 
another owned land in the centre of the cityj- as well as two 
cinemas. The Moadell family was the other important land- 
holding family in the valley. As administrators of the 
Moshiri vaqf they held land in other parts of Fars, including 
the district of. Korbal in the eastern part of the Marvdasht 
plain (see fig. 6). As with the Dehghan family they employed 
overseers (mob5shirs) to administer their holdings. 
It is tempting to suggest that the zabet-neshin (revenue- 
collectors, bailiffs, controllers of agricultural production) 
transformed their association with the land in Ramjerd into 
personal ownership of parts of it, and that the Dehghan family 
are the descendents of those formerbailiffs who controlled the 
1. Fasali, op-cit., vol-ii, p. 214. 
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district from Jashnian. This is reinforced by Lambton's 
definition of the term I dehghan I: "head of a village who held 
certain lands by hereditary right and acted as government tax 
collector". 
' 
At the beginning of the twentieth century one Ali Haji 
Nasrollah Khdn Estakhri constructed the ghdleh of Chamani; 
which now houses the headquarters of one of the larger land- 
owners in the valley, Mustafa Abdulahi. At that time the new 
village of Chamani had not yet been built. It was eventually 
located alongside this ghallehl. 
2 It is not known who Istakhri 
was, whether he actually owned land or rented land in the 
valley, or whether he was merely the overseer (mobashir) for 
the vaqf of the Moshir family, or indeed all three. The 
expansion of settlement in the 1930s was partly in response to 
government legiSI ation, 
3 
which obliged owners of land to ensure 
its cultivation or risk dispossession, and both the Dehghan 
family and the Moadell family sponsored the building of the 
new villages of Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek and Chamani. 
In the early 19SOs the Moadell family employpd Mostafa 
Abdulahi to manage their estates in the Ayub valley and in the 
district of Korbal. Abdulahi is from a family of Shirazi 
merchants. His grandfather was a lambskin trader with Russia 
who invested his accumulated wealth in the purchase of the 
1. Lambton, 1953, p-426. 
2. The village of Chamani thus now consists of two separate 
gha'lehs, see fig. 14 - 
3. A law passed in November 1937 stated that owners of land 
were bound to brinK them into cultivation (see Lambton, OP-cit., 
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large village of Bardej in the district of Korbal, to the 
east of Shiraz. Initially eml2oyed as an overseer (mobdshir), 
Abdulahi managed to purchase land in both Ramjerd and Korbal. 
He had emerged in the 1970s as the most important controller 
of agricultural production in both the Ayub valley and in the 
area around Mohamadab7ld in Korbdl (see fig. 6)- 
Much of the land which he now controls was 'dead land' 
(mavat) prior to his employment. Through the installation of 
motor pumps he brought a significant proportion of land in the 
Ayub valley under cultivation again. Parts of this land were 
under the control of the Dehghdn family. The position of 
'dead land' is somewhat complicated. 
1 It would seem that a 
person who reclaimed dead land, either by marking that land 
(tahjir) or irrigating it, gained thereby a-claim to cultivation 
and de facto ownership. Abdulahi employed pumps to irrigate 
some 300 hectares outside the cultivated areas of the villages 
of Chamani, Buraki and Pol-e-No. On this land he employed 
wage labourers recruited from a variety of sources. 
In addition to his de factor ownership of this land 
Abduldhi bought part of Pol-e-Ho from the Moadeli family and, 
until land reform was the malek of that village. He also had 
effective control of the village of Chamani, but he rented 
this from the Dehghan family and from one Mohamad Joukar, a 
small bazaar merchant in Shiraz, who became his own brother- 
in-law. In lieu of rent to the Dehghan family Abdulahi managed 
1. Lambton, op-cit., p-204. 
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agricultural production in the former's village of Futudbad, 
adjacent to the village of Jashnian. 
Abdulahi had landed interests elsewhere. Through purchase 
of land in the Mohamaddbad valley (Korbal) from the Moadell 
family and the installation of motor pumps in that area he has 
managed to bring a considerable amount of that valley under 
cultivation. 
1 Personnel from this area have been transferred 
to work on his estates in the IyLb valley. He has sub-rented 
other parts of the Mohamadabad valley to tulumbeh karan who 
have themselves installed pumps to irrigate smaller areas of 
land. Abdulahi owns a variety of agricultural machinery which 
is used both in Ramjerd and in Korbal. Both places are linked 
into a network of personal control over land and people which 
combine into a considerable personal enterprise. Abdulahi him- 
self was a prominent member of the Iran Novin party which was 
the party in power and he sat, like Dehghan, on the Shiraz city 
coun ci 1- His brother was governor (farmandar) of the import- 
ant provincial town of Kazerun. Another brother controlled 
reclaimed land on the Kazerun road just to the west of Shiraz, 
adjacent to the gendarme post of Deh Sheikh. 
2 
In addition to Abdulahi there were other landed proprie- 
tors in the Ayub valley. Buraki was owned by a retired army 
1. Much land in the Mohamadabdd valley, apart from that 
around the established villages, could not be irrigated, being 
away from the waters of the river Kor. It was used by Basseri 
and Kurd Shuli pastoral nomads as pasture land. 
2. This gendarme post now disused, was established as one of 
the outer defences of the provincial capital and is located 
next to a settlement known as Sakhteman-e-Joukar, and owned by 
Abdulahils brother-in-law of the same name. The gendarme 
station. controlled the Shiraz end of the Shiraz-Bushire road 
and was attacks by dissident tribal groups 
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colonel, who entrusted the management of that village to a 
resident. Esfardrdn, the largest village in the valley was 
owned by three urban-based landlords, one of whom was an agri- 
cultural engineer. The other two were urban merchants, 
The 'malek-raliyat system' 
A discussion of landownership in the valley gives few 
clues as to the local organisation of production, or of the 
evolution of that organisation which extracts surplus from 
the peasant cultivators. It is easy to 'cumulate' the changing 
complexes of rights and obligations which have bound the 
peasant cultivator (raliyat) to the landlord/ landowner (malek) 
into, what has been called the 'mdlek-raliyat- system' , and 
attempt to describe the system as a functioning whole, by 
abstracting its central and common characteristics. Such a 
procedure does, however, take the changing relationships out 
of their historical context. Not only does it ignore the com- 
plexities within the category Imalek' , 
for power within the region over time, 
that all Iraliyal share the same probl 
plexities within village organisation. 
exploring the question of ownership of 
elsewhere are not only associated with 
and thus the struggle 
but also, 'by assuming 
ems, ignores the com- 
The difficulties of 
land in the valley and 
the very complex inter- 
relationships between land and political power, but also with 
the categories employed to investigate forms of ownership and 
the evolution of control of land, whereby political control 
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and land grants, tax farming and the receipt of legitimacy 
from above through a 'chain of command', have significantly 
coloured the nature of exploitation, and involved a very com- 
plex association between control of land and control of 
political office. 
The lmdlek-ra I iyat system' , rather than being some time- 
less contractual relationship between a category of producers 
and a category of owners, appears in this light to be based 
on attempts., especially during the reign of Reza Shah, to 
rationalise agricultural production and government control 
over the rural areas, and seems to have been institutionalised 
at that time to characterise village production. 
Lambton maintains that the 'dominant type of settlement 
was the village' 
1 
and that this dominant typo-has maintained 
its dominance for millenia. She justifies this by pointing 
out that corporate settlement ensured labour for communal pro- 
jects and for defence against invaders. In addition 'it was 
easier to deal with the village as a unit than with individ- 
uals', 
2 
and government policy encouraged group settlement. 
The village with its supply of labour for 'communal' production 
was used as the unit for assessment, and as the lowest unit in 
the administrative hierarchy. This has had important impli- 
cations for the ways in which government control has been 
exercised and society has been organised. 
Fields within the village boundaries were normally culti- 
vated in common by cooperative groups of villagers. Most 
1. Lambton 19 69, p-6. 
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villages seem to contain a core, or cores, of extended family 
groups which form the basis for the production teams and 
village organisation. Agricultural activity within thevillage 
was managed by the most powerful males; a group of elders 
(rish sefidan) under the control of a headman (kadkhoda) . 
The nature of control over such agricultural production units 
has varied over time, and, until relatively recently, always 
appears to have been subject to negotiation between the 
various parties involved. As indicated in the section on land 
use and settlement, there was never any rigid separation between 
the tax farmer and the landholder/owner, despite the tendency 
for land to fall under the de facto control of particular 
families. Until the expansion of cash-crop farming during the 
nineteenth century those in charge of the col-lection of taxes 
appear to have been little interested in what was produced, 
visiting the areas under their control at infrequent intervals. 
The amounts that these landlord/ administrators were able to 
extract from the agricultural cultivators varied according to 
the nature of their control. Sometimes they were obliged to 
tour their districts with escorts of armed retainers to secure 
taxes from the cultivators. It cannot be assumed that the 
peasant cultivator readily gave up a proportion of the 
harvest 
out of a sense of moral obligation to the malek. 
The rate of 
extraction was, however, obviously subject to some maximal con- 
straints and the need to at least provide the conditions 
under 
which labour could be reproduced. 
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With increased interest in commercial production, the 
relationships between the landlord/administrator and the 
agricultural producers were subject to increased circum- 
scription, as the former arrogated rights of individual owner- 
ship to himself, and the latter was increasingly subjected to 
external control over the form of agricultural production. 
LegiSlation enacted during the 1930s formalised what Lambton 
terms a 'customary' relationship into a legal contractual 
relationship backed by state control. A law for the individual 
registration of property was passed in 1922. In 1926 a law 
establishing a uniform land tax was established. From 1929 
the government played an increasingly active role in the 
development of the economy-' Government monopolies for the 
purchase of many staple crops, such as opium and wheat, were 
created. Rights of ownership were further reinforced by legis- 
lation concerning dispossession of property in 1930. 
In terms of local administration, major changes were also 
made during this- period. In 1935 a law was passed which made 
the kadkhoda the legal representative of the landlord in the 
village, and responsible for maintaining cultivation. He 
3 
became thereby a government representative within the village. 
1. Lambton 1953, p. 184. 
2. Ibid., p-188- 
3. Prior to its formalisation in terms of village headman, the 
term kadkhoda was used to refer to the head of a craft guild, 
or to the head of a quarter in a town. In tribal studies the 
term is used as the head of a tribal sub-group (tireh) (see 
Lambton 1953, p. 430). 
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Legislation appears to have been generally aimed at increasing 
agricultural production. Owners of land which was not under 
cultivation were required, by a law of 1937, to bring such 
land into cultivation. The peasant cultivators became legally 
bound to cultivate for the landlord who now had the increased 
authority of the state to enforce his wishes. The result was 
to increasingly subordinate the peasantry to the control of 
the landowner and decrease its ability to act independently on 
the land now owned by the landlord. 
This new legislation attempted to place the relationship 
between malek and raliya into a contractual mould. It was 
formulated in terms of the raliyat leasing land from the 
landowner for a fixed share of the crop. This was divided 
according to the provision of the five traditional factors of 
production (land, water, seed, animal labour, and human 
labour) . The provider of each was entitled then to one 
fifth 
of the crop on irrigated land. In the Ayub valley the land- 
owner provided land, water and seed, and thus received three- 
fifths of the crop. 
In addition to their 'contractual' obligations as share- 
croppers, the villagers were also legally bound to perform 
other tasks, especially those which supported agricultural 
production - the cleaning and maintQ nance of irrigation 
canals and the repair of village roads. The 'contractual' 
obligations of the landowners were to provide a minimum of 
support for the villagers through the provision of loans to 
offset natural and social disasters and help villagers 
in neg- 
es- 
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The relationship which appears to have existed between 
the controllers of land and agricultural producers prior to 
this legi-c2ation also involved additional 'obligations' and 
'duties' for the villagers. To talk of these as 'customary' 
is to ignore the fact that they appear to have varied consid- 
erably and to have been subject to considerable negotiation. 
The public language of the 'good faith' econom)ý 
1 
which attempts 
to gloss over the often arbitrary exercise of power speaks of 
generous e. xchanges, of paternalistic authority, and mutual 
'rights' and 'obligations' whereas, as Ono has maintained, the 
relationships between malek and rallya were often very hostile. 
"the mdlek exploits the peasants, his raliyats with 
the sheer purpose of getting labour out of them and 
to squeeze land rent out of them, and his means of 
controlling the deh is attuned unscrupulously rather 
than directly to meet this purpose. " There is also 
alldeep rooted sense of mistrust between a malek and 
his raliyat. " (1967, p-4S2) 
1A term taken from Bokrdieu, P., 
, 
Outline of a Theory of 
Practice, Cambridge, 1977. Ihe concept is used again in 
Chapters 11&12-Bcý"r*dieu states: 
"The man of good faith would not think of selling certain 
fresh food products ... to another peasant, but always distri- 
butes them among friends and neighbours. He practises no 
exchanges involving money and all his relations aye based on 
total confidence; unlike the shady dealer, he has recourse to 
none of the guarantees (witnesses, written documents, etc. ) with 
which commercial transactions are surrounded. The general law 
of exchanges means that the closer the individuals or groups 
are in the genealogy, the easier it is to make agreements, the 
more frequent they are, and the more completely the), are en- 
trusted to good faith. Conversely, as the relationship becomes 
more impersonal, i. e. as one moves out from the relationship 
between brothers to that between virtual strangers ... or even 
complete strangers, so a transaction is less likely to occur 
at all, but it can become and increasingly does become purelN 
"economic" in character, i. e. closer to its economic reality, 
and the interested calculation which is never absent even from 
the most generous exchange ... can be more and more openly 
revealed (ibid., p-173). 
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While Ono's observations were made at a time when control oý, er 
the peasantry by the landlord had been reinforced by government 
legislation there is no reason to suppose a basic communal 
unity of interests at an earlier time. Cooperation and support 
were bought rather than inherited. The relationship between a 
malek and his raliyat involved relationships of inequality 
rather than specific contractual relationships between a 
landowner and a tenant supposedly rooted in the equally valuable 
assets that each brought to the agricultural process. It is 
not sufficient to descrjý e the malek purely in terms of 
ownership of agricultural land, as it is not sufficient to 
describe the raliyat as only an agricultural share-cropper. 
These are relationships of inequality and 
have their parallels in the context of the evolution of the 
relationships between people whether in the rural, urban or 
tribal environments. 
1 To isolate the 'malek-raliyat system' 
as an organising concept for the analysis of the 'traditional 
agrarian structure' as I Ajami does 
2 deflects analysis from 
examining the nature of domination and the institutionalisation 
of inequality. It also ignores the reasons for its formu- 
lation as a means of characterising the rural situation as 
'problematic' at a particular point in time; it is the 
Imalek-raliyat system' itself which is seen in the late 150s 
and early '60s as the major obstacle to reform in the rural 
1. The term raliyat. is generally translated as 'subject'. 
2. 'Ajami, 'Transformation of the traditional agrarian struct- 
ure p 1973. 
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areas. 
1 Lambton, in her two very detailed works on Iranian 
land tenure never mentions the 'mdlek-ra'iyat system' once. 
She does, however, attempt to accumulate a great deal of eýi- 
dence, and to synthesise this into a generalised formulation 
of the relationships between landlord and peasant in Persia. 
This may in fact itself be one of the reasons why the 'mdleR- 
raliyat aystem' was isolated by Iranian scholars in their 
attempts to come to terms with agricultural production in Iran 
at that time. It was translated into Persian and provided a 
ready peg on which Iranian students of land tenure could hang 
their interpretations of current events. Malek is defined by 
her, not in terms of landlordship, but very definitely in 
terms of land ownership, and she gives no other reading of the 
term in her 1953) publication. In her 1969 publication, on the 
I other hand, she appends to the definition of landowner the 
meaning given it by the Land Reform law of 1962: 'one who owns 
the land but is not personally involved in cultivation'. 
2 The 
term larbabl, while retaining associations with landownership 
is imbued with the ideas of masterhood and landlordship. 
3 
It cannot be used as a synonym for malek in the Marvdasht 
plain. The arbab is the landlord, removed from agricultural 
production; people like Dehghan and Moadell in the Ayub valley 
and the Q avams elsewhere in the plain. The malek is more of 
the landowner, although the term still implies a relationship 
of authority - people like Abdulahi were called malek. 
1. This is in contrast to the situation during the 130s when 
the 
, 
malekin were considered to be the major forces for modern- 
isation. 
-t-ambton ý9447-p-371- 
Ibid., p-367- 
5c 
The Land Reform programme 
In terms of the evolution of the relationships between 
landlords and peasants briefly outlineJabove, the land reform 
programme was more the consolidation of an emerging trend in 
the agricultural development of Iran, rather than a radical, 
'revolutionary' movement. It had the effect of: 
1. removing the non-productive landowners from pro- 
duction; 
2. transforming the labour force into wage-labourers, 
and marginalizing the majority of former share- 
croppers on unproductive enterprises; 
3. increasing the economic 'rationalization' of agri- 
cultural production. 
Its supposed effects were the abolition of 'feudalism' in 
order to give the peasants control over their own destinies 
so that they could take part in the economic and social recon- 
struction of the country; the government and its agencies 
were to cooperate with the peasant in confronting the oppress- 
ive Imalek-raliyat system'. 
1 
In the spring of 1971 the Ministry of Land ýeform and 
Rural Cooperatives was merged into the much wider ranging 
Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs. 
2 The work of the 
1. For a discussion of the land reform programme up to 1966 
see Lambton 1969. Also see Denman 1973 and Jazani 1980 for 
contrasting evaluations. In addition see Keddie 1973, McLachlan 
1978, Katouzian 1974, Lambton 1972. 
2. In November 1976 the work of this ministry was taken o%rer by 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources , thus resol%, 
ing 
the rivalry that had existed between the two ministries. The 
latter represented Iran's more successful commercial agricultural 
enterprises and agri-businesses with U. S. backing, whereas the 
forine-r- tended itself with the small farmer and rural 
cý)operative, c-f- WeJJnbaum 1978. 
11 
157 
former Ministry was presumed to have been completed. A small 
article appeared in a September edition of one of the leading 
national newspapers indicating that the last of the land to be 
transferred under the terms of the land reform laws had been 
transferred. In May 1973 it was estimated that approximately 
75% of all farming households, or 1.8 million tenants had 
received land. 
1 
The basic aim of the land reform programme was to divest 
the large absentee landowners of their large land holdings, 
and thereby reduce their ability to act independently of the 
central government. Monies received by the landowners from 
the expropriation of their lands would, it was hoped, fuel 
other sectors of the economy, to the overall benefit of the 
drive for industrialization. In addition it would appear that 
the Shah was attracted by a peasantry firm in its allegiance 
to him and combining with him in opposition to the regime of 
'slavery' exercised by the 'feudal landlord' (Shah's address 
to members of rural cooperatives in 1962). 
As early as 1907 the National Consultative Assembly abol- 
ished the system of land assignments and tax farming (tuyul), 
whereby estates were farmed out in recognition of services 
rendered to the reigning monarch. But this only went a small 
way in alleviating the lot of the peasant. In 1947 a bill was 
introduced into the National Consultative Assembly aimed at 
1. Halliday 1979, p-112. 
JýH 
incre as ing the peas ants I share of the harves t by 15 %, b ut the 
provisions of the bill seert to have been largely ignored. I 
In October 1952 erime Minister 'Mussadeq issued two decrees 
aimed at directing capital received by the large landowners 
from the peasant share-croppers into a fund for agricultural 
and rural development. Village councils were to be set up 
combining the interests of both landowners and share-croppers. 
Certain services, considered demeaning, but formerly provided 
by the villagers to the landowner or his representative, were 
2 to be aboliShed. In August of the following year Mussadeq was 
overthrown and all his decrees were abrogated, but the idea of 
village councils was retained in subsequent legislation. 
Many factors combined to make the execution of land reform 
programmes dif f icult in the early 160 1 s, one -o-f which was the 
absence of any cadastral survey. This was circumvented by 
legislation which recognized the de facto cultivation rights 
of both the peasants and the landowners; land was transferred 
to those peasants who were actually cultivating at the time of 
the reform, the layout of the village lands was not therefore 
ups et- 
The land reform law delimited the size of the maximum 
holding that could be legitimately held by one landlord to 
one village, but this was very easily and very quickly circum- 
vented. Membership of a cooperative society was a prerequisite 
1. Lambton 1969, p-37. 
2. Ibid., p-38- The responsibilities of the various -rural 
councils were outlined. Dues to landlords and labour services 
were also abolished. 13ut these were reimposed in some areas 
after Mossadeq's overthrow. 
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for the receipt of land. The various provisions of the land 
reform law of January 1962 subsequently became known as the W 
'first stage' of land reform-' 
The additional articles to the law, passed in January 
1963, and subsequently known as the 'second stage' of the 
reform, reversed some of the obvious inadequacies of the first 
stage and ushered in modifications, the results of a recog- 
nition of the political realities of the country. 
2 The limi- 
tations on holdings to one village meant that a landowner 
could retain ownership of one village in toto, or a maximum 
of 6 dang3 distributed over a number of villages. But legis- 
lation of August 1963 and February 1964 provided that members 
of a landowner's family could hold land up to the limited 
maximum. Land which had been mechanized priGr to January 
1962, that is land worked by machinery and/or by wage labour, 
was not subject to division. 
4 This latter clause exempted 
from re-distribution large amounts of land on the most fertile 
soils - land that was devoted to commercialised agriculture. 
Much land in the Ayub valley, and elsewhere in the plain, fell 
under this provision. The aim throughout was to*minimise the 
dislocation of production and maintain and perhaps improve 
agricultural productivity. 
See Lambton 1971, pO'17. 
2. Halliday comments: "A second stage of land reform came into 
effect in January 1963, but it was considered too radical and 
was watered down in a number of ways in 1964" (op-cit., p-111). 
3. Real estate was divided into 6 parts or dangs. 
4. Lambton comments: "as long as the landowner observed good 
farming practice there was no limit to the amount of mechanised 
land he could retain in his possession" (Lambtor. 1969, p-196). 
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The initial implementation was fraught with difficulties, 
especially in Fars province. Many anomalies came to light, 
and it was with the expressed intention of correcting such 
that the additional five articles becume law in January 1963, 
although not implemented until much later. They were aimed at 
reducing the dichotomy that had arisen between those villagers 
who had received land, and those in 'chosen' villages who were 
not eligible, 
1 
and those villages owned by small landowners 
not subject to reform. As the effects of the reforms became 
more apparent, the opposition to them also became more vehement 
and resulted in a subversion of their aims. The supplementary 
articles of 1963, subsequently entitled the 'second stage' of 
land reform, were decidedly conservative. They covered the 
large majority of villages not dealt with under the first stage. 
The landowners were allowed to keep a maximum of 30-150 
hectares of non-mechanised land, depending on the area. But 
they were obliged to dispose of the remainder according to 
five choices presented to them: 
1 They could lease their lands to the share-croppers. 
The rent would be decided upon according to average 
income from it over the previous three years, and 
would be subject to periodic review. 
1. Under the provisions of the land reform law of January 
1962 a landowner could select a 'chosen' village (deh-e- 
entekhabi) , the maximum holding he was allowed under the pro- 
visions of the reform. This could be a single village or a 
number of shares in different villages which together did 
not exceed six dangs. 
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2. They could divide the land according to existing 
share-cropping agreements. 
3. They could sell the land to the peasants at prices 
mutually agreed upon, but subject to the additional 
agreement of the Ministry of Land Reform. 
4. They could sell the land to the government on 
terms equal to those of the first stage. 
S. They could set up a joint-stock company with both 
Farties receiving shares according to former share- 
cropping arrangements. 
Rather than viewed as a measure to appease the landowners, 
which to a certain extent it was, it could also be seen as a 
means of preventing the emergence of a strong independent 
peasantry. As Lambton has pointed out: 
"As the efforts of those who aimed at the creation 
of an independent self-reliant peasantry were attended 
by an increasing measure of success, those holding the 
reins of power began to realise that the emergence of 
an independent peasantry might constitute a new factor 
in the political situation and threaten their own 
power. " 
(Lambton 1969, p-215) 
This second stage was not implemented until 1965 . and was 
declared completed in January of 1967. 
The third and final stage of the reform programme took 
the form of a more general and all embracing format for 
increasing agricultural productivity. Having supposedly 
reformed tenurial conditions it was now deemed necessary to 
make a concerted effort to bring the 'backward' agricultural 
sector into line with the burgeoning industrial sector to 
foster a self-reliant and growth-oriented econovy. The thirC 
stage stressed the amalgamation of uneconoric holdings and a 
strengthening of rural cooperatives, 
1 
with the attendant 
promotion of mechanization. This has had the specific effect 
of undermining the security of tenure achieved by the peasant 
proprietor under the first and second stages, by obliging him 
to put his land at the disposal of external agents; the agents 
of government appeared to usurp the position of the former 
malekin. Emphasis was placed on agro-business and what were 
known as 'farm corporations' (sherekat-ha-ye sahaini-ve-zerali). 
In such corporations villagers provide labour and land in 
return for shares in the corporations and the government pro- 
vides management, machinery and capital. 
2 
1. "In theory, a cooperative society was to have been set up 
wherever land was transferred to the peasants. In practice, 
this was not possible, and the setting up of cooperatives 
lagged behind the distribution and settlement of the land. " 
(Lambton 1971, p-37) 
2. "Phase three ... was aimed above all to consolidate rural holdings. The new policy either encourages farmers to parti- 
cipate in new state-run farming corporations, or displaces 
them through the private agricultural firms in which Iranian 
and foreign business interests are collaborating 'to apply 
capital-intensive techniques to the countryside. " (Halliday, 
op-cit., p-113). These farm corporations were managed by 
skilled engineers appointed by the Ministry of land reform and 
Rural Cooperatives. 'Ajami comments: "By May 1973, a total of 
43 farm corporations covering about 196,863 hectares in 327 
villages and annexed farms with a membership of 15,2SO share- 
holders had been set up" ('Ajami 1973, pp-37-8). 'Ajami states 
that although these farm corporations appear to have succeeded 
in raising agricultural productivity they have done this only 
with the application of considerable capital inputs, and there 
were significant problems with both village and management 
commitment to them. A model farm corporation was established 
at the foot of the Persepolis platform in the Marvdasht plain 
and, was included on the itinerary of most visiting dignitaries. 
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It is envisaged that all land irrigated through the new 
Dariush Kabir dam, which involves most of the dehestan of 
Ramjerd and substantial parts of the remainder of the Marv- 
dasht plain, would come under the unified control of govern- 
ment through a number of production cooperatives. 
1 By 1974 
four of these had already been set up. Unfortunately inform- 
ation is not available from the production cooperative in which 
the whole of the Ayub valley is now incorporated and the 
regime is not anxious to reveal performance statistics. 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the land reform 
programme because official figures tend to obscure more than 
they reveal and because it cannot really be conceived as sep- 
arate from its immediate past nor, from the trends towards 
the commercialisation of agriculture of which it now appears 
to be an integral part. Data from 1972 reveal that 16,300 
villages were distributed whole or in part through the first 
stage. 
2 The total number of villages in Iran is variously 
estimated at between 48,000 and 54,000. On these figures only 
approximately 30% of villages were involved. It was initially 
1. Or Isherekat-ha-ye talavuni'; these differed from the farm 
corporations in that they were more a middle road strategy in 
which the farmers retained their individual rights to land 
while working in groups. The aims were to amalgamate small 
uneconomic holdings with the agreement of the majorit), of the 
villagers involved, provide financial and technical assistance 
in agricultural production. These production cooperatiýI-es 
were under the control of a supervisor who was appointed b-ý 
the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Affairs (the successor 
to the Ministry of Land Reform and Rural Cooperatives) (see 
'Ajami 1973, p-42). 
2. Annual report, Bank-e-Marka: i, Tehran 1972. 
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estimated that of all villages considered to be eligible 
only 37% were whole villages, 
1 
which means that perhaps 8 or 
9% of all villages were released from their former landlord, 
who would still however retain his share of village lands. 
This does not of course include that significant element of 
the rural population who had no rights to land anyway, variously 
estimated as between 40 and 50% of the village popliation. 
2 
Public figures for the results of the second stage are 
not availa. ble, but according to Keddie: 
"A generous estimation can be made that ... of the 60 to 70% of villagers affected by the second phase, 
under one tenth of these (6 to 7%) received any land. " 
(Keddie 1972, p-384) 
Katouzian estimates that of all peasants with cultivation 
rights less than one third 
"received or privately bought land, or acquired 
shares in agricultural corporations, about 40% were 
given tenancies and around 28% still cultivate under 
the old system. " 
(Katouzian 1974, p-231) 
Even liberal estimates would claim that only perhaps 5% of 
the total rural population became actual land owners and 10% 
became lease holders or share holders. 
3 Although'a minority 
of peasants were able to improve their position, and join the 
movement for modernisation, the major results of the reforms 
appear to have been: 
1. Katouzian, M. A. , "Land reform in Iran, a case study 
in the 
political economy of social engineering", Journal of Peasant 
Studies, V01-1(2)1974, pp-220-239- 
2. For a discussion of the position of these people within 
the village see below, P- 246 - 
3. See Theberge 1975. 
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1. The entrenchment of the interests of the large 
landowners , through a clarification of their position 
vis-a-vis the bureaucracy; 
2. The division of interests of the former malek and 
raliyat and the commercial is at ion of the former's 
land at the expense of the latter. 
Modern agriculture has concentrated on capital rather than 
labour-intensive operations and the larger landowners have 
been in a superior position to avail themselves of the funds 
and expertise available for that. The peasant proprietor has 
been reduced in many instances to the cultivation of an unecon- 
omic holding employing primitive equipment, and it has been 
suggested that unemployment and urban migration have been 
fostered thereby. 1 
Lambton notes that landowners in Fars tended to live 
more exclusively off the land than in other parts of the 
country. 
2 The province heads the list of villages bought in 
part by the government, which suggests that the landowners 
tended to remain in more villages. Social and political 
influence was still derived from land, probably to a greater 
extent than elsewhere. In November 1962 a land reform offic- 
ial was killed near Firuzdbdd. Martial law was declared in 
Fars and the man was made a martyr. The 'feudal landlords' 
1. Halliday, op-cit., p-130. 
2. Lambton 1969, p-102. 
1&ý- 
of Fars were considered to be the cause of resistance and 
blame for the killing was put on the Qashqai khans, whose 
estates were specifically confiscated under Art. 35 of the 
1962 land reform law. 
Land reform in the Ayub villey 
The land reform programme did not reach the Ayub valley 
until the summer of 196S. That year was a bad year climati- 
cally, and resistance to the reforms was quite strong among 
the village inhabitants. Harvests were down and many villagers 
felt that they would be worse off than before as a result of 
the division of land. The question of the boundaries isolated 
by the land reform officials in that year, not only those 
between landlord and village cultivator, but also those between 
villages remained a source of conflict in the ensuing years. 
But the power of the large landlords served to override any 
major opposition from the villagers. The land reform officials 
and the rural gendarmery supported the landlords ' interpre- 
tation of their entitlements. 
considerable proportion of land in the Ayub valley was 
already cultivated by mechanised means, having been brought 
into cultivation by people like Abduldhi in Chamani, and 
Takhizadeh in Esfardaran, in the 19SOs and was thus not sub- 
ject to reform. This was external to that area worked by the 
1. Lambton 1969, p-p-68-9. 
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vi 1 lagers Cultivation on this ! and did not involve very 
many villagers. Abdu-Lahi employed his o-vn workers, often 
bringing them into the valley from elsewhere, and paying them 
in cash on a formal contractual basis. 
In Chamani the village was divided between the former 
share-croppers and the landowners, represented by Abduldhi, 
according to the existing share-cropping agreements. The 
village cultivators received 300 hectares and the landowners 
450 hectares. Abdulahi was able to retain the best land by 
dictating the nature of the division. He combined it with the 
300 hectares of land which he had brought into cultivation 
between Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek and Chamani. The 300 hectares 
received by the village cultivators in Chamani was divided 
between 38 former share-croppers, 22 of whoM-lived in Chamani, 
and 16 in neighbouring Buraki. This gave each share-cropper a 
notional amount of just under 8 hectares per person. 
1 
In Pol-e-No the 21 former share-croppers received 300 
hectares of land, and the landowners, again represented by 
Abdulahi, retained control of approximately 450 hectares. 
When added to the land in Chamani and the 300 pump-irrigated 
hectares, Abdulahi was able to consolidate a unified estate of 
1200 hectares and retain significant interests in three 
villages (both Pol-e-Nos and Chamani) and maintain considerable 
control over the activities of villagers in those places. 
1. This remained a notional amount because individual land 
holdings were never isolated. 
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Prior to the reforms, Buraki was owned by a retired army 
colonel who lived in Shiraz. He employed an overseer (mobashir) 
to manage his affairs. The landowners retained 80 hectares., 
while 16 villagers received title to 120 hectares with land 
riýf orm. Buraki residents claimed 1S hectares of land adjacent 
to the more recently established village of Chamani which was 
above the general irrigated level of the plain but had once 
-1 been served by a short ghanat, now long abandoned. This land 
had been reclaimed by Abdulahi who had installed a pump at one 
of the old ghanat outlets. Buraki residents claimed that this 
was their land and, like the land devoted to rice (see below 
p. 17c) ) had been traditionally cultivated by them. 
In Esfardran, the largest village in the valley, owner- 
ship was divided between three landlords prior to the reform. 
The largest of these, Takhizadeh, had mechanised some land 
which was excluded from redistribution. 58 village cultivators 
received 420 hectares. Takhizadeh retained 7SO hectares and 
the other two landowners (Dehghan and Basiri, the first the 
large landlord in Jashnian, the second an urban merchant) 
retained 240 and 158 hectares respectively. 
Domafshan was a settlement created by former pastoral 
nomads on the side of the Ayub mountain, and above the general 
level of irrigated land. Much land in this village was devoted 
to dry farming and many of the inhabitants were still involved 
very considerably in pastoral nomadism. 18 villagers received 
ownership of 80 hectares. 
1. Underground irrigation channel, more common in areas away 
from major riverine irrigation systems. 
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The division of land within the %-alley has accentuated a 
division between the large landowners and the ý-illage cultiva- 
tors, and has fostered a dualistic interpretation of village 
social organisation, as being divided into at least two 'pro- 
duction systems', one employing 'traditional' agricultural meth- 
ods, and labour intensive techniques, the other employing modern 
agricultural methods and wage labour; scratch ploughs exist side 
by side with tractors in all villages in the valley. It is 
often maintained that the two are perceptually distinct and it 
was oonvenient for the central government to regard them as such. 
But they are fundamentally related as two sides of the same coin. 
In addition to these two 'production systems I, two other 
'systems have been recognised. These are the 'remnants of the 
former lmdlek-raliyat system' or larbab-rai-yat system', and 
the Itulumbeh kar system'. 
1 Such an atomisation of village 
production ignores the complex inter-relationships that exist 
between them as well as the history of their emergence as sep- 
arate spheres of production. It takes the methods of product- 
ion, the techniques involved, without examining the relations 
of production which provide clues as to the reasons for their 
separate evolution. 
The next chapter analyses the organisation of local product- 
ion in the Ayub valley in order to bring out the complexities 
which were characteristic of such production, and the different 
sorts of relationships which were constructed between villagers 
and between villagers and landowners. This is done to demon- 
strate the problems associated with any neat characterisations 
of 1,0ý;. aj podLu-tinn which separate the large landowners from 
', e villaRers. 
Q 'I 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE ORGANISATION OF LOCAL AGRICULTURAL AND PASTORAL 
PRODUCTION 
It is in the organisation of local production that patterns 
of alignment between personnel within the plain are articulated. 
The emphasis so far has been on providing a regional and his- 
torical framework in which social organisation within the 
Marvdasht plain can be appreciated. This is vital if we are 
not to fall into some of the traps set by a priori reasoning 
about the nature of rural society, which ignore the context in 
which such rural organisation is set, and which tend to isolate 
discre. JE organisational forms and ignore their intimate inter- 
relationships with the wider regional framework in which they 
are contextualised, as well as the fact that they are also the 
historical products of such inter- relationships - 
A major problem is the successful conceptualisation of 
those living in V. illages as parts of a larger social, politi- 
cal and economic whole. The available terminology which 
talks of 'peasant' or 'agrarian' communities is itself part 
of the problem. 
1 The social processes which affect villagers 
cannot be explained simply by recourse to local inter- 
1- Much recent social analysis has focused on attempts to iso- 
late a separate 'peasant mode of production' or 'peasant sociev, 
which tends to concentrate on the internal characteristics of 
the peasant household or village community, to the detriment of 
other features which are consigned to the '-outside'. See for 
example the works of Chayanov (1966) , Wolf (1966), Shanin(1972) , 
and Sahlins (1974) - For an interesting critique of these attempts 
see Ennew et al. (1977) and Bernstein(1979) Silverman(1979) 
examines the use of the concept of 'peasant' in anthropology from 
its early use by people such as Redfield, Firth, Kroeber, wolf. 
Mintz (1973) provides an important counter-balance to the 
suggested in Redfield's work. 
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action. 
1 Because of their involvement in social contexts 
which necessarily include non-villagers, it is essentially mis- 
leading to distinguish them from others who are fundamentally 
members of the same social milieu. Thus the dichotomies 
rural/urban, landlord/peasant, tribe/state gain their percept- 
ual clarity as a result of the complex negotiations between 
those competing for control of resources and the emergence of 
a public language which legitimates the division, under 
particular historical circumstances. 
It is proposed in this section to analyse the nature of 
production within the Ayub valley, concentrating on the 
village of Chamani, in order to highlight the different pro- 
cesses involved in village production, and to show the differ- 
ent types of production to be found within one particular area 
in order to demonstrate the problems of treating places separ- 
ately. This involves a description of different activities 
and their associations with different people as well as an 
attempt to question some of the assumptions which have hin- 
dered an interpretation of Iranian village organisation. It 
is initially focused on particular types of produýts because it 
is through such a focus, rather than on 'village production' 
generally that the associations which bind the production in 
the village to the wider region can be readily emphasised. 
1. For a relatively early attempt to examine Iranian society 
from a regional perspective see English (1966), and De Groot 
(1977) uses a regional perspective in her historical analysis 
of the same area of Iran. 
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The major crops grown in the Ayub valley are shown in fig. 11 
together with the schedule of their cultivation. 
Certain features of the Ayub valley should perhaps be 
emphasised at this point. Firstly, because a great deal of 
land has recently come under the plough, the relationships 
established between landlord and peasant were not subject to 
the same restrictions as those in older-settled villages. 
Chamani, Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek and Domafshan were constructed at 
a time wheýn pressure to increase productivity was increasing 
(in the inter-war period) and those responsible for their con- 
struction were able to impose their own criteria on production 
to a greater extent than in those villages where landlords 
'received' an already developed village organisation. The 
former were not only able to select who would settle but also 
what would be cultivated. At a later date, when new land was 
trought. into cultivation with machinery, it was possible to ig- 
nore the labour intensive nature of village production to a 
greater extent, 'as small numbers of wage labourers, confirmed 
in their personal allegiances to the landlord could be employed. 
This land could be legitimately divorced froir incorporation 
into the village production system. Secondly, but relatedly, 
because of their recent establishment, these new villages were 
inhabited by people with considerable interests external to 
the village itself. Their interests were obviously more diý- 
erse than those of other, older villages and not as firmly 
rooted in village agriculture as tn these older villages. 
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While numbers of settlements rose and population in the 
valley increased considerably this did not necessarily imply 
increasing living standards. Many of the new settlers were 
former pastoral nomads who were either seasonally resident in 
the valley anyway or were migrants from areas outside the plain., 
The period in question (the inter-war and immediate post-war 
era) was one of considerable change which served to strengthen 
the control of a few and weaken the position of many through a 
process of. Imarginalisation' associated with increased indi- 
vidual production of cash crops, and the effective removal of 
villagers from land through changes in tenurial conditions. 
Until land reform there were very few small independent 
peasant proprietors in the plain and those that did exist were 
normally engaged in the cultivation of such things as fruit 
trees. 2 It is doubtful, however, whether the concept 'small, 
independent peasant preprietorl is a valuable one to isolate 
in either pre-reform or post-reform days. A classification 
according to such criteria iends to ignore the dynamic pro- 
cesses that have been and ciantinue to operate in the plain. 
1. Statistical evidence from Paydarfar's study of Ramjerd in 
the late 160s indicates that of the sampled population approxi- 
mately 31% were not native to the villages in which they were 
questioned (cf. Paydarfar 1974, p. 58). 
2. With the introduction of motor pumps in the '20s and '30s 
there was a gradual increase in the number of villagers who 
managed to rent or buy formally uncultivable land in the plain. 
But it is doubtful whether these can be called 'independent, 
peasant proprietors' because their families usually retained 
interests in land in the adjacent villages, in which they con- 
tinued to hold share-cropping rights. 
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As indicated earlier there are a host of relationships that 
individuals might construct which mean that they may be seen as 
peasant proprietor, small landlord, bailiff, as well as perhaps 
a wage worker at the same time. Rather than try to isolate 
individuals in these terms it is perhaps more important to 
analyse the processes whereby particular roles are explicitly 
isolated at particular periods of time. In some places these 
processes are more 'advanced' than in others and therefore 
embody different forms of relationships. In many ways it might 
be said that the situation in the Ayub valley is more 'advanced' 
than elsewhere, despite the fact (or perhaps because of it) 
that the villages in the valley figure as relatively undeveloped 
villages in Ramjerd according to the criteria adopted by 
Paydarfar in his 1974 survey- 
For the great majority of the population of the Marvdasht 
plain, production of agricultural goods with a minumm of sur- 
plus, and without the benefits of mechanisation, is still the 
major means of gaining a livelihood. This is traditionally 
supplemented by animal husbandry and by the sale of carpets 
woven by many of the women in the villages. Wagý labour from 
both agricultural and non- agricultural sources supplements, and 
in an increasing number of cases, has become more important 
than, the meagre income fromthe land. Such a statement obvious- 
ly disguises wide variations within and between villages, not 
1. Ibid., p-26. Paydarfar gives various scores to different 
criteria found within the villages surveyed on the assumption 
that the level of societal development of a village may be meas- 
ured by the presence or absence of a number of indicators. 
Items, such as radios, with the highest frequency were given the 
lowest ranking score. On this basis Buraki emerged as the 
, mos, t, ___4eve1nped! __jaj, the N-illages in the valley, followed by 
Pri-e-No and Domafshan, with Chamani the lowest. 
I 
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only in personal incomes but also in types of interest. 
Cultivation by villagers in Chamani 
In Chamani the villagers cultivate wheat, barley and a 
small amount of 'kisen' ,a fodder crop, on their own, as well 
as raising significant numbers of sheep and goats. Rice is 
also cultivated on the village lands by a small number of 
villagers resident in Chamani and a larger number of Buraki 
residents, in cooperation with Abduldhi, the large landowner 
in the valley. The village of Chamani is bordered on the north 
by Uanjan, onthe west by Nasrabad, and on the south by 
Buraki (see map, p. 89 ). It comprises some 750 hectares of 
land most of which, apart from that on the foothills of the 
Ayub mountain, and that bordering the river -Kor, is irrigable. 
Irrigation water comes from a canal which has its origin beyond 
the site of the dam at Dorudzan, in the dehestan of Kamfiruz. 
This particular irrigation canal also provides water for areas 
further downstream - Buraki, Domafshan, Pol-e-No, Esfardr-an 
and Mehrdbad. 
The irrigation canals were maintained by the villagers 
who contributed labour to periodically clear them. In the 
case of jointly used canals labour from the villages receiving 
water i, ý, as employed. The responsibility for their upkeep rested 
with the landlord, until the nationalisation of water in 1967, 
when responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Water 
and Power. The construction of a modern irrigation network 
based on the recently completed Dariwsh Kabir dam, replaced the 
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old system in 1973. (The following year the whole of the 
valley was incorporated into a-large state managed cooperative. ) 
Prior to land reform the villagers were employed as 
either share-croppers or as agricultural labourers on the 
fields of the large landlords. Part-time specialists were to 
be found in supportive activities to the agricultural processes. 
A distinction has often been made between those villagers with 
share-cropping rights (nasaq-ddr) and those with none(khwush- 
neshin). However in practice distinctions between the two 
were minimal; the landlord was able to exercise considerable 
choice in who would be involved in cultivation. 
1 
It is not unusual for villagers resident in one village 
to have interests in land in a neighbouring village. In all, 
16 adult males from Buraki had traditionally -cultivated land 
in Chamani and in addition to rice they were involved in the 
cultivation of wheat. As a result of land reform the 750 hect- 
ares of village land in Chamani was divided according to exist- 
ing share-croppi, ng agreements - the landlord maintained control 
1- The nasaq-dar was that person selected by the landlord to 
formally take charge of the cultivation of a parf of the village 
land. The village lands were divided into ploughlands which 
were cultivated by work-teams in which all the instruments for 
production, including animals and tools, were present. Attached 
to those nasaq-dars given responsibility for cultivation were 
others, brothers, sons of the actual nasaq-dar, who helped out 
at peak periods. In subsequent years these latter might them- 
selves become nasaq-dars. As Keddie points out: "Sharecropping 
contracts were nearly always verbal, unclear, and designed to 
keep the tenant from accumulating any surplus" (1972, p-373). 
There was no direct association between individual village share- 
croppers and particular stretches of land. 
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of 3/5ths of the land, or 450 hectares, and the villagers 
acquired control of the remainder. In addition to the 16 
people from Buraki there were a further 2-1 villagers resident 
in Chamani who became landowners. (In addition to the 750 
hectares themare approximately 100 hectares of pastureland, 
bordering the river and the village of Uanjan. This land was 
also used by the villagers together with the access to limited 
pastureland on the Ayub mountain. ) The land that was allo- 
cated to the villagers was the worst in the village and sub- 
ject to increasing salinity. In any one year prior to reform 
about 300 hectares would normally be left fallow. In effect 
land reform doubled the pressure on land by confining the 
recipients of land to the cultivation of much less. Lack of 
adequate resources and much more intensive use had considerably 
reduced the amount of land that could be left fallow, and 
resulted in the dry farming of much land which formerly was 
not considered cultivable. 
Each villa I ge was divided into a number of herasehs for 
purposes of production. These cooperating groups provided the 
majority of skills necessary for the cultivation of a variety 
of crops. They were composed of close kin and allied families 
who provided the flexibility required for maintaining an 
adequate means of livelihood. Both those with cultivation 
rights and those without were members. As increased emphasis 
was placed on the production of cash crops and as agricultural 
production within the village was increasingly dominated bv 
the dictates of the landlord, the kinship-based nature of the 
1 
heraseh seems to have declined in importance as a unit of 
agricultural organisation as individual control by the land- 
lord intensified. 
The herasehl was under the leadership of the most power- 
ful male in the group who supervised agricultural labour, pro- 
vided resources for cleaning of irrigation ditches and paid 
the rent to the landlord. Each herdseh was apportioned land 
in various parts of the village allowing it to cultivate 
different -crops . The heads of the various herasehs were under 
the supervision of the village headman (kadkhodd) who, after 
1935, became the landlord's representative in the village 
(see above, p. 
The heraseh was not normally associated with a particular 
stretch of village land. The way in which it articulated with 
village production seems to have varied according to the 
nature of the influence of the landlord. When the latter's 
influence was weak the various herasehs were able to take more 
control over the management of the various facets of general 
agricultural production. As the landlord became. increasingly 
interested in commercial production, and the village itself 
became more the unit of production rather than merely an 
administrative unit for the collection of rents and taxes, the 
heraseh appears to have become less independent. 
1. For a discussion of these traditional work groupings see 
Safi Nejad 1972. 
- 
In other parts of Iran they are referred to 
as bonehs or sahras. In the Ayub valley the term sahra refers 
to the uncultivated land, used as pasture land. This was under 
the supervision of the head of the sahra who apportioned 
pasture to the various owners of animals in the village. 
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The heraseh was divided into a number of ploughlands or 
khish. The khish was the amount of land that would normally 
be worked by a yoke of oxen. Each heraseh would have one or 
more ploughlands in the various parts of the village land. 
So that the village wheat, barley and rice fields, for example, 
would each have a number of khish from the various herasehs 
which made up the village population. 
It has been suggested that periodic, often yearly redis- 
tribution of land meant that de facto ownership by villagers 
of particular stretches of land was circumvented. But the 
heraseh was not primarily organised in terms of the control of 
particular stretches of land and thus, although in periods of 
strong landlord control, entrenchment on particular stretches 
of land might be avoided this would not appear to have been a 
major reason for reallocation. Rather the nature of agricul- 
tural production and the relationship of villagers to land 
pre-supposed control of scattered sections of village land, 
to provide the necessary resources for the cultivation of a 
variety of crops. 
Rice Cultivation 
Of the 750 hectares in Chamani, about 15 hectares were 
devoted to the cultivation of rice. Before the establishment 
of Chamani, an area adjacent to the main irrigation canal was 
traditionally cultivated with rice by residents of Buraki, in 
1. See Keddie 1972, p. 374. 
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cooperation with the representatives of the landlord of the 
then largely wasteland area of Chamani. This tradition has 
been continued, despite pressures on irrigation water. In e> 
other parts of the plain rice cultivation has declined, par- 
ticularly since the nationalisation of water in 1966, and 
sub-sequent restrictions on its use. 
1 Rice was the only crop 
still subject to cultivation under tradition share-cropping 
agreements associated with the'malek-ra'iyat system'. The 
landlord (Abdulahi) provided the land, the seed and the water 
and the villagers provided animal labour and human labour; the 
distribution was thus three parts to the landlord and two 
parts to the villagers. 
The land was prepared in the autumn, for planting at the 
beginning of April. Transplanting took place in July and the 
crop was harvested at the end of Octob er/be ginning of November. 
Rice was a particularly prized crop, not only because of its 
yields but also because of its value in the diet of the villa- 
gers - 
Twelve cooperating groups (khish) were involved in the 
production consisting of between 2 and 4 individuals per khish, 
and involving in all about 30 people, although this number 
expanded at harvest time. Each group entered into a yearly 
contract with the landlord for the cultivation of about two 
1. In 1970 the Ministry of Water and Power formally restricted 
the use of water from the river Kor to 40 days during the 
c1ring. Extractions by pump in areas above Marvdasht were res- 
tricting the amounts of water entering the irrigation neti,, orks 
in areas further downstream - in Korbal and towards lake 
Bakhtegan. 
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hectares of land. Labour was shared in the ploughing and in 
the irrigation and manual harvesting of the crop. The land- 
lord employed a specialist irrigator from the village of 
Shahrak, up towards the dam, where considerable expertise in 
rice cultivation existed and from where many irrigators migra7 
ted for about 6 months of the year to work on similar contracts 
in various parts of the plain. The landlord provided this man 
with a room in the village andrayment was in the form of a 
share of the harvest on the threshing floor. 
Ploughing was traditionally done with the oxen brought to 
the fields by the head of the khish. Rice, requiring more 
labour intensive methods than other crops, still retained a 
significant labour input; perhaps the major reason why it was 
still produced under traditional share-cropping agreements. 
The cost of employing outside help was borne by the khish and 
not by the landlord. 
Sugar beet, another summer crop, was intensively cultiva- 
ted in Chamani prior to the land reform programme but was sub- 
sequently abandoned. The villagers stated that the reasons 
for its abandonment were that the land on which it was formerly 
grown had been taken over by the landlord and they no longer 
had the land on which to cultivate it. It is however still 
grown in Buraki and Esfardran, and in other parts of the 
1. In Chamani this man lived with his sisters who were 
married to two landowners in the village(nos. 1 and 2- see 
appendix 2 
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plain. 
The composition of cooperating groups in the rice fields 
seems to have varied from year to year and, because the large 
landowner retained control of the land, it would appear that 
it was ultimately his choice which in the end was important. 
Bearing in mind that traditionally certain Buraki families and 
4 Chamani families had been involved in cultivation on rice 
land within Chamani, he selected the heads of the various khish 
according to his own criteria, which included expertise as well 
as individual attachment to him. These sar-e-khish would them- 
selves collect others around them to help in cultivation. 
Normally these were close relatives, but some were more loosely 
joined together. For ex4mple Abduldhils kadkhoda, himself a 
Buraki resident, worked together with the landless, but com- 
paratively rich, shop keeper from Buraki, and one brother not 
1. The history of the development of sugar beet is informative. 
The town of Marvdasht grew around the sugar beet refinery which 
was constructed there in the 1930s. The government invested a 
great deal to ensure the cultivation of sugar beet in the 
Marvdasht plain. ' 
They provided financial and technical assis- 
tance to would-be producers with which to install motor-pumps 
on land being brought into cultivation and they also provided 
elaborate extension services. They guaranteed to buy the har- 
vested crop at pre-determined prices. Under suclý circumstances 
many landlords invested in sugar beet production. This employed 
considerable amounts of village labour, under traditional share- 
cropping agreements. After land reform many of the large land- 
lords appear to have abandoned production because of the demands 
on labour, and most sugar beet is now cultivated by peasant pro- 
prietors on land retained by them, in cooperation with the 
sugar beet refinery. Villagers themselves are responsible for 
ensuring that the crop reaches the refinery. They are not how- 
ever in control of prices and some villagers are now obliged 
to transport their crop to the other sugar beet refinery in 
Kavar because of over-production in the Marvdasht plain. 
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normally -msident in the area, being engaged primarily in pas- 
toral nomadism, came down from the sarhad specifically to 
participate in the harvest. 
As noted earlier there were 12 cooperative groups involved 
in rice cultivation. These were represented by 12 separately 
accumulated piles on the threshing floor (sar-e-kharman) where 
the various debts incurred during cultivation were repaid. 
Throughout the harvest period the landlord's representative 
(mubasher)was present in the village to supervise the distri- 
bution. No rice was distributed except when this person was 
present, and to ensure that no one was able to take from the 
various piles in his absence the various piles were raked over 
and stamped with a large wooden stamp on which were cut the 
words IYa 'Ali' - The kadkhoda for the landlord did the count- 
ing with the help of portable scales and the irrigator together 
with the heads of the various groups put the weighed measures 
of the landowner and the various individual members of the 
cooperating groups into their individual piles. One typical 
distribution involved five piles, one for the landlord amount- 
ing to about 270 mann (1 mann Marvdashti = 3.2 kgs. ) and 4 
individual piles of 42 mann each. This implies a total harvest 
of approximately 5,280 mann or 16,700 kgs., of which the land- 
lord took 3,000 mann for sale on the urban market, and the 12 
cooperating groups received about 2,000 mann. With no more 
than 4 people in any one of the cooperating groups this meant 
that each individual received at least 42 mann. The irrigator's 
share was 105 mann, or approximately 2% of the crop. A similar 
1 ;- -', 
percentage was taken to support the village development fund, 
and supervised by the village development council. 
1 The 
villagers I shares were used for personal consumption and did 
not enter the market. 
Only the irrigation of the rice was subject to the employ- 
ment of a specialist irrigator (abiar) brought in from outside. 
A fellow villager of his was also employed on the landlord's 
lands in Futuabad which were given over to rice. And the land- 
lord's mpresentative, resident during the harvest in Chamani 
spent time there supervising distribution and removal in the 
landlord's own truck. Arrangements for the cultivation of 
rice in that village seem to have been similar to those adopted 
in Chamani. 
Wheat cultivation 
Approximately 200 hectares of land in Chamani cultivated 
by the villagers were given over to wheat and in any one year 
approximately 12,0 hectares were planted. These 120 hectares 
were divided into two for purposes of supervising cultivation, 
each involving the cooperation of a number of khish under the 
control of the most important adult male. The 16 Buraki land- 
owners were divided into 6 khish and together formed one heraseh, 
the head of which was one Mashd Baber who sat on the Chamani 
village council. The 9 Chamani landowners involved in the cul- 
tivation of wheat, under Yadollah Baneshi (No. 1) were similarly 
1. This was stored in one of the store-rooms (ambdrs) attached 
to the courtyard of the head of the village councll (ralis-e-I 
. 
ýIýumLan) - 
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divided into 4 khish of Luri and Persian families. There were 
no Rusta Turks involved directly in the cultivation of wheat. 
1 
The land to be planted with Iroshan' wheat, the local 
variety, was ploughed, disced, and built into beds (takht) 
ready fo r the distribution by hand of the seed at the beginning 
of autumn. Little use was made of chemical fertilizer in 
Chamani as it was in other more prosperous villages, but animal 
manure was collected from those individually owned animals and 
distributed prior to ploughing. The two herasehs took it in 
turns to irrigate their wheat with one group working from sun- 
rise to sunset and the other from sunset to sunrise. Approxi- 
mately 10-15 mann of seed per hectare were sown. The beds 
were specially built to take the irrigation water and measured 
approximately 100x20 metres. The first irrigation (and one 
full irrigation took approximately one week) , was around the 
beginning of Aban (see fig. 11 ), one month after planting. 
This was known as the khak db, or 'water for the ground'. The 
second irrigation was around the end of Azar or one month 
following the first and was known as the pei-ab, or the 'water 
for the root'. The third irrigation, known as th e sagh-ab, 
or Iwater for the stalk' . was applied about 10 
days after No- 
Ruz, the Persian New Year, i. e. the end of March. The fourth 
irrigation, known as gol-abl, or 'water for the flower' was 
applied one month later in Ordibehesht, followed by the final 
1. The population of Chamani consisted of Luri, Persian and 
Turkish speaking people. See below, chapter X) 
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Fig. II Agricultural cyc le of maj or crops in Ayub valley 
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irrigation in Khordad one month later and known as daneh-ab, 
or 'water for the seed I - In a dry year another irrigation was 
often necessary. 
Each cultivator gave 500 rials per year to the local 
office of the Ministry of Water and Power since national isation, 
for the use of the water. Other than the use of a tractor for 
ploughing and discing, little other mechanised means were 
employed. Each khish harvested the crop by hand, as with the 
rice harvest. Combine harvesters were not used by the villag- 
ers in Chamani, although they were extensively used elsewhere in 
the plain. Costs for the employment of tractors varied accord- 
ing to the type of land but in Chamani were between 200 and 
300 rials per hectare, the lower figure for discing, the higher 
one for ploughing. This was paid in cash by the head of each 
herRseh to the tractor owner. 
Yields on the villagers' land in Chamani were low, partly 
because of the poor quality of the soil and partly because the 
villagers did not have the facilities or the reserves to make 
efficient use of mechanisation or of available chemical ferti- 
lizers. At the harvest a 2% levy was made which went into the 
village development fund. The remainder was primarily used by 
the villagers for subsistence and only secondarily did it enter 
into the market, usually through sale to the landlord or to 
individuals in the village who had relations with corn merch- 
ants in Marvdasht, or in exchange for goods bought in the 
village shop. In a good year yields might reach 1,000 kgs. 
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per hectare, but more normally they were much lower (on wheat 
fields on which chemical fertilizer has been applied, yields 
reach 1,500 kgs. in other villages in the plain). Thus, if an 
individual was involved in the cultivation of approximately 
4.5 hectares., then he might expect to product up to 4,000 kgs. 
or 1,200 mann of wheat in a good year. With a sale price in 
the early 170s of 10-14 rials per kilo. this suggests an in- 
come from wheat of about 4,000 tomans or approximately 1270 
at 1970-1 prices. 
1 (It was locally assumed that approximately 
200 mann was needed per person per year for consumption. ) 
Seed for the subsequent year could be retained in a good year. 
Barley cultivation 
The only other crop of significance grown jointly by the 
villagers was barley. Most of this was dry-farmed (daim) on 
the unirrigable area bordering the river, the remainder was 
grown on irrigable land bordering this. In all approximately 
100 hectares were devoted to irrigated barley, grown primarily 
as a fodder crop and only secondarily for sale. In any one 
year about 60-70 hectares of this would be under cultivation. 
It was the primary crop cultivated by the Rusta Turks in 
Chamani. 13 adult males formed one heraseh for the cooperative 
production of this crop, divided into khish and under the over- 
all control of the kadkhoda of the Turks, Jav5d (No. 7) , who was 
1. In the early 1970's k= 150 rials (10 rials =I toman). 
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also head of the village council. Barley has a shorter grow- 
ing season than wheat and only one or two irrigations are 
necessary. Yields are, however, considerably lower and 
obviously the amounts harvested by the villagers could hardly 
support them. They useda great deal of the barley as fodder 
for their comparatively large numbers of animals. 
Kisen 
In aqdition to barley the villagers devote half a hectare 
per person for the cultivation of another fodder crop, kisen. 
All villagers participated in this, which occupied about 10 
hectares of land. 
Chamani appeared to be distinct from many other villages 
in the plain where a majority of the villagers obtained at 
least a major proportion of their income from the cultivation 
of village lands, especially if the villagers were also invol- 
ved in the cultivation of summer crops, such as cotton, opium, 
1 
or sugar beet. 'Within the valley, in the larger village of 
Esfardran, the villagers were involved in more intensive cul- 
tivation of cash crops and there there would appear to have 
been much more concerted action by the 58 villagers, who ob- 
tained 420 hectares of land for their personal use with land 
reform. They financed the installation of a pump to obtain 
1. Opium was cultivated under strict government control in a 
selected number of villages in the plain, including the 
recently established farm corporation. It was an extremely 
profitable crop but much of the profit went to the government. 
It was however grown surreptitiously in many of the more iso- 
lated parts of the province. 
Igo 
water from the river, to supplement the supply coming bý- canal 
from behind the dam, and with the help of the sugar beet 
refinery embarked on large scale production of sugar beet. 
They employed mechanised means to cultivate their land and 
made considerable use of chemical fertilizers. 
Pastoral interests 
In addition to the wide variety of agricultural activities 
in which people in most parts of the Marvdasht plain are en- 
gaged there was a significant interest in livestock, particu- 
larly sheep and goats. These would seem to have always been a 
part of the sedentary village economy, but they were more 
important in some villages than in others. A variety of 
arrangements were utilized for pastoral actiV-ities, ranging 
from the small herds of 5 or 10 animals taken out by the small 
son of the household to graze on pasture within the village 
lands and housed in the family compound at night, to the long 
range nomadism which utilized the full ecological range of the 
southern Zagros and involves thousands of animals, specialist 
camping groups and coordination of access to pastures. The 
reasons for concentration on pastoralism or on agriculture are 
many and varied, depending not only on physical environmental 
conditions, but also on socio-historical circumstances of 
individuals and groups. In the Ayub valley, for example, 
former nomadic pastoralists who were obliged to settle under 
191 
the enforced sedentarisathn programme of Reza Shah have never 
given up their interests in sheep and goats. 
For some villagers ihe raising of sheep and goats was a 
major source of income, especially for those who had their 
roots in pastoral nomadism. In Chamani for example, the vill- 
agers owned some 750 sheep and goats. These wýre separated 
into five flocks, each under the control of an individual 
shepherd who took the animals out from the house compounds in 
the morning to find grazing and brought them back in the 
evening. 23 heads of households owned some animals; from the 
8 owned by those with the smallest numbers to the 100-plus 
animals owned by two of the four Rusta Turk brothers. The 
Rusta Turks in Chamani owned about two thirds of all the ani- 
mals in the village. All the shepherds were-Turks and, apart 
from Ziad, were the sons of major animal owners. For looking 
after the animals of others the shepherds received S rials 
per head per month. 
Javad, the kadkhoda of the Rusta Turks, and head of the 
village council was responsible for the allocation of grazing 
rights within the village area. He was commonly referred to 
by the villagers as Irais-e-sahrd' which might be loosely 
translated as that person in charge of the 'open country' (i. e. 
that land not under agricultural production). He himself had 
100 animals, as did his brother Ziad. A third brother, Azad, 
had 90, and their father's brother, Kamar Khan, had 80. These 
were the largest animal owners in Chamani. (It is 
interesting 
to note that in work done among the nomadic Farsi Madan section 
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of the Qashqai confederacy of tribes that average household 
ownership of sheep and goats was reported as only 36, and 2S% 
of all nomadic households did not own any animals at all 
I 
The major pasture lands for the village of Chamani were 
those along the banks of the river Kor, and on land devoted 
to barley adjacent to this and cultivated by the Rusta Turks. 
The five flocks were shepherded separately, feeding on the 
green barley in the spring before moving to higher ground, on 
the Ayub mountain, and across the river to Abarej and Khafrak 
in the high summer. They returned to the vicinity of the 
village after the harvest when they were allowed to feed on 
the stubble. There was never enough grazing in the area 
immediately around the village, and what there was was subject 
to increasing restrictions, through expansion in agricultural 
production and increasing numbers of animals. 
Different types of relationships were therefore constructed 
with shepherds and others to exploit pasture land outside the 
village and in many instances outside the plain. With increas- 
ing agricultural production, animal husbandry was being 
squeezed out of this part of the plain and pushed into a long- 
range nomadic 'straight jacket' which was characterised by 
movements between largely separate summer and winter quarters; 
flock owners were obliged to move further and further afield 
in order to secure adequate access to grazing facilities in 
more marginal parts of the province. The Rusta Turks in 
1. 'Aj ami et al. , 1974. 
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Chamani, for example, had made arrangements with the Turks in 
Uanjan and Junaki for the joint exploitation of the area ad3a- 
cent to the river in which all three villages had contiguous 
stretches of territory. Arrangements of a different sort were 
made to move animals further afield. Contracts were made with 
those nomads, some of whom were relatives anyway, who passed 
through the area in the spring and autumn. Javad, among the 
Rusta Turks of Chamani, contracted with some of these nomads 
to take his animals with them. The most formal type of con- 
tract was a yearly one known as nimeh kar, whereby the shep- 
herd took the products of the animals entrusted to him, as 
well as half the number of offspring, in return for looking 
after the animals. But many different and more informal con- 
tracts appear to have been constructed,, some only involving 
a period of months when the shepherds took the village animals 
up to the sarhad in the summer, or down to the garmsir in the 
winter. 
1 
Distinctions between nomadic and sedentary ways of life 
begin to blur, as do distinctions which separate pastoral 
from agricultural populations, when one begins to try and un- 
ravel the complexities of their inter- relationships within the 
Marvdasht plain. A distinction was locally made between khdki 
and bddi, 
2 between sedentary and nomadic, in reference to 
1. For a recent discussion of herding contracts see Beck, L., 
'Herd owners and hired shepherds; the Qashqai of Iran', 
Ethnology, vol. 19, No: 3, July 1980. 
2. Literally 'people of the soil' (peasants) and 'people of 
the wind' (nomads) - 
1 C)4 
different facets of a group's activities. Thus the Rusta Turks 
in the valley maintained constant inter-connections with their 
nomadic cousins, uniting them under a loose framework for the 
joint exploitation of agricultural and pastoral resources. To 
call this framework 'tribal' is fraught with complexities 
about the definition and use of the term Itribe'. The distinct- 
ion between tribe and non-tribe is indeed difficult to make, 
but it cannot be so easily correlated with the distinction 
nomadic/sedentary or pas toral/agricultural , as has often been 
maintained. As in the case of animals in the valley one is 
dealing with pastoral activities that are classified as tribal 
and non-tribal and which are not necessarily nomadic-' 
Chamani was one of a significant number of villages in 
the plain, like Pol-e-No and Domafshan in the valley, where 
pastoral activities, as evidencedby relatively large numbers 
of animals, were still important. Most of the older villages 
had smaller flocks which were shepherded together on the vill- 
age lands and which did not figure as prominently in the vill- 
age economy. Competition for pasture among these flocks was 
not as intense, because they were seldom taken off the village 
lands - 
The Rusta Turks in Chamani were not directly engaged in 
very much agricultural production, being associated primarily 
with the production of barley, and animal husbandry formed 
quite a significant proportion of their income. As conditions 
1. See above, chapter 
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of production in the valley and in the plain generally changed 
their ability to maintain their interests in this form is 
called into question. Unlike the large landlord they did not 
have the capital to invest in buildings or fodder to improve 
their flocks, or to make them less dependent on a traditional 
form of pastoralism. The circumscription of pasture lands 
associated with their decreased availability meant that they 
were being pushed into taking different sorts of employment 
outside the traditional agricultural/pastoral context in which 
they were rooted. In these. central areas large scale pastoral 
activities have become the virtual monopoly of the large land- 
lords as 'traditional' pastoralism, like 'traditional' agri- 
culture is pushed into themore marginal areas of the village 
and of the province. 
Other agricultural production 
Despite occupying the attention of the majority of 
villagers in the valley, their agricultural activities were 
marginal to overall agricultural production which was dominated, 
as elsewhere in the plain, by large, urban-based landowners 
and renters of land who were increasingly interested 
in this 
land as a means of producing profitable cash crops. The 
nature of the control of these landowners and renters of 
land 
varied according to the nature of their holdings, and the ex- 
tent of their involvement in production. Land was still a 
major means of acquiring status, and therefore ownership and 
control of it was imbued with considerations of power and 
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authority both at the local and regional level. In examining 
the nature of agricultural activity engaged in by these urban- 
based personnel it is not sufficient simply to describe their 
economic involvement as this cannot realistically be separated 
from their involvement in the regional polity and their per- 
ceptions of their places in that polity. This becomes immed- 
iately evident when we look at the interests of the largest 
agricultural producer in the Ayub valley, Abdulahi. 
In co. ncentrating on land alone, one ignores the actual 
relations of production which are rooted in associations with 
land but not necessarily in formal legal title to land. 
Abdulahi for example, although not the owner of all the land 
that he cultivated, had managed to we ld it into a unified 
estate which transcended the village boundaries of Chamani, 
Buraki, and Pol-e-No. He is now the most important political 
and economic personality in the valley. His estate stands in 
apparently marked contrast to the adjacent fields now cultiva- 
ted separately by the villagers (except of course for the small 
amount of rice cultivated by the villagers on Abdulahi Is terms) 
On his estate Abdulahi employed wage labourers recruited from 
adjacent villages, but more often from elsewhere in the region. 
Investment in sophisticated farm machinery and in chemical 
fertilizers, as well as in the services of expert extension 
workers from government offices, presents a picture of modern, 
efficient, cash-crop farming, in contradiction to the labour 
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intensive and comparatively unproductive work of the villagers. 
This picture of economic efficiency and economic rational gov- 
erning interest and investment in agriculture disguises much 
that is 'traditional' in Abdulahils activities and leads us 
into a static appreciation of a dual economic structure and 
away from the processes that bind all sections of the local 
population together. 
This estate in the Ayub valley was only one of a wide 
variety of activities in which Abdulahi was involved. To 
represent him as a progressive farmer solely interested in 
increasing productivity and profitability is to ignore the 
context in which he acted and the multi-faceted nature of his 
concerns which governed the nature of his inter- relationships 
with others, both in the Ayub valley and in the wider provin- 
cial framework and which had major effects on the population 
in the Ayub valley. It might indeed be argued that any attempt 
to analyse events and relationships within the valley could 
not proceed without an analysis of his interests and the con- 
text in which he was situated; from this point of view the 
Ayub valley serves as one locus of interest in a province-wide 
network (again one of the traps that the anthropologist can 
fall into by concentrating on places rather than on people) - 
Besides being a member of the Shiraz City council, having land 
in Shiraz and gardens on the outskirts, Abdulahi had signifi- 
cant landed interests in the area around Kushk-e-Molliih in the 
district of Korb5l. 
1 His brother administered land along the 
1. The winter quarters of the Basseri were in Korbal Kav5r 
an d. &tt-, rvc 3 tan - -fb*mb-r,, on 19 5 3, p- 15 9) 
"1 O 
Kazerun road, where the family has made significant invest- 
ments in livestock. Abdulahi also managed land for Dehgan in 
the latter's village of Futuabdd in the district of Ramjerd. 
Abdulahils father was the major landowner of the large village 
of Bardej with a population of 7,000, south-east of Shiraz, 
and Abduldhi had significant interests there after the former's 
death in 1971.1 Seen from. Abdulahils perspective these dis- 
parate interests combine into a loosely centred 'empire' con- 
trolled from his residence in Shiraz, and personnel employed 
in one area might be freely transferred to another, as indeed 
they had been in the past. 
1. It is interesting to note a report written by T. Marinos 
in 1962 on a 'field trip to the regions of Esfahan and Fars'. 
Mr. Marinos was adviser to the social affairs section in the 
economic division of the Plan Organisation with special inter- 
est in community development, and the only 2 villages he 
visited in Fars were Bardej and Tarbor. He describes Bardej 
as an 'extremely backward village' which belonged to 'a most 
uncooperative and mean landlord who lived in Shiraz' who was 
very influential politically (p. 15). 'The landlord's influ- 
ence over most government services was too strong to ignore. 
In the past, some villagers who had the courage to move inde- 
pendently in support of changes affecting their way of life 
... not only werp they faced with complete 
failure but aleo 
were branded as subversive elements by the security police of the 
Os tan -I (p - 16-17) According to his informant: 'up. to 3-4 
generations ago, all the land in the area was of public domain 
and then it was bought by the ancestors of the present day 
inhabitants of the village. The man did not know how the land 
became the property of their landlordl(p. 17). 'The village of 
Bardej is a typical example of the existing feudal system in 
the area' (p. 17). Tarbor, the other village that Marinos 
visited is justnorth of Abduldhi's own settlement of 
Mohamadabad and he was responsible for the collection of rents 
in that village. Tarbor is described in the report as a very 
different village in which the villagers owned half the land 
and which 'gave the impression of a modern clean village 
built on properly designed plan' (p. 18). 
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In the Ayub valley Abdulahi was engaged in the cultivation 
of wheat, barley and rice (see above) , as well as melons and 
cotton. He also used the valley as grazing grounds for his not 
inconsiderable flocks of sheep and goats during the summer 
months of the year. In partial payment for land rented to him 
by Dehghan in the valley he supervised cultivation of some of 
the latter's land in the village of Futuabad as well as rent- 
ing land there to cultivate rice, wheat and cotton. His 
interests in the valley were controlled from his base in 
Chamani. This consisted of a 15-roomed courtyard which occu- 
pied perhaps one-third of the area of the village (see fig-14). 
It was built before the actual foundation of the 
village for the use of the representative (mubasher)of the 
Mushir vaqf. During most of the year Abduldhi visited the 
valley at least once every month, and during the critical pre- 
harvest season was there for a number of days at a time. 
Since the purchase of motorised transport it was only two 
hours journey from Shiraz and with the building of a passable 
connecting road to the major tarmaced dam road, he was able to 
bring his town car with him. The day-to-day administration 
of his lands in the valley was in the hands of two people, 
both known as kadkhodas, one resident in Buraki and responsi- 
ble for land in Chamani (Rais Asad) , the other resident in 
Pol-e-No and responsible for land there. Above them was an 
1. When work was begun on the Dariush Kabir dam a tarmaced road 
was built from the main Shiraz-Esfahan road at Pol-e-Khan to the 
dam site. Khen the canal construction company took Chamani as 
the centre for their operations they levelled and widened the 
existing track from that road at Kushkak (see fig. 7). 
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overall manager for the valley more or less permanently resi- 
dent in the house in Chamani (Mashd Ali Khan, mubasher) , who 
was not a resident of the village but had come from Abdulahi's 
interests in the district of Kurbal, where he left a family. 
Above them was an overall general secretary (nayeb), 
who was resident in Chamani at critical periods but who other- 
wise looked after Abdulahils office in Shiraz, which was 
attached to his residence. This latter person owned a house 
in Shiraz where his family lived. 
These landed interests in several parts of central Fars 
provided Abdulahi and his family with the basis of a not 
inconsiderable income, maintaining a rather wealthy urban 
family with rising expectations' , but with considerable tradit- 
ional affiliations, attached as it was to other bazaar merchant 
families and the older administrative hierarchy. His position 
in the regional political scene, and the implications this 
had for residents of the Ayub valley are dealt with later. 
It is, however, necessary to reiterate that any understanding 
of events in the Ayub valley must remain incomplete unless 
they take account of this man's varied yet important influences 
and interests. 
As a result of land reform Abdulahi controlled 450 
hectares within the village of Chamani and 450 hectares within 
the village of Pol-e-No. In addition, the 300 hectares brought 
under his personal control was claimed by him prior to land 
reform through his installation of 3 motor pumps to extract 
water from the river. Together some 1,200 hectares of irrigable 
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I 
land were under his unified control. This does not include 
the land devoted to rice in Chamani, or the land used for the 
cultivation of cotton in a cooperative venture with the villa- 
gers of Pol-e-No. He pays about 200,000 Ts. per year (, J12,000) 
in rent for the land he does not personally own. The 300 11 
hectares adjacent to the river and irrigated by pumps was 
excluded from the reform and was from the time of its reclam- 
ation, (1953/5) worked by wage labourers. The relations of pro- 
duction under which this land was cultivated were extended to 
land in Chamani and Pol-e-No after land reform in 1964. The 
early 150s was the time when Abdulahi was beginning to carve 
out an independent career for himself. He wanted to get away 
from his father's overriding influence in Korbal and preferred 
to start in Ramjerd, where he was asked by Moadell, the admin- 
istrator of the Mdshir vaqf, to work as a mubasher. Abdulahi 
gained control of the 300 hectares by installing motor pumps, 
and subsequently rented land from Moadell rather than administer 
it. 
Wheat 
The water from the pumps was supplemented by that from 
the older irrigation channel to irrigate 600 hectares of wheat. 
240 hectares were given over to the cultivation of a newly- 
introduced high yielding variety from Mexico, which Abdulahi 
grew for the second time in 1970. This variety was smaller and 
more wind resistant and required a shorter growing season, 
but 
more irrigation (see fig. 11). For his efforts with this 
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new seed Abduldhi had been awarded the title of most progress- 
ive farmer in Fars for the year 1969. The remaining 360 hect- 
ares in the valley devoted to wheat were sown with local 
Roshan and Inia varieties. Because of his experiments with 
Mexican wheat Abdulahi was given considerable financial and 
technical support by the local agricultural office in Shiraz 
which provided subsidized fertilizers as well as extension 
services. The major task of the sepah-tarvij (extension 
corpsman) seconded to the village in 1969 as seen by Abdulahi 
was to look after the new wheat, rather than to be of service 
in the general agticultural education of the villagers as was 
more generally intended, and as the sepah himself saw his job 
In addition to the two representatives in Chamani and 
Pol-e-No who also had land of their own, and to the two admin- 
t 
istrators, the mubdsher and the nayeb, Abdulahi employed a var- 
iety of personnel to help in.,, cultivation. Some of these were 
more like personal servants, others had the status of wage 
labourers and were employed on a daily or a monthly basis 
depending on the needs at the time. Some tended to be more 
permanent than others, but at any one time perhaps 15 people 
1. One of the major provisions of the White Revolution wa ,s the setting up of various revolutionary corps which would form 
the front line in the modernisation drive. These included 
Literary Corpsmen, Extension corpsmen and Health corpsmen. 
These corpsmen were recruited'from senior school graduates and 
as part of their national service were given a short training 
before being seconded to the rural areas. 
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were working on Abdulahi Is fields in the Ayub valley. Apart 
from the seasonally employed wage labourers, all Abdulahi's 
workers could be moved around from one of his interests to the 
other depending on requirements. So that the housekeeper/cook 
in the house in Chamani might, be moved to help in Shiraz or in 
MohamadRbad, the house built by Abdulahi in his garden in 
Korb. il. Similarly permanently empbyed tractor drivers worked 
land both in Ramjerd and in Korbal. Abdulahi personally owned 
a wide variety of agricultural machinery in addition to the 
three tractors, but he did not own any combine harvesters. 
In recent years the numbers of privately owned combines had 
increased considerably dnd subsequently the cost of rental had 
, ý! 
been reduced. For many large landlords it worked out cheaper 
to rent rather than own. The same was, to a lesser extent, 
true for tractors. ' although their increased flexibility made 
them more useful for a greater proportion of the agricultural 
year. Abdulahi also owned a large truck which he used for 
transporting grain and fertilizer to and from Shiraz, and he 
employed a permanent driver for this - When the truck was not 
required for village work it was hired out to a transport 
company in Shiraz. 
Unlike the majority of village cultivators Abdulahi was 
in a position to store his whe-at harvest until prices were high, 
and in 1971, one of the worst years for some years, when 20% 
of his wheat and barley crop was burnt by the sun and lack of 
water he was not unduly worried because the price rose by more 
than 20% on the national market to compensate for the losses 
incuyTed. 
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Barley 
Barley was grown by Abdulahi on the unirrigable land next 
f 
to the river and on that land behind the village of Chamani 
which was above the general level of the plain. Arrangements 
for its cultivation and its harvesting were flexible and it 
was not given the same amount of attention as the wheat; it was 
not grown as a cash crop, but rather as a fodder crop and to 
provide pasture for Abdulahi's herds of --zheep and goats, as well 
as the two horses he owned. , The land was prepared by Abdulahils 
workers using his tractors. On the fields adjacent to the 
river harvesting was done by villagers by hand, because of the 
unevenness of the ground. For the privilege of being allowed 
to harvest the crop they could take one quarter of it. On the 
area behind the village of Chamani those permanent ly- res i dent 
workers of his did the preparatory work in their own time. 
They were provided with the land and the seed by Abdulahi and 
were then entitled to receive half of the harvest under a 
nimeh kar contrdct. 
Cotton 
Cotton has been grown in parts of Ramjerd since the nine- 
1 
teenth century. Abduliihi devoted some 30 hectares within 
Chamani to its cultivation. The land was prepared with the 
help of machinery, and ihe irrigation 'beds' (takht) were pre- 
pared by wage labourers employed by Abdulahi. Small amounts 
1. See Fasali, Vol-2, pp-214-215. 
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of chemical fertilizer were applied, but apart from irrigation 
little further attention was given to it. In 1970 the cotton 
harvest realised some 8 tons with a sale value of 1,500 tomans 
per ton. The cotton was harvested by any of the villagers, old 
and)oung who had the time to do so, and they were remunerated 
at 6 rials, per m\ ann coBected. The cotton was initially stored 
in the landlord's house in Chamani before removal to the 
ginning factory in Shiraz. In the spring of 1971 however, 
Abduldhi decided to invest more attention to the systematic 
cultivation of cotton and enlisted the services of the agricul- 
tural office in Shiraz who sent out an engineer with special 
i 
machinery to contour-faim the land and sow the seed evenly. 
This was the only machine of its kind in Fars at the time and 
again Abdulahi was seen to be in the forefront of agricultural 
innovation in the'province. Still the harvest in that year 
was collected by the villagers who were remunerated as before. 
Jdliz Kar 
Also in 1971 Abdulahi began an experiment with the culti- 
vation of melons and cucumbers (jaliz) on land subject to dis- 
pute with the villagers of Buraki near the gha'le of Chamani, 
and irrigated by a small pump installed the year before by him 
and capable of irrigating 30-55 hectares. Such an experiment 
reflected an increasingly popular form of cultivation being 
practised in other parts of the plain. It differed more mark- 
edly from any of the other cultivation techniques in practice, 
in that it did not involve directly any local labour. In 
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Chamani 6 specialists from the northern Iranian city of Ghom, 
where melon and cucumber production was traditionally important, 
were contracted by Abdulahi to cultivate 1S-20 hectares. Water 
from the motor pump and land were placed at their disposal by 
Abdulahi, together with 50% of the fertilizer and seed 
required. The remainder was provided by the 6-man team on a 
nimeh kar contract. The land was leased for 9 months and the 
profit from the crop was divided equally between the cultiva- 
toys , who obtained half, and Abdulahi. The head of the team 
was responsible for the payment of the workers. Other less 
permanent workers were frequently to be found on the melon 
field having come down from Ghom to help their colleagues/ 
relatives - After subtracting transportation costs and the 
prite charged by the urban middle man through whom sales on the 
urban market were 'processed, the head of the team took 5% 
from the total sales in payment for his fee. The remainder was 
divided equally between this man and Abdulahi. Before paying 
other members of the team the price of seed and fertilizer 
provided by the head was deducted. These members were paid 
on a daily basis, their wages being deducted from the remain- 
der of the income before the bonus was paid. The bonus depen- 
ded on the profitability of the crop and was the equal split 
between all the workers of the remaining monies after all 
deductions. 
The melon cultivators were semi-permanent residents of 
Chamani during their time there, but lived in isolation from 
the rest of the villagers in rooms provided by Abdulahi in his 
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courtyard. For the two cold months in the spring they lived 
indoors but when the weather became more suitable they erected 
a hut in the middle of the field and ate and slept there for 
the remaining cultivation period. They did not rely on the 
village for anything, obtaining their supplies of food from 
Marvdasht and from Shiraz. All living expenses were shared 
and costs were deducted from their bonuses at the end of the 
season. Production tended to be high and techniques used rel- 
atively sophisticated. Although figures for productivity are 
not available from Chamani, Ajami has calculated that for the 
village of Sheshdangi, where a similar operation was being 
undertaken, near Marvdasht, each member of the team realised 
some 4,300 tomans for their work in the year 1966/67. 
Thus in the Ayub valley alone Abdulahi was engaged in a 
number of very different enterprises, some, such as rice cul- 
tivation, involving very Itraditionall cooperative relation- 
ships between himself and a group of share croppers; others, 
such as melon cultivation, totally excluding local inhabitants 
from the production process. In this latter case we have the 
complete divorce of villagers from agricultural production on 
part of the village land. In Shashdangi 'Ajami talks of the 
emergence of four separate production systems (viz. the rem- 
nants of the old arbab-ra'iyat system, the large machanised 
estate, the peasant proprietor system, and the tulumbeh kar 
system), as if they involved separate personnel and were 
carried out independently of each other. 
1 In the Ayub valley 
1. 'Ajami, op-cit. 
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this separation is not so evident and indeed according to 
'Ajami's criteria for distinction Abduldhi is personally 
engaged in all four. In the Ayub valley at least it is not 
possible to disaggregate in the way in which 'Ajami does and 
in fact such a dis aggregation, obscures the basic ties which 
.I 
bind all the 'systems' into one in the context of village agri- 
culture in the plain. Arbitrary divisions based primarily on 
types of production give little information about the actual 
relations of production that are operative. Nevertheless 
distinctions in the methods employed for cultivation of the 
land give some clues as to the nature of various landowners and 
farmers in the plain and- thus to the different socio-political. 
g7oups at the regional and local"'levels. In many circumstances 
Abduliihi might be classified as a 'progressive' farmer, and 
that is the mould 'in which he has been casteby regional admin- 
istration, but in many other circumstances, particularly when 
one analyses the nature of his relationships with those who 
work for him, his actions reveal a very 'traditional' approach 
to both personnel and cultivation (see below, Chapter XII) - 
Pastoral interests 
In addition to his interests in agriculture, Abdulahi, 
like many of the villagers, had invested considerable capital 
in sheep and goats. In the early 1970's he had approximately 
2,500 animals, as did Takhizadeh, one of the landowners in 
Esfardran. These animals were divided into 8 flocks of approxi- 
mately 300 animals, each looked after by one shepherd. The 
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animals were separated according to age, and in the early 
summer according to sex. Abdulahi employed 6 shepherd house- 
holds to look after his animals. They all had yearly renewable 
'contracts I, and had in the early 170s, in the majority of cases 
been working for Abduldhi for, a number of years. In the win- 
ter months, from , November through to March, they were based in 
and around MohamadRbdd in southern Korbal. In early spring 
and autumn they spent some time around Deh Sheikh on the 
Kazerun road, on land controlled by Abdulahils brother, and in 
the summer they were based in the Ayub valley. In all three 
places Abdulahi had built extensive shippens to house them, 
I 
when grazing, or weathet conditions were bad. The distance 
,Y between summer and winter quarters was approximately 80-100 
kilometres which was quite an extensive migration through cen- 
f 
tral Fars but was 'short in comparison with some of the long 
range migrations made by some. of the tribal-nomadic groups - 
Conditions in Mohamadabdd are comparatively warmer than those 
in the Ayub vall-ey and, in addition to the shippens within the 
Mohamadabad compound, stone foundations, similar to the now 
abandoned s emi- subterranean winter dwellings of the Rusta 
Turks in Chamani, had been laid in various parts of the valley, 
to house both flocks and shepherd families at times during the 
winter months, to serve as local bases forgrazing. In the 
spring the flocks were brought up to Ramjerd to graze on the 
green wheat and barley in the Ayub valley and in Futuabad prior 
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to being taken to higher ground in Kamfiruz, 1 behind the dam 
for some weeks. When the harvest had been gathered in in the 
Ayub valley the sheep returned to feed on the stubble before 
returning, via Deh Sheikh, to Mohamadabad forthe winter. 
Competition for use of pasture lands had become increas- 
ingly intense in\central Fars. Despite a decrease in the late 
sixties and early seventies in the power of tribal nomadism 
the numbers of animals on the land would seem to have increased. 
Competition was from a variety of sources, the animals of 
villagers as well as of long range pastoral nomads, and signi- 
ficant numbers of animals were brought down from Isfahan during 
i 
the winter months to take advantage of grazing facilities in 
central Fars. In addition, expansion in the area under culti- 
vation had significantly reduced the amount of land available 
to pastoralists. This is put as high as 20% in the sarhad-e- 
kuchek to the west of Shiraz. 
2 Many areas that were once 
I- Much of the dehestan of Kamfiruz is now submerged under 
the lake built up behind the dam. At the time of field work 
many villagers had already been relocated in parts of Ramjerd 
as well as elsewhere. The ownership of the land was not clear 
as the Ministry of Water and Power had issued compulsory pur- 
chase orders for land affected by the dam. Kamfiruz was tra- 
ditionally used by sections of the Qashqai as their summer 
grazing area (sarhad). It was also famous for rice production 
(see Fasali vol-ii, p-313). 
2. See 'Ajami et al., 1974. A distinction was made within the 
Qashqai between sarhad-e-kuchek (lit: small cool area) and 
sarhad-e-bozor, g (lit: large copl area). The former was located 
to the west of Shiraz between Kazerun and Shiraz in which much 
recent settlement had occurred. The latter related to the 
higher, more remote areas of the upper Zagros region. 
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freely available to pastoral nomads have now been restricted, 
for a variety of reasons; the association in the mind of the 
central government of dissidence and tribal nomadic organi- 
sations; the de facto take-over of land by members of the 
urban middle classes; and the, expansion of village agricult- 
ural activity. 
Abdulahi had built up his interests in Ramjerd and 
I 
Mohamadiibiid in the last 30 years, not without the influence 
of the various agents of the central government with whom he 
was associated. Together he and his father were responsible 
for ensuring the completion of the various gendarme stations 
on this part of the Shir-az-Fasa road and the extension of cen- 
tral authority was paralleled by' an extension of their author- 
ity and influence into an area that had previously been under 
the influence of the Basseri khans, members of whosetaifehs 
extensively used the Mohamadabad valley prior to Abduldhi's 
emergence. Abdulahi united with the forces of central govern- 
ment and law and. order to defeat the 'tribal/feudal rebels' - 
Until some thirty or forty years ago much of the valley was 
unattractive to agricultural investment because of the lack of 
surface water and there was consequently little pressure on the 
pastoral nomads who were using it. Since then Abdulihi has 
been in more or less constant conflict with Mohamad Khan Basseri, 
until the latter's eventual imprisonment, and many threats were 
made on the former's life. Similar conflicts were increasingly 
evident in the Marvdasht plain as the migration routes of the 
long range pastoralists were restricted. Access to pasture- 
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lands was exceedingly complex, and was made more so rather 
than less by the government's nationalisation of all pasture 
land as a national resource. Rather than preserving rapidly 
denuded areas of the environment this has served to exacerbate 
the fact that those who held power had better access to res- 
ources. So it was not surprising that when Abdulahi wished 
to restrict the flocks of Darreshuri pastoralists passing 
through the area around Futuabad he was very easily able to 
obtain a document signed by the head of the tribal gendarmerie 
to restrict access in favour of his own herds, (when previously 
the Darreshuri had used the area) Similarly it was hardly 
surprising that Abdulahý was able to obtain access to grazing 
land in Kamfiruz, above the dam-, ' when others, in a particularly 
dry year., could not. A letter of authorisation served to stem 
the anger of the villagers in the area who were in serious 
need of the limited pasture available for their own animals. 
Abdulahils shepherds had been recruited from a variety of 
sources. His chief shepherd, Ali Aghd, came from Beiza, where 
he had been recruited through Luri acquaintances in Chamani. 
Other shepherds had abandoned long range nomadic life amnng the 
Basseri and the Arab tribes to work for him, and one Turki- 
speaking shepherd had formerly lived in Nasrabad adjacent to 
Chamani. Contracts were renewed at No Ruz, the Persian new 
1. In this Abdulahi was supported by the gendarmes stationed 
at Kushkak. They presented the heads of the various encamp- 
ments with this document in the spring of 1971 and the latter, 
who were intent on staying in the area for a number of days 
because reports indicated that spring was late in opening up 
their summer pastures, were obliged to move on under threat of 
use of force and arrest. 
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%4 
year. Each shepherd received a yearly cash income of 200 
tomans together with 40 mann of wheat, 10 kilos of wool at 
shearing, a felt shepherd's coat (namad), tea, sugar, cigar- 
ettes and cloth shoes (giveh). If this proved insufficient to 
meet subsistence requirements, it was supplemented when neces- 
II 
sary, and occasional gifts of cash were given, at the whim of 
theflock owner. The head shepherd was remunerated in a differ- 
ent way and instead of a yearly cash payment received a monthly 
income of 150 tomans. Each shepherd family was allowed to 
retain a small personal flock of sheep and goats and these 
varied in size from 20-50. No other animals were allowed by 
Abdulahi, and the shephords' animals were not allowed to mix 
with the main flocks but were iriazed separately, on land 
allotted by Abdulahi. The wool that the families received at 
shearing was used'to make carpets, by the women. 
Because of the very dry conditions prevalent in southern 
Iran during the summer of 1971 it was suggested by the shep- 
herds that the flocks be allowed to move to higher ground where 
pastures were more extensive. Abdulahi did not follow up this 
suggestion. He was less dependent on natural pastures than 
other nomadic pastoralists and could purchase tufala 
(sugar 
beet pulp) to see him over the worst periods of drought. He 
was also in a position to call in the resources of the most 
modern veterinary facilities available. Takhizadeh, the other 
large flock owner in the Ayub valley did however take his ani- 
mals up to higher ground and obtained grazing rights 
for that 
year in Sarhad-e-Chahardangi, in the summer quarters of some 
214 
of the long range pastoral nomads. On that occasion his own 
shepherds accompanied the flocks, but it would appear that in 
other cases animal owners contracted with these nomads to 
take their animals up to the summer quarters and down to the 
winter quarters on various sorts of shepherding contracts. 
During the spring and summer months, when milk was more 
I 
7 
readily available, the women in the shepherd encampments pre- 
k 
pared cheese, butter) kashk (dried curds) , yoghurt, and butter 
milk which was syphoned off by Abduldhi for his family's use 
in Shiraz. Sufficient was however retained for the personal 
use of the shepherds' families and Abdulahils retainers in 
Chamani and a considerable amount of kashk was stored for food 
in thewinter. Although the shepherds contracted to provide a 
certain amount of produce from the animals in their charge it 
would appear that Abdulahi could take off products if and when 
he required. The shepherds were offered a little help in their 
work at peak periods of lambing and shearing by village labour 
temporarily contracted by Abdulahi from among villagers who 
normally worked for him as wage labourers. The separated 
flock 
of lambs was looked after by one of the older members of the 
Rusta Turks in Chamani (Avolfat) who was paid cash for the 
month or so that he was employed. Regular agricultural workers 
from Chamani were seconded from their irrigation work to help 
in the shearing for which they received no additional payment 
but were provided with free meals and a kilo of sweets; willing- 
ness to help at this time built credit later 
for those involved. 
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Shearing was supervised by the landlord's representative in 
the Ayub valley. The wool was immediately sold, largely to 
wool merchants in the Marvdasht and Shiraz bazaars, but also 
small amounts were bought by villagers for use in carpet pro- 
duction. 
Each year Abdulahi sold about 300-350 head to merchants 
in Shiraz. Individual animals brought in between 200 and 250 
tomans when sold in the autumn of 1971, representing a cash 
sale price of as much as 87,500 tomans or about 46,000. These 
were sold on the hoof and driven into Shiraz from Mohamadabad. 
Additional animals would be bought during the year when the 
opportunity presented it'Self, either from villagers or from 
pastoral nomads and his whole stock had been derived from such 
sources. In future years, with increased opportunities within 
the Ayub, valley afforded by the construction of a ipeat pro- 
cessing plant, Abdulahi was - proposing to bring in more system- 
atic techniques for pastoral production, placing more emphasis 
on artificial feed and the introduction of better strains of 
animals - He had already invested considerable capital in 
erecting out-houses to house his flocks, outside Chamani. 
I 
There was very little to distinguish Abdulahi's shepherds 
from others engaged in pastoralism in the three areas in which 
they were found; the black tentý which they occupy are no 
1. This meat processing plant was ostensibly being constructed 
as part of a package of measures to rationalise pastoral nomad- 
ism. It was envisaged that a chain of these would be built 
along the major migration routes. Unfortunately the pastoral 
nomads who moved through this part of the plain were not geared 
to selling their animals at that particular time. It would 
appear that the plant favoured the activities of people like 
Abdulih17 I-athyr--ttraTr-pastoral nomads. 
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different from those used by the pastoral nomads who are sea- 
sonally to be found in the Marvdasht plain, or from those used 
by villagers who camp temporarily with their flocks in areas 
removed from their permanent place of residence. Former pas- 
toral nomads in Pol-e-No, f9r, /example, would unwrap their goat 
hair tents each summer and take their flocks on to the moun- 
tains across the river. But despite the similarities in organ- 
isation, the control of personnel and of production were fun- 
damentally different and the contrasts in the operations of 
Abdulahi and villagers is revealed in the ways in which the 
former was able to call on very different sorts of help in his 
pastoral activities. N: 
The compound built by the Abdulahi family in Deh Sheikh 
I 
on the Kazerun road has been carved out, at the foot of a 
gendarme station, 'from former open country used by Qashqai 
nomadic pastoralists who now -compete for use of the land with 
Abdulahi's herds at various peak times of the year. 
1 Conflicts 
over access are -frequent but those with access to sources of 
power in the urban centres invariably prevail. The strong in 
this case are not the tribally organised any longer. 
Landlords and Landowners 
The Ayub valley thus contains a variety of large land- 
owners who view their associations with the land in very differ- 
ent ways. It may be because the landowner in Sheshdangi 
2 
1. This is in the sarhad-e-kuchek of some of the Qashqai 
pastoral nomads. 
?- 'Aiami. oi)-cit. 
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for example, was himself an agricultural engineer, that the 
distinction between cultivation techniques on his land and 
those on the land of the villagers, were more evident, but 
one cannot deduce from this what the relations between the 
landowner and those employed by him were. Certainly the 
Imarginalisation' of much of village agriculture as a result of 
the land reform programme has given scope for sometimes radical 
intervention, as a result of the q removal of certain constraints 
on action but everywhere landowners are constrained by the 
socio-historical legacy with which they approach agricultural 
production. 
Takhizadeh, for example, one of the major landowners in 
the village of Esfardran runs his estate on prima-kily commer- 
cial grounds. He personally supervises the cultivation of 
cash crops utilising the most sophisticated machinery and 
employing wage labourers on a formal contractual basis. He 
has little control over village activities and maintains that he 
does not want any. Because of his ownership of land within 
the village boundaries he does however sit on the village coun- 
cil and is involved in village-wide development projects. He 
is unusual in the plain in that he classifies himself as a. 
farmer and gains most of his income from his farming activities. 
Unlike Abduldhi, and other lan'dlords, he would frequently be 
found driving his own tractor. 
Esfardran is the only village in which Takhizadeh has 
land. He owns, like Abdulahi, a variety of agricultural machin- 
ery and has made extensive use of available extension services 
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provided by the agricultural office and foreign German aid 
missions. In the early '70s he was primarily engaged in the 
cultivation of wheat (260 hectares) and in the raising of 
sheep. He was interested in increasing concentration on 
alfalfa, of which he then had, 17 hectares, to provide fodder 
for his animals, and was intent on ploughing back profits in 
wheat into the relatively expensive scraping of land (at 
P 2,000 tomans per hectare) with the ultimate aim of putting 
500 hectares under alfalfa.. He had already built a complex of 
buildings to house 900 animals during the winter and hoped to 
extend these to house the 2,500 animals which he then owned 
i 
and ultimately concentrate almost exclusively on meat product- 
ion. The nearness of the sugar beet refinery provided a ready 
source of Itufalal (sugar beet residue) for his animals. The 
proposed large meat processing plant to be constructed outside 
the neighbouring village of Fakhrabad, would absorb much of 
his produce. The ten or so people he employed were all on 
regular contracts and under the supervision of two men resident 
in Esfardran. Takhizadeh lived in Shiraz but with the in- 
creased availability of transport he was able to commute between 
his home and his farm. He also maintained a job as an agri- 
cultural engineer having received extensive training in the 
United States. 
It might be said that Takhizadeh's interests give credi- 
bilitY to 'Ajami's claims for a number of separate production 
systems operative within one village. Closer inspection reveals 
a very complex inter-relationship between his interests and 
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those of others in the village; illustrated by joint rights 
to water and joiAt responsibility for the clearing of irri- 
gation ditches, by the joint construction of roads out of the 
village, by reliance on others for access to pastureland, both 
in the valley and elsewhere. Together these make discussion 
of his enterprise in isolation extremely problematic. He was 
much more the farmer than the malek which had important impli- 
cations for his role in village affairs and for the ability of 
the villagers to act independently. As noted earlier 
Esfardran is an old established village, unlike Chamani, and 
its villagers had been involved in considerable independent 
improvements to their land since land reform. His position 
both locally and regionally was,, very different from that occu- 
pied by Abdulahi. k 
Dehghan, on the other hand, one of the largest absentee 
landlords in the dehestan, was not involved at all in agricul- 
tural production. Most of his land was rented out to people 
like Abdulahi and he only visited his holdings on a tour of 
inspection perhaps once a year. I-b took little interest in 
increasing efficiency of production and was much more the bene- 
volent master or squire (arbdb) who used his land, in con- 
junction with his urban investments to support his political 
and social ambitions in Shiraz.. His income was largely derived 
from rents collected by his representatives; people such as 
Abdul5hi - 
In between the capitalist farmer and the rentier was 
Abdulahi. In many respects he was at the forefront of agricul- 
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tural innovation, but, unlike Takhizadeh, he knew little about 
agricultural production, visiting his estates perhaps twice 
a month. His operations in the Ayub valley were intensive 
and he invested large amounts in improving agricultural pro- 
duction. In Korb5l, however, he remained the rentier. Unlike 
Takhizadeh he exerted considerable personal influence over a 
wide variety of 'activities in the valley. The contradictions 
which are to be found in his activities and the dilemmas impli- 
cit in his position are in many ways the dilemmas which 
characterise the modernisation of agriculture in the plain and 
indeed of modernisation in general in Fars. He still operates 
according to a personalistic and paternalistic rationale in a 
situation where the forces of modernisation and change increas- 
ingly imply the rational . pursuit of commercial interests and 
the exercise of bureaucratic and 'neutral' forms Of authority. 
Takhizddeh and Abdulahi were personally involved in culti- 
vation, other landowners such as Dehghan weie not and had 
delegated the use of their landto others, either other urban 
residents, or villagers, producing very different configurations 
of personnel and production characteristics in the various 
villages of the district. For example, in neighbouring 
Rasmanjan a small landlord who lived in some style in a house 
that he personally constructed outside the village walls and 
which was modelled on much lower middle class housing in Shiraz, 
owned one dang of the village (one sixth). He managed the whole 
of the village agriculture for the remaining five landowners, 
one of whom wasthe brother of Abdulahils secretary (payeb). 
Little mechanisation had been introduced and agriculture remained 
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at a relatively unproductive level. To call this man a 
khordeh malek is to deny the fact that he was also a mubasher 
and a mustajer. In addition to his interests in land, he had 
also set up the only flour mill in the immediate vicinity to 
which villagers from Chamani and Buraki took their wheat to be 
ground. Nasrdbad and neighbouring Uanjan, in which n, any of 
the Rusta Turks of Chamani had relatives, were owned by the 
Behbahani family, an old-established Shirazi family who in the 
early 170s, because of the peculiarities of the first land 
reform laws, were not obliged to distribute any land in Uanjan, 
which remained their 'chosen village' (deh entekhabi) and which 
was all cultivated under traditional share-cropping agreements. 
Abdulahi himself had constructed very different sorts of 
relationships with the inhabitants in and around his land in 
Korbdl. The nature of agricultural activity found in this area 
was very different from that- found in Ramjerd, a result of the 
lack of surface water in the former place. As in the Marvdasht 
plain recent years had seen a rapid expansion in the numbers 
of pumps installed to tap ground water, and irrigate numerous 
10-hectare stretches of land. This part of southern Korbal was 
beyond the reach of irrigation water from the river Kor. 
Administratively it remainedpart of the Marvdasht plain but v: as 
more easily approached from Shiraz via the south-easterly 
Fasii-Darab road (see map p. 85). The valley was dominated by 
the relatively large and very old villages of Dariyan and 
Kushke Mollah. Of the other 6 major settlements in the valley 
three were established within the present century and were 
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relatively small. Additionally some small settlements ha d 
been abandoned in the last fifty years, some a direct result 
of the depredations of nomadic tribesmen. The older established 
settlements were irrigated by Lhýýndts whichwere maintained at 
considerable communal expense. The additional settlement of 
Mohamadabiid was, rather, one. large walled garden in the middle 
of which Abdulahi built a large urban-style house and swimming 
pool attached to which were extensive outhouses and shippens. 
This complex dates from the late 150s and was named after 
Abdulahils eldest son. Thevalley still contairvd extensive 
pastures nn which Abdulahils flocks grazed : during the winter 
months. These pasturelands once provided extensive grazing 
facilities for tribal gtoups of Basseri and Kurd Shuli nomads 
who migrated through the area. 'Their presence on this land 
was problematic and Abdulahi ha d been engaged in a protracted 
struggle with thefli for control of the land. With the help of 
the gendarmerie he had managed to restrict their access to a 
few days during the spring. 
The total population of this part of Korbal was about 
20,000. They were primarily engaged in the cultivation of 
wheat and barley, most of which was dry-farmed because of the 
absence of water. Where water was available around the pumps, 
considerable attention was given to the market-gardening of 
vegetables for sale on the urb-an market. Unlike Ramjerd there 
had been a great increase in the numbers of what 'Ajami has 
called Itulumbeh karan' (lit. those who work with pumps) and 
recognises as a separate production system and as the most 
, progressive'. The landowner makes over his rights to land to 
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individual peasants in return for 10% of total crops as rent. 
All other costs of production are borne by the peasants them- 
selves - It is perhaps the most similar of the cultivation 
techniques to that employed on what has become known as the 
'family farm' ; cultivation is,, under the direction of the head 
of the household and labour power is provided by other members 
of that household. The owner of the land has no influence 
over what is cultivated on the land. Cultivation tends to be 
relatively intense and there is a concentration on summer 
crops (saifi) but overall income would appear to be consider- 
ably larger than that obtainable by villagers working as in 
Chamani. Mechanisation tends to be limited, as a result of 
the relatively small size of the holdings, but the availability 
of machinery to rent ensures that they have access to such if 
f 
required, and productivity appears to be comparable with that 
obtained on the larger mechanised estates. Abdulahils estab- 
lishment at Mohamadabad can be classified as a Itulumbeh kar' 
enterprise, because, in spite of the fact that it is situated 
on the mother well of an abandoned ghan5t, cultivation in the 
garden is totally supported by pumped water. The overall 
expansion of the cultivated area facilitated by the install- 
ation of motor pumps is to be seen as part of a much greater 
expansion around the older est-ablished settlements in Fars 
which had considerably reduced the amount of land available as 
pasture land for the large nomadic flocks that passed through 
this central area on their twice yearly migrations, and had 
resulted in considerable degradation of the natural environ- 
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Ment. as well as in considerable conflict between nomadic and 
sedentary sectors of the population. 
After the harvests in late autumn Abdulahi spent some 
time at his residence in Mohamadabad collecting the rents due 
from the various cultivators. He personally owned one dang of 
the whole area (excluding Dariyan) which covered about 5,000 
hectares. The total value of all rent for the valley was 
reckoned at 420,000 tomans of which Abduldhi was entitled 
to 70,000 Ts. (c. dC5,000). ' Two forms of collection seemed to be 
operative. On land cultivated by villages jointly the 
kadkhoda was responsible for payment of the rent which was 
assessed on a per hectare basis by Abdulahi, but was subject 
to negotiation. For Tabor it was calculated at 80 Ts. per 
hectare whereas the kadkhoda was insisting on 75 Ts. ; the 
total amount due was calculated at 20,000 Ts. For the indi- 
vidual 'family farms' of theý,. Itulumbeh 
karan each head of house- 
hold was responsible. Two dangs (2/6ths) of the valley was 
owned by the. Mushir vaqf (administered by the Moadell family 
as in Ramjerd) and rents were collected for this by Abdulahi. 
The remainder was owned by large numbers of small landowners 
(about 70 in all) who also asked Abdulahi to collect their 
rents for them. 
It is unrealistic to talk of separate production systems 
and separate the activities of the large landowners from those 
of the small landowners who received land with the execution 
of the land reform programme. One factor which emerges very 
clearly iE the diversification in the types of activities in 
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which both large landowners and villagers are engaged, in 
order to secuTe a means of livelihood and as a means of accu- 
mulating wealth. As will become more obvious in the section 
which deals with occupational spe ci ali sat ion, this is not 
merely confined to agricultur, al and pastoral interests. The 
heraseh, for example, is not to be interpreted just as a coop- 
erative group for the cultivation of the village fields. 
Production by villagers is not just confined to village lands. 
Rather, the heraseh emerges as an association of closely rel- 
ated people for the joint exploitation of agricultural and 
pastoral resources. It is the association of land with the 
interests of a group of 'people rather than the association of 
people with a particular stretch of land which is important. 
The subordination of production to the interests of the land- 
lord and its increased confinement within the boundaries of 
the village served to disguise this as increased emphasis was 
placed on cash crops. Under such circumstances it was not so 
much what was grown as whether the crop/s would provide suffic- 
ient cash income to maintain an adequate standard of living. 
But, as can be seen from both Abdulahi's interests and those 
of villagers in Chamani, the concentration on those crops or 
activities which will maximise income is far from complete. 
Unlike Takhizadeh or villagers'in Esfardran who had invested 
a larger proportion of their resources in producing a limited 
number of cash crops they were not as vulnerable to changes in 
market forces. Nevertheless, the lagro-pastoral' combine rem- 
ained the most important organisationalr. eansfor both villagers 
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and landlords to insure the maintenance of their interests. 
Because of the varied nature of their interests both land- 
lords and villagers were obliged to enter into *cooperative' 
relationships with others to secure the labour required for 
the maintenance of their enterprises. Such 'cooperation' was 
enhanced by the codified legal bonds established between land- 
lord and peasant during Reza Shah's reign, which formulated 
their relationship into formal contractual obligations. But 
the increased use of machinery and of individually contracted 
wage labour has served to decrease the extent of the derendency 
of large landlords on the availability of village labour 
articulated through the'heraseh. It has also served to break 
up the cooperative alliances between villagers. Firstly 
because the increased use! of money allows for more independent 
production and secondly because the changes in tenurial con- 
ditions within village agriculture have obliged villagers to 
look elsewhere for alternative sources of employment. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIATION 
The preceding discussion of agriculture and animal hus- 
bandry has attempted to demonstrate the ways in which these 
activities transcend the boundaries of the village, thereb), 
setting the stage for an analysis of what the village is and 
of how it is appreciated by those who are obliged to live and 
work with it and in it. The production of foodstuffs and of 
animals represents only one aspect of the lives of the villa- 
gers - The continuance of what might be termed 'traditional' 
relations of production has ensured the retention of some occu- 
pations which are rooted in an interpretation of the village 
as a 'community' enterprise. At the same time changes in the 
ways in which production is conceived associated with the 
large scale changes of recent 
\ 
decades have increased opportu- 
nities, particularly in wage labour of various sorts, in places 
far removed from original places of residence. As a result of 
such changes, as well as changes in social organisation, it is 
by no means self-evident that one can use the 'village' as the 
basic unit for analysis. Neither is it necessarily obvious 
what the term implies, because it would seem that it has very 
different connotations for the actors involved - both those 
resident in the village and those perceiving it and acting on 
it from outside. Attempts to question the use of the term 
, village' are not merely sterile attempts to 'totalize' or 
, cu= ulatel all available interpretations in order to construct 
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some 'meta-village ' concept, and thereby take the place 's 
reality out of its history and thus 'domesticate' a particu- 
lar village through the use of pre-determined, and often 
unreflexively applied categories. Rather an attempt is made 
to explore the dynamics of different interpretations for the 
clues they offer for a richer understanding of social organi- 
sation in the plain. Not only are there different interpre- 
tations of what the village means, but those interpretations 
have changed over time. 
The village 'community' 
The problems attendant upon initiating such an analysis, 
I 
as well as their initial recognition are, perhaps predictably 
and unavoidably, rooted in the particular circumstances sur- 
rounding the proc. 6ss of field work. Because of the comparatively 
recent settlement of villages such as Chamani, the existence 
of a community of interest, circumscribed by the village, 
could not be taken for granted as it perhaps could be, and was , 
in many middle eastern ethnographies which concentrated on 
older-settled villages. Immediately, an analysis of socio- 
economic activities takes one outside the village confines 
because it is not necessarily the only focus for the activities 
of villagers nor even the prime focus for the major landlord 
who has such an important effect on the lives of villagers. 
What is the village then? And in what terms can we talk 
of village institutions? Is there such a thing as a 'village 
1. See chapter V above, where an attempt is made to pro- 
vide szme_hIs. t_ar! r_aL background to these problems. 
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community' or a ivillage economy' and how do these make them- 
selves manifest? In exploring such questions one might be 
better equipped to interpret how the category is used as a 
basis for action by both 'insiders I and 'outsiders' - 
Social analyses of villages in Iran have suggested that 
its internal structure is undergoing radical change; and the 
land reform programme has been used as a symbol for such change. 
Such interpretations are predicated on the assumption, usually 
implicit, that there was a 'traditional village' which was 
characterised by such things as a relatively self-sufficient 
economy in which cohesion was maintained through established 
I 
'village' institutions, N defined in terms of the village itself. 
J 
The processes of 'individual is ation' , whereby extended house- 
holds are broken up, and I agricultural isation whereby more 
'efficient' agriculture displaces certain members of the vill- I 
age and results in increased "divisions of labour, are seen to 
be the dominant forces in a progressive modernisation. (The 
concept of progress is surrounded with moral implications of 
goodness and badness rather than seen simply as a progression. ) 
Also underlying these analyses is the concept of a 'village 
community', which is both ahistorical and moralistic, and 
which assumes the a priori existence of some, implicitly less 
dynamic, organisation in the past. 
Consequent upon such an interpretation, villagers have 
often been assumed to be backward and conservative in their 
adoption of innovations, and different in fundamental ways to 
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their urban counterparts' on the assumption that urban centres 
are the foci, for change and that they have a prerogative on 
? correct' interpretation and on an unambiguous interpretation 
of phenomena. 2 Thus correlations are made between different 
forms of economic differentiation within the village, and the 
adoption of new forms of technology. Abduldhi for example, in 
Chamani, is described as 'most progressive farmer in Fars', 
despite the many 'traditional' features of his operations (see 
below, Ch. XI I) 'Ajami, also, in his analysis of villages else- 
where in the Marvdasht plain correlates literacy, standards of 
living and levels of mechanisation with different 'classes', 
because he never reflexi'vely examines interpretations of these 
pheonomena, both as they are appreciated locally and regionally. 
3 
1. Modernisation theory in particular, with its assumptions 
that all societies must pass through a series of stages on their 
road to development, has looked for obstacles and facilitating 
mechanisms which might explain the reasons why some societies 
develop in different ways to others. Obstacles have tended to 
be predicated in terms of the backwardness of the peasantry 
(cf. in particular Foster 1945). Facilitating mechanisms have 
been sought in research into entrepreneurial activity and the 
function of medi'ators between the modern and the traditional. 
2. Activities in these centres were deemed to be more civi- 
lized than those at the periphery. In some twist of the evo- 
lutionary perspective, those at the periphery were seen to be 
lower on the evolutionary ladder, and the tribal nomads were 
consigned to one of the lowest rungs. This was regarded as 
self-evident by their occupation of the more marginal areas 
(cf. Paydarfar 1974). Arising from this particular concaten- 
ation of perceived relationships and assumed superiority comes 
the conception of the tradition-bound, conservative villager, 
resistant and hostile to change and the outside world, gov- 
erned by fatalism and narrow bigotry. 
'Ajami 1971. 
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A 'correct' interpretation of their meaning remains implicit 
and is not specifically related to the context in which it is 
articulated at a particular time in a particular place. More 
blatant in its assumptions is Paydarfar's study of social 
change in southern Iran whe. re, - explanations are rooted in the 
reified concepts urban, rural, and tribal, formulated in terms 
of a continuum which correlates urban with good and tribal 
with bad in many popular myths. 
Attempts to overcome the problems of analysis which are 
implicitly rooted in such reified categories have been a feat- 
ure of much middle eastern ethnography. Rosenfeld, for example, 
has suggested that a structural dichotomy between urban and 
rural in middle eastern terms, or between respectively asso- 
ciated features of openness to change and conservatism, or 
f 
resistance to change, is a mistake: 
"the peasant 
they are one 
He criticises the 
although they ack 
exists in b'oth structures at once; 
and the same to him. " 
(1972, p-50) 
C 
work of Stirling, Antoun and Gulik because, 
nowledge the importance of inter-relation- 
ships between urban and rural, they fail to integrate the two 
and transcend the limitations of the category boundaries in 
that they: 
"place the structures and roles of the broader system 
on one side (the centralised government, industry, 
policeman, soldier and construction gang foreman) and 
those of the village system on the other (village 
heads and council, agriculture, fellahs and migrant 
worker. " (1972, p-49) 
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As Bcýdieu maintains: 
"t'4, '_e systematic picture of interlocking units (in this case urban, rural and tribal) ignores the unceasing dynamism of units that are constantly forming and re- forming, and the fuzziness which is an integralpart of native notions inasmuch as it is at once the pre- conCiL'tion an z=- it d product of their functioning. 
(1977, p. 109 - my underlining) 
The concepts urban, rural and tribal, and associated town, 
village and tribe, as well as citizen, peasant and tribesman, 
cannot be taken for granted but must be looked at in terms of 
the particular people being, investigated. Already a confusion 
has been introduced in that both 'town' and 'village' relate 
to places, whereas 'tribe' relates to a group of people. 
Similarly in English the concept 'citizen' has attached to it 
kP lications of political rights. The labels that people put 
on events, personalities or institutions have their own hist- 
orical rationale., and attempts to distil universal character- 
istics from specific instances lead one into gross over- 
gene ralis ations , and out of a discussion of actual configur- 
ations of personnel. L6ffler sums up the problem neatly in 
his discussion of social organisation among the Boyr Ahmad 
in a physically more marginal area of Fars: 
"one could attempt to call Mahmud a semi-peasant, 
partially tribal partially-peasant, or semi-urban, 
or another such term., and assert that the case is 
irrelevant for the study of the peasant. To this 
one could tejoin in pointing out Mahmud's peasant- 
ness, his origin, his basic cultural orientation, 
his dominant concern, and his being regarded as 
'one of us' by his fellow villagers. " 
(1971, p-1088) 
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In attempting to escape from the intellectual constraints 
imposed by the adoption of specific lab s, such as 'peasant' 
or 'tribe', Lbeffler is obliged to go back to the actual his- 
torical circumstances in which Mahmud is rooted, rather than 
work with the a priori constructions of other social investi- 
gators, or of those in power in the regional and national 
centres who, perhaps unwittingly, wish to impose their cultural 
interpretation on a reality only partially perceived. It is 
in the context in which they are used that such terms as 'peas- 
ant' and 'tribe' gain their definition. To try and abstract 
from that context endangers the historical validity of the 
concept and ossifies meaning into forms which have lost their 
dynamism. 
The anthropologist, like others, is in cnnstant danger of 
such abstractions through attempts to construct 'the whole'/ 
the 'meta-concept', rather than concentrate on processes. In 
many instances this 'whole' is taken for granted', as in the 
studies of 'Ajami and Paydarfar. The use of a term implies 
the adoption of a stance in an ongoing process of Istructur- 
ation' and its meaning must be unravelled from the context, 
together with the pre-conceived notions of that meaning as. 
they enter into its use within that context. 
' 
1. Giddens states: "Stru-ctures must not be conceptualised 
as simply placing constraints on human agency, but as enabling. 
This is what I call the duality of structure. Structures can 
bLiways in principle be examined in terms of their structuration 
as a series of reproduced practices. To enquire into the struc- 
turation of social practices is to seek wexplain how it comes 
about that structures are constituted through action, and reci- 
procally how action is constituted structurally"(p. 161). "To 
study structuration is to attempt to determine the conditions 
which govern the continuity and disollution of structures or types 
of structurell(ibid., p. 120). See also Giddens 1977 pp-129-34 (, Notes on the theory of structuration'). 
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Thus the notion of 'Village' (deh) needs to be examined 
as it is used to describe social organisation within the Ayub 
valley, and elsewhere in the plain, before any understanding 
of its use as a category of understanding as well as its impor- 
tance as a point of reference, can be made. This is particular- 
ly evident in the case of newly-settled villages (although 
similar interpretations of the village from a regional point 
of view do not necessarily mean that older-settled villages 
are not perceived from the same or similar perspectives). 
Lambton maintains that: 
"there seems little doubt ... that from the earliest 
times that we have records the dominant type of 
settlement was the'village" 
(1953, p. 2) 
and that this was in response initially to a need for collect- 
ive defence. She goes on to state that: 
"the tribal nature of society in early times deter- 
mined that the villageýmade up of a clan should be 
the model settlement". 
(ibid., p-2) 
Subsequently the need for defence was supplemented by the need 
for cooperative labour to maintain irrigation networks and by 
the preference of government for dealing with groups in one 
place, rather than dealing with scattered individuals. 
So. that: 
"there was a tendency to treat the village as a 
corporate unit from early Islamic times down to 
the twentieth century. " - 
(ibid., p-4) 
Lambton also maintains that the form of ownership prior to the 
land reform programme (characterised by what is termed the 
malek-_raliyat system) developed from a communal form of settle- 
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ment. The history of the settlement of land and its control 
in Iran is indeed a complex one which has been relatively well 
documented by Lambton among others. Terms used to express 
relationships in and through land have changed over time and 
have accumulated around them a complex history of interpre- 
tation. During the land reform programme for example attempts 
to define what a village was often proved problematic. Attempts 
were made by the state to constrain, by explicit definition 
and circumscription, and according to a rationale which was not 
necessarily that of those involved; implicit processes incor- 
porating specific sorts of inter- relationships which, because 
they remained implicit provided a flexibility of action. 
According to the land reform law of January 1962 a village 
(deh) was defined as: 'a centre of population and the place 
t of residence and work of a number of families who were engaged 
in agricultural operations in. the village lands and which was 
by custom recognized locally as a village' (Art-1, para-10). 
In January of th, e following year the land reform council attemp- 
ted to provide further criteria which were intended to avoid 
the confusion arising from earlier attempts. Throughout it 
would appear that an attempt was being made to cricumscribe a 
process which varied from place to place, and translate this 
into a legislative form, or legal formalism, which would be 
'objectively true' for the whole of the country. 
Place of residence was increasingly used by central gov- 
ernment as a means of situattig , 'understanding', and thereby 
'domesticating' individuals. ' The values attached to such 
concepts as 'village' are concretised through the implementation 
of policies which reflect theT. Such values not only incor- 
porate ideas abo , ut what a village is, but also relatedly, 
about what a village should be, so that a holistic and funct- 
ional model provides the backdrop for government interference 
in village affairs. Government agencies, for example, presume 
a 'community of interest' within the village which is evidenced 
in the legislation for the creation of village councils, the 
accumulation of a village' development fund, and the establish- 
ment of houses of equity (khaneh ensaf) and of culture CkhAneh 
farhang) under centrally- inspired development progýrammes- 
The appreciatdon of-what villages should be and the faci- 
lities that should be available to them has led to thefDrmu- 
lation of a policy aimed at completely restructuring rural 
space and of concentrating populations into small towns (shahrak) 
in which basic amenities could be efficiently provided. Bec- 
ause of their small size many of the villages in the Marvdasht 
plain were ignored by government development programmes whi. ch 
concentrated on the larger, older settlements and those near 
existing communication channels. 
1. The term 'domestication' is used here and elsewhere in the 
thesis to refer to that process whereby people accept certain 
relationships which involve inequality between parties to a 
transaction. It is used in terms of marriage transactions to 
indicate the process whereby a daughter becomes a bride and is 
incorporated into the household of her husband. It implies a 
process in which relationships of domination or subordination 
V 
are ; I; takLenn for ranK1 (cf. Goody, J., The domestication of to k lor 
va e Mji: n: d: the a 
2 
Such a 'community of interest' cannot, however, be taken 
for granted, founded as it is on a consensus model of the 
functioning of society. The 'traditional village' (deh) was 
perceived as self-contained and relatively autonomous, presi- 
ded over by the village council (majlis) of elders (rish 
sefidan), the he'ad of which, the kadkhoda, acts as interpreter 
of village affairs to the outside world. A number of village 
specialists, such as carpenters, bath-house attendants and 
night watchmen, complete the picýure of an integrated and 
cooperative enterprise. But once one begins to investigate 
this apparent simplicity many problems emerge. There are a 
i 
number of terms that can be used to express the term 'villager' 
(viz. dehati, deh-neshin, dehghiin, zarleh, rusta, and raliyat) 
and these, rather than describing individuals, point to types 
of inter-relationships. Dehati, for example, is never used 
by villagers, but rather by-urban dwellers in reference to the 
? uncivilized peasant'. Deh-neshin refers to someone who has 
merely settled down in a village. Dehghan has been translated 
as 'peasant' or 'farmer', and Ono uses it to mean 'villager'. 
Lambton on the other hand defines it as meaning 'peasant' or 
'peasant attached to a ploughland' with a former meaning of 
, landed proprietor or head of a village who held certain lands 
by hereditary right and acted 'as the government tax collectort. 
'Ajami restricts the term to those peasants who received land 
through the land reform and translates the term as 'peasant 
1. Lambton 1953, p. 426. 
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proprietor I- Zar'eh is translated as 'crop-sharing peasant', 
attached to a 'farm' (mazrd'eh) in which he is engaged in cul- 
tivation (zeralat). Rusta is translated as 'peasant' and 
would appear to be equivalent to our 'rustic'. Ra'iyat, 
although more commonly used as a term which indicates a 'crop- 
sharing peasant' has a much wider connotation and is trans- 
lated as 'subject The terms dehghan, zarleh, and rusti, as 
well as keshdvarz (lit. 'engaged in agriculture') in addition 
to representing relationships to the land, are used by people 
in the Ayub valley as surnames. 
With changes in official attitudes accompanied by increas- 
ing central control certain of these terms have been discredi- 
ted and officially replaced. We have already mentioned that 
the term 'kadkhodal has undergone considerable changes as a 
result of its increasing association with official representa- 
tion in the village through-the mdlek. Because of the assault, 
through the land reform programme on the 'feudal landlords' 
(the malekin) it, has been officially replaced by ra'is, meaning 
more generally headman. Traditionally however it would seem 
that it was used to refer to the head of a kinship group, and 
is still used in this way in the official tribal hierarchies 
of such groups as the Qashqai. Similarly the term 'raiyat' ' 
(or 'subject) indicating a qu-asi-feudal relationship between 
, landlord' and 'peasant', enshrined in what is generally referred 
to as the Imalek-raliyat system', has also been Ide-graded'. 
official translations now speak of 'peasant proprietors' 
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(dehghan) and of , large landowners I rather than 'landlords I, 
although the conflation of landownership and landlordship still 
remains and it is difficult to effectively replace the term 
malek. It would seem that a suitable term which separates 
landownership from landlordship, i. e. formal landownership 
from the exercise of a certain type of authority, has not been 
found (and people like Abdulahi cannot be referred to as 
farmers). By using the term dehghan however, the position of 
the former Iraliyat' has been nominally raised. 'Ajami for 
example finds it easy to talk of the 'remnants of the 'arbdb- 
raliyat system' and treat it disparagingly as unproductive, but 
in referring to the interest of what he calls 'the former 
malek' , he identifies it as the,, Imechanised estate' without 
introducing any analysis of the relations of production obtain- 
ing on that eatate (which use of the term malek-ra'iyat 
implicitly did) As with the Itolombeh-k5r system' it is def- 
ined in terms of technology. One can speak of I. tolombeh-karan' 
(i. e. those who work with motor pumps) but there is no such 
term for those who work on the mechanised estate ('mechanizeh- 
kdrRn 19) - Perhaps this sort of landowner would 
like to be 
known as a 'farmer' but Imalek' remains as the only viable 
term by which one can refer to this sort of 'farmer'. 
Terms which emphasised tKaditional relations of pro- 
duction are replaced in favour of what are perceived as more 
value-neutral terms; terms reflecting a changing emphasis as 
well as indicating changes in the relations of production - 
changes which in many respects were more apparent than real. 
2ý-C, 
So that officially one cannot speak of the interests of the 
Imalek, except in a negative sense, but rather of the Imechan- 
ised estates of the former malek', as though the personalities 
and the contexts in which the malek operated have been somehow 
mythically transformed. Associated with this confusing 
plethora of interpretation are value loaded interpretations of 
the nature of social organisation at the village level. To 
examine these terms as indicators of particular functioning 
groups is to ignore the fact that they receive their definition 
in an ongoing practice which incorporates definite relations 
of production. There is a danger of accepting the terms as 
representative of particular forms, both in the separation of 
occupations and their association with particular personnel, 
and relatedly, in status differentiation which is often trans- 
lated into actual 'class divisions within society. 
Dehgh5n and Khwushneshin 
In attempting therefore to analyse occupation different- 
iation within the village one is in danger of separating 
indi- 
vidual people from the Itotalising' role that the 
label repre- 
sents In Chamani for example, and in other villages, 
to use 
the term dehghin to describe those villagers who received 
land under land reform is to m-ake an artificial distinction 
between them and other villagers, and to presume that this 
label somehow describes their distinctiveness. As we have 
seen, for some of these so-called 'peasant proprietors', 
income 
- 
from agricultural activity may, not be of major importance, 
and to make a division between those who do and those who do 
not have land is to create an artificial distinction between 
villagers. Those who do not have rights to land have been 
recently lumped together under the label 'khwushneshin' which 
has gained the more specific meaning of 'landless labourerl 
in the work of some interpreters. Lambton translates the term 
as those who do not have rights to land. 1 In some of the 
older-settled villages these share-cropping rights might have 
tended to become hereditary, but 'in Chamani, as in other newly 
settled villages, it was first and foremost the malek who 
decided who would and who would not have access to land and, 
who was in the position to change his mind when and if he 
wished. The land reform laws, which translated these rights 
into formal owners, hip, rigidified an association which had not 
necessarily any continuity. It was a shifting arrangement 
controlled by the mdlek to provide workers for the cultivation 
of his land. 
Having occurred, this accident of legislation has been 
subsequently imposed upon pre-reform history to provide an 
accepted, timeless interpretation of social organisation within 
village Iran. The problems of the khwushneshin seem to have 
been first isolated, however, by Iranian social scientists in 
1. Lambton 1969, p. 370: "inhabitant of a village who is neither 
landowner, peasant, nor agricultural labourer". In these terms 
khwushneshin does not include landless labourers. But see 
Hooglund (1973): "The overwhelming majority of khwushneshin, 
however do not have any work. These are the agricultural 
labourers. " (p. 236). 
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the late 160s, and the category has come to be regarded by 
some as one of the chief means through which social differences 
within the village are interpreted. 'Ajami thus states that 
the khwushneshin have been effectively excluded from partici- 
pating in village affairs, and this exclusion has produced 
'bitter class consciousness': 
"There is a sense of isolation and lack of belonging 
to the village community among the khwushneshin 
families. They rarely participate in community 
development projects. " 
('Ajami 1969, p-65) 
It is true that the government legislation for the creation 
of village councils did exclude non-landowners from represen- 
tation on that body, but' to use the term as a means of differ- 
entiating within the village between significant social groups 
is a major distortion of reality in the Ayub valley. 
The term khwushneshin is an indistinct one, used in some 
areas to identify those villagers who, although based in one 
village, gain their livelihood other than by continuous cul- 
tivation of that village's lands, i. e. they may be involved 
in taking the village's animals to find grazing, or in moi, ing 
around from one harvest to another helping when required. 
It 
is defined by Haim as meaning 'colonizer, new settler', from 
neshin meaning 'settled' and 'khwushl meaning 'happy, gay, 
well, pleasant, good, lucky, ýrosperousl, with the presumed 
1. Khosrovi draws a distinction between the 'rural bourgeoi- 
sie' which includes such groups as shop-keepers and money- 
lenders and the 'rural proletariat'. See Khosrovi, K., "La 
stratification sociale rurale in Iran", in Etudes rurales, 
No. 22-23-24,1966, "Les paysans sans terre en Iran: les khoch- 
nechin"y in Sociologica Ruralis, Vol. 13, No-3/4 1973, and 
jamieh-shenasi-ye-Rusta'iye Iran, Tehran 1972. 
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implication that such people were without ties, ' and Khosroý-i 
translates the term khwush as 'free'. 
2 Thus khwushneshin is 
distinguished from dehneshin (village dweller), shalirneshin 
(city dweller) and chadorneshin (tent dweller). There is no 
justification for saying that, the khwushneshin are defined as 
a group by the fact that they had no cultivation rights; neither 
did any of the women. 
3 
According to 'Ajami it is the khwushneshin who suffer 
I 'relative deprivation', and. it is, they who are the major 
4 'achievers' in the village. He puts forward data from vill- 
ages in the Marvdasht plain to justify this claim. It is they 
who are motivated to look for new opportunities. The khwush- 
neshin appear to have been defi'n'ed in a negative way and foc- 
used on for analysis because of the supposed importance 
attached to gaining land during the land reform programme. 
Thus Miller asserts that: 
"A feeling of discontent is growing among the 
khoshneshin (who comprise 40% of this village). " 
(1964, p-594) 
The distribution of land in the Ayub, valley has not par- 
ticularly enhanced the economic position of the majority of 
villagers, and thus the distinction between dehgh and khwush- 
neshin has even less relevance. To state, as 'Ajami does, that 
1. Haim, op-cit.; p. 282. 
2. Khosrovi, 1973. 
3. Hooglund revealingly states that: it should be pointed 
out that neither peasants, nor khwushneshin necessarily recog- 
nise the validity of this, or any other, classification system 
(Lbid., p. 231). 
4. 'Ajami, I., "Social classes, family, demographic character- 
istics and mobility in three Iranian villages", in Sociologica 
it E, jL u --Vv1m4Lr No. 1,19 6 9. 
24-Lý 
perhaps half the population in the plain falls within this 
category is in fact to underestimate their numbers if they 
I 
are defined as those without rights to land. They might in 
fact be expected to incorporate upwards of 901 of the popu- 
lation. Can the so-called. 1problem of the khwushneshin' then 
mean anything? What does it in fact mean to try and identify 
this 'group' as the potentially 'revolutionary class in the 
Iranian countryside17 Much more relevant to explore is the 
process which, on the one hand Itraditionalises' the agricul- 
tural work of those who did receive land, and on the other 
obliges a much larger group of people to seek alternative 
I 
employment on the labour market. 
The category 'khwushneshin' includes the auxiliary labour 
available within the village; from those who work for others 
in the fields on a semi-permanent basis, to those who wander 
from village to village to work at peak periods. It also 
includes itinerant as well as settled merchants, public serv- 
ants employed within the village, such as field watchmen 
(dashtebiin)_, bath-house attendants (hammdmi) , barbers (salmani) 
and carpenters (najdr). In the 'traditional' village the 
position of these persons was just as secure as any other 
group, and to say that their 'residential rights' are far from 
secure, as Ono does, 
' is to iinore their integral participation 
in-the process of village affairs; the result again perhaps of 
taking the village as the unit of analysis rather than looking 
1. Ono, op-cit., p-460. 
2-5 
beyond it. Many 'residential rights' are now in jeopardy, not 
because the villagers do not or cannot exercise them, but 
because, firstly they are not necessarily formulated in such 
rigid terms , and secondly present economic conditions do not 
provide, if they ever did, sufficient resources within the 
village framework. In Chamani such 'residential rights' were 
not given a great deal of attention, because of the ability 
of the landlord to evict villagers who did not conform, and 
also because of the extra-village interests that have been a 
normal part ofIvillage life'. 
The opposýtion that has been generated between dehghan and 
khwushneshin serves to disguise, as the land reform which was 
partially responsible for the creation of the opposition also 
serves to disguise, a more fundamental process. As Halliday 
maintains, perhaps the only rationale for land reform was: 
"the alteration of landownership by the state in 
order to encourage the growth of a home market and 
a capitalist class structure in the Iranian country- 
side -" (1979, p-10S) 
Lenin defined the spread of capitalism as being associated 
with three processes; the spread of commodity relations through 
which land and labour become separated from each other and. 
become objects of exchange, to be bought and sold on the market, 
and through which the agricult'ural product becomes a commodity 
in-a situation in which money becomes the major medium of 
exchange; the growth of a home market, and the growth of a 
capitalist class structure in which the term 'peasant' no 
longer indicates membership in a particular class, since it 
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covers both those who own land and those who have only their 
labour to sell. 
1 
The categories which have been used to describe the acti- 
vities of individuals, 'landless labourers', Iwage labourers', 
'landowners I, begin to break down once one begins to look at 
the particular configurations of the activities within the 
context in which they are set. Similarly with the categories 
'merchant' or 'trader'. It is even more confusing when it is 
understood that the actors are not representative of individ- I 
uals acting alone, but are constituent parts of households 
and larger cooperative organisations such as the heraseh. 
i 
Thus Hooglund's classification of Khwushneshin into three 
J categories (viz. the rural bourgeoisie, the non-agricultural 
worker, and the agricultural labourer) 
2 disguises the fact 
that all three may be found in any one family and that any 
individual might be engaged- at different times in several 
activities. Agricultural labourers and non-agricultural work- 
ers might also be landowners in their own right. 
This is perhaps more of a problem associated with the 
circumscription of particular units of analysis, and the sep- 
aration that such a process involves for, in this case, the 
various occupational divisions, and their integration, not only 
within the wider social fabric from which they cannot ulti- 
mately be divorced, but also from the domestic context in which 
1. Lenin, V., The development of capitalism in Russia, Moscow 
1956, quoted in Halliday, 1979, p. 104. 
2. Hooglund, op-cit., p-231. 
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I 
they are embedded. Attempts to hierarchise rural social org- 
anisation according to such occupational divisions, and the 
construction of a stratified model of rural society, tend to 
perpetuate divisions which are never so discrete. It is 
necessary therefore to utilize different units of analysis in 
attempts to characterise social organisation in the Marvdasht 
plain in order to reveal the multi-faceted nature of the pro- 
cesses involved in change and in order to circumvent the rigid- 
ifying tendencies associated with the concentration on parti- 
cular perceived forms. 
This concentration on form, to the detriment of an under- 
standing of the processes involved, is based on an idea of 
'systems' and 'structures' in which pattern is observed through 
the arrangement of the parts in some wider anatomical or 
morphological whole. But, as Giddens has point out; 
"there is no 'pattern'-in human social life apart 
from the regularities involved in systems of inter- 
action .... In the theory of structuration, 'structure' is con- 
ceptualised as generative rules and resources drawn 
upon by actors in the production and reproduction of 
systems of interaction. " 
(Giddens 1977, p-14) 
The 'form' produced then is little more than the Aristotelian 
shadow projected onto the cave wall; a transient projection 
which encapsulates a particular configuration of events and 
inter-actions. Such an encapsulation is often reified, in the 
functionalist tradition, to produce substantive and supposedly 
substantial forms - strata in society which can be objectively 
2 
discerned, or configurations of personnel which are given some 
objective unity, such as an occupational division (khwushneshin) , 
or the household, or even the tribe. 
One such projection is that derived from the characteri- 
sation of interactions in terms of kinship, where kinship is 
used as an ideological tool for the 'explanation' of inter- 
actions and is seen as the basis of the construction of most 
inter-relationships (i. e. the ideological pre-suppositions by 
which people lexplain'the nature of their involvement with 
others is in terms of kinship). Kinship still serves as a 
very important means by which villagers, and others involved 
in village production, dxplain their interaction with others, 
not just in the realms of lhousýhold production', but also 
through the legitimisation of what Alavi terms 'primordial 
f 
loyalties' in kinship terms. 1 At attempt is made in subsequent 
chapters to analyse the importance that is placed on kinship 
connections, by moving out' from the domestic organisation 
of production to the wider organisations that are predicated 
in kinship terms and their importance for villagers in the 
Ayub valley in their struggle to come to terms with changing 
politico-economic circumstances. 
Such an analysis is also associated with attempts to move 
beyond the concept of 'peasant*' which, either fail to specify 
the internal differentiations that are to be found within peas- 
ant societies by treating them as 'communities' and stressing 
1. Alavi, op-cit. 
the unity which pervades such 'societies', ' or which, through 
a concentration of the 'functioning' inter- relationship of 
parts within this empiricist form fails to appreciate its form- 
ation in terms of the 'outside' of which it is both part and 
from which it cannot be ultimately isolated. 2 The 'process 
of 'peas antisatibn I which stresses the creation of a 'peasantryl 
stresses the part that this 'outsidelplays in the formation 
of a type of inter-relationship with the wider environment, 
and focuses on the processes involved in the creation of 
separate forms. 
1. See for example Stavenhagen who, following Shanin, uses 
four characteristics to describe peasantry as a general type 
of rural population: 1)the peasant family farm as the basic 
unit of multi-dimensional social organisation; 2) land husbandry 
as the main means of livelihood"directly providing the major 
part of consumption needs; 3) specific traditional culture 
related to the way of life of small communities; and 4) the 
underdog position - the domination of peasantry by outsiders" 
(Stavenhagen 1975; p. 66). See also Shanin 1971 and 1972. 
2. Recently significant atte, mpts have been made to overcome the 
problems associated with using the concept of 'peasantry'. In 
particular see Ennew et al. 1977, Bernstein 1979 and Friedmann 
1980. Friedmann maintains, for example, that 'peasant' is not 
a concept,, "but-it cannot simply be replaced with existing 
concepts because it does not refer to a unique set of production 
relations ... 'peasants' with specific class relations, such 
as sharecroppers and immobile landless labourers, require 
specifications distinct from each other and from households in 
full possession of the means of production. The term 'peasant' 
must give way to analytical specification of forms of product- 
ion based on internal characte'ristics of the unit and external 
characteristics of the social formation"(Friedmann 1980, p. 160). 
And Bernstein points out that: 
"Rural cultivators that we descriptivel term 'peasants' 
have existed in very different types of societies and in differ- 
ent historical epochs - for example, European and Japanese feu- 
dalism, the pre-capitalist agrarian empires of India and China, 
or in the many countires of the Third World today where colon- 
ialism has been a major'historical force in creating peasantries 
with specific characteristics. It follows that such a general 
definition of peasants is ahistorical, and at best has only a 
descriptive utility" (Bernstein, 1979, p-423). 
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The stratification of villagers according to occupations 
must thus be approached with caution. Various opportunities 
were open to individuals and their families at various times 
of the year and these have been expanded by the increased avail- 
ability of wage labour away from more permanent places of resi- 
dence. 
Cooperation for the provision of basic goods and services 
within the village obviously does involve specialisation but 
this does not necessarily imply specialisation between families 
rather specialisation within families where the family attempts 
to provide all the necessary resources for the maintenance of 
its independence. In the larger, older settlements this would 
seem to be less easy as the demands on specialist services, 
such as the carpenter or the blacksmith, increase and such 
occupations tend to occupy a majority of the time of practit- 
ioners. But even this should not be divorced from the familial 
context in which most such production was supported. Similarly 
certain villages might specialise in the production of parti- 
cular goods, such as pots, or shoes, or the provision of irri- 
gators, but again this seems to have been supplementary to 
family provision of other essential goods and services. 
The 'village community' cannot be identified as some un- 
I 
differentiated entity. There are a whole host of specialisa- 
tions and diversifications of labour which link one village to 
another and which link the village to the city and the wider 
environment. Members of rural settlements are still apparently 
committed to a degree of self-sufficiency supported by the 
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cooperation of kin and close allies but are also committed to 
a whole host of inter-connections within and between settle- 
ments, which make the idea of self-sufficiency more a myth 
than a reality, and which ultimately disguise the nature of 
domination by people who are seen as 'outside' the 'community' 
and thus distanced from its internal dynamics. 
Village specialists 
Within the village a number of relatively distinct special- 
isations are apparent. In the smaller villages in the Marv- 
dasht plain, however, these cannot be assumed to separate 
individuals from the familial context in which production is 
embedded. As a result of the conceptualisation of the village 
as a 'community' and of legislative attempts-to reinforce such 
a view particularly during the reign of Reza Shah, it is 
tempting to see these specialists as serving a community. As 
will hopefully become apparent their activities cannot be 
divorced from the context in which they are undertaken. Many 
combine these interests with other occupations and are but one 
facet of a multi-faceted familial organisation of production. 
Dashteban (Village Watchman) 
In most villages a person was employed to make sure that 
the village animals did not stray on to the cultivated fields. 
He was normally employed by the village and received, from the 
kadkhoda a portion of the harvest reserved for communal expenses. 
His job was not highly regarded and the dashtebans made up the 
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lowest strata of the agricultural population. In Chamani there 
were two watchmen, one Hosein Khdn (No. 30) was in Abdulahils 
payment, the other Karim marzeban (No. 26) was employed by the 
villagers themselves. Hosein Khdn, whose family lived else- 
where in the plain and who belonged to the once nomadic Nafar 
tribe, came to the village with his marriage to the sister of 
Hosein Dadkha (No-23). A man of limited intelligence Hosein 
Kh5n was regarded as the village idiot. He had no connections 
with his paternal kin. His marriage was the only uxorilocal 
marriage recorded in the village. He lived with his wife and 
one small daughter in one room in the courtyard in whichlis 
brother-in-law lived. 
His duties as dashtebdn were not particularly onerous, 
but they were regarded as of very low status and much of his 
work was described as 'kar-e-zananl(women's work). He was 
responsible for fetching water every day from the spring at 
Imamziideh Ayub (the only source of drinking water for the vill- 
age) to supply the landlord's house. He also looked after the 
landlord's cows which were housed in pens adjoining the land- 
lord's house. He also had other menial tasks to perform when 
necessary, like cleaning the house or feeding the horses. For 
his work he did not receive a cash income, being remunerated 
in a similar sort of way to the shepherds employed by Abdulahi. 
He received SOO mann of grain per year which was de posited in 
the village shop from which he obtained virtually all his pro- 
visions for the support of himself and his family. The land- 
lord occasionally provided him with changes of clothing and 
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cloth shoes (giveh) as well as with surplus food from the 
landlord's table. In addition he received small amounts of 
cash from the landlord at New Year and from such things as 
the sale of landlord's cows. But cash did not figure promin- 
ently in his income. He was tied to Chamani and the land- 
lord's employment and rarely managed to get out of the village. 
He was in an analogous position to many of the women in the 
village, being in a situation of complete dependence on others. 
Hosei. n Khdn was not, however, the only dashteban in the 
village. The villagers themselves employed Karim to take care 
of the herd of cows and donkeys which were taken out to pasture 
every day. Hewas in a very different position, however, from 
that of Hosein Khan. He, together with his brother with whom 
he shares a courtyard in the village came to Chamani from 
Marvdasht. They were both landowners in the village and 
were attached to the heraseh of the Baneshi Lurs. Prior to 
Abdulahils involvement in Chamani Karim was the housekeeper 
of what is now Abdulahils house. 
A totalising conception of the nature of the dashteb5n is 
in danger of ignoring the very different associations that 
these two people have to the production process. One completely 
dependent on the landlord, the other a landowner whose identi- 
fication as dashteban is only part of a wider involvement, 
with his brother, in agriculture within the village. 
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The Hammami (bath-house keeper) 
The bath-house (hammam) is a feature of many villages in 
the plain. As a result of recent development programmes many 
villages,, especially the larger ones, have opted for the con- 
struction of a hammaM as a priority in their community develop- 
ment programmes. These range from the large bath-houses staffed 
by full-time specialists in the larger villages to the one-room 
makeshift establishments in smaller villages such as Buraki and 
Chamani. In these former villages the hammami belongs to a 
particular occupational group, members of which are to be found 
in several villages. Because of the nature of their occupations 
they are regarded as religiously unclean and of very low status. 
Marriages between them and other members of the village were 
restricted. However, because of the large numbers of hammams 
recently constructed in several villages in the plain their 
services were in demand and they were able to secure higher 
payments than the ordinary agricultural labourer. 
In the smaller villages the separation of bath-house 
keeper from other sections of the village population was not 
as distinct. In Chamani, for example, it was Keyar, the son 
of Kamar Khan Rusta (No. 18), one of the larger herd owners in 
the village who constructed a crude, one-room hammdm. This was 
fired by oil which heated the two water-filled oil drums placed 
on the roof. It was provided to other villagers at a small 
cost. In Buraki a similar construction had been built by Meshd 
Baber, a member of the village council. Both Keyar and Mashd 
Baber were landowners and the former was also engaged by 
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Abdulahi as a builder. They did not regard the provision of 
the bath house as a community facility. Its construction 
earned them merit but did not occupy much of their time and 
was open to select groups of people rather than to the public 
generally. 
The Salmani (barber) 
Specialist barbers were also to be found in many villages. 
Again the older, larger villages contairec', barbers who came from 
specialist families. Again in the smaller villages this eepar- 
ation w-Es not as apparent - In Chamani, the barber was Rahim, 
the son of Mahd Taghi (No-23). He was a small landowner and 
his activities did not take up a great deal of his time. He 
was paid 10 rials per hair cut by some and given a small, but 
variable proportion of the harvest by others in return for his 
services. In addition to cutting hair and shaving he was also 
brought in for circumcisions, but villagers increasingly resor- 
ted to urban clinics for such operations. 
The Najjar (carpenter) 
Again in the larger villages a specialist carpenter was 
to be found who made and repaired agricultural equipment. In 
the smaller villages the carpenter, resident in one village 
often supplied the requirements of several neighbouring vill- 
ages. Thus in Chamani, Agha Jan (No. 12) a person allied to the 
Rusta Turks and married to Mashd Mehvi, the foremost carpet 
maker in the village, was the carpenter. He served the villages 
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of Buraki, Pol-e-No and Uanjan as well as Chamani. He main- 
tained a small garden in Buraki from which he obtained some 
of his timber. He provided these villages with wooden ploughs 
and replaced worn out parts, as well as wooden beams for roof 
construction and pitch forks and ridge-makers. He also rep- 
aired other wooden articles. For this service he received 
500 mann of wheat and barley from each village, every year. 
Agha Jan was also a landowner. In the more isolated villages 
of the pla. in the carpenter was also responsible for the wooden 
threshing sledge, now increasingly replaced by the tractor. 
More specialist services, provided in Marvdasht and Shiraz, have 
- considerably reduced the work that such village-based 
carpenters do. 
The Banna (builder) 
There are a number of builders to be found in the villages 
but, not until recently has this been classified as a special- 
ist occupation. ' As more villagers have taken up work on urban 
construction sites in Marvdasht and Shiraz certain individuals 
have gained an increased expertise and modern houses, outside 
the main ghalleh reflect the introduction of urban designs and 
building techniques. Not one person derived their sole income 
from bf2ilding and most villagers were able to carry out their 
own repairs. Certain individuals were noted for their plaster- 
ing abilities. Mutual help seems to have been flexibly reward- 
ed according to the relationship between the parties involved 
but as cash transactions became increasingly common, contracts 
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of a more formal nature, especially in Chamani for work for 
the large landowner, were negotiated, and i, -ork on village proj- 
ects was remunerated in cash. 
In addition to these specialists identified in terms of 
the so-called 'traditional' organisation of village production, 
there are also others such as musicians, tinkers and itinerant 
peddlars as well as religious specialists, who visit the vill- 
age from time to time. The tinker and the lamp mender were 
temporarily resident outside the village, setting up their 
black tents and staying for perhaps one week during the year, 
mending pots and pans, sharpening knives and mending lamps. 
After which they move on. The musicians ivlere employed at 
weddings, and caue from the urban centres. 
The smaller villages were not able to support a resident 
mullah and many of them did not have mosques. But itinerant 
mullahs and ý. ýids were frequent visitors, especially at harvest 
time when they would be given gifts of cash and food in return 
for services rendered. These religious functionaries provided 
charms and amulets against infertility, various illnesses and 
the evil eye, as well as legitimating marriage services and 
settling disputes between villagers. 
The growth of Marvdasht 
Many of the goods and services which were once either pro- 
vided within the village or by specialists within other villages 
have now been concentrated in Marvdasht which has grown into a 
major servicing and marketing centre for the plain. The increased 
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availability of cheap motorised transport means that the town 
is within easy reach of most of the many villages in the plain. 
Most iron goods for example are now produced and sold in 
Marvdasht and much of the former work of carpenters, especiall, " 
in the provision of personal items of furniture (beds and 
storage boxes) are produced there. The work of the village 
carpenter is increasingly confined to minor repairs. Itinerant 
merchants and peddlars are seasonally based in the town and 
travel out with their goods on the backs of motor-cycles to the 
villages of the plain selling plastic goods, cotton cloth and 
haberdashery. 
Marvdasht is also important as the administrative centre 
of the plain. Here are the local courts, the secondary schools 
and the social welfare facilities which are not available in 
most villages. Many villagers have relations and friends in 
this rapidly expanding town with whom they can stay and some 
have bought land and houses in the town which they use as bases 
during their visits there. Much of the agricultural surplus 
from the villages are channelled through merchants in the 
bazaar there and large numbers of shops provide a wide variety 
of consumer goods and specialist services. Wool is brought 
into the town for dyeing and much wool is available for sale. 
In addition to shops there are a number of mosques and hammams 
used by the villagers, as well as private doctors. 
Villagers and village shopkeepers have constructed special 
ties with particular shops or particular parts of the bazaar. 
These shops are often owned by relatives of villagers and ser'ý'e 
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as foci for particular villages in the town. Sectors of the 
town also serve as centres for the rural population of particu- 
lar areas. The shops as well as the houses of relations in 
Marvdasht serve as storage points for goods in transit to the 
villages and as postal addresses for the village. Thus a small 
number of shops on the main street of Marvdasht, selling a 
variety of goods from cotton cloth to meat, dyed wool and 
general supplies serves the whole of north Ramjerd. They were 
linked to these villages through the frequent visits of vill- 
agers as well as by a land rover which called at least once 
per day and transported both people and goods. This land rover 
brought such things as meat, vegetables and paraffin on demand 
from the town, goods not normally available in the village 
shop. Most goods were obtained from the small number of 
closely interlinked shops on the main street, which was the 
'bus stop' as well as the 'post office' for north Ramjerd. 
1 
The whole plain is criss-crossed by such services and 
networks of alliances which integrate diverse parts of the plain 
through Marvdasht and serve to stress the interdependence of 
settlements. Many of the smaller landowners had residences in 
Marvdasht and many of the town dwellers were from villages in 
the area. 
1. The land rover driver, Ghasem Ali, came from the village of 
Ghasemabad in southern Ramjerd (see fig. 7 ). He owned land 
in that village which was cultivated by relatives who remained 
in the village. 
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In addition to its place as a service centre, Marvdasht 
was also a major production centre. The sugar beet refinery 
employed, on a seasonal basis, large numbers of villagers. 
Construction work and machine repair shops and small pro- 
ductive enterprises also absorbed labour from the surrounding 
villages. Marvdasht has grown very rapidly, from being merely 
a small, temporary settlement around the newly completed sugar 
beet refinery to its present population of about 30,000 in the 
course of just over a generation. The population is derived 
chiefly from the villages of the plain. 
Migration and Wage Labour 
As the Marvdasht plain has been increasingly utilised for 
commercial crop production the local economy of the area has 
become increasingly diversified. The numbers of those engaged 
primarily in agriculture have decreased and the numbers of 
small-scale entrepreneurs have increased. These appear to sur- 
vive in the face of modern capitalist development by a readi- 
ness to undertake the less profitable types of production and 
services. Such entrepreneurs have provided the basis for the 
expansion of the town of Marvdasht as the small trader, or 
transporter seeks to sell or obtain products in areas which are 
relatively isolated. 
The more successful rural entrepreneurs have apparently 
left many of the villages and established themselves in Marv- 
dasht. The most successful and the better educated represent 
those groups which are most 'free' to undertake this movement 
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from village to town. Their labour in the ý-illage has been 
compensated by hiring others to do their work, or relying on 
others within the household group to cultivate their land. 
In the first instance it would appear that the skilled and 
prosperous are the first to migrate, rather than the poor 
or those who did not receive rights to the land (the khwush- 
neshin). 
It is the women, the very old, and the very young who are 
left b ehind in the village as a result of occupational diver- 
sification. As a result of the land reform programme and 
mechanisation fewer workers are required on the village land. 
Machinery decreases the labour intensive demands of traditional 
agriculture and the reduction of land available to thevillager 
for production increases pressure to diversify. The richer 
members of the village can employ others to do their work. 
Labourers are attracted from poorer more isolated areas and 
employed as wage labourers by those who move out or move into 
different occupations. 
Activities external to the village have undoubtedly 
increased in recent years as a result of changes in tenurial 
conditions and associated loss of opportunities in village 
agriculture, and with increased opportunities available outside 
the village. But the importance of extra village connections 
before land reform should not be under-estimated. The 'trad- 
itional' picture of itinerant workers and merchants moving from 
village to village in search of work and markets has its 
'modern' analogue in migrant wage labour and the seasonal move- 
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ment of men and machines over wide stretches of the countryside 
In Chamani, Hasanjdn Bdneshi (No. 4), the village shop-keeper, 
himself a small landowner had bought, with 'Abbas Hoseini, 
the representative of the landlord in Buraki, a combine har- 
vester. This was garaged in Chamani and driven by Karim 
Z ahreh (No -2 8) - In spring it was taken down to the plains of 
Khuzestdn and followed the harvests up from the coast into the 
higher reaches of the southern Zagros. This was not an isolated 
example. Large numbers of combines could be seen at this time 
on the move towards the harvests. 
Similarly Javad Rusta (No. 7) had invested in a tractor, 
again with Rusta Turks from Junaki. This was employed in var- 
ious places throughout theyear. The rates charged for these 
machines varied according to the nature of the land and, in the 
case of the tractor, the nature of the work. The combine 
owner was remunerated in terms of a proportion of the harvest, 
which was however increasingly translated into cash terms. 
The tractor owner was remunerated in cash according to the 
amount and type of land involved. Agricultural labourers still 
travelled from village to village at peak times but their place 
was being increasingly taken by the seemingly more efficient 
machines. The hiring on a short term basis of such facilities 
was within the financial reach of those with insufficient land 
1. A proportion of Hasanjan Baneshils time away from the 
village was spent negotiating contracts for the utilization 
of his combine harvester. 
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to justify the purchase of one themselves - And it was often 
cheaper for those with sufficient land to hire-in these faciii- 
ties than to invest in them themselves. Combine harvesters 
had become so widespread in recent years that, unless one i, -as 
willing to spend considerable time and energy on their main- 
tenance and in moving them from harvest to harvest, the), were 
not considered profitable investments. In the early '60s 
informants maintained that a combine owner could virtually 
guarantee 20% of the harvest. In the early '70s this had been 
reduced to about 8% and necessitated their deployment over 
wide areas to make them yield returns. 
A discussion of occupational differentiation which focuses 
on differences between villagers according to the different 
occupations of those villagers not only disguises the fact 
that any one person may be associated with different types of 
work at different times, and that households may employ their 
available labour resources in different ways. It also disguises 
the many extra village activities and personnel that are vital 
to an understanding of social organisation in the plain. It 
also, and perhaps most importantly, disguises the relations of 
domination between those identified as holding different occu- 
pations and the ways in which such inequalities are established 
and maintained. In this way the village is perceived as a 
homogeneous whole and the inequalities which are evident within 
the village and between villages as well as those between large 
landlord and peasant remain unexplainable. 
It is difficult to make rigid distinctions between those 
who do and those who do not earn their livings from wage labour 
as the nature of interdependence in the local economy ensures 
their integration within a productive enterprise based on the 
family group. No one in the villages in the Ayub valley was 
totally reliant on wage income for maintenance of livelihood. 
In Chamani the only people who were remunerated with a regular 
wage were those permanently employed by Abdulahi but this was 
not considered by them to be their only source of income and 
their relationships with Abdulahi were those of personal serv- 
ants rather than wage labourers. 
The expansion of opportunities within the plain and in 
Shiraz took a variety of forms. In a small minority of cases 
it involved the more or less permanent movement of people from 
the village to the town where they obtained permanent employment 
of set up in business on their own. In the great majority of 
cases it seems to have involved seasonal movements from the 
village to obtain work in the city, while retaining significant 
interests in the village. 
Wage labour was perceived as a supplement to family income 
which was still based in the agro-pastoral combine. Several 
families in Chamani had members who were away from the village, 
some for short periods, others for more extended periods. In 
areas of the plain towards Lake Bakhtegan in the east, and in 
areas further south towards the gulf it was not unusual to 
find villages in which a majority of the able-bodied males 
were away working in the oil-fields. Some had been away for a 
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number of years but sent regular remittances back to support 
their families in the village. Some had managed to establish 
successful businesses in places like Bahrein or Kuwait, others 
were on short term labour contracts. Savings from such migrant 
work were invested in a number of things, ranging from the 
purchase of consumer durables, to investment in new housing 
and in the education of children. In addition villagers, 
through a complex kinship network, invested in service facili- 
ties in the urban areas (taxi cabs, shops, street vendors' 
stalls) . 
During the late 1960s and early 1970s much work was avail- 
able for village labourers at the dam or in the construction 
of canals from the dam. The Ordibehesht company, with its base 
in Chamani employed about 50% of the able-bodied male popu- 
lation of the valley and contracted for the use of machinery 
and transport which villagers had available in the form of 
tractors and mini-buses. Daily wages for these workers were 
no more than those earned as agricultural labourers (about 80 
rials per day)-ý There were gross fluctuations in the numbers 
employed as well as in the people who sought employment at 
any one time. The permanent employees of the company i,, ere c'ity 
dwellers. Villagers only worked when they felt like it; there 
was no regular commitment to the companies and many contracts 
were very short term. A minority of villagers were employed on 
monthly contracts and these received, in addition to a slightly 
higher wage, free insurance which entitled them to free medical 
services and contributed towards a state pension. The majority, I 
however, were signed on on a daily basis. 
266 
For the majority of villagers the diverse interests of 
their families, provided the independence necessary to maintain 
an adequate livelihood. Few were obliged to move permanently 
away from the village and join the ranks of the urban unemployed 
as is frequently reported in studies of agrarian change. Those 
who did move tended to be the most able entrepreneurs and 
those with the greatest resources. They rarely gave up their 
interests in the village. In Buraki for example the landlord's 
representative had sent his son to Shiraz to receive a higher 
education and there he lived with a brother who had moved out 
of the village some 20 years previously to buy land in the city 
and start his own retail business. Most villagers had relations 
of one sort or another in the urban centres and these were used 
as bases for frequent visits. Most villagers made seasonal 
visits to Shiraz to visit the shrine of Shah Cherogh, an 
important Shila pilgrim centre and to consult the doctor. The 
able-bodied men were often away from the village for extended 
periods of time.. It is not primarily the poor who have enjoyed 
increased mobility as a result of ecnnomic differentiation, but 
rather the rich or comparatively rich within the village popu- 
lation who have been able to avail themselves of new opportu- 
nities - 
In Cha-mani the criterion of land-ownership then seems to 
have little correlation with the overall nature of employment 
opportunities. Perhaps because of the nature of the village, 
the full-time, discrete, specialists that are found in the 
larger villages are not found. The divisions of families 
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according to occupational types is minimal, although at aný- 
one time a variety of opportunities are exploited by each 
househdd. The ownership of land at this level does not in it- 
self indicate increased access to material resources and indeed 
some of the poorest families in Chamani are to be found among 
the so-called Idehghanian'. A picture emerges of a village 
population that has always been involved with the outside' 
and which has been obliged to elaborate the nature of these 
ties through restrictions on village land use. This is repre- 
sented, not only in the relationships thatthe inhabitants of 
the village themselves have constructed, but also in the 
scattered nature of the interests of people like Abdulahi 
and the scattered origins of the people he employs. 
Any separation between agricultural and-non-agricultural 
work, or between those employed and those unemployed produces 
an arbitrary division based on a particular perception of 
reality which does not match the divisions imposed by the vill- 
agers themselves. Recent changes in tenurial conditions have 
required a certain re-orientation for villagers, but it is not 
adequate to say that those who have been denied access to land 
have been pushed out of the village and joined the ranks of the 
migrant wage labourers. Unless one analyses the context in 
which the changes have been taking place, and the historical 
organisation of production, one is in danger of atomistically 
isolating the individual as the locus of decision-making and 
seeing him as divorced from the complex links that bind him to 
networks of kin and associates; of imposing a particular pattern 
268 
of reality which ignores the fact that occupational speciali- 
sation may be conceived of very differenti)- in the strategies 
that households use in their attempts to maintain a livelihood. 
The optimizing logic of the formal economist ignores the multi- 
faceted nature of what might be described as the larger, 
'informal' economic sphere, where optimization methodology may 
involve the accumulation of such things as 'symbolic capital', 
by the deployment of strategies that would not necessarily be 
described as economic in any narrow sense. 
The sexual division of labour 
Little so far has been said about the work of women or 
their role within rural production. With increased occupational 
differentiation among the male population it -is the women who 
appear to be much more immobile. In villages where many men- 
folk are away as migrants the women keep the household together, 
sometimes supervise agricultural production and, in the absence 
of others., either male relations or hired labourers, may work 
in the fields at peak periods. It would appear that under 
normal circumstances the women are not involved in cultivation 
and that it is only the poorer households, where labour is 
scarce do women help with such work. 
tk 
1. B64rdieu uses this term in his analyses of the inter- 
relationships between good-faith economies and bad faith econo- 
mies. "The only way to escape from the ethnocentric naiveties 
of economism, without falling into populist exaltation of the 
generous naivety of earlier forms of society, is to carry out 
in full what economism does only partially, and to extend 
economic calculation to all the goods, material and symbolic, 
without distinction, that present themselves as rare and 
worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation" 
Bordieu 1977, pp: 177-8). And "symbolic capital, which in the 
orm of the prestige and renown attached to a family and a name 
is readil-ý--c-o-n-VE'Ttible back into economic capital, is perhaps the 
most valuable fort?. of accumulation in a society in which the 
269 
Their role in the domestic economy is however much greater. 
Formal cultivation does not require large amounts of labour 
except at peak periods and commentators have remarked on under- 
employment among men in the traditional agricultural sector, 
when they might have little to do on the fields themselves for 
several months of the year. This is not the case with women 
who are primarily involved in processing rural products, 
whether using dairy products to produce yogurt, cheesEý curds 
or butter, spinning and weaving the wool into carpets or other 
woollen goods, or milling grain and baking bread. These tasks 
are central to the maintenance of the rural household, although 
they are less publicised and involve the women in much more 
continuous work for longer periods of time. This is in 
addition to their role of managing the domes-tic budget, looking 
after the children of the household, and fetching drinking 
water. Despite the existence of electric-powered flour mills 
in many settlements much grinding was done by hand. Similarly 
spun and dyed wo. ol was available for purchase in the bazaar in 
Marvdasht but most women spun the wool themselves although all 
the wool was now dyed commercially in the town. ' 
Being largely carried out within the family courtyard, 
many of women's activities remained partially concealed and 
such concealment has tended to underestimate their contribution 
to the family economy. In the Ayub valley the production of 
woven woollen goods was an important occupation and provided a 
Note I from previous page cont. 
severity of the climate ... and the limited technical resources 
demand collective labour" (ibid., p-179). 
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considerable source of cash income to the household. In 
Chamani 23 of the 34 households had women who produced carpets. 
Chamani was locally renowned for the quality of its small rugs, 
woven to a tribal design typical of the Turks in the area. 
The carpets acknowledged to be the best and worth most on the 
market, were those woven by the Turks in the village. Patterns 
are learned by heart and transmitted from mother to daughter. 
It is unusual for a women to work on a carpet alone and she is 
normally accompanied by another female member of the family, 
or perhaps by an 'apprentice'. Carpet production is primarily 
a winter activity and a separate room in the house compound 
accommodates the loom. Learners were attached to older, skilled 
workers, both in the village and elsewhere, so that the daughter 
of Mashd Rahman (No-19) worked with and learned from Mas. hd 
Mehri, the wife of the village carpenter and the foremost 
carpet producer in the village, whereas the daughter of Mashd 
Hajali (No-27) was sent to work with her father's sister in 
Beiza. While Chamani was renowned for its rugs, Buraki 
specialised in the production of jajims (coarse, woven blankets 
used to cover seats or wrap bedding in). Together with these, 
produced virtually exclusively for sale, and as parts of a 
bride's dowry, very coarse saddle bags (khorjin) were also 
woven for everyday use in transportation and storage. 
The rugs produced in Chamani in the early 1970s retailed 
for about 800 tomans on average and, given that each household 
produced between two and three carpets per year, this represen- 
ted a cash income of between JtOO and 4200. Wool is provided 
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by individual flocks when available, otherwise it is bought 
locally, or in Marvdasht. It is spun and combed bY hand before 
being sent to the various dyeing establishments in Marvdasht. 
All the dyes used are chemical. Approximately 6 mann, or 18 
kilos of wool are required for each carpet and two women weav- 
ing steadily can complete one in about two months. One mann 
of wool cost approximately 45 tomans in 1971, but this was 
subject to very rapid increases in the following years. Returns 
for labour are, of course, minimal, but if there are any full- 
time specialists in the village it must surely be these carpet 
makers; many of the daylight hours of the winter months are 
spent in their production under often badly lit and cramped 
conditions. 
The organisation of the carpet industry is in the hands 
of the men of the village and one or two havebuilt up specialist 
interest as middlemen. In Chamani the person recognized as 
the most able in this respect was Hasanjan Baneshi (No-4), who 
was also the village shopkeeper. Others, such as Javad (No. 7) 
and Akram Rusta (No-10), perhaps because of their ownership 
of animals as well as because of their standing in the village 
were also involved, but could not command the resources, in 
terms of contacts rather than capital, that Hasanjdn could. 
He provided a variety of credit facilities for those who could 
not afford the initial capital outlay, or finance the whole 
production, and purchased the finished product for half its 
retail price. Although he himself, unlike Javad and Akram, 
had no animals in the Ayub valley he did have sheep with rela- 
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tives in Beiza and he obtained much of his wool from there. 
He had built up special relatinnships with one of the dyeing 
establishments and a small number of the carpet dealers in 
Marvdasht. Not only did Hasanjdn deal with much of the carpet 
production in Chamani but with that of other villages in the 
valley. He was recognised for his bargaining skills and was 
called in to help in the sale of carpets produced by the 
villagers independently, to outsiders. Thus he was called in 
by Ali Naghi (No-21) Abdulahils housekeeper, when the former 
wished to sell the product of his wife's labour to the latter's 
brother. 
Occasionally carpet buyers would visit the village, as 
Hasanjan visited other villages, and buy, or contract to buy, 
a certain number of finished items. Individual villagers who 
had themselves considerable interest in sheep and goats might 
also send the carpets to dealers in Marvdasht and Shiraz bazaars. 
The role of carpets in the economy of the villageshould 
not be under-estimated. The cash income from them, controlled 
by the head of the household, paralleled the income from agri- 
cultural production and the sale of animals. As village agri- 
culture and the agro-pastoral combine have been obliged to 
diversify it has also had to intensify as pressure on resources 
has increased. One means of intensifying production has been 
to increase carpet production and all carpets in Chamani for 
example now appear to be produced for commerclal sale. This 
has involved an increase in the amount of time that the women 
are obliged to spend in making carpets. 
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With the rapidly increasing price of wool and carpets in 
the late 160s and early '70s, the tncome for all engaged in 
their production rose considerably. Carpets did not lose their 
value under the circumstances which were responsible for rapid 
increases in inflation during that time. Proportionally the 
income derived from their production increased as the price 
of wheat declined in the face of foreign imports. It might 
therefore be suggested that, rather than being a supplementary 
'craft' industry which was marginal to basic agricultural pro- 
duction, carpet production provided the major source of cash 
income for those closely tied to village production. 
Merchants and traders in the village 
The expanding facilities and services provided by both 
Marvdasht and Shiraz, coupled with increased mobility, had 
served to centralize the production of certain sorts of goods 
in these places and to undermine the traditional work of village- 
based craftsmen. In the same way, whereas formerly villagers 
relied on the village shop for the provision of goods, not 
produced in the village, such goods were incre asingly pro- 
vided by retail outlets in the town where prices iýere cheaper, 
and choice greater. 
Certain sorts of goods continuedto be provided by village 
retail outlets which occLpied an important position in the village 
economy. In the larger villages there were more formal retail 
institutions which specialisedin specific sorts of goods. One 
development in recent years was the establishrent cf a 
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cooperative shop in the larger villages where a consumer 
cooperative paralleled the production cooperative which was 
set up with the establishment of the village councils and 
village development funds. Such shops provided agricultural 
produce, fertilizers, and heating fuel to village members as 
well as other types of household goods. The aim was to ensure 
the collective provision of essential goods while cutting out 
the excessive profits often taken by middlemen. The larger 
villages also often contained their own tea-houses (chai-kh5neh) 
and butchers' shops. 
In the smaller villages such specialist establishments 
were not to be found. A room in someone's house served to 
store such goods. These were relatively informal establishments 
with no opening hours and were usually operated by the women 
of the household. In Chamani, Hasanjan Baneshi (No-4) operated 
such a shop. In it he stocked a few consumer durables, such 
as kerosene lamps and bales of cloth, and other non-perishable 
commodities such as tea, sugar, soap, pens, cigarettes and 
tobacco, paper, salt, plastic shoes and sewing equipment. He 
also on occasion stocked kitchen utensils and children's 
clothes. He had different fruits and vegetables which were 
seasonally available. Anything that a villager wanted Hasan3an 
woud obtain on demand in his frequent visits into town. 
1. It would appear that those individuals who were already in 
charge of retail outlets within the village gained control of 
the new cooperative institutions. 
2. In addition to people using him for his bargaining skills 
and knowledge of the carpet industry they also valued his abilitý 
to negotiate the complexities of the urban bazaars. 
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Many of the transactions within the shop were in kind 
rather than in cash, as opposed to the shops in Marvdasht where 
transactions were predominantly in cash. The shop served as 
a centre for the collection and distribution of various village 
produce such as grain, eggs and wool. Much of these latter 
were exchanged for produce on sale in the shop. Stocks of 
grain and wool accumulated in the shop. Village specialists 
who received payment in kind deposited their grain with 
Hasanjan to provide the resources for future purchases from 
the shop. Hasanjan extended credit to villagers, repayable 
at harvest time in grain or wool. Prices paid in this shop 
were slightly higher than those paid in town. 
The relationships built up between the shop-keeper and 
other villagers was complex. He not only helped with the 
financing, of carpet production in particular, but also acted 
as buyer for some villagers in the urban market because of 
his supposedly greater knowledge of commercial activities and 
seller of village products to outsiders. 
This was the only formal retail establishment in Chamani. 
There wem similar shops in the other villages in the plain. 
They wereall controlled by relatively prosperous members of 
the village population. But shop-keeping only involved a por- 
tion of their energies and all were involved, either in village 
agriculture or other occupations outside the village. Hasanian 
Baneshi for example was also a landowner although he left 
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cultivation of his land to others. The shop-keeper in Buraki 
was involved in rice production and, like Hasanjan, financed 
carpet production in that village. The shop-keeper in Pol-e-No 
was the head of the village council. 
Other, usually much poorer individuals, were also periodi- 
cally involved in certain retail activities. On occasional 
visits to town villagers bought excess quantities of such things 
as tobacco or chewing gum or toys which, because of their 
unperishable nature could be sold later when demanded. Others 
bought stocks of vegetables such as potatoes and tomatoes, not 
grown in the villages and hawked them among the villagers. 
One or two specialist traders travelled to the more physically 
isolated villages selling such produce for cash or for other 
products, such as grapes, that could be resol-d. Traders also 
bought such things as brushes from the town and traded these 
for cash or other goods. 
Like the cultivation of more marginal land under nimeh kar 
contract by those who did not receive land under land reform, 
these trading activities seem to have expanded in recent years. 
Some traders spent days away hawking a donkey-load of potatoes 
where the effort required to realise even a small return was 
considerable. They served the more remote areas where the 
established retail traders in the city were unwilling to invest 
much time and energy because of the low profits to be gained 
thereby. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE HOUSEHOLD ECONOMY 
As long as attention is focused on village production and 
on differences in access to land, or on different sorts of occu- 
pations available to villagers, it remains very difficult to 
focus on the organisation of domestic production and on that 
framework which articulates the various activities of indivi- 
duals into a coherent synthesis and provides the basis for 
the organi. sation of social life. In this chapter I want to 
shift attention to an analysis of the organisation of the 
household and household production, and look at the various 
strategies applied in attempts to deal with a changing social 
environment. 
Although the 'household' is lofficialised' by the practice 
of policy-makers as well as social scientists, it forms the 
basic unit by which the available census material is construc- 
ted',, like the village it is a tool for analysis rather than 
some isolable unit divorced from its social context. It may 
be the miniFal unit 'for the organisation of the labour pro- 
cess', 
1 but it is not the only unit. It is necessary to exam- 
ine the basic features of the 'household economy' as they are 
perceived by the villagers themselves, if that is possible, 
1. Friedmann, H. (1980), 'Household production and the 
national economy: concepts for the analysis of agrarian form- 
ations I, in Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol -7, No. 2 pp. 159-84 
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through the analysis of particular families, and look at the 
relations of production which link households through relation- 
ships of increasing social distance. It is necessary to look 
at the nature of the relationships between different sorts of 
'employers', the activities of cultural and economic brokers, 
and the work of state employees, as they affect village life 
and maintain relationships of domination which subordinate 
many villagers to the interests of others. If we maintain a 
distinction between, say, the state, the landlord, and the 
head of the household, it becomes difficult to examine the 
processes of subordination and the ways in which the more 
powerful are able to maintain their positions within society. 
In many ways the means by which the head of the household 
manipulates household resources has its parallels with the 
ways in which the landlord manipulates his resources, and the 
state is used to justify control over both people and resources. 
Considerable attention has been given in recent years 
to what has beeft termed 'the domestic mode of production', 
based on the work of people like Chayanov and Sahlins. One 
of the major problems associated with the use of this concept 
as an analytical tool is the tendency for it to be seen as a 
fqrmal entity, and in so doing, ignore, or lexternalise' other 
features of what become the 'outside', such as the landlord, 
or the tribal chief, or the state. Sahlins maintains however: 
1. See Chayanov, A. V., On the theory of peasant economyp 
Homewood, Ill. p American Economics Association 1966. 
Edited 
by Thorner, D., Kerblay, B., and Smith, R., and Sahlins M., 
, wný Age Economics, 
Chicago, 1974. Q 
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"clearly the DMP can only be a 'disarray lurking in 
the background' always present and never happening. 
It never really happens that the household by itself 
manages the economy, for, by itself the domestic 
stranglehold on production could only arrange for 
the expiration of society. " 
(1972, p-101) 
Despite problems with its use and the identification of par- 
ticular configurations of personnel, Sahlins identifies four 
major characteristics which give some definition to the way 
in which it may be appreciated, and give credibility to its 
use as an heuristic device. First of all there is the nature 
of the division of labour by sex whereby 'the normal activities 
of any adult man, taken in conjunction with the normal activi- 
ties of any adult woman, practically exhaust the customary 
works of society'. 
1 Secondly there is the relationship between 
household groups and the tools that they use such that they 
can normally handle within the group all the tools necessary 
for their maintenance. Thirdly, production is for use rather 
than for exchange - for livelihood rather than for profit. 
From which the fourth characteristic emerges, which Sahlins 
terms 'Chayanov's rule': 'in the community of domestic pro- 
ducing units, the greater the relative working capacity of the 
household the less its members work'. 
This domestic mode of production is then primarily 
geared to the production of livelihood and not to that of 
1. Sahlins, op-cit., p-79 
2. Ibid., p-87. 
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surplus .1 The major characteristics identified do provide a 
basis from which to approach domestic production in the Ayub 
valley, but they must be used with caution. It is worthwhile 
highlighting some of the problems associated with it at this 
point. Firstly, production and consumption have been so 
separated in the domestic economy that the independence of 
the man and the woman is no more than an ideal, perhaps an 
ideal perpetuated by villagers and others in their attempts to 
maintain ipdependence. 
2 Independence is, however, largely 
illusory. The spread of different sorts of commodities means 
that the household employs items which are not, and cannot 
be produced by themselves or by other specialists within the 
village - It is only the poorest inhabitants, unable to afford 
some such commodities, who are more reliant on personal pro- 
duction than others, and such poverty does not necessarily 
qualify them for categorisation as independent because of the 
ways in which they are subordinated to richer members of 
society. The se'Paration of productinn for livelihood from pro- 
duction for profit is also problematic, not only under circum- 
1. Production for 'livelihood' is hypothetically separated 
from production for 'subsistence' in this case. It is presumed 
that production for subsistence involves conditions of pro- 
duction that have already resulted in the subordination of 
villagers to the 'exploitation' of a privileged minority. Pro- 
duction for livelihood, on the other hand, implies production 
geared to fulfilling needs. It is a theoretical distinction 
of orientation rather than an actual difference in the amounts 
produced. 
2. As such it is related to the 'myth of equality' which was 
perceived to characterise Luri ideals of individual indepen- 
dence (see Black, 1972) . 
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stances in which capitalist ideals have expanded to influence 
the nature of production, but also under so-called 'traditional' 
circumstances. The notion of livelihood and of profit presume 
two different sorts of society - the former based on egalitar- 
ian principles, the latter recognising inequalities associated 
withindividual production. Again it is possible to suggest 
that such a separation is idealistic given the traditional 
control over resources exercised by a minority of, usually 
urban-resident, personnel. Thirdly, to suggest that the greater 
the working capacity of the household, the less its members 
work, and that this is any different from other forms of pro- 
duction (where those with control over resources invariably 
trnnslate that control into increased access to leisure) is 
also idealistic. Some members may be able to translate the 
greater working capacity of the household into increased 
leisure, others, notably the women, are rarely in such a 
position. It might be maintained that under cha nging forms 
of production some are able to enjoy more leisure while others 
are obliged to increase the amounts of time devoted to work. 
The idea of the 'domestic mode of production' parallels 
what Bordieu identifies as the 'good-faith economy', in that 
through the pooling of household resources a generalised sys- 
tem of reciprocity is set up and the formal calculation of 
exchange rates is abandoned (or Idomesticeted'/'naturalised'). 
Pooling is then seen as a 'within' relationship whereas 
2a2 
reciprocity is a 'between' relationship. 
1 This then becomes 
something that is not necessarily specific to particular con- 
figurations of personnel identified in the field and formaliv 
circumscribed as separate households, but can also be used to 
circumscribe any 'within' or 'between' relationship, and thus 
include the 'within' relationships that supposedly character- 
ise kinship groups, and by extension, tribal groups. Simi- 
larly it might also be used to characterise relationships 
between members of the state, for the general good. The con- 
cept of the 'domestic economy' is thus capable of disguising 
the 'domestication' process whereby prevailing relations of 
inequality appear as'natural'. 
An uncritical use of the terms 'household', 'family', and 
'domestic unit', as if they were interchangeable and as if 
they could be divorced from the context in which they are 
situated, disguises the different processes involved in their 
construction and also the various approaches which underlie 
1. C. f. Sahlin8, op-cit., p-188. "On a very general view, 
the array of economic transactions in the ethnographic record 
may be resolved into two types. First, those 'vice-versa' 
movements between two parties known familiarly asr 'reciprocity' 
(A; p-4B). The second centralised movements; collection from 
members of a group, often under one hand, and redivision within 
this group .... This is 'pooling' or 'redistribution'. On an 
even more general view these two types merge. For poolingis 
an organisation of reciprocities, a system of reciprocities.... 
True, pooling and reciprocity may occur in the same social 
contexts - the same close kinsmen who pool their resources in 
household commensality, for instance, also as individuals share 
things with one another - but the precise social relations of 
pooling are not the same. " 
definitions in certain forms. Lineton , in his Giscussion of 
household organisation in southern Greece, looks at households 
as 'bundles of rights' which are not necessarily associated 
with common residence. But this does not really go far enough 
and is still rooted in an attempt to isolate the household as 
a 'formal' entity. As Sahlins has maintained, the household 
economy exists in the totalising schema of the observers, and 
it is perhaps only in confrontation with extra-ordinary events 
(including the confrontation with foreign anthropologists) 
that the solidarity of the domestic group is revealed. Numer- 
ous studies talk of the discontinuitiss between the 'ideal' 
household and the e--mpirical reality. 
2 Ethnographers have, 
perhaps unreflexively, sometimes taken this ideal concept as 
a statement about the nature of an organisational form. While 
stressing the fluidity of household composition they have 
preferred to unquestioningly accept a meta-conception which is 
never perhaps explicitly formulated in the minds of so-called 
tmembers' of suchtunitst. In doing this there is a tendency 
to atomise social organisation and give discreet and separate 
existence to a unit which does not necessarily merit such dis- 
tinction. Thus Barth can say of Basseri: 
"(The) independence and self-sufficiency of the nomad 
household, whereby it can survive in economic relation 
with an external market, but in complete isolation from 
all fellow nomads, is a very striking and fundamental 
feature of Basseri social organisation. " 
(1963, p. 21) 
1. Lineton, M. J. (1971), quoted in Davis, J. (1977), People 
of the Mediterranean, p. 175. 
2. See in particular, Antoun 1972, Stirling 1965, and 
Campbell 1964. 
And Van Nieuvenhuijze also states that: 
"it (the household) is the baseline for traditional 
social organisation. The traditional authority in 
the middle east, along with the traditional social 
structure, pivots around the kinship principle. " 
(1971, p-388) 
As with the identification of occupational divisions one 
is in danger of substituting an analysis of process with an 
aialysis of form. This is not simply a question of ignoring 
constant changes in the composition of domestic groups, nor 
of differe-ntiating between what people have identified as an 
'economic unit' (the household) from a kinship unit (the 
family). 1 It is also in another context failure to recognize 
institutionalised under-production ('Chayanov's rule') and 
the fact that some households fail to reproduce autonomously, 
and are therefore subsumed for their existence in some wider 
, productive organisation. 
Without resorting to the atomis tic tendencies of such 
authors as Barth, or completely dissolving the category'2 
analysis can be focused on the domestic unit through the mar- 
riage arrangements that are deemed to bring it in. to existence. 
In the Ayub valley marriage is seen as the initiation of a 
process of reproduction based on the probability of theEmerg- 
ence of a discrete economically viable unit. In response to 
the Iformalising' enquiries of urban questioners (and foreign 
social scientists) villagers have little problem in identifying 
f. Sal zer, E. R. (1974) , p. 183. 
2. Goodell in her analysis of Khuzistan villages seems to do 
this when she maintains that: "In the village culture and prac- 
tice there is no concept of parents or of the collectivity of 
children_within the family. " (1975ý 
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these discrete units, and these have been incorporated into 
census compilations as the basic building blocks of the social 
structure. It should perhaps be stressed at this point that 
when questions were asked about the composition of households 
in Chamani, they were directed to male informants, and the 
'units' thereby identified were in terms of adult males. 
The 'domestic unit' exists therefore as one of a series 
of conceptual foci and as a framework for the organisation of 
activity within the village. Social boundaries between indi- 
viduals and groups obviously change over time, as well as 
changing in terms of expressions of relationships between 
social actors at any one time. The anthropologist's picture 
of reality is in danger of encapsulating and thereby reifying 
a particular moment in that change (however extended). In 
this he/she is likely to be aided by the physical boundaries 
found within the village, between courtyards for example, 
which reflect the social boundaries encapsulated in their con- 
struction, as well as by the particular temporal configuration 
of personnel which reflect perhaps temporary alliances. In 
the older settlements it is likely that there wiL be a dis- 
continuity between physical and social form, as old walls are 
breached and new ones erected, reflecting changing patterns of 
alignment. Many walled villages give the appearance of con- 
siderable spacial disorder, and lack of space obliges differ- 
ent generations to utilise that space in different ways. Per- 
haps Barth's understanding of the autonomy of the nomadic house- 
hold of the Basseri was at least partially influenced by the 
2-6 
physical discreteness of the apparently autonomous black tent. 
Such discreteness is not so obvious in the confines of the 
village ghalleh. 
As Davis has maintained, 'the mainspring of the domestic 
cycle is marriage 151 and the identification of discrete dom- 
estic units by villagers seemed to reflect the very close 
association that was deemed to exist between marriage and 
independent status. The 'hearth' (khaneh) is the very basis 
of the unit, the very heart of the 'home' (khaneh) and the home 
cannot be constructed without the presence of a woman. Khaneh 
can also be translated as 'household' when the household coin- 
cides with the domestic unit. But a more frequent translation 
of household is khdnevadeh, which does not necessarily indi- 
cate common residence or even close physical proximity, but 
rather proximity of kinship. Khanevadeh implies, not only 
the concept of 'family', but also of Itribel. 
2 Similarly 
another term for family is oulad which implies patrilineal 
descent rather than common residence. 
3 The khaneh is called 
after the male head (i. e. khaneh-ye-fulan, the house of so-and- 
so). The khanevadeh is called after the family name (i. e. 
khdnevii'deh-ye-Rusta in reference to the Turki speaking popu- 
lation of Chamani (see below, Ch. XI )- 
1. Davis, op-cit., p-195. 
2. C. f. Haim, op-cit., p-257. 
3. Wright, S. (1978) comments for the Mamasani, "While oulad 
refers to the sons of a man who is still alive or who has only 
recently died, the word oulad can also be used for the male 
descendants of a man who was alive two or three generations ago. 
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It is possible therefore to make an analytical distinct- 
ion between physical proximity (implied in the use of the term 
khdneh) and kinship proximity (implied in the use of the term 
khanevadeh) - But in practice such a distinction is not often 
made explicit. It implies an attempt to separate behaviour 
emergent in different spheres of activity. Goody sees the 
difference between household and family as being in the spheres 
of production and reproduction respectively. 
1 Salzer sees the 
difference in the spheres of economics and kinship. 
2 Neither 
division is satisfactory because the analytical separation is 
not evident either in the activities of the villagers themselves 
or in the complementary activities of production and repro- 
duction, or economics and kinship. 
Thus, while bearing in mind the problems of isolating 
particular forms, such as the household and the family, in 
order to inform appreciations of social organisation in the 
valley, one must be wary of conforming to the totalising con- 
ceptions of others, both scholars such as Goody, and villagers 
themselves. One is engaged in re-forming the concept in the 
light of all available evidence from the village. This is much 
more than merely conforming to their perceptions; it is also 
comparing the differences between what villagers say they do 
and what they actually do; between the public world of community 
cooperation and 'good faith', and the private world of self- 
interest and individual gain. It is through the public world, 
1. Goody, J., 1966, p. 99. 
2. Salzzer, op-cit., p. 183. 
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and the tools used to create order and understanding in that 
world that an appreciation of the private world is made avail- 
able - It is not so much what is made available for public 
knowledge, but why it is made available and other things are 
not that is important. 
The household characteristics of Chamani 
Male informants in Chamani identified 34 separate domestic 
units (khdneh) through the names of the adult males who were 
their heads. The composition of these 34 units is given in 
Appendix 1. Their isolation as will be seen is not necessarily 
a recognition of their independence or autonomy. The large 
majority of them (21) were elementary families of husbands and 
their wives and unmarried children. Seven extended families 
were isolated which consisted of husbands and their wives 
together with married sons and their wives and children. Of 
the remaining six families, three were elementary families with 
an additional ageing parent or widowed sister-in-law of the 
head of the household, and three were couples, with children 
who had set up house separately or, in only one c-ase, a newly 
married man and his wife. Fig-12 gives the numbers of differ- 
ent household forms. (fhe numbers in brackets refer to the 
specific numbers given to each household for easy identification 
and are reproduced in Appendix 2, together with the names of 
the adult heads of households to whom they refer. ) 
The Si7e of the domestic unit varied from those with only 
two people, to that unit which contained 12 people (No-18). 
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Fig. 12. Composition and size of dome-z7tic units 
in Chamani. 
C om-o os it i on: 
Hu. Wi. (3) 6,34,23 
Hu. Wi. + Chil dren. (21) 1 3,4,5,7,12114,15 , 1?, 19120 
21122,24,26,27,28,29,30,31,33. 
Hu. Wi. + Sons Wis (6) 2,8ý9,10,11,13- 
Hu. Wi. + Sons Wis + Chi. (1) 18 
Hu. Wi. + Chi + Hu Mo (2) 25,32 
Hu. Wi. + Chi + Bro's Wi. (1) 16 
Total 34 
(Numbers to right refer to those given to each domestic 
unit for identification - see Appendix 2. ) 
Size: 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
(Numbers of persons in household) 
1 10 11 12 
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Informants maintained that the ideal household consisted of the 
male head, his wife and their children together with adult sons 
and their young families. Residence was predominantly patri- 
local and it was deemed important for the son to set up his 
house next to or near that of his father. The oulad or patri- 
lineally organised close kin grouping was considered to be the 
basic unit for obtaining and maintaining independence together 
with the females who were attached to it. It provided the 
necessary political and economic security for the exploitation 
of available opportunities. The extended family was considered 
to be the 'natural I grouping which would provide the necessary 
cooperative labour for undertaking diverse economic activities. 
Such an ideal was only realised by seven households within 
Chamani at the time of fieldwork. 
The most common family form, the elementary family, did 
not exist in isolation from other families. Close kinship ties 
connected most villagers to each other in a network of inter- 
relationships. 'It is misleading to look at such groups as 
representing independent activity. The need for cooperation 
between domestic groups was ensured by the requirements of both 
rich and poor; the former in need of cooperative labour to work 
their varied enterprises, the latter in need of employment to 
ensure their livelihood and provide hope for future autonomy. 
The ideal of household autonomy, often reproduced as a 
fundamental feature of middle eastern societies in which the 
household represents, in an atomistic form, the smallest segment 
of the lineage system, is supported by informants I emphasis on 
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the equivalence and equality of separate households. Indepen- 
dence can be achieved through the individual efforts of the 
head of the household and the cooperation of his close agnates. 
The model to which every informant seemed to aspire was the 
independent control of a variety of resources which assured him 
and his dependents of sufficient income to aspire to positions 
of wealth and influence. The contrad: . ýýions within such an 
ideal are relatively obvious; only by obtaining control over 
the labour of others can such an 'independent' position be 
obtained. Certain relationships of control are perceived as 
'naturally' legitimate - the control over a wife's labour or 
of the labour of children, for example. 
The formal myth of the equivalence of households and of 
mutual cooperation between households serves-to disguise actual 
relations of inequality. The ranking system within households 
in which women and female children rank below men and male 
children is reproduced between households, where increased age 
is supposedly correlated with increased control over resources 
and higher prestige. The richest, oldest member is the highest 
on this ranking system. But many of the older men in the vill- 
age were not the richest or the most powerful. 
Within the framework of a patrilineal kinship ideology 
there is the constant dichotomy between keeping the patrimony 
together and the fissive tendencies associated with the inde- 
pendent aims of sons. The composition of individual domestic 
groups at any one time is much more than a reflection of their 
'position' within the domestic cycle; it is also a reflection 
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of the particular progress of the struggle between the fission 
and fusion of kinship groupings. The ideals of patriarchy, 
age and wealth, disguise the actual alignments of individuals, 
and differential access to resources. 'Cooperation' is rooted 
in the 'natural I framework of the extended patrilineal family; 
in the 'natural' authority of the father and the supposed 
'cooperation' between brothers. 
This familial framework provides the basis for the orien- 
tation of more extensive organisations for cooperation and 
interaction, through the extended family, the 'clan' grouping 
and the tribal framework, where 'kings' or 'chiefs' are per- 
ceived as primarily superior kinsmen, to paraphrase Sahlins. 
It is through the extension of this kinship ideology that coop- 
erative relationships between households are-cemented, and 
through the extension-of the 'good faith' economy that others 
are 'domesticated'. The division of labour within the house- 
hold, whereby sons work for fathers and wives work for husbands 
is reproduced in the division of labour between households 
whereby some men construct relationships of dependency with 
others and relationships of inequality are perpetuated. As 
Sahlins points out, in relationship to the kinship base of 
chieftainship and leadership, the relationship between leaders 
and followers 
"is conceived in terms of balance, a 'mutual helpful- 
ness', a 'continual reciprocity'. But in strict material 
terms the relationship cannot be both 'reciprocal' and 
'generous'. the exchange at once equivalent and more so 
*- The ideological ambiguity (the inequality in a 
society of amicability) is functional. On the one hand, 
the ethic of chiefly generosity blesses the inequalitý; 
on the other., the ideal of reciprocity denies that it makes any difference. " 
(Sahlins 1972, pp-134-5) 
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Much of the remainder of this thesis is devoted to an 
exploration of the ever widening ramifications of this 'ideo- 
logical ambiguity,. First through an analysis of relationships 
within the household. Secondly, through an analysis of marriage, 
the institution which underlies the creation of households. 
Thirdly, through a concentration on the wider kinship relation- 
ships which, while publicly isolating the bride and the groom 
also serve to legitimate wider cooperative alliances. And 
fourthly ýhrough a focus on the ways in which the kinship idiom, 
in being centralised under a ruling I chief I becomes politi- 
cised. As Sahlins maintains: 
"the issue is between a chronic tendency to divide 
and disperse the community, and, on the other side, 
the development of political controls which would 
check this fission and effect an economic dynamic 
more appropriate to the society's technical capacity. " 
(ibid., p-131) 
The dichotomies attendant upon the fission and fusion of 
kinship groupings are reproduced at a more general level 
where the kinship idiom is extended to ensure greater control 
over production in the wider socio-political environment. 
While maintaining an ideal of independence, the village 
population is increasingly differentiated in terms of control 
over resources. The picture of an homogeneous village popu- 
lation in which all are engaged in the cooperative cultivation 
of crops, ignores the many extra-village relationships and net- 
works constructed by villagers, and the positions of the larger 
absentee landowners and their representatives. Are these to be 
classified as members of the village? Certainly their influ- 
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ence within the vIllage is important and their control of much 
village production, directly and indirectly, means that they 
are integral to the economic and political life of the village. 
But their domestic groups are located within the city or in 
other villages and because of that there is a tendency to 
regard them as separate. 
The village of Chamani consists of two distinct parts 
(see fig. 15 ); the ghalleh in which the majority of the inhabi- 
tants live, and the landlord's courtyard, in which are found 
the various store rooms and living quarters used by the latter 
and his representatives when resident in the village. Above 
this, towards the Ayub mountain are two recently built court- 
yet, As together -with other courtyards which were under construc- 
tion in the early 1970s. In addition to these buildings there 
is now a compound which contains the two-roomed school house, 
and three recently constructed houses which contaLn the head- 
quarters of the Ordibehesht company, engaged in constructing 
the irrigation canals from the modern dam. 
In a dualistic interpretation of the organisation of Vill- 
age life in which the landlord's interests are separated from 
those of the villagers, it is tempting to treat the landlord's 
courtyard as separate from the rest of the village and talk of 
the ghalleh, in which the majority of the population lived, as 
equivalent to the village. The other buildings are treated 
as external to village production. In reality it is perhaps 
more useful to consider the landlord's courtyard as part of a 
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larger domestic unit, with its centre in Shiraz. It does have 
its ownIdtchen and is related through the personnel employed 
by Abduldhi to other households in the village who live within 
the ghalleh. 
From the vantage point of the Imamzadeh Ayub, above the 
village (the source for fresh water for the village and a place 
of local pilgrimage), the ghalleh of Chamani appears to be 
physically very regular in its construction. It is divided 
into 8 separate courtyards (hayats) transected by two lanes 
(kuchehs). - These 8 courtyards are surrounded by single- 
storeyed rooms which open up on to the central area and which 
house the majority of the village population. Each courtyard 
(hayiit) contains approximateýy four domestic units and pro- 
vides the focus for much daily activity. Physical location 
within particular courtyards reflects greater social proximity 
between domestic units, and cooperatinn between such units 
serves to complicate recognition of them as separate units. 
Demographic changes, fission over time of domestic groups and 
the incorporation of different types of people have also 
influenced the location and alignment of interests and groups. 
Until land reform accommodation within the ghalleh was provided 
by the landlord who legally owned the village and was, together 
with his representatives, in charge of local administration. 
Villagers who did not conform to his wishes were not only 
removed from production as share-croppers on the village land, 
but were evicted from the village itself. Some of these took 
up residence in neighbouring Buraki. Thus, while encapsulating 
the major inter-relationships between domestic groups, the 
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actual physical location of people in the ghalleh also reflects 
the influence of the landlord. Each domestic unit was origi- 
nally allocated two rooms, excluding store-rooms and animal 
sheds., and the upper rooms that a number of villagers have 
subsequently constructed. 
It was suggested by informants that recent courtyard con- 
struction outside the walls of the ghalleh was in response to 
population pressure. This would only appear to be part of the 
reason, for, while some courtyards were obviously overcrowded 
(B in particular), others had vacant space within them (H in 
particular). Other reasons must be sought, in the nature of 
relationships between domestic groups and their evolution over 
time, and in the prevailing security at the end of the 160s 
beginning of the 170s which made the necessity of living 
behind the defensive walls of the gha'leh largely redundant. 
The model of courtyard living presumed that those with 
whom one shared the courtyard were close agnatic kin. In 
other parts of Fars, especially in the less densely populated 
areas, it was also assumed that there was a correlation between 
I 
the extended patrilineal group and the ghalleh, so that physi- 
cal residence and kinship proximity coincided; the village 
approximated to the clan settlement. While such an association 
was acknowledged by informants, the nature of settlement in the 
Marvdasht plain, as well as its evolution, and the forms of 
control exercised over land, meant that the model was rarely 
achieved. Firstly, many of the villages in the plain had a 
relatively mobile population; migrants came and went, additional 
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populations were brought into villages by landowners. Secondly 
the head of the extended patrilineal group was rarely the con- 
troller of land in the Marvdasht plain, as he might have been 
in more isolated parts of the region. With the increasing con- 
trol of the landlord over village production and village 
affairs, it was not in the latter's interest to encourage the 
development of a supposedly unified patrilineal grouping with- 
in the village. 
In so me of the more recent settlements where a ghalleh 
has not been constructed, as in Domafshan and Pol-e-No-e-Kuchek 
the physical pattern of settlement is one of rather haphazard 
arrangement of individual courtyards (see fig. 10 ). These 
two settlements are smaller than the other settlements in the 
valley and their population appears to be much more closely 
associated with a dominant kinship grouping. Both settle- 
ments contain a majority of former pastoral nomads. 
In all the newly constructed courtyards design seems to 
incorporate considerable room for expansion; with the apparent 
assumption that it will contain more than just the elementary 
family, and that as time passes and interests expand, it will 
ut-limately house various relatives and their offspring. They 
are relatively large areas surrounded by strong retainer walls, 
which provided space for domestic animals as well as for the 
construction of additional rooms around all sides of the court- 
year when/if occasion demanded. 
297 
One of the factors which undoubtedly influenced the iso- 
lation of independent domestic groups was the availability of 
space within the courtyards. Three of the extended families 
for example (Nos-9,10 and 18) had moved in the early 160s into 
newly constructed courtyards above AbdulHhils compound and 
had built into their construction considerable potentialfDr 
household expansion. This undoubtedly delayed the separation 
of the married sons. On the other hand pressure on space with- 
in the ghalleh was obliging expanding family groups to split 
at an earlier date than might have been expected. No. 34, for 
example, the son of No - 13, was the only case of a son who had 
apparently left the courtyard of his father to take up resi- 
dence in another part of the ghalleh before the birth of chil- 
dren, and this may be partially explained by-pressure on 
space within that courtyard (G), in which there were already 
two extended families and six married couples. Similarly in 
courtyard C there were also six married couples, and one of the 
sons of No-2 was intent on constructing a new courtyard above 
the village. 
I 
The centrifugal tendencies associated with the establish- 
ment of an independent domestic unit are thus at odds with the 
centripetal ideals of patrilineal solidarity. The forms which 
the domestic units take reflect the various partial solutions 
to this dichotomy in the particular histories of family fission 
and fusion. There would appear to be two ways in which separ- 
ate domestic units might be established; either at the death 
of the father, or prior to that time, through the partial 
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separation of the interests of father and married son. This 
latter may of course take place as a result of re-settlement 
in different places, the result of migration out of the village. 
In Chamani only in four cases has division and settlement 
within Chamani preceded the death of the father and it is 
clear in all these cases that separation is far from complete. 
In all four cases (Nos-5,22,24 and 34) the sons have either 
established families or independent occupations. All but No. 
22 who was Abduldhils housekeeper, had received land with the 
land reform programme because they were at that time estab- 
lished share-croppers. In three of the cases (Nos. 5,22 and 
24) the sons live next door to their ageing parents and within 
the same courtyard. 
Changing economic circumstances associated with changes 
in tenurial conditions and changing opportunities imply changes 
in the types of strategies used to secure the productive and 
reproductive capacities of the domestic unit. It is an ack- 
nowledged aim of every adult male to marry and establish his 
own domestic unit. The selection of a bride is merely the 
initiation of such a process. The ability to acLeve separ- 
ation is not always realised and it might be argued that recent 
circumstances have seemed to delay the process of fission 
among some families by obliging members to pool resources in 
response to declining opportunities within the village and to 
encourage it among others. It would appear that this process, 
rather than leading to the destruction of the so-called 
'extended family' will lead to its entrenchment in some cir- 
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cumstances. This is in apparent contradiction to the idea of 
accelerated fission and the destruction of community often ass- 
umed to be a corollary of increases in migrant labour opportu- 
nities and the attendant labour mobility that that is 
assumed to entail. 
If one adopts the assumption that within the presumable 
autonomous domestic unit factors of production will consistent- 
ly be combined in such proportions as to secure independence 
and that there is therefore an 'optimal family size', then 
the processes associated with delaying or accelerating fission 
do indeed appear to be mutually contradictory. If on the other 
hand one accepts the fact that individual domestic units may 
fail to reproduce themselves autonomously, and that the 
nature of this 'unit' may change over time, then no such con- 
tradiction necessarily emerges. It is not unusual in the 
eastern parts of the Marvdasht plain, and in villages towards 
the gulf, to find settlements in which there are few able- 
bodied males; they are away on migrant labour contracts of 
one sort or another. In such cases their wives and dependent 
children tend to live under the protection of the older male 
residents in the courtyards of their fathers-in-law. The 
nature of their independence is questionable as they are not 
even separate commensal units. Similarly in analyses of noma- 
dic pastoral groups within Fars, evidence would seem to indi- 
cate that while one sector of the group migrates with the ani- 
mals others are often engaged in agriculture in either summer 
or winter quarters, while still others work as wage labourers 
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in the cities. The products of all labour are pooled to pro- 
mote the joint security of all contributors to the enterprise. 
It may be argued that changes in tenurial conditions with- 
I 
in the Marvdasht plain have resulted in a decline in the imp- 
ortance of land as a means. of, -obtaining a relatively secure 
base from which 'to establish an independent domestic unit for 
the majority of the population. Sufficient time had not yet 
elapsed since the land reform to indicate whether the land 
obtained by villagers would be sub-divided among their off- 
spring on their deaths, or would be accumulated in the hands 
of a smaller number of people through purchase. The distri- 
bution of land in the middle '60s precluded its sale, but 
there is reason to suspect that control, if not de jure owner- 
ship, had passed out of the hands of some of the original bene- 
ficiaries of the land reform programme, as villagers moved 
out in search of wage labour contracts and entrusted the culti- 
vation of their land to relations. In any case the amalgam- 
ation of much land within the Ayub valley and the dehestdn of 
Ramjerd into agricultural cooperatives would seem to have 
forestalled such a process by villagers. The diversity of 
traditional occupations, together with a flexibility of move- 
ment and response, and an insecurity of tenure, only temporar- 
ily alleviated by the land reform, all added up to the need 
for the acquisition of a diversified series of resources from 
which to build independence. 
According to informants, independence is achieved through 
a series of stages. Such stages ideally mark the progress of 
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a man through life and his acquisition of the resources 
necessary to maintain that independence. From dependence on 
others to control over the means of production is still an 
ideal, despite changes in the relationships between the village 
population and the means of p, roduction, which would appear to 
have blocked some forms of mobility and opened up others. Land 
reform has changed the relationships that villagers have to 
land and increased wage-labour opportunities have changed the 
basis on which household viability might be maintained. 
In theory the domestic unit is the basic unit for the co- 
ordination of productive activity and for consumption. Its 
members are bound together by co-residence, commensality and 
the organisational leadership of the male head, who is respon- 
sible for decision-making and for the welfare of members. In 
practice such independence is rarely visible because of the 
large numbers of joint responsibilities and activities which 
link households - Again theoretically all a man needs to set up 
his own domestic unit is a wife and a relatively secure means 
of gaining a livelihood. In practice the relatively secure 
basis from which domestic units and households could develop 
is not derived from a single source (i. e. land) , if it ever was. 
Other opportunities must be explored. But uncertainty and 
flexibility seem to have been-the predominant features in the 
Ayub valley. Strategies seem to have always focused on diý, er- 
sification of interests, with different members of the house- 
hold occupied in different actiý, ities, organised into what 
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Black has referred to as 'agro-pastorall combines. 
1 
The size of domestic groups varies as does the space the), 
occupy. But size and allocated space are not directly cor- 
relable; some large domestic groups have only one room, while 
smaller ones have up to four, with an additional upper room 
(bolo-kh'aneh) for entertaining. When Chamani was being built 
each domestic group was allocated two rooms by the landlord. 
These two basic rooms were a living/sleeping room and an 
adjacent kitchen, which sO'metimes doubled as an additional 
sheping room, both looking out on to the courtyard. Eleven of 
the thirty-three domestic groups identified in Chamani by male 
informants only occupied one room. This is not considered to 
be adequate by villagers as a separate kitchen is considered 
to be essential for autonomous domestic arrangements. Thus 
f 
those who only have one room are more or less dependent on 
others with kitchen facilities. These are always close rela- 
tives. The widespread use of paraffin stoves as well as the 
outside location of fireplaces on which bread can be made every 
day does mean however that even with one room a certain inde- 
pendence can be achieved. 
In six of these eleven cases one is dealing with emergent 
domestic groups; married sons and their wives and young off- 
spring who have been allocated a separate room in the same 
courtyard as their parents, but who continue to share the same 
1- Black, op-cit., p-620. He refers to this as a 'contract- 
ually defined association for mutual profit', and uses the 
Persian term sherkat to translate it. This tends to divorce 
it from its ideological foundation within the kinship sN, stem 
which eschews the notions of formal contract and of profit. 
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sofreh (table-cloth). On the basis of such a division it is 
difficult to distinguish between these and sons not given 
independent status. The young wives help the older women with 
the various domestic tasks (c. f. sons of numbers 2,5,10,11 
and 13). In three other cases (nos. 6,21 and 24) one is deal- 
,I 
ing with older couples whose children have established their 
own domestic groups and the balance of authority has shifted 
from the former because of advanced age. The kitchen is seen 
to be organised more by the younger wives. A common sofreh is 
N 
spread and food is cooked in common although the older couple 
may eat separately. In another case this involved the emerg- 
ent domestic group of a'younger brother whose other brothers 
both had two rooms. The widoweýd mother lived with the eldest 
brother (c. f. 31,32 and 33). Hosein Khan (no-30) was the 
landlord's dashteban and one of the poorest men in the village 
who, with his wife and young ýdaughter live in a room adjacent 
to her brother. Again the kitchen was shared. 
In the newly built courtyards space does not seem to be 
at such a premium as in the gha'leh. The courtyard, in 
addition to providing space for the fire on which the bread is 
baked, may contain a small vegetable plot enclosed by low mud- 
brick walls to keep the animaýs out, in which one or two fruit 
trees might also be grown. In summer months wooden bedsteads 
are placed in the courtyard if not on the roofs, and the car- 
pet frame is placed outside, shaded by a makeshift shelter of 
brushwood or woven goat-hair. Additional rooms around the 
-2 ý4 
courtyard house the donkeys and other animals as well as stored 
goods. The furniture of the living/sleeping room is minimal. 
A locally produced carpet or two provides floor covering and 
during the day the individual bed-rolls are stacked along the 
back wall. A tin chest or two contains the small number of 
valuables as well as clothing and such items as cigarettes and 
tea. SHelves built into the walls provide space for storing 
e crockery in frequent use and for photographs and lamps. The 
keys to the chest are normally kept around the woman's waist. 
The kitchen houses the pcts and pans used in cooking. Storage 
bags containing flour and rice are kept here and raised stands 
provide room for the goat-skin water containers. It is not 
usual for the kitchen to be carpeted. 
Division of Labour within the household. 
Despite the varied activities in which each domestic group 
is engaged there is a basic division of labour between the 
sexes, and the deemed autonomy of the group is rooted in the 
'cooperative' relationship that exists between a man and his 
wife. The domestic tasks in and around the home are carried 
out by the women. This is seen as their prerogative and they 
are in charge of the food-stores of the group. They prepare 
food, wash and mend clothes, ýrepare the wool for the product- 
ion of carpets and make the carpets. They also fetch drinking 
water from the spring at the imamzadeh. They are also res- 
ponsible for keeping the house clean. When the sheep and 
goats are giving mill\ it is their responsibility to milk them 
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and prepare butter, cheese and yogurt. major responsib)ilit), 
is the daily production of bread - wafer-thin rounds prepared 
on a concave copper griddle over an open fire. This is often 
done communally when three or four women take it in turns to 
produce a few days supply on the same fire. Flour for the 
bread is normally taken for grinding in the neighbouring village 
of Rasmanjan, where the flour mill caters for most of the 
requirements of the valley. Flour can also be purchased in 
small quantities from the village shop. Together with the 
children the women make frequent excursions into the fields to 
collect greens and herbs. Throughout the day they are con- 
stantly occupied. 
Children do give some help and as they grow older they 
are expected to take on more household responsibilities. Girls 
help their mothers in most tasks, both girls and boys look after 
the animals, leading them out'to pasture in the morning and 
perhaps staying with them throughout the day. With the open- 
ing of the village school many of the boys were unavailable 
for most of the day, but when they had time they also collected 
fuel for the fire; wood from the mountain as well as animal dung. 
Most of a woman's time is spent in and around the house, 
busy with domestic chores or caring for infants. The times 
when she is not so engaged may be spent visiting female rela- 
tives in adjacent courtyards or adjacent villages, but she is 
never away for more than a few hours if there is no one to help 
her with the cooking and when she is away she usually helps 
with the carpet or other task that her female relative is 
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engaged in. She is expected to be at home to provide tea and 
food for her husband and any guests he may bring home. It is 
taken for granted that women will do all these things - they 
are the domesticated (or naturalised) centre of the domestic 
group - 
Marriage involves the transference of the bride from the 
domestic group of her parents to that of her husband's parents, 
where she comes under the authority of her mother-in-law. She 
may not be a stranger to her husband's household because her 
I natal group may live in an adjacent courtyard, but her new 
roles of wife and daughter-in-law subordinate her, at least 
initially, to her mother-in-law, the khanoM (mistress) of the 
house. Her activity comes under constant scrutiny and she is 
obliged to help the khanom with all the domestic chores as well 
as with the production of carpets. She is in effect the 
latter's servant. Relationships with all adult males in the 
household will initially be reserved. As time passes the wife 
gradually takes on the responsibilities once shouldered by her 
moth er - in- law . 
Men's work is largely outside the home, apart from struct- 
ural repairs to the fabric of the house. The area around the 
hearth is not the place for them to linger during the day. The 
door of the ghalleh serves as a place were men informally con- A, 
gregate when there is nothing specifically to do. Their da-, ý 
time activities are virtually completely separate from those of 
the women whom they ignore if they appear on the street on their 
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way to fetch water or wash clothes. The agricultural cycle pro- 
vides the basic rhythm for their work, regulating the execution 
of agricultural tasks, as well as the periods when they can 
take employment outside the village. Most adult males have 
some direct involvement in the production of crops and/or in 
animal husbandry'. Agricultural work is only onerous at certain 
critical times of the year giving the impression that men have 
a great deal of spare or leisure time. Such an impression is 
predicated on a distinction between work and leisure not neces- 
sarily shared among villagers. If the villager is seen as 
only producing to fulfil the perceived requirements of the dom- 
estic group of which he'is a member, then once those require- 
ments have been met there is no necessity to do more. 
At times when males are absent for short or long periods 
from the village, women are expected to perform some if not all 
of their work. This would depend obviously on the material 
resources of the household and frequently labour was hired in. 
The reverse is not the case however. If by chance a woman 
should have any free time then there is always work on the 
latest carpet, either her own or that of another. Judging by 
the frequent numbers of males to be found outside the villa. ge 
gate there is little shortage of male labour for extensive 
periods of the year. 
The 'cooperative' efforts of a husband and wife and their 
offspring are supposed to provide sufficient resoutces to 
ensure adequate consumption for the domestic group and to ensure 
its reproduction. An important source of income for all families 
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apart perhaps from those directly supported as parts of 
Abdulahils domestic establishment, is the product from agri- 
cultural labour. This is supplemented by the products of 
animal husbandry, primarily sheep wool and goat hair. Addit- 
ionally cash is obtained from. the sale of livestock and in- 
creasingly importantly, of carpets and from wage labour. The 
agricultural harvest is rarely large enough to be sold but 
small amounts of cash are obtained by a few from the collection 
of liquorish plants which are transported by donkey to a 
collection point in Marvdasht. Where cash crops are grown by 
villagers, as in Pol-e-No (cotton) and Esfardran (sugar beet) 
then cash becomes an important part of income. A few of the 
richer villagers obtain incomes from hiring out machinery, 
from renting property they have acquired in town and from 
small-scale investments in urban enterprises such as taxis. 
Consumer expenses which cannot be provided from household 
production and which are usually bought for cash in the urban 
bazaar, or in cash or grain from the village shop, include 
clothing, tea, tobacco, sugar, soap, salt and animal fat, as 
well as occasional purchases of meat and vegetables, and fruits 
such as dates which can be stored and which figure quite pro- 
minently in the diets of the villagers. Dyeing expenses for 
wool are a small but regular item in household expenditure. 
The head of the household has control over the cash resources 
of the group, including those of his unmarried sons. Reserves 
are required especially to pay for marriage expenses. There 
are also occasional purchases of gold jewellry. 
-zog 
CHAPTER X 
MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
ALLIANCES 
The pivot on which individual household construction turns 
is that institution which transforms relationships legitimated 
through agnation into those legitimated through affinity, i. e. 
marriage, or the transformation of a daughter into a wife and 
of a son into a husband. As Bourdieu maintains: "the choice 
between fission and fusion, the inside and the outside, security 
and adventure, is posed anew with each marriage". 
1 The 
marriage ceremony itself is one of the most colourful rituals 
in which people in the Marvdasht plain participate. On no 
other occasion in the calendar ", does one find such display and 
conspicuous consumption. On no other occasion is one confron- 
ted with such a formal and public differentiation of personnel 
into the kin groups of the bride and groom. This conspicuous- 
ness in marriage ceremonies has often supported the notion 
that marriage par excellence is the way in which ties between 
agnatic groups, in a society adhering to a patrilineal ideology, 
are cemented. Indeed it is often on the basis of just such 
ceremonies that the discrete construction of descent groupings 
is predicated. 
And yet as will hopefully be pointed out in the next 
chapter, the construction of formal agnatic descent groups often 
proves problematic. If this is indeed the case then marriage 
1. Bourdieu 1977, p-57. 
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seen as a 'link' between such groups might prove to be just 
as problematic. There can be no doubt that the marriage cere- 
mony, which often lasts for several days, and is expressedl%, 
aimed at attracting large numbers of guests to bear witness to 
the legitimation and the transformation, is perceived as an 
important event. ' It might be seen as the legitimation for the 
'domestication' of the 'outside', represented by the 
'stranger/bride' in the creation of a new domestic unit, and 
as an elaborate means of naturalising and thereby normalising 
the relations of 'domination' that are imposed on the bride, 
and thus resolving the contradictions associated with the 
fission of one agnatic group and the potential emergence of 
another. But such a perception"ignores the fact that the 
bride remains a daughter and the husband remains a son. 
Marriage provides the link between discussions of domestic 
groups and wider associations based on kinship; between indi- 
vidual self-interest and collective concerns, and between what 
Bourdieu terms ýpractical' kin and 'official' kin ("it is 
practical kin who make marriages; it is official kin who cele- 
brate them"). 
' It is a means by which the 'inside' is turned 
, outside' and the 'outside' turned 'inside' and as such haý 
analogies with more formal economic transactions where the 
'outside' is 'domesticated' th-rough the imposition of features 
of the 'good faith' economy and the dissimulation of self- 
interest (see below, chapter XII). By clothing marriage in I 
1. Ibid., p-34- 
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elaborate colours (it is an occasion for women to dress in their 
finest clothes) the 'true' colours associated with the play of 
naked self-interest can be disguised. The often prolonged 
and delicate negotiations which precede the actual ceremony, 
where practical considerations of economics and status differ- 
ences are weighed and evaluated, are very often conducted, at 
least initially, in private, by women. In the public, male- 
dominated, ceremony such considerations take second place to 
the officialising strategies which re-state egalitarian prin- 
ciples of cooperation and harmony, and provide occasions for 
the public display of collective interest. 
Scholars such as Barth and Irons working in other parts 
of Iran have commented on what they see as the limited social 
significance of marriages. For example, Irons states: 
"Among the Yomut, the ties created by marriage have 
little social significance beyond the range of two 
closely related groups of households. " 
(1975, p-127) 
and Barth similarly comments: 
"no larger kin group than the 'tent', i. e. the 
elementary family, is normally made relevant to 
the marriage transaction. " 
(1964, p-32) 
in reference to marriage among the Basserl. If one takes as 
one's units of analysis, either the economically and socially 
independent households, or gerkealogically defined and suppo- 
sedly discrete agnatic groups, then indeed the nature of their 
inter-relationship becomes problematic because, rather than 
being treated as models for reality, they become objects of 
attention themselves; reified objects which are treated as if 
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they were real. Barth, in his later discussions about ethnic 
groups and boundaries pointed towards using the analytical 
focus provided by the boundary itself, rather than focusing on 
particular forms of social organisation which are the relative 
products of particular historical and environmental circum- 
stances. 
1 In both Barth's earlier work and in Iron's analysis 
of the Yomut Turkmen the social form, the household, is 
implicitly accepted as a valuable aiialytical tool and their 
generalisation (or formalisations) emerge from that basis. 
Antoun also, in his study of an Arab village in Jordan, 
2 
implicitly accepts the concrete existence of such groups as 
'the household'. 'the ldzum', 'the lineage' and 'the clan', 
with which he structures his an'alysis, but is puzzled by the 
question of a young informant who, in response to questions 
about affinal relationships in grandparental and previous gen- 
erations asks, 'with an air-of wonderment and slight impatience 
.... Why inquire about such things, when it is well known 
that we are all, related in some way or another? '. 
3 Unfortu- 
nately Antoun seems to dismiss this query and states that the 
'some way or anothef is important to both the villager and the 
ethnographer, 'in the assessment of the structural cohesive- 
ness of the village community'. 
4 This is of course assuming 
that this 'structural cohesiveness' and 'community, of interests 
I. Barth, F., Introduction to Ethnic groups and boundaries, 
London 1970, pp-9-38. 
2. Antoun, R., Arab village, London 1972. 
3. Ibid., p-134- 
Ibid., p-134- 
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that he presumes exist within the village are more than the 
a priori imposition of an order already established in the 
analytical schema of the researcher. If the analytical units 
abstracted from the reality (the household ... clan, etc. ) 
were important to the villager in terms under which Antoun 
conducted his enquiry, then surely the villager would not have 
reacted with 'wonderment' and slight 'impatience'? Antoun 
elsewhere in the same work seems to realise the problems of 
making concepts fit forms when he states: 
"The household has no necessary relation to any parti- 
cular type of dwelling unit. Moreover there are no 
ready indices of its existence such as separate 
entrances or granaries or ritual shrines. Indeed the 
demarcation of a hdusehold by dwelling unit may be 
quite erroneous. " 
(1972, p-55) 
Information on marriage alliances for groups in Chamani is 
I 
given inthe discussion of wider kinship associations in the 
next chapter. This is partially analysed in terms of where 
individuals obtained spouses from, and in terms of presumed 
genealogical proximity. These are however only two descript- 
ive criteria. There are a whole host of more mundane criteria 
which imply a detailed understanding of the life histories of 
the individuals and households involved. The combination of 
previous circumstances associated with already established 
kinship and neighbourhood networks provide the backdrop for a 
pragmatic evaluation of both social and economic costs and 
benefits implied in the construction of new alliances. The 
'pattern' of alliances or the synthesis which the anthropolo- 
gist (and the villager) might offer, may be nothing more than 
'14 
the post facto rationalisation and justification which empha- 
sises those elements of the 'good faith' economy without 
publicly revealing the very important strategic and selfish 
implications associated with the transfer of women. 
1 
A distinction needs therefore to be made 
between public r'ationalisation and private motives in any dis- 
cussion of marriage alliances. The spectacular marriages 
which unite very separate groups of people serve only to push 
into insignificance the more mundane alliances which unite 
practical kin in everyday activity. The private questions con- 
cerning the negotiations which precede marriage, the economic 
evaluation of the parti6s involved, the status of the wife in 
the husband's home, the relationships with the husband's 
mother, are very difficult to publicly and honestly answer. 
Firstly because the public negotiation of value is at pains to 
disguise the workings of self-interest, and secondly because 
the 'undercover' negotiations are usually the concern of women 
and are wiý. ll advanced before they publicly emerge; any irre- 
concilable differences mean that negotiations can be called 
off before the public is alerted. 
1. As Sahlins maintains: "it does sometimes miss the point, 
however, to view marital exchange as perfectly balanced pres- 
tation. The transactions of marriage, and perhaps contingent 
future affinal exchange as well, are often not exactly equal 
.... For unequal benefit sustains the alliance as perfect balance could not". He explains: "The exchange that is symmet- 
rical or unequivocally equal carries some disadvantage from the 
point of view of alliance; it cancels debts and thus opens the 
possibility of contracting out. If neither side is 'owing' then 
the bond between them is comparatively fragile. But if accounts 
are not squared, then the relationship is maintained by virtue 
of the shadow of indebtedness', and there will have to be 
further occasions of association, perhaps as occasions of 
further navment. ll Thid .Pp- 222) 
1 
Publicly there are a number of formal procedures and 
I 
preferences that are acknowledged. It is, for example, the 
responsibility of the senior males of the households to select 
the bride for the son or to give the daughter to an acceptable 
groom. Formal negotiations. about bridewealth payments are con- 
ducted through them. This does not imply that in the less 
formal world the potential spouses do not get a limited amount 
of choice. Certain preferences are also publicly acknowledged. 
It is for example preferred if an alliance can be constructed 
between parallel cousins, the sons and daughters of brothers, 
failing that between relations traced through either the father 
I 
or the mother, because Iýif marriage is within the family then 
one at least knows what is happening to the money'. Such pre- 
ferences indicate a desire to construct alliances between 
people from the same or neighbouring villages and thereby 
facilitate post-marital interaction between members of the 
groups so joined. The desirability of parallel cousin marriage 
is publicly justi, fied in terms of maintaining lineage solidarity 
and the patrimony. It is also seen as a convenient means of 
reducing the amounts that need to be formally transferred; the 
closer the two families the less elaborate need the preparations b 
1. Much work in recent years has been devoted to the problems 
associated with parallel cousin marriage which appear to challenge 
the rules of exogamy and the ideas of separate lineages. As 
Bourdieu has pointed out: 'it challenges the whole notion of uni- 
lineal descent as well as the theory of marriage as an exchange 
of one woman against another, which assumes an incest taboo, 
i. e. the absolute necessity of exchange" (p. 30). In his dis- 
cussion of parallel cousin marriage Barth puts forward the 
rationale that such marriages are a means of strengthening lin- 
eage solidarity (Barth 19S3). Subsequent analysis dwelt on the 
differentes beiween this theory and actual statistical practice. 
But as Bourdieu points out, "We can immediately see what is 
/ Cont. overleaf 
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There are obvious pragmatic advantages in marrying into 
known families, but these may not always be publicly defensible, 
and although publicly brothers are expected to put up a united 
front and cooperate, in practice this relationship may be the 
one most faught with tension., The fact that large numbers of 
villagers are related to each other in one form or another 
means that pragmatic opportunism can be dressed in terms of 
lineage solidarity even when it may in fact mean the reverse; 
(the marriage of a son into, the family of another village not 
only means an extension or re-affirmation. of kinship links but 
it also denies the brother resident in the same village the 
i 
opportunity of obtaining' a son-in-law). 
J Of 64 marriages recorded in Chamani for example, at least 
42 were constructed between partners who acknowledged kinship 
I 
links between them, and this figure is likely to have been 
higher if more detailed genealogical knowledge through the 
women had been available for those who had married into fami- 
lies from their, places of birth. Of these 64 marriages only 
22, or approximately one third, were constructed between vill- 
agers resident at the time of marriage, in Chamani itself and 
includes the original settlers who brought their wives with 
Note 1 from previous page cont.: 
strange about the idea of calculating rates of endogamy when 
... it is the very notion of the endogamous group, and there- fore the basis of calculation, which is in question (ibid., 
p-33). 
Defining parallel cousin m 
wider tgroup' which it is supposed 
that the group itself is a product 
gical relationships which link its 
justification in such terms may be 
descriDtion which legitimates much 
arriage in terms of the 
to sustain ignores the fact 
more than just of genealo- 
members and as such its 
merely the post facto public 
more pragmatic considerations. 
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them. Because of recent mobility in this village as in many 
other villages in the plain, there are many connections between 
villages often far removed from the valley, which makes it 
difficult to correlate physical distance with social distance. 
If. however, one uses the category of social distance as a 
tool for analysis then increasing social distance between 
partners to a marriage (which as Irons and Barth, among others, 
have noted is not just an alliance between individuals, but 
one between households), it appears to involve increasing 
formality and publicity, being accompanied with more formal 
negotiations and greater attendant risks. 
Marriage negotiations 
, 
Proposals for marriage and negotiations of bridewealth, 
I 
like other more formal economic negotiations, are conducted 
through mediators. Publicly these include senior agnates 
representing the fathers of the prospective bride and groom 
and the more senior the agnates the more formal importance 
attached to the negotations (and vice versa). Privately and 
informally the ground-work to these negotiations has already 
been completed by women mediators, in the case of marriages 
over considerable social distances, and by women relatives in 
the two households where such-relatives exist. In cases where 
social distance is minimal these informal negotiations may be 
the major preludes to the public announcement of a marriage. 
Formal negotiations may often be protracted and involve se%-eral 
preparatory visits by the negotiating team representing the 
, 18 
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father of the groom. The negotiation of familiarity is a deli- C> I 
cate task hedged with inherent dangers, especially loss of 
face (iberu) and of honour and status (ehteram). As noted 
later in terms of the negotiation of economic contracts, the 
amount of time expended increases as social distance increases; 
the more time spent the greater the deemed social proximity and 
the less the likelihood that the family giving the bride will 
feel undervalued. This negotiation of worth is also the nego- 
tiation of merit. It is not simply the negotiation of the 
value of a commodity, the bride, by two parties who see the 
object of negotiation as something apart from themselves. For 
the 'wife-giver' , as well as for the 'wife taker' , these nego- 
, "I tiations are to determine the v alue or standing of the house- 
hold. Only secondarily are they about the value of the lost 
labour of a daughter. The constant paradox involves the need 
to marry off daughters on the one hand, with the need not to 
be seen to be 'selling cheaply' on the other and formalisations 
in terms of buying and selling are assiduously avoided. 
Bride price consists of two main parts. Shirbaha repre- 
sents a gift to the wife's mother for rearing the girl. This 
bride- or milk-price is normally payable before the wedding 
ceremony and is used by the future bride's household to help 
equip her with clothing and other domestic articles necessary 
to bring to the new home. The nature of shirbaha varies. 
Sugar, sweets, tea, clothes and utensils form traditional parts 
of the payment but it would seem that general practice now 
involves the giving of cash. Additional gifts to the future 
- 
bride and her household may also form a part of the protracted 
negotiations - 
The more substantial part of the marriage payment is the 
mahr or mahrieh which in the Marvdasht plain seemed to involve 
settlements of between 3,000 and 4,000 Ts. but these were sub- 
ject to variatio'n and to the general inflation rate. Part of 
the payment was in cash and part in animals. Land did not 
figure at that time in the majority of negotiations between 
villagers. The mahr might, in addition to cash and animals, 
include jewellry but it was basically seen as a guarantee 
against divorce in that a substantial part of it remains under 
the control of the bride's father despite the fact that it is 
the woman's part of the future household's resources. 
The actual price of the mahr will vary according to the 
social distance of the respective parties involved and the anal- 
ysis of their respective resources, but an accepted social 
minimum seems to be generally obtainable. In cases of close 
kin, or neighbours, public figures may be stated but the actual 
amounts transferred varied according to the nature of the dom- 
estic control exercised by the senior males of the households 
involved; the formal transfer of ownership of animals for 
example may not involve their physical separation from one 
jointly administered herd whos'e control remains in the hands 
of the animal giver. 
In the case of a divorced man marrying a second time, to 
a virgin, then it is stated that the price of the mahr would 
double, to overcome the disadvantages of such an alliance to 
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the bride's family. Relative age figures prominently in nego- 
tiations so that the marriage of a virgin to an older man sub- 
stantially increases the amount paid. Conversely, the marriage 
of a young man to an older woman, whether a widow or not, sub- 
stantially decreases the am. ou, nt paid. Physical and social dis- 
ability are also' reflected in marriage agreements and in the 
size of weddings, and public display seems to be directly cor- 
related with size of bridal payments. In cases where families 
exchange daughters there may be no payment of bridewealth 
although a token amount is invariably transferred. 
With the more formal negotiations, agreement on payment, 
I 
and the transfer of gifts from the groom's household to that 
of the bridels, is sealed through a formal engagement, and the 
use of the term nRmzdd indicates that names have been pledged. 
In this period the two households exchange hospitalities and 
the future groom visits his-future wife's household periodi- 
cally where he is treated with respect and courtesy. In the 
more common cases involving less formal negotiations, between 
close kin or neighbours, children may be pledged to each other 
from an early age, to perhaps ensure cooperation between fami- 
lies. Such pledges may or may not be honoured depending on 
the changed circumstances later in life. 
The marriage ceremony 
In the less formal cases the actual date on which the 
formal wedding contract (aghd) is signed in the presence of a 
religious functionary (mullah or 5khund) may not be formalised 
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until the actual arrival of that religious functionary in the 
village. In the more formal cases the date is arranged well 
in advance. The aghd marks the formal beginning of the wedding 
and the marriage is usually consummated soon after. Celebra- 
tions are initiated by the groom's household. A flag is raised 
on the top of his house at this time. A flag may similarly 
be raised over the bride's house if she lives in the same vill- 
age. The head of the groom's household hires musicians and 
perhaps players, and food to feed the guests is prepared by 
his kinswomen. Large pots to cater for large numbers are norm- 
ally hired together with stoves, from dealers in Marvdasht. 
Celebrations take place 'in the groom's courtyard, or if that is 
not large enough, in that of a close relative. The bride 
I 
remains veiled and secluded in her own home until she is brought 
to the room especially reserved for the new couple in her new 
household, where she remains in seclusion attended by her kins- 
women - The senior males of the groom's household are publicly 
in charge of the celebrations which revolve around the dancing 
of the women and the stick game (chub bazi) of the men. This 
latter was said to be an occasion in which rivalries between 
different groups of men might be exorcised. 
1 
During the festivities the marriage contract involving 
the mahr settlement is formally read out, agreed to and signed 
in front of witnesses. In larger, more formal weddings, two 
1. An increasingly common item in many weddings is the engage- 
ment of a group of urban player/musiciens who not only provide 
continuous music but also dancers and actors. For a descript- 
ion of their involvement in a village wedding see Appendix I- 
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religious representatives may be called in to represent each 
side of the contract. They are entertained at the expense of 
the groom's household. The bride and groom are brought 
together to pledge themselves to each other on the QoIr5n and 
sign the contract before sepayating for the resumption of 
festivities. Prior to the signing of the aghd both the man 
and the woman have been taken to the bath and this is repeated 
before the eventual consummatiodof the marriage that same 
evening. This is accompanied with great publicity; girls dance 
before the bride who is ritually escorted to the bath and back 
to her place of retirement. Similarly the groom is bathed 
and publicly shaved by the village barber. After this a large 
metal bowl is placed in front of him and the guests file past 
dropping their contributions into it. Each gift is announced 
by a literate relative of the groom's household who registers 
the name and the amount at thýe same time. Important guests 
obviously give more and may in fact publicly pay for part of 
the entertainment - the musicians or the players. 
The transfer of the bride to the home of her new parents- 
in-law marks the formal transformation of her status, regard- 
less of the closeness of ties which link the households. The 
close male agnates of the groom go to the bride's home on the 
day of the aghd to fetch her. *Here they are fed by the bride's 
parents before they take her, often against the public will of 
the household, on horse-back or by landrover to the groom's 
house. Formal authority and responsibility pass from the 
father to the father-in-law. 
-Z zý 7 
But transformation and separation are never as discrete as 
they are publicly claimed. The new wife may constantly visit 
her own parents and the emergent household does not appear to 
be normally separable until the birth of the first child. 
Practice does of course vary depending on the personal histor- 
II 
ies of the two families and their closeness. In one case from 
Chamani where a young man, the son of Akram (No. 10) married 
a substantially older woman than himself from Uanjan, there 
was a bare minimum of ceremony and the bride continued to live 
I 
with her parents in Uanjan and the son with his. No restrict- 
ion was however placed on mutual visiting. The son's brother 
i 
had formerly married the wife's s ister and it was expected 
that she would eventually move to Chamani. The reasons for 
the marriage were jokingly proclaimed as being associated with 
the sexual precociousness of the young man and the elderly 
(and thereforepotentially unmarriageable) status of the woman. 
In another case, that of Hosein Khan (No-30), the landlord's 
dashteban, here-was a slightly dim-witted individual with no 
immediate family in the area, married to the only sister of 
one of the villagers. She was regarded as being unmarriageable 
because of her temper and he came to live in a room with her, 
next to her brother. There was no marriage celebration and no 
bridewealth was given. These-were however exceptional settle- 
ments and the vast majority of women moved to their groom's 
courtyard. 
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Public rationalisation and private motives 
Despite the public nature marking many of the marriage 
transactions in the valley, and the accompanying statements 
stressing cooperation and solidarity between the households of 
affines, and often between la, rger lineages, the political capi- 
tal derived from such marriages does not appear to correlate 
with the public announcements in practice. One major reason 
for this is perhaps to be located in the public vocabulary 
that is often accepted as the 'truth' by the males who proclaim 
it. In this public language the males speak of alliances 
between families (oulad) which are defined in terms of the 
male members. A contradiction necessarily arises if we take 
this language as an indication of actual practice in that it 
is very evident that marriages in the Ayub valley are not just 
governed by obvious status differences between the families 
involved; rich families marry, into poorer ones and vice versa. 
This could be explaindd by the common interests of members of 
the same oulad. , But as Barth has commented in relationship to 
his work among the Swat Pathan: 
"Affinal relationships are ideally relationships of 
friendship and support; but the relation of connubium 
by itself does not create significant bonds of common 
interest ... affinal ties may be charged with politi- 
cal meaning through the addition of other contractual 
relationships. " 
(1965, p-40) 
Construction of family ties through marriage does not necessar- 
ily help in the pursuit of self-interest, i. e. marriages are 
not necessarily to be explained in terms of economic cooperation 
between households so united, other factors not explained by 
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reference to the implications of the formal strategies, are 
involved. 
These formal strategies ignore those strategies which 
I 
women adopt, and through their patrifocal lenses hide the tact- 
ical advantages pursued by wo. men through marriages. As indi- 
cated previously', information for the construction of genealo- 
gies was based on male informants. The construction of female 
alliances, and attempts to discern in detail the ways in which 
women perceive marriages must remain therefore imprecise and 
tentative. The bias of the male researcher interpreting 
material received predominantly from male informants is indeed 
difficult to correct. Nevertheless it would appear that in 
many respects the marriage negotiations are just as crucial to 
the women who are gaining daughters-in-law and the mothers who 
are losing daughters. 
The separation of the predominantly domestic lives of 
women from the predominantly public life of men, and the models 
of separate 'worlds' or 'spheres' of activity which have been 
constructed on that basis ignores the fact that both sexes are 
intimately involved in both. The 'public' and the 'private' 
cannot be separated through appeals to a dualism which fails 
to look reflexively at the ways in which they structure each 
other. Again marriage, througli its colourful ritual, is the 
pivot through which the 'private', 'inside' world, inhabited 
by women, is made public, for the purpose of extracting a member 
from one group and re-inserting her into another, through a 
public, outside world inhabited by men. 
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It was often stated by informants that daughters were a 
liability because they were raised for so many years only to 
be given to someone else in marriage, and their subsequent 
labour lost. The birth of a son was acclaimed, that of a 
daughter regretted; and yet there was no denial that a good 
wife wI-D worked well and produced many children was essential 
for the creation of a viable household. The substitution of a 
trained daughter for an untrained daughter-in-law cannot be 
greeted with much enthusiasm by the senior woman of a household. 
The patrilineal ideology which upholds the unity of the lin- 
eage grouping, publicly acclaims the importance of men and 
denies the importance of women. To assert such implies the 
constant 'horizontal' movement bf women through 'vertically' 
aligned groups of men. And yet the close relationships that 
f 
often exist between members of households mean that women as 
well as men are often closelyrelated. Unfortunately this is 
not necessarily revealed in the genealogies collected. The 
separation that Bourdieu makes between 'official' and 'practical' 
kin means that the more pragmatic implications associated with 
marriage agreements are made amenable to analysis; but the sys- 
tematic construction of a model of the Imatrilineage' which, 
'shadows' that of the patrilineage is not made. Perhaps such 
a model should not be constructed, as it formalises something 
that is not so formalised in the minds of the social actors. 
And yet, as an heuristic device it does allow one to confront 
the perceptual bias associated with the conception of the patri- 
lineage. Bourdieu states: 
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"The male, that is to say, the dominant reading... 
represses the other possible pathway, albeit some- 
times more direct and often more convenient practi- 
cally, which would reckon through the women. " 
(1977, p-42) 
Unfortunately, systematic evidence is unavailable for the 
construction of such a Imatrilineage I for villages in the Ayub 
valley, but tentative suggestions might be forwarded where 
there appear to be 'gaps' in the official explanations of inter- 
relationships. Explanations for these 'gaps' in terms of 
k 
female strategies may not be sufficient but they do point beyond 
thelofficiall explanations into an examination of lineage 
endogamy and the importance of practical kin. If we examine 
the genealogical inter-relationships which link the Baneshi 
Lurs, we find that the wives of two of the prominent male mem- 
bers of this group are sisters who came from Shahra Their 
brother is the rice irrigator and lives in Chamani for part of 
the year. They live in adjacent houses in the same compound. 
The wife of Iadollah (No-2) is his second. His first one came 
with him from Amirdbdd in Beiza. Four of their children have 
married (3 sons and 1 daughter). The daughter was married to 
a person from Shahrak. Masih, their oldest son, was married 
to a girl from Amirabad, the original place of residence of his 
father and mother. The two younger sons, Rahman and Mansur, 
were respectively married to Iadullah's second wife's sister's 
daughter (daughter of No-1) who lives in the same compound, and 
to the daughter of his wife's sister's husband's sister. This 
For more detail, see following Chapter. 
I 
"22 
latter person is married to Ghobad, one of two brothers who 
also came from Amirabad and now live in Buraki, having been 
thrown out of Chamani by Abdulahi (see fig. 13 ). The second 
brother has married the daughter of Kaka Khan (No. 6), who was 
raised in Futugbad but whose wife also comes from Amirdbad. 
Both sisters (the wives of 1 and 2) have managed to see 
f 
their daughters married to presumed matrilateral kinsmen in 
their original place of residence (Shahrak). Masih took a 
k 
presumed kinswoman from his father and mother's original place 
of residence. These sisters have also ensured that their own 
offspring have intermarried. In theory, and presumably for 
i 
public purposes, Rahman1has marri ed his preferred parallel 
cousins (i. e. his father's brother's son's daughter). In 
practice it would appear to be easier to look at this marriage, 
and others like it, as that of the children of sisters. 
Ghobad and Hosein also-come from Amirabdd. Ghobad married 
Goljan, Malek's sister and Hosein married the daughter of a 
woman from that. place. Official interpretations which tend to 
exclude women, as well as demonstrating a relatively shallow 
genealogical knowledge, conspire against the detailed recon- 
struction of matrilateral connections but it would appear that 
the women in the Baneshi households are indeed closely inter- 
related. 
If we take the much more complex Rusta genealogy we are 
confronted with similar difficulties. The core of this geneal- 
ogy is four brothers who have developed separate interests. 
Javad and Azad (Nos-7 and 8) still live in the ghalleh of 
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Chamani, but the other two Ziad and Akram (Nos-9 and 10) have 
" ý--- S- moved out of the ghalleh (see fig$ "oc-16)-The wives of 7 and 8 
are both daughters of Rusta settlers in Chamani, whereas those 
of both 9 and 10 have been brought to Chamani from Hasanabid. 
Little is known about the actual matrilateral inter-conncect- 
ions between most of the women, but the very fact that 23 of 
the 30 recorded marriages for the Rusta Turks are between 
people who live in Chamani or BuTaki seems to indicate close 
interconnection. In the cases of two of the separate house- 
holds identified as part of this group their attachment is 
specifically through women (see Nos. 14 and 17). 
Connections with the villages of Hasandb9d and Uanajan in 
particular are not just to be interpreted in terms of patri- 
lineal connections uniting members of the Gerali tireh, but 
f 
must also be reckoned in terms of the connections through women 
that have been renewed, through marriage, in the case of 
Ziad (9), and in the cases of daughters given to people in 
Uanajan by Nos. 8,13 and 1S, and sons receiving daughters from 
there by No-10. Two sisters of the four brothers were married 
to men in Junaki which (despite the fact that that link has not 
been reciprocated through the alliances of their respective 
offspring) provides an important channel for the construction 
of business ventures between No. 7 and his brother-in-law there. 
Some marriages between Rusta Turks in Chamani itself appear 
rather odd at first glance. Why should Javad (7), the most 
powerful member and head of the village council, give his 
daughter to Mina's son (11) for example, and obtain his wife 
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from Avolfat (13)? Neither alliance would appear to serve his 
political or economic interests. Both Mina and Avolfat are 
relatively poor villagers and their sons are not involved in 
any of Javad's enterprises. But they do represent senior mem- 
bers of the lineage in the village and they have wide connect- 
ions through their women with other villages. 
1 
In the selection of marriage partners several criteria are 
thus involved; not only the interests expressed by the males 
in terms of maintaining lineage solidarity and maintaining and 
improving their social position through strategic alliances, 
but also the interests of the women in ensuring that their 
daughters stay near them, and that they obtain reliable help 
with the domestic chores. These criteria in practice are 
influenced by the demographic availability of suitable spouses, 
but each alliance/will attempt to obtain the best possible con- 
figuration of these criteria. The interests of the women may 
however be in contradiction to those of the men. This is 
dramatically revealed in the case of divorce, or separation, 
where public interests and private concerns polarise the two 
sexes and pit families against families in the public arena: 
Safar Baneshi, a landowner in Chamani who had come to 
settle there, had married the sister of Rezali, the 
head of the Tajiks in Chamani. 2 This latter's family 
was an old respected family from Buraki. He had nego- 
tiated what he thought was a strategic alliance between 
his eldest daughter, Manijeh, and Eskandar, the son of 
Mashd Akbar Keshavarz, one of the richest people in 
Buraki and the brother of the head of the Buraki coun- 
cil. They had been married for two years without the 
1. Some of the implications of this are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
2. The Tajiks in the village had their own leader, known as 
ka4Lýýa as did the Lurs and the Turks. For the implicati P ions 
ol- these divisions within the village see following chapter. 
ik 
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appearance of children. Manijeh accused Eskandar of 
continuously hitting her and accused her mother-in- 
law of victimising her. She fled her husband's house 
in Buraki and sought refuge with her mother in Chamani. 
The latter supported her daughter against the combined 
weight of Safar, Eskandar and other males from Buraki. 
A senior male agnate, a kadkhoda of a village in Bei 7a, 
was brought in to try and sort the situation out with- 
out success. Manijeh wanted a divorce. She accused 
her husband of being a", ýomanl, and she received the 
support of her close female relatives. Finally the 
case was referred to the gendarmery and Abduldhi 
offered to sit down to dinner with the two parties after 
entreaties from Safar and the extension corpsman resi- 
dent in the village at the time. It was suggested 
that they choose a neutral place such as Domafshan in 
which to resume co-residence. Eventually a temporary 
resolution was gained when Manijeh decided to return 
to her husband's home. 
In public terms then society,. is composed of discrete 
agnatic groups united týrough common cooperative interests 
and a common patrimony. Friction and discord within and between 
groups is deemed to be ca used by women who cannot be trusted 
and must therefore be strictly controlled. Part of the reason 
for this is that women transgress the divisions between fami- 
lies; a married woman is a member of two families, one by birth, 
the other by marriage. The women then are the strongest as 
well as seemingly paradoxically the weakest links in the chains 
which connect patrilineally organised families, and are thus 
in an ambivalent position and potentially dangerous. They have 
intimate knowledge of the activities of both families in ways 
in which the men cannot. 
The women are the receptacles in which the honour of the 
males is placed. Because of their ambivalent position this 
must be constantly guarded. Women, because of their unrelia- 
bility are capable of bringing shame on the males. A person 
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of good repute has honour and shame as it resides in his 
women-folk, but the women are basically ignorant of the 
nature of family honour. 
1 Honour, like power, resides with 
men, who participate in the good-faith economy, where trust 
and good-faith are at a premium, and it is associated with the 
virility, manliness and courage of the men. To call these into 
question, as Manijeh did, not only brings the man's honour 
into disrepute, but by implication that of the whole family. 
In most cases women occupy positions without public responsi- 
I bility. Their area of control is limited to the domestic 
hearth and the sexual division of labour, described above, 
characterises this. In, their domestic work women come into 
constant contact with other women and during the day the 
ghalleh is essentially theirs, when the men are out working. 
1. The play performed at the village wedding and described 
in Appendix 1 indicates some commonly held assumptions. 
'3 
CHAPTER XI 
¼ 
EXTRA-HOUSEHOLD RELATIONS OF KINSHIP, NEIGHBOURHOOD AND 
CONTRACT 
In the preceding two chapters emphasis was placed, firstly 
on the nature of household id'entity, and secondly on marriage 
which was presumed to bring households into existence. It was, 
however, suggested that, despite the ideal of household auton- 
omy, most, if not all, households were dependent on others, not 
only for the provision of work opportunities, but also for the 
provision of labourers. Such dependence took a variety of forms, 
trarying from close associations of kinship, linking people 
i 
through obligations to vhat might be termed a 'moral community' 
to more formal contractual arrangements based on wage labour. 
Reference was made in Chapter IX to Scdilinls distinction between 
'within' relationships, and 'between' relationships; the one 
designated as a pooling relationship, the other as a reciprocal 
one. Pooling in that context involved the relationships that 
existed within a-household, for example, where products were 
pooled and redi-stributed among members according to the criteria 
of the head of the household. 
Sahlins makes an analytical separation between pooling and 
reciprocal relationships which he admits is somewhat arbitrary-I 
The distinction is difficult to maintain in practice, for it 
may well be that 'within' relationships are emergent in 'between' 
relationships, and vice versa. Do we interpret parallel cousin 
1. See Sahlins 1972, p-188. 
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marriage for example as being a relationship within the patri- 
lineal descent group, or as between brothers? It is demonstrably 
both. Similarly the cooperative activities of villagers engaged 
in cultivation, identified earlier as the herdseh, or the khish 
are to be interpreted as being both between supposedly autono- 
mous household heads, as well as within a 'moral community 
The two relationships are inseparable in action. 
As this implies, close relationships of pooling and recip- 
rocity can be extended out from the household to include des- 
criptions ofielationships'between households. It must be borne 
in mind that Sahline wes particularly interested in 'tribal' 
societies, and as such he assumes that tribal political rela- 
tionships are to be expl, ained in terms of extensions of kinship 
links (using the segmentary lineage system as a model). As 
such the situation in the; - Marvdasht plain appears -as much more 
complex, in that there are both 'tribal' and 'non-tribal' rela- 
tionships within and between villages, in the ways in which 
Sahlins appears to use the term 'tribel. For present purposes 
it would appear, to be more useful to appreciate kinship rela- 
tionships in ierms of public statements about preferred action, 
rather than as statements of actual inter-relationships, and so, 
following Bourdieu make a distinction between public and private 
languages. A public language of good faith and trust, rooted 
in a kinship idiom is opposed -to a private language which ex- 
presses the instrumental aspects of transactions. 
In this respect it is possible to use Sahlin's model for 
the analysis of reciprocity within and between tribal societies. 
Reciprocity is perceived as varying along a continuum which con- 
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tains at one end 'generalised reciprocity, (identified here 
with features of the good faith economy) and at the other, 
'negative reciprocity' (identified here with features of the 
bad faith economy). As one moves away from the household one 
moves from a close network of.. kinship alliances into an arena 
where trust and'good faith are at a minimum, and where reci- 
procity is governed by formal, instrumental contracts. This 
model is schematically reproduced below. 
Fig-14 Reciprocity and kinship residential sectors 
(Reproduced from Sahlins, 1972, p-199) 
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As an heuristic device it can perhaps be extended to 'non- 
tribal I situations , especially if it is accepted that the div- 
isions which separate tribal from non-tribal are problematic 
(see above, Chapter III) , and is quite useful as a starting 
point in our analysis of the different forms of alliance con- 
structed within the village. But it does have serious defic- 
iencies - It presumes that the public language of kinship and 
the private language of self-interest are mutually exclusive, 
i. e. the further one moves from the household, the greater the 
social and physical distance. While this Pay be generally true 
it builds into the model an unreflexive quality, starting as it 
does from the supposed isolation 
'of 
the already established 
independent household. Similarly the mutual trust and support 
publicly acknowledged between brothers for examplt may in fact 
disguise acute sources of tension. The model is thus of limi- 
ted value in explaining the-dynamic postulated in the previous 
chapter which is expressed through marriage, in which the 'out- 
side' is domesticated/naturalised and transformed into close 
associations of kinship, and in resolving the dilemma that is 
inherent in the fission and fusion of households. As a public 
statement about the boundaries of the 'moral community' it 
retains some value in serving as a foundation for the analysis 
of cooperative alliances within a unified framework which in- 
cludes those alliances constructed between villagers and those 
constructed with the large landlord and agentsof the state. 
This allows them to be considered within one social universe, 
rather than treated as separate. 
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The public language of kinship still provides an important 
medium for the construction of. relationships between households. 
As suggested in Chapter XII it might be seen as disguising the 
actual relationships of inequality, through a process of domes- 
tication and naturalisation. Those who exercise authority are 
confirmed in that authority as their 'rights' over resources 
are moved beyond question. In kinship terms this involves the 
legitimation of their control by their position within the kin- 
ship structure. In other terms it is their position within the 
state hierarchy and their individual control over property 
legitimated through state legislation. 
As this process of domestication occurs the 'myth of 
equality', which Black maintains operates in Luristan, is 
encouraged. 
1 TheAnstrumental transactions between individuals 
are translated into relations. hips of cooperation and trust - 
they are publicly seen as 'within' relationships, between 
people engaged in cooperative alliances. The public language 
of the 'good faith' economy has been entrenched in many studies 
of middle eastern societies, especially those which have foc- 
used on tribal groups in the more marginal areas of the count- 
ries in which they are located. Emphasis has been placed on an 
egalitarian ethos, where the s. egmentary lineage system offers 
institutionalised checks and balances to the entrenchment of a 
powerful elite. This egalitarian ideal is often rooted in a 
1. Black 1972. 
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staunch individualism which stresses personal achievement and 
a commitment to independent action, seen in the freedom asso- 
ciated particularly with a nomadic existence, or in the freedom 
from the restrictions imposed by the central government. 
This 'myth' helps to reinforce a dualistic interpretation 
of society in which a small group of leaders are separated, and 
considered separately from the larger groups over which they 
have control. Barth, for example, in his analysis of the Bass- 
eri makes a very important distinction between political rela- 
tions which operate at a corporate, or tribal, level, and 
economic relations where: 
"each Basseri household stands entirely alone and 
must deal with the agents of an impersonal fluct- 
uating world market. " 
(1959, P-100) 
This leads him to an analysis which more or less completely 
separates the world of the tribal chiefs from that of the ordi- 
nary tribesman. Similarly Irons in his analysis of residence 
groups among the Turkmen states: 
"Residence groups are contractual in nature, their 
composition being a matter of mutual consent .... 
Cooperation and mutual assistance among members of 
the same camp in economic and domestic labours are 
extensive. In terms of political affairs such groups 
are of little importance. " 
(197S, p-46) - 
emphasis added 
The-chief is the source of tribal power in this scheme. He is 
the major arbiter in inter-tribal disputes and operates auto- 
cratically; 'power is conceived as emanating from him rather 
than delegated to him by his subjects'. 
1 How different is this 
Barth, op-cit., p-71. 
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from the relationships that existed between landlords and 
peasants described in Chapter VI? 
But changing conditions of production, associated with 
mechanisation, changes in tenurial arrangements and increasing 
independence of individual pr, oduction, have served to decrease 
the extent to which people are dLrectly dependent on the cooper- 
ation of others. This is most obviously the case with the 
large landowners who are in a position to buy-in villa'ge labour 
on a contractual basis. But it is also the case with wage 
labourers who, through their individual wage-earning capacity, 
are able to operate in an increasingly independent way. The 
growing importance of the state has facilitated this develop- 
ment through technical and financial assistance to 'progressive' 
individual farmers, and through its position as 'mediator' 
f between landowners and villagers. 
As the circumstances under which production is undertaken 
have changed, so have the bases on which cooperative alliances 
might be constructed. Godelier maintains that: 
"(in primitive societies) kinship relations function 
as relations of production, political relations, and 
as current ideologies. Here kinship is therefore 
superstructure and infrastructure. " and "The question 
of passing from class societies to the State may, there- 
fore, be partially reduced to a knowledge of the cir- - 
cumstances wherein kinship relations cease to play the 
dominant role unifying all the functions of social life. " 
(1977, p. 123) 
Changing relations of production have served to transform the 
political functions of kinship, traditionally expressed in 
tribal terms, and legitimated through a petrilineal kinship 
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ideology. The expansion in the productive forces associated 
with such changes has resulted in an increase in both the social 
and physical distance that separates the direct producers from 
those who control the means of production (i. e. land). But 
such a transformation is by iýo means complete or straightfor- 
ward. The kinship idiom, if not actual kinship relations is 
still used to legitimate control over villagers and in the 
construction of cooperative alliances. 
In the Marvdasht plain, and in the Ayub valley in particu- 
lar, the public language of both villagers and large landowners 
stresses the fact that mutual support and cooperation under- 
line the basic equAlity'of people. Villagers are at pains to 
insist that they are free to do what they like and to construct 
alliances with whomsoever they like. But from what has already 
been described it'is obvious that such freedom is limited and 
that there are distinct diff6rences in wealth, not only between 
the large landowners and the villagers, but also within villages. 
In trying to come to grips with this question of social 
differentiation there are considerable problems, firstly about 
the indices which are taken for social stratification of the 
population, and secondly about the position of different groups 
within the village. Indices of social stratification such as 
the possession of material goods, such as tractors or radios, 
may be merely the random results of differential vulnerability, 
and perhaps in the villagers' terms, the results of individual 
initiative. They may be specific to individual household his- 
tories and explainable in terms of sources of income from out- 
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side the family and numbers of workers in the household, for 
example. These are largely reflections of the positions of 
discrete households in the domestic cycle rather than stat-ments 
about their relationships to the means of production. Social 
groupings within the village, likewise may only be ideological 
I 
justifications for the ways in which certain individuals are 
able to maintain control over production. The ownership of a 
tractor does not necessarily mean anything in itself but must 
be related to the context in which it was obtained. Where did 
the resources come from? If the tractor owner spends time 
working with that tractor under what conditions do others work 
his land for him? Is týe tractor perceived as a 'communal' 
resource, or are formal contractual arrangements made for its 
use within the village? 
As Bernstein maintains: 
"Differentiation in the materialist sense is tied to 
the conditions in which wealth becomes capital when 
it is not consumed individually but productively 
through investment in the means of production. It 
is this which gives content to the classification of 
'poorl, Imiddlel and Irichl peasants in terms of the 
relations of production. " 
(Bernstein 1979, p-430) 
The 'primordial loyaltiesthat Alavi speaks about, 
1 based in 
kinship relationships and a public language of good faith and 
trust allow some individuals to appropriate the labour of others 
and free themselves for engagement in more profitable enter- 
prises, thereby reinforcing their superior position. Wolf 
speaks in similar terms of the 'many stranded dyadic vertical 
1. Alavi 1976. 
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coalitions I that cut across the class interests of both land- 
lord and peasant and perpetuate relationships of inequality. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to look at the ways in 
which personnel are separated from each other and labelled as 
being members of particular isolated groups in which relation- 
ships of inequality are authorised, and perceived as parts of 
the natural social order. It is through this process of author- 
isation and legitimation that relationships of inequality are 
formalised and particular informal clusters of individuals are 
recognised as groups. But one must be careful to make sure 
that the names used in the separation of interests do not hide 
k 
the processes associated with the differentiation which are 
rooted in a particular history and in a process of structuration 
involving constant change and compromise. 
If we look at the circumstances in which recourse is made 
to kinship in a changing environment we find that it is used in 
a variety of ways and that it is not sufficient to assume that 
as a means of organising production it is now increasingly 
redundant. As Bourdieu maintains: 
"The generalised law of exchange means that the 
closer the individuals or groups are in the gen- 
ealogy, the easier it is to make agreements, the 
more frequent they are, and the more completely 
they are entrusted to good faith. " 
(1977, p-173) 
1. Wolf, 1966. 
1 
This is not only to be interpreted as a statement of fact, sup- 
ported by Sahlins' propositions about the nature of reciprocit, ý, 
but also as a statement of intent. If agreements between par- 
ties to an exchange can be dressed in the language of kinship 
then the easier it is for them to be transacted without rec- 
ourse to formal,, legal contract. 
As a starting point, both for the examination of the var- 
ious forms of cooperative alliances constructed between villa- 
gers, as well as in an examination of the changing nature of 
the lagro-pastoral combine', that latter institution . provided 
both the different labour skills as well as access to different 
resources to ensure the, livelihood of its members. The agro- 
pastoral combine implied the possession of both land and animals 
by an extended patrilineal family. In this it was an extension 
of the individual/household. The head of the extended family 
deployed the labour of its members into both pastoral and agri- 
cultural activities. 
Emphasis in the agro-pastoral combine was placed on the 
production of livelihood in the absence of commercial cash-crop 
farming. As such it might be perceived as a model for organ- 
isation under non-capitalist conditions. With the expansion 
of capitalist relations of productinn and the spread of a 
money economy, emphasis shifted to production of particular 
goods on a particular stretch of land, the surplus from which 
could be sold to meet other needs. There was a change in 
emphasis, the culmination of which was the individual association 
of people with particular stretches of land. This shift in 
emphasis had important consequences for socio-political organi- 
sation, described-in Chapter XII below. 
Firstly, through the formalisation of relationships between 
the landlord and the peasant, the agricultural activities of 
the latter were increasingly confined to production for the 
landlord on village lands. And secondly, through the indivi- 
duation of property rights, of which the land reform programme 
might be seen as an expression, there was a decrease in the ways 
in which people were dependent on others as they were able to 
exchange their production for goods available on the market. 
The various configurations of personnel now resident in 
I 
f 
Chamani provide the basis for an understanding of these very 
complex processes, some of which have already been emphasised 
in previous chapters. If we look at the history of this parti- 
cular village, it might bring them more into focus. Prior to 
the actual construction of the gha'leh in which the majority 
of the residents of Chamani now live, a proportion of what are 
now the village'lands were cultivated by residents of Buraki. 
As indicated in Chapter VII, there are still 16 Buraki residents 
with rights to land in Chamani. They form, together with three 
households now resident in Chamani, one heraseh. At the time 
of the foundation of the ghalleh a group of nomadic Turks who 
used the area around Chamani is their winter quarters were 
invited b7 the landlord to settle in the village. They were 
obliged to settle under Reza Shah's sedentarisation programme. 
5-" 5 
They were members of the Gerai tireh of the Baharlu taifeh, 
which was formerly allied to the Khamseh confederac-v of tribes. 
Other members of the same nomadic group settled in other vill- 
ages in the plain, most notably in neighbouring Uanjan and 
Junaki, as well as in Mian Gh4leh across the river from Chamani. 
The present descendents of these original settlers still retain 
significant connections with these villages. They also com- 
prise one heraseh within the village and in the early 1970s 
consisted of 13 households', and have taken on the family name 
of Rusta (see fig. 15 ). 
At the time of the construction of the village another 
group of settlers, migrants from Beiza, the neighbouring 
dehestan, were also given land in Chamani. These now also com- 
prise a separate heraseh -consisting of six households. They 
have taken on the, family name of Baneshi, after the village in 
Beiza from which they came. - It would seem that one of the 
reasons for their migration from Beiza was their relationship 
with some of the, residents in Buraki, with whom they retained 
significant contacts. 
These three sets of people, the Buraki residents, the 
Rusta Turks, and the Baneshi Lurs, fromed the three herasehs 
which cultivated the village lands of Chamani. Each heraseh 
had its own leader who was called a kadkhoda, who was respon- 
sible to the kadkhoda of the landlord for deciding what would 
be cultivated and for supervising cultivation. They retained 
significant interests outside the village iteelf even before 
the land reform programme which effectively reduced the amount 
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of land they were able to control from 750 hectares to 300 
hectares (see Chapter VI). With this reduced control over agri- 
cultural production in the village, the external connections 
which had always been maintained became more important as chan- 
nels for future opportunities. In addition to these three 
herasehs was the overarching control of the landlord who, until 
land reform, not only controlled all agricultural activity in 
the village, but in addition owned land independently outside 
the village boundaries which, with the help of motor pumps 
and wage labour, he had brought into cultivation. This was con- 
sidered separately from village agriculture although some 
villagers were employed, as wage labourers. 
J 
The Rusta Turks: 
The Rusta secItor of the village population identified it- 
self with the tribal system- and was immediately thereby connect- 
ed to a regional tribal framework. Visitors from the nomadic 
sector of the Baharlu taifeh were entertained at twice yearly 
intervals as they passed through the area on their migrations, 
and individual relatives helped out at harvest times. Contracts 
for the care of sheep and goats were constructed between seden- 
tary and nomadic relatives. They were perhaps the most distinct 
group within the village, becduse they spoke Turkish and 
because their women claimed a virtual monopoly over village 
carpet production. This distinction appeared to be breaking 
down somewhat as the younger generation spoke Persian and as 
others learned to make carpets. All 13 heads of households 
gained land with the land reform programme. 
The Rusta Turks claimed descent from a common stock. 
Eight of the 13 male heads shared a common known ancestor only 
two generations removed from them (see fig-15 )- Three of the 
remaining five adults are the, immediate descendents of brothers 
II 
and the other two are connected by marriage to the core patri- 
line. These statements are, however, more interesting for 
what they do not reveal rather than for what they do. Fig. 15 
is a public statement which partially justifies their present 
inter-connections. First of all it does not take us very far 
historically into the patriline of the group. Bagh Mirza, the 
I 
grandfather of the pres(ýnt leader of the Rusta Turks (Rais 
Javad (No-7)) is the only person from that generation who was 
identified. Secondly this genealogy tells us little about the 
nature of inter-relationships with other members of the Gerai 
tireh. Thirdly it gives us-little information about the alli- 
ances that have been built up through the women. Fig. 15 does 
show some of the marital inter-relationships, but, unless they 
have been contracted with women in Chamani itself, exact gen- 
ealogýcal connections between parties to the marriage are not 
available. Information for the construction of this genealogy 
is based on information gained from at least three people 
(Nos. 7,11 and 14) and it is therefore perhaps surprising that 
more extended, knowledge which pushes back the genealogical 
boundaries is not available. Two reasons for this might be 
put forward. Firstly there was a genuine lack of knowledge, 
and secondly the assumptions underlying the responses to the 
enquirer may have skewed those responses. The skews occur as 
a result of informant bias as to what he thought the purpose 
of the enquiry was, and also, relatedly, and perhaps more 
importantly, because of what the informant thought it was 
important to reveal. 
The information presented in fig. 15 incorporates 29 
marriages and presents a rather diverse picture, made less 
amenable to analysis because it tends to be 'place focused' 
t rather than 'people focused' (based predominantly on ego-centres 
network techniques to elicit information). If we try and break 
these figures down it will be observed that of those marriages 
11 were constructed with people who were themselves Rusta Turks 
living in Chamani. Another seven were constructed with Rusta 
Turks living in Uanjan. The remaining 11 were constructed 
with people in Hasanabad/Marvdasht (4), neighbouring Buraki 
(4), Zarganak (1) on the other side of the Ayub mountain, or 
with non-Turks in Chamani itself (2). Perhaps significantly 
there were no alliances between the Rusta Turks and the Baneshi 
Lurs. 
The core of this group was the four brothers, Javad(7), 
Azad(8), Ziad(9) and Akram(10). Javad was the acknowledged 
head of the Rusta heraseh and was, in the early 1970S, the head 
of the village council, representing 13 of the 22 village 
households who received land with the land reform programme. 
The father of these four brothers was Agha Mirza who was himself 
one of five brothers, all of whom, except for Kamar Khan (No-18) 
were in 1971 dead. Little was known as to where these five 
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brothers obtained their wives from, but it is likely that all 
of them were married before they came to live in Chamani. It 
is known that one of their sisters was married to a resident of 
Uanjan, and that Agha Mirzals wife's sister married a Qashqai 
tribesman from Sarhad-e-Chahr-dangi. Apart from that there is 
no information on either the sisters of the five brothers, or 
on those of the four brothers who now form the core of the 
Rusta Turks, except that two sisters are married to residents 
in Junaki. 
The other households attached to the Rusta Turks are either 
the direct descendants of the five brothers (Nos-14,15 and 16) 
or affiliated to them through marriage. Mina and Avolfat (Nos. 
11 and 13) are older members of the village who were related 
(exactly how is not known) to Javad's family-and members of the 
same tireh. They were themselves the sons of brothers, and 
Avolfat has two brothers who are residents of Uanjan. Complex 
hilateral ties connect the Rusta Turks to many villages in the 
surrounding area. and the available genealogical record is only 
a partial map of theseties. 
A notable feature of this collection of related individuals 
is that their unity, if that is what it may be called, is only 
evident in terms of their attachment to the village lands within 
the confines of a single heraseh, and their representation 
through this on the village council. Apart from that and their 
collective presence at marriage ceremonies, there are few occas- 
ions when they might be seen as a corporate group. Indeed, 
despite recognised closeness both socially and physically, a 
major feature is the independent action of huusehold heads, 
especially since land reform has obliged them to turn their 
attention from village agriculture. Their 'unityý as a group 
was perhaps more a feature of their inter-action with/opposition 
to Abdulahi, in terms of village government and administration, 
and thus with agents of the national government. 
Nevertheless, kinship links were still important for the 
construction of joint economic activities both within the vill- 
age, and, 
. 
especially since land reform, between villages. The 
13 landowning households were divided into four khishs for 
agricultural production on village land. These were close kin 
alliances between people who usually lived in the same court- 
yard. Income from the land was, especially for the Rusta Turks, 
only a small proportion of their income. It will be remembered 
that they were only involved in the cultivation of barley. 
With the reduction in the amount of land under their control 
it might be said that the khish was under-worked. This had 
two effects, both of which served as a spur to increased differ- 
entiation within the village. Firstly some individuals were 
able to expand their external interests through existing kin- 
ship networks. Secondly other individuals were entrusted with 
the cultivation of the formers' land. Individual differentia- 
tion, reflected in control over such means of production as 
agricultural machinery was achieved through cooperative alli- 
ances with poorer relatives; 'primordial loyalties' were assis- 
ting in the creation of a class of rich peasants. 
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The four brothers who formed the core of the Rusta Turks 
were engaged in very different types of activities. They 
formed the basis of two khishs and the enterprises in which 
they were engaged and which extended beyond their individual 
households were noticeably different. The lines of cooperation 
were not with immediate kin as the public language of kinship 
might have suggested. The four brothers lived in two court- 
yards in very separate parts of the village (see courtyards 
E and I. fig-16). Ak-ram(10) and Ziad(9) had built a separate 
courtyard above that of Abdulahils, whereas Javad(7) and Azad 
(8) lived in an older courtyard in the gha'leh. 
In the early 1970s Javad was a man in his late 140s and 
probably the richest man in the village, owning part shares in 
a tractor and in a mini-bus, in addition to Iiis land in Chamani 
and his 100 sheep and goats. He lived with his wife and five 
children. In all he had seven children, four sons and three 
daughters. Two of his daughters were married, one to Ali Vez, 
the son of Mina(l 1) , and the other to Mashd Akbar Keshavarz, a 
member of one of the more powerful families in Buraki. His 
wife Khadijeh was the daughter of Avolfat. He hýd two sisters 
who were married to residents of Junaki. 
Rais Javad was given the title of rais-e-sahra (lit. "head 
of those lands which were not cultivated"). This presumably 
reflected his own significant interests in sheep and goats and 
his authority to allocate pastures in the village among those 
who have animals. He also had four cows and two donkeys which 
were herded with the village herd by the village dashteban, 
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Karim Marzeban(26). His 100 sheep and goats represented a sig- 
nificant investment, and it is likely that he in fact owned 
more than that because of the contracts constructed between him- 
self and his nomadic cousins. Barth states that for the 
Basseri nomads such numbers can sustain a 'satisfactory life 
style' (1964, p. 16). Javad did not herd the animals himself 
and those that were grazed in and around the village were kept 
in his courtyard, separated from a similar sized herd that his 
brother., Azad, owned. His oldest son helped with the animals 
on occasion, but they were normally herded, together with those 
of Azad's by the latter's son, Niaz. Barley grown on the vill- 
age lands helped to support these animals, but in the summer 
they were moved further afield into areas to the north and west, 
and, as intimated earlier, both brothers contracted with their 
nomadic relatives to take them up to the sarhad in addition to 
buying wool and animals from the latter. 
Javad's wife was a skilled carpet maker, and his sheep 
provided more than enough wool for the two carpets she produced 
on average every year with the help of her daughters, the ones 
who were married as well as the ones still at home. Some of 
Javad's time was spent in the carpet business, buying and 
selling wool and trading in carpets on the Marvdasht and Shiraz 
bazaars. 
Most of the spring months saw him supervising the work of 
his tractor, which was taken to various parts of the plain to 
work the lands of different villages. He owned the tractor 
with Mohamad Ali, the kadkhoda from Pol-e-No, and it was used 
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in that village as well as in Chamani, Junaki, Uanjan and 
Fakhrdbad. The contacts for such contracts came through the 
kinship network with relatives of both Mohamad Ali in Fakhrdbdd 
and Javad among the Rusta Turks in Uanjan and Junaki. It was 
reported that remuneration from tractors was high, and some 
informants suggested that it was as high as one third of the 
harvest. Payment did however vary according to the nature of 
the land and the terms of the individual relationships construct- 
ed; it was paid in either cash or a share of the harvest. 
Javad did not drive the tractor most of the time although it 
was garaged in Chamani. The chief driver was Mohamad Ali's son 
who was also a mechanic. 
With the increase in activity just outside Chamani occas- 
ioned by the establishment of the canal construction company, 
there was an increased demand for transport to and from the 
village to Marvdasht and Shiraz. Javad, together with a partner 
from Junaki, had bought a mini-bus. This was also available 
for general use, by villagers. It was driven by the son of his 
partner in Junaki. Javad himself did not work for the con- 
struction company. This company had constructed a series of 
buildings and had installed an electricity generator. In anti- 
cipation of electricity eventually being provided to the vill- 
age, Javad was the first person in Chamani (apart from Abdulahi) 
to have his house wired. The company had also, despite consid- 
erable local protests, piped water from the spring at Ayub, to 
a point just outside the village, and Javad, as head of the 
village council was negotiating with the company engineers to 
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bring piped water into the village. His varied activities 
meant that he was frequently absent from the village. 
Much of his time was taken up with various interests, but 
he was also the head of the village council which involved him 
in frequent dealings with urban-based authorities - the gen- 
darmery and various government agencies. He also acted as 
official host for those who came to the village, and mediator 
in disputes between villages and the landlord and government. 
He was repaid from the 2% development fund which his council 
controlled. He also provided loans for individual allied Turks 
in the village. On major religious feast days, such as Eid-e- 
Ghorban, it was he who slaughtered an animal and distributed 
it to members of the Rusta Turks, and who entertained visiting 
nomadic relatives at Ayub. 
His agricultural land was worked by his brother Azad and 
the latter's brother-in-law, MashdAyaz. Azad was married to 
the daughter of one of the five original brothers. They had 
eight children, 'five sons and three daughters. Two of the 
daughters had married, one to a Rusta Turk in Uanjan and the 
other to someone resident in Marvdasht. His wife was also a 
carpet maker. Azad was much more closely involved with village 
agriculture and had few outside interests. MashdAyaz, his 
wife's sister was a younger man whose wife was the daughter of 
Akram(10). He helped his brother-in-law with the agricultural 
work, but was also employed as a wage labourer by the canal 
construction company. He lived with his wife and seven young 
children in courtyard A. 
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It is difficult to separate the activities of these three 
households. Together they are joined in a loose cooperative 
alliance within Chamani. The labour provided in ]particular by 
Azad and his sons forms the basis on which Javad is able to 
move out of agricultural production. But it is not just the 
cooperative labour of these people, but a wide variety of others, 
both within the village and elsewhere. For example, both Mina 
and Avolfat (11 and 13) work on occasions with Javad. Mina's 
son is married to Javad's daughter, but there is a great differ- 
ence in wealth between the two families. Avolfat's daughter 
is married to Javad, and the former's family provides the basis 
for a wide series of contacts throughout villages in the plain. 
The families of both Sahreh Khan (15) and Haji(16), both 
of whom are landowners, were also loosely allied to this coop- 
erative group. In addition to their own agricultural work these 
two, the sons of two of the original five brothers, also helped 
with the cultivation of Javad's land, for which they were rem- 
unerated with a-share of the harvest. Sahreh Khan's wife came 
from Buraki, his one married daughter was living in Uanjan. 
Haji' s wife came from Chamani. Together with their children 
they formed two separate households in courtyard F, which they 
shared with the village carpenter Agha Jan. Haji supported his 
deceased brother's wife. Neither had any animals and they were 
dependent on the land and their occasional cash income from 
wage labour and carpet production for a livelihood. 
Akram(10) and his brother Ziad(9) shared one of the newer 
courtyards in the village. He lived in three rooms with his 
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wife, two unmarried daughters, one unmarried son, and a recently 
married son and his wife. Two other daughters had married and 
left the household. One had married Ali Khan(31) a member of 
a family which was based in Buraki. Ali Khan and his brother 
Kaka Khan(32) were not landowners, working as agricultural 
labourers on both the lands of the Rusta Turks and the Buraki 
residents. The o-ther daughter had married MashdAyaz(14), a 
close ally of Javad's. Akram's eldest son, Nezam, was married 
to a Rusta Turk from Uanjan and lived in two rooms in the same 
courtyard. The recently married son had married Nezam's wife's 
sister., and were given one room in the courtyard. Nezam and his 
brother had not yet formed independent households. Neither of 
them had received land with the land reform programme. Nezam 
himself had been drafted into the army. 
Bread and most meals were cooked in common, and the women 
shared in the production of carpets. 
Both brothers obtained wives from around Hasanabad, between 
Mian Ghaleh and, Marvdasht on the other side of the river. One 
of Ziad's daughters had been given in marriage to a resident of 
Hasanabad. Another daughter had been married to someone in 
Uanjan. One of his sons had married the daughter of the 
village carpenter, Agha Jan(12). 
Akram owned 30 sheep and goats which were herded together 
with the 100 animals that Ziad owned, by the latter. 7iad was 
much more involved with caring for the animals while his brother 
and his sons were more inxolved with agricultural production, 
and took charge of 7iad's land. The sons of both brothers, in 
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addition to their agricultural work, were also occasional wage 
labourers with the canal construction company. Akram and -iad 
used their relatives in Hasanabad to provide grazing for their 
animals in the summer. Akram, rather than Ziad, was also 
involved, like his brother Javad in trading in wool and carpets. 
The alliances that these two constructed were very differ- 
ent from those constructed by Javad and Azad. This is partly 
a reflection of the amount of domestic labour available to them, 
but also their external associations seemed to be more oriented 
to Hasanabad where their wives came from. Again the cooperative 
labour of these two domestic groups, which formed one khish, 
of seven adult males, provided the basis for a wide variety of 
activities, rooted in ownership of both land and animals. 
Another khish which was part of the Rusta Turk heraseh was 
that headed by Kamar khan(18), the only surviving brother of 
the five who originally settled in Chamani. This was the larg- 
est domestic group in the village. Kamar khan lived, with his 
wife in a courtyard above that of his nephews (courtyard J), 
together with the family of Namaki(20). (Namaki was originally 
brought to the village from Bardej in Korbal by Abdulahi to 
work on the latter's land, his daughter married Kamar khan's 
son and moved out of the rooms provided for him by Abdulahi in 
the ghalleh, after helping Kamar khan with the construction of 
his relatively new courtyard. ) 
Together with his wife there was one unmarried daughter 
and two unmarried sons. Attached to him were his two married 
sons, Felomars and Keyomars with their wives and children. 
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Kamar khan did not himself own land because he was not directl\- 
involved with agricultural production at the time of the land 
reform programme. His son, Keyomars, was, however, a landowner. 
Kamar khan owned 80 sheep and goats which were herded by Sohrab, 
his younger son. In addition his four cows were taken out with 
the village herd. 
This extended household had constructed very different 
types of alliances to those of the other two Rusta Turk groups 
already described. Kamar Khan did not marry a Turk, but the 
daughter of Mahd Taghi Nazari(23). The Nazari family had 
moved into Chamani as landless labourers soon after its estab- 
lishment, and one half was now allied to the Rusta Turks, while 
the other half was allied to Abdulahi. His three married sons 
have all married non-Rusta Turks. Keyomars had married Numaki's 
daughter. Felomars had married a girl from Falumak. The 
youngest married son, who was away in the army, had also taken 
a wife from a village just south of Falunak. All three wives 
lived in Kamar Khan's courtyard. Two daughters had also been 
married. One to Avolfat's son, Darbish(34), and the other to 
a former tractor driver of Abdulahi's who lived in Zarghanak. 
Domestic arrangements still revolved around a single hearth, 
but with the increasing age of Kamar Khan, Keyomars was begin- 
ning to take on some of the responsibilities of the head of the 
household. He and his wife occupied two separate rooms in the 
courtyard and did not share all meals with Kamar Khan. Namaki 
afid his household operated independently within the courtyard. 
Keyomars was the bath-house keeper in Chamani and had just 
ý61 
begun to build a new courtyard behind that of his father's on 
land purchased from Abdulahi, together with Ali Naghi(21). 
Keyomars was an agricultural worker together with his mother's 
brothert son. On occasion he also worked as a wage labourer 
on village construction sites and for the canal construction 
company. But he was never away from the village for any exten- 
ded period of time, unlike his two married brothers, one of 
whom was in the army, while the other worked for most of the 
summer on construction sites in Shiraz, returning to the vill- 
age at weekends Keyomars' wife, umlike her mother-in-law, was 
a carpet maker, and she was helped in this by her two sisters- 
in- I aw. 
The remaining khish affiliated to the heraseh of the Rusta 
Turks was that led by Avolfat(13) and Mina(11ý who shared a 
common courtyard (G). They were the sons of two brothers and 
came to Chamani on its foundation. They formed together with 
Mina's son-in-law, Mahd Agha(17) one cultivating group. Avol- 
fat's household consisted of his wife, five sons, three of whom 
were married and one unmarried daughter. Like Mina and Kamar 
Khan, Avolfat was an elderly man, and a nomad until he settled 
in Chamani. One of his other daughters was married to Javad(7) 
and the other to a resident of Uanjan, where he still had two 
brothers. Avolfat occupied two rooms in the courtyard and 
his married sons both had two separate rooms. Darbish, his 
eldest son(34) had recently moved with his wife to rooms in 
courtyard A because of pressure on space in courtyard G. His 
sons had married girls from Uanjan and Buraki. 
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The extended household involved three married couples with 
their unmarried children. Although all lived in the same 
courtyard, all domestic chores were not shared. Each had a 
separate hearth on which separate meals were cooked. The 
bread was, however, baked in common and the wives pooled some 
food resources and helped each other with carpet production. 
Two sons helped out with agricultural work with their father. 
One son was in the army. Both Darbish and Avolfat were land- 
owners. Darbish also worked as a wage labourer with the canal 
construction company and sometimes as a day labourer up at the 
dam. He also on occasion worked for Abdulahi as an irrigator 
on a daily basis. During 1971 he was engaged in helping his 
brother-in-law, Keyomars with the construction of his new court- 
yeard which he hoped to be able to eventually move into. Avaz, 
his other son, was also a tractor driver for someone in Uanjan, 
from where his wife came. His work took him all over the plain 
and away from the village for extended periods. 
In addition'to their small interests in land, both Darbish 
and Avolfat had interests in animals. The former had 20 sheep 
I 
and goats as well as three cows. The latter had 10 sheep and 
goats and two donkeys. The cows were herded with the village 
herd. Darbish's sheep were herded by Niaz, Azad's son, while 
those of Avolfat were herded by Kamar Khan's son. Avolfat also 
owned a house in Marvdasht which he leased to relatives living 
there. He was frequently out of the village visiting relatives 
in the surrounding area. Because of his age he had partially 
withdrawn from agricultural production, but he was hired as a 
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part-time shepherd by Abdulahi to look after his flock of lambs 
during the spring and early summer months, for which he was 
paid in cash. 
Mina, the other household head in courtyard G lived, together 
with his wife and three unmarried children, two sons and one 
daughter, in two rooms. Another son, Ali Vez had married 
Javad's daughter, and a daughter had married Mahd Agha(17) who 
lived with them in courtyard G. They comprised three married 
couples with their children. Ali Vez, Mina's eldest son was 
a wage labourer and worked regularly as an irrigator for Abdul- 
ahi . Mina himself was also on occasion hired to help. Mina Is 
household was one of the poorest in the village. He had few 
external interestsand was dependent on others, such as Javad and 
Abdulahi, to provide him with work opportunities. 
The four khishs reflect very different configurations of 
people combined in a variety of cooperative alliances, partially 
reflecting their positions within the domestic cycle. Kinship 
ties were still very important in securing cooperation based 
on mutual trust and support. 
The Baneshi Lurs 
As previously noted a major feature of many settlements 
within the plain was the extent of relatively recent in- 
migration. Significant among the immigrants in Ramjerd were 
the so-called 'Luril groups who spoke a dialect of Persian and 
I originated in areas to the north and west of the plain. 
They 
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were not related to the Lurs of Luristan, except in so far as 
they occupied the more physically marginal areas of the south- 
ern Zagros. Such Luri groups, migrants from these higher areas, 
not only figured prominently in populations within villages in 
the Marvdasht plain, but also as tirehS among the Qashqai nom- 
adic tribes. Luri families figure in both the populations of 
Chamani and Buraki within the Ayub valley and in Shahrak, 
Zarghanak and Futuabad within the dehestdn. It is likely they 
are to be found in many other villages as well. Significant 
relationships are retained between these villages and the 
places from which they came in the dehestdn of Beiza, to the 
west of Ramjerd - Banesh, Amirabad, Sarglan, Takht-e-Sang and 
Kushk-e-Beiza. 
Beiza has traditionally been part of the sarhad (Fasali 
ii. 183), like Kamfiruz, above the dam. Both border the areas 
of the Kuh Giluyeh, occupied by such tribal groups as the Boyr 
Ahmad and the Mamasani Lurs (see Loeffler, Fazel, Afshar 
Naderi). Pastoralism figured prominently in the economy of 
this area, but unlike the more visible long range nomadism of 
groups such as the Qashqai, migrations 'take place almost 
entirely within tribal territory'(Fazel 1972, p-9). 
The Lurs who migrated from Beiza into Ramjerd were not 
nomadic pastoralists like the Rusta Turks appear to have been, 
but villagers with significant interests in sheep in goats. In 
the Kuh Giluyeh areas one does not apparently encounter the 
elaborate political hierarchies of such groups as the Qashqai, 
with which the Rusta Turks can so readily identify. The whole 
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area was apparently organised into distinct tribal territories 
with small chiefs and settlements corresponding to the diý-is- 
ions of the tribe (Afshar Naderi) This would seem to be very 
similar to those political relationships which operated to 
wield the boluk, in the nineteenth century into a political 
force under one landlord. For example, it was noted in 
Chapter IV that one of the groups which resisted the Afghans 
was the Korbali tribes. 
Explanations for the movement of the Lurs from the higher 
areas into places like Ramjerd have focused on political ex n- 
sion associated with population growth (Fazel) but this appears 
more as post facto justification rather than explanation. It 
would appear that in the Marvdasht plain at least expansion of 
agriculture in the 1920s and 1930s offered considerable oppor- 
tunities to new settlers, and the conditions created under 
Reza Shah offered a stability which encouraged such expansion. 
In more recent years there has been a second exodus as villagers 
from behind the dam in Kamfruz moved to escape the rising 
waters of the lake. 
The Lurs in Chamani are isolated because the), formed a 
single heraseh for agricultural production consisting of six 
domestic groups. But they were very closely connected with 
other in-migrants who had settled in Buraki. They claim no 
allegiance to a larger tribal framework in which they saw them- 
selves encapsulated. Lack of detailed socio-historical inform- 
ation on them limits the nature of the interpretation of their 
precise kinship links, some of which are given in fig. 13 - 
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But it would appear that when land in Chamani was opened up 
the landlord drew on people from Buraki and on relations of 
those people looking for land. 
They gain their identity as a group in terms of their 
association with land in Chamani, but this is, like the Rusta 
Turks, only one of their interests. The nature of patrilineal 
kinship ties which connect them to each other are much more 
tenuous, and hardly acknowledged by them. They say they are a 
group of cooperating kin (ghom-o-khish) connected through bi- 
lateral kinship ties. In many anthropological studies of 
economic and political organization, kinship is seen as impor- 
tant in the construction of corporate kin groups, with duly 
constituted authority by which their external and internal 
affairs are regulated and thus economic and political roles 
appear in the form of kinship roles. By trying to examine the 
form of grouping in these terms one is in danger of ignoring, 
not only the social space available to individuals in their 
struggles to survive in a changing world, but also the impor- 
tance of the prevailing social relations of production in 
actually constituting these groups. An examination of the Rusta 
Turks has attempted to show how and when specific kinship asso- 
ciations are used. The Baneshi Lurs display even greater lack 
of 'genealogical cohesion' in their public statements about 
their 'corporateness'. Rather than referring to themselves as 
a distinct tireh, expressed in terms of a patrilineal idiom, 
they point to their former place of residence and to the bi- 
lateral ties which connect them. 
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The known marriage alliances constructed among the Baneshi 
Lurs number 16, twelve of which are mapped on fig. 13. 
In addition to these were the alliances constructed by Safar 
(3) and Hasanjan (4). None were with Rusta Turks, most being 
from the area from which they had come. The Baneshi Lurs were 
divided into three khishs for purposes of agricultural pro- 
duction. Two brothers (Ghobad and Hosein) who came from Amira- 
bad with Iadollah (2) and Malek (1) were resident in Buraki 
having been evicted from the village by the landlord prior to 
the land reform programme. 
The leader of the Baneshi Lurs was Iadollah, who represen- 
ted them on the village council. Prior to the land reform 
programme he was also Abdulahils representative (kadkhoda) in 
the village. Together with his brother's son and their immed- 
iate families they formed one khish consisting of five adult 
males - They lived together in one courtyard (C). As indicated 
in Chapter X, their wives were sisters and many household 
activities were-carried out together. Iadollah had three 
married sons and one married daughter. The three sons, together 
with their wives and small children, lived in the same court- 
yard - One son was married to Malek's daughter, another 
had 
obtained a wife from Amirabad in Beiza, and the other from 
Buraki, where he married Malek's sister's daughter. Iadollah's 
married daughter lived in Shahrak, from where her mother and 
aunt had come. 
Only Iadollah and Malek were landowners, their sons were 
landless labourers. Two of Iadollah's sons worked the land for 
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their father, as well as working as wage labourers on con- 
struction sites in the plain. The other son, Mansur, worked 
on a regular basis (until his dismissal) for Abdulahi as an 
irrigator. Iadollah owned 20 sheep and goats and Malek owned 
60. In addition both Mansur and his brother Masih owned 10 
and 20 animals respectively. These were herded normally by 
Kaka Khan's son, Ali (see below). During the summer months 
they were taken up to Amirabad in Beiza to utilize the summer 
pastures at higher altitudes made available by rehtives in 
that area. The wives of Iadollah and Malek, as well as those 
of Mansur and his brother Masih were also carpet makers. Their 
products were sold through Hasanjan (4), the major carpet trader 
in the village, and realised a not insubstantial cash income 
for the extended family. 
The second khish allied to the Baneshi Lurs was headed by 
Hasanjan and comprised his household, together with those of 
Mashd Hajali (27) and his brother Mashd Karim (28) , both of 
whom did not gain title to land during the land reform programme. 
Hasanjan was the village shopkeeper. He also owned a part 
share in a combine harvester with Mashd SeifollaH, a man who 
lived in Shiraz, but whose brother, a native of Beiza, lived 
in Buraki and was the landlord's overseer in that village 
(mobasher). Hasanjan was one of the richest villagers in 
Chamani and of all villagers had perhaps the widest network of 
contacts outside the village. He did not maintain close rela- 
tionships of either kinship or friendship with many others in 
the village. He did, however, sit on the village council as 
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secretary, and his position as shopkeeper made him an important 
source of credit for many villagers. 
Hasanjan lived with his wife and six children in a separ- 
ated part of courtyard C (also occupied by Iadollah and Malek) - 
His sister was married to Mashd Hajali (27) , who, in addition 
to working for Hasanjan, was also Abdulahi's pump attendant in 
Pol-e-No. Both Mashd Hajali and his brother were in-migrants 
from Beiza. The only one of Hasanjan's daughters to have 
married had moved to Buraki as the wife of Rais Mahmud's son. 
Rais Mahmud was a member of a prominent Turki-speaking family 
in Buraki and his brother was Abdulahils kadkhoda in Chamani. 
For two to three months in the late spring and early sum- 
mer Hasanjan was away from the village working with his combine 
harvester in Khuzestan- He employed his brother-in-law, Mashd 
Karim as driver and he accompanied him. In later months he 
spent considerable time negotiating contracts for his corbine 
in the sarhad - At other times he was away from the village 
collecting supplies for the carpet industry or in trading in 
wool and supplies for his shop. He normally worked between 
Beiza and Marvdasht. In Beiza he maintained con; act with rela- 
tives , buying large amounts of wool which 
he transported for 
sale in Marvdasht. He acted as middleman in a variety of acti- 
vities, and with a variety of personnel, buying such things as 
shirts for villagers and selling such things as sheep and car- 
pets on behalf of the villagers, both in the Ayub valley and in 
Beiza. 
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Hasanjan did not have any animals himself in Chamani. He 
did own three cows which were herded with the village herd. It 
is likely that he did own animals in Beiza that were shepherded 
by others, but this was never confirmed. His shop stocked most 
of the requirements that villagers would normally have bought 
in Marvdasht or Shiraz. He accepted payment in both grain and 
wool as well as cash, and although his prices were marginally 
higher than those in town, he was convenient and did provide 
credit. His wife and son normally looked after the shop. His 
eldest son was the only child in Chamani who had progressed 
beyond sixth grade in school and was at high-school in Shiraz, 
where he stayed with the family of Mashd Seifollah (the combine 
owner). Hasanjan had little to do with direct agricultural 
production, entrusting it to his brothers-in-law who were 
remunerated in kind for this with a half share of the harvest. 
Like Javad, Hasanjan was intent on building a new courtyard 
outside the gha'leh. 
In addition to his important role on the village council 
and in providing credit facilities to villagers, he also enter- 
tained. more important visitors; village leaders and religious 
dignitaries from Beiza were publicly entertained by him at his 
own expense when they occasionally visited the area. Such 
visitors were entertained in his upper room. He was visibly 
in competition with Javad, the official leader of the village 
council, for prestige in the village political hierarchy. He 
did not command the 'given' tireh associations that Javad had 
through kinship connections within the village itself, but 
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seemed to try to compensate for this by public displays of 
generosity extended to all villagers, and through his friendship 
with government agents involved in village affairs, such as the 
local teacher and extension agent. 
The other khish within the Baneshi Lur heraseh was that 
composed of the households of Kaka Khan (6), his son Hatam 
and Safar (3). Both Safar and Kaka Khan were landowners. They 
lived in the same courtyard. Hatam had set up a separate house- 
hold in that he occupied independent rooms with his wife, whom 
he had obtained from Futuabad, and his six unmarried children. 
He did not own land but worked his father's with Safar. Kaka 
Khan saw his relationships with the other Baneshi Lurs in 
terms of their 'having come down from the sarhad together'. 
His wife was from Banesh. Hatam's brother, -Ali, was unmarried 
and looked after the animals owned by his brother and father. 
The latter owned 50, the former owned 30. These were herded 
together and Ali acted as shepherd for the flocks of Iadollah 
and Malek and were taken up to Beiza by Ali during the summer 
months. Hatam's sister lived in Buraki and was married to 
Hosein, a former resident of Chamani and brother-in-law of 
Malek. 
Safar lived with his wife, the sister of Karim Rezali 
Marzeban (25 & 26) and their five small children as a separate 
household in courtyard A. One duughter had married into a pro- 
minent household in Buraki (see above, Ch-X Both the wives 
of Safar and Hatam were carpet makers. Apart from their 
interests in land and animals they were engaged in few other 
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enterprises. They did not regularly seek out wage labour, or 
work for Abdulahi. 
The Baneshi Lurs are, like the Rusta Turks, characterised 
by their divergent interests implying very different sorts 
of alliances. Their identity as a 'group' was forged through 
Iadollah, Abdulahils kadkhoda in pre-reform days and was only 
important in terms of their cultivation of village lands as a 
single heraseh, entitling them to representation on the village 
council. Their interrelationships are rooted in associations 
with areas of Beiza from which they came. 
The ex-Buraki residents 
A small group of --ýChamani residents formed a single khish 
which, while tied to cultivation on village lands, had much 
closer associations with Buraki. For cultivation of wheat 
they were part of the heraseh headed by Iadollah Baneshi. For 
rice cultivation, in which they were also involved, they were 
part of the heraseh headed by Mashd Baber of Buraki residents 
with cultivation rights in Chamani. Their representative on 
the Chamani village council was Mashd Baber, himself a resid- 
ent of Buraki. 
The core of this group in Chamani was the two brothers 
Rezali and Karim (25 & 26) who lived together with their wives 
and six children and their widowed mother in courtyard D. 
Rezali (25), who was called the 'head of the tajiks' by the 
Rusta Turks, had brought his wife from Kushk-e-Beiza. His 
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sister had married Safar Baneshi (3). Karim, his younger 
brother, had married a girl from Marvdasht. Both brothers were 
landowners and despite maintainýý separate residences, much dom- 
estic activity was carried out in common under the household 
authority of Rezali. Karim had 30 sheep and goats and two 
cows, the latter used for ploughing, like many of the other 
cattle in the village. 
The two brothers came to Chamani with their father from 
Buraki. Prior to Abdulahils arrival in the village Karim was 
housekeeper to the landlord's representative who occupied 
Abdulahils compound. He was in the early 1970s village 
dashteban, taking the village herd out to graze every day, for 
which he was remunerated through the village council at harvest 
time - Neither brother was involved in the search for wage lab- 
our and seemed to have few outside interests, being able, 
apparently, to sustain a livelihood from agricultural production 
of wheat and rice and from their animals. Neither of their 
wives produced carpets and they were amongs the poorest inha- 
bitants of the village. 
They were joined in agricultural production by Hosein Dadkha 
(29), who also gained land under the land reform programme. 
He lived with his wife and three children in two rooms in the 
very crowded courtyard B. His sister and her husband, Hosein 
Khan (30), lived in one very small room next door, together 
with their one small child. Hosein Khan was Abdulahils dashte- 
Hn and to all intents and purposes was part of Hosein Dadhka's 
household. Hosein Dadkha's other brothers were landowners who 
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lived in Buraki. It was not clear why he himself moved to 
Chamani. Neither his wife nor his sister were carpet makers, 
nor did Hosein Dadkha own any animals. 
Living in the same courtyard as Karim and Rezali (25 & 26) 
was one extended household consisting of three brothers who 
were all landless labourers. They were recognized as indepen- 
dent households because of their divergent individual activi- 
ties, but it would seem that there was much inter-dependence 
because of the precariousness of their position. While they 
managed to produce some income through working for the heraseh 
of the Buraki residents in Chamani, they also on occasion worked 
for Rusta Turks, Baneshi Lurs and in Pol-e-No. They were the 
sons of Imam Gholi who, when alive, was 'caretaker' (negahban) 
of the Imamzadeh Ayub. Since his death that-work had fallen 
into the hands of his younger brother's family, which was resi- 
dent in Buraki. One of the three brothers, Kaka Khan(31) was 
the acknowledged head of the group and had married into a 
family from Pol-e-No. He had four young children. His other 
brothers were relatively young; Ali Khan(32), with whom their 
widowed mother lived, was married to the daughte; of Akram(10), 
and Ali Reza(33) had married a Lur from Kushk-e-Beiza. A 
fourth brother lived with his wife in Kushk-e-Beiza. Their 
wives did not make carpets, nor did they have any animals. 
They were constantly searching for work as wage labourers. 
This account has attempted to illustrate the variety of 
alliances constructed within a relatively small village between 
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households which vary from those in which kinship links are of 
prime importance, to more formal relationships of contract. 
It has proceeded through an analysis of most of the cooperative 
alliances to be found in one village and pointed out some of the 
internal social differentiations that are an inherent feature in 
most alliances, depending partially on the associations between 
kin at particular stages in the development of domestic groups. 
However, it has not included perhaps the most important alliance 
to be found within the village, which, in some senses, incor- 
porates the whole village, and that is Abdulahils enterprise, 
and the relationships that he has constructed between villagers 
and others. Nor has it addressed the problems directly asso- 
ciated with the separation of those alliances based on kinship 
from those based on contract. Some of the complexities of this 
issue were addressed in the chapter on marriage, where emphasis 
was placed on the differences between a public language of good 
faith and cooperative trust, and the private language of indi- 
vidual self-interest. 
In reality it might be argued that Abdulahi's enterprise, 
of which Chamani is but a small part, cannot be treated separ- 
ately and is just another cooperative arrangement built with the 
same principles that villagers use; the tools used and the val- 
ues expressed by Abdulahi are, it is maintained, similar to the 
ones used by villagers. But his enterprise does provide an 
intellectual bridge to a concluding discussion of the relation- 
ships that have been constructed between the state and the 
village and point backwards as well as forwards to an wholistic 
376 
analysis within a regional context - Pointing towards the 
variations on a small number of structural themes rather than 
to discontinuities in social organisation, the results of par- 
ticular perceptions of supposedly discrete social organisational 
forms. It points backwards to the continuity with the past 
in terms of the similarities of relationships outlined in 
earlier chapters. 
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CHAPTER XII 
CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS OF INEQUALITY AND AUTHORITY 
Abdulahi and the negotiation and extension of 'familial' control 
The last chapter attempted to describe the types of rela- 
tionships constructed between households within Chamani. This 
excluded the relationships constructed by perhaps the most 
powerful household within Chamani, that of Abdulahi, the large 
landowner. This chapter aims to describe the features of that 
household and, by extension, the continuing 'familial' control 
exercised by Abdulahi over village affairs. In addition, some 
of the conflicts and the contradictions that have arisen between 
th. b- type of control and an increasingly centralized nation state 
are also explored to demonstrate the continuity with the past 
as well as the problems posed for future development. 
A description of Abdulahils household at this point is 
aimed at showing the similarities between it and those of the 
villagers in Chamani. It is also aimed at elaborating the 
features of kinship and contract which provide the bases for 
the construction of alliances between households. * It is very 
different from any household within the Ayub valley in terms of 
size and range of interests but the underlying premises on 
which it is constructed remain the same. It might be said 
that his household includes all those 'domesticated' by him. 
He lived in a relatively large house in Shira7 constructed 
in one of the older sections of the city. His immediate 
family 
consisted of his wife and four unmarried children, two sons and 
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two daughters. His younger brother, Mortessa, lived in a simi- 
lar but smaller house about 100 yards down the street. A third 
brother was governor (shahrdar) of the provincial town of 
Kdzerun and lived in a very new house on the outskirts of the 
city. Both brothers were younger than Abdulahi. In addition 
to his own house, Abdulahi had built a new house for the use of 
his elder son on one of the most prestigeous boulevards of the 
city. Outside Shiraz, Abdulahi had his 'country residence' in 
Mohamaddbad, a large detatched house with its own swimming pool 
in the middle of his garden. Less imposing compounds, such as 
that in Chamani, were available to him in all the villages in 
which he had interests as well as in the two gardens he rented 
in the suburbs of Shiraz. 
Each of these establishments had its own complement of 
staff but these were interchangeable as and when the need arose. 
His wife was in charge of domestic arrangements in his main 
house in Shiraz and rarely left it. To help her she had sev- 
eral resident maids and a cook, as well as male helpers. 
Meals were normally cooked to cater for 20 people. Abdulahi, 
when in town, normally ate separately from the rýst of the 
household, except on the occasions when there were family 
guests. He had his own personal valet/chauffeur, Sadrollah, 
a man from Bardej, Abdulahils father's village. Sadrollah was 
the maternal cousin of the two brothers Namaki and Mashd Rahman 
in Chamani (Nos-19 and 20). He catered for his smallest per- 
sonal needs and supervised the preparation of his food both 
in Shiraz and when he was away. from the city. He also drove 
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him around in one of the three personal vehicles that Abdulahi 
owned. For village and family use he had a land rover and a 
small car. Of all people Sadrollah was perhaps the closest to 
Abdulahi. 
Many of the products used in the kitchen came from his 
own land and animals - In addition to grain and meat he also 
obtained fruit and vegetables in season as well as various dairy 
products from his flocks. So did the households of his two 
brothers and his wife's sisters. He would not drink the piped 
municipal water, preferring to have water brought in in goat 
skins from Ayub. Most bread was cooked in the courtyard over 
an open griddle as in the village. 
Abdulahils work proceeded at his pace, apart from the occa- 
sions when he was obliged to attend public functions. The morn- 
ings when hewas in the city were taken up with farming and 
business interests conducted in the office adjacent to the 
street at the bottom of the courtyard, or in his private room 
on the first floor of the house. Here he received a constant 
stream of petitioners from both the city and the various vill- 
ages in which he has interests. After lunch he retired to rest 
until late afternoon when visitors again began to arrive. 
Usually his formal engagements were at this time of day. There 
were weekly council meetings as well as the numerous official 
functions at which his presence was required. His wife rarely 
accompanied him to official functions in the evenings, and he 
preferred to take a younger female companion, often his daughter, 
or niece. His wife led a very different and separate life to 
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him, moving only short distances from the house. He was 
caught between the demands of a public and westernised life 
style, while his wife was closeted behind the veil (chadour) 
in a very conservative family environment. 
On the many occasions when he was out of Shiraz, he would 
spend days at a time in the various villages in which he had 
interests, receiving representations, collecting rents, dele- 
gating various tasks as well as entertaining local officials 
and leaders. Wherever he went he normally took most of the 
provisions he would personally need. This was assiduously 
bought by his valet prior to the trip in shops with which he 
maintained a personal account. On the occasions when he went 
to the capital, Tehran, for pleasure and business, he stayed 
with friends, leaving his personal staff in Shiraz. He also 
made private, yearly excursions to the tourist centres of 
Europe for pleasure as well as to obtain his yearly medical 
check-up. All his clothes were bought in Europe. 
As the oldest brother,, he took personal control of many of 
the family's activities and over-rode many of the decisions 
made by his brother, Mortessa, who was nominally'in charge of 
the family's interest in Deh Sheikh, as well as those made by 
his eldest son. Because of his position in the formal politi- 
cal hierarchy of the city he also managed many of the interests 
of his wife's family, which was an old bazaar merchant family. 
His son had no particular occupation and no particular inter- 
ests. He was totally maintained by his father, who also appoin- 
ted a personal valet, also from Bardej, to cater for him. His 
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son spent most of his time hunting, riding and generally enter- 
taining himself. He occasionally supervised agricultural ý, 'ork 
for his father, but was given little responsibility, despite 
the fact that he was approaching his middle twenties. 
At any one time one could expect to find between 15 and 20 
people in residence in Abdulahi Is house in Shiraz, not only 
those formally employed by him but female relatives and their 
children as well as less formal helpers. His business contacts 
were extensive and to try and separate them from his kinship 
connections is indeed a difficult, if not impossible task. 
They varied from the very traditional clergy and bazaar merch- 
ants such as his brother-in-law, Joukar, from whom he rented 
land in Chamani, through a wide variety of middle-class pro- 
fessionals associated both with the city administration as well 
as with some of the larger industrial establishments (such as 
the canal construction company in Ramjerd), to the higher 
echelons of regional authority, such as the governor general's 
office and the interests of the Moladdel family. 
The comparatively large number of people attached to 
Abdulahils enterprise ranged from those who were permanent 
retainers to those with whom formal contractual arrangements 
were constructed such as the melon cultivators in Chamani and 
the irrigators who were paid a daily wage. His ability to 
manipulate a wide variety of resources and personnel was of 
the same type as that associated with the agro-pastoral com- 
bine utilized as a basis for the maintenance of livelihood by 
both nomadic and sedentary populations in the Marvdasht plain. 
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Changing social relations of production and the associated 
increase in control by the state have seemed to change the 
nature of the relationships between himself and those who work 
for him. The political functions of kinship alliances rooted 
in a 'tribal' idiom have been publicly abandoned as appeals to 
national unity and 'neutral' state control have been espoused. 
But the kinship idiom, if not actual kinship links, still pro- 
vide the bases for the construction of cooperative alliances 
under changing social and economic conditions, as indicated 
in the previous chapter. 
These changing conditions of production, associated with 
mechanisation, changes in tenurial arrangements and increasing 
independence of production have served to change the ways in 
which people are dependent on the cooperation-of others. 
Large landowners are decreasingly dependent on village labour 
and villagers are able to act in seemingly more independent ways. 
The growing importance of the state has facilitated this devel- 
opment through technical and financial assistance to 'progres- 
sive' farmers and through its emerging position as 'mediator' 
between large landowners and villagers in some instances and 
in others as supporter of the large landowners. 
In some respects the state may be said to have taken over 
some of the responsibilities that were formerly seen as the 
obligations of the malekin. In so doing the nature of the rel- 
ationship has changed as the distance between villager and state 
official has increased. Through the formal separation of their 
interests with land reform the malekin have also been able to 
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distance themselves, or have been publicly distanced from the 
activities of villagers. But the state, rather than being the 
'neutral arbiter' that it is publicly made out to be, is 
administered and controlled by some of the former "umdeh malekin'_ 
and their supporters. 
As the distance between the villager and the state appar- 
ently increases, so does the ability to attribute blame to a 
supposedly impersonal entity, and deny, or distance onself from 
individual responsibility. Beteille comments: 
"people in power seem to enjoy the most respect when 
they are furthest removed from the ultimate source 
of power which is physical compulsion. " 
(1977, p-18) 
This physical compulsion lies in the power of such people as 
the gendarmery and the courts. The individual interests of the 
powerful can be disguised behind the veil of mutual support and 
trust, where private interests are converted into public good 
through processes which naturalise the actual relations of 
domination. Dehghan, the large absentee landowner in Jashnidn 
and Futuabad commented: 
"Only a few years ago sickness and death was' very common 
in the villages. Many died of malaria. I felt a great 
responsibility for the villagers on may land. Because 
there was no other source of help I was obliged to pro- 
vide medicine and pay their hospital fees. I couldn't 
see-anyone die when I inew I could do something about it. 
With land reform however and the transference of the 
villagers' welfare maintenance into the hands of the 
central government a great burden has been lifted from 
my shoulders. I no longer feel obliged to look after 
my villagers. " 
(personal interview, May 1971) 
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Dehghan, like others, considered that the state had taken on 
the role formerly occupied by the malekin. It was the state's 
duty and the duty of the villagers themselves to ensure their 
own means of livelihood, and the new language of democracy and 
participation in the development of communities through cooper- 
atives became enshrined in the rhetoric of the white revolution. 
Responsibility for development and for maintenance of con- 
trol was removed from thepersonal relationships which connected 
landlords to villagers; they were no longer required to exer- 
cise direct political authority and were thereby given an oppor- 
tunity to operate much more independently. And yet they were 
still dependent on the labour of villagers to help with pro- 
duction and as such they were obliged to secure their cooper- 
ation and support. An increased social distance separated the 
actual holders of power from the villagers, coupled with the 
interposition of a supposedly separate group of 'neutral' arbi- 
ters (state officials and the police), the large landowners 
were allowed to, distance themselves from the direct exercise 
of authority. In so doing they were, seemingly paradoxically, 
able to maintain relationships based supposedly on good faith 
and trust. Relationships of inequality were thereby naturalised 
as people like Dehghan maintained a distant paternalistic watch 
over 'his villagers' and no questions were asked about his 
rights to control over land. There were, in addition, 'objec- 
tive guarantees' which legitimated these unequal divisions 
through the authorised distribution of recognised offices. 
These took the form of titles and honours which were confirmed 
385 
by a body supposedly removed from the circumstances in which 
the relationships of inequality were established (i. e. the 
church and the state) - 
In chapter A it was suggested that marriage might be seen 
as the 'domestication' of the 'wild' 'outside' represented by 
the stranger/bride in the creation of a new domestic unit. 
With the interposition of a supposedly 'neutral' body in charge 
of law and order many of the relationships of the larger land- 
owners might be interpreted in similar ways. So that many of 
Abdulahils contacts and contracts with others were based on 
attelupts to place these relationships on to a much more personal 
and informal footing and to incorporate people into his domes- 
tic establishment - his 'big, happy, family'. The successful 
installation of a motor pump for example was-accompanied by a 
sacrifice of a lamb whose meat was generously distributed among 
both the engineers and Abdulahils workers in Chamani. The sale 
of a few cows was accompanied by an insistence that the buyer 
should give a gift to Hosein Khan, the dashteb9n (No. 30), who 
was looking after them. What might be interpreted as an instru- 
mental transaction was transformed into a generoýs exchange 
among friends. 
The successful negotiation of a contract for grazing ground 
for his sheep, on the other side of the river Kor, was inform- 
ally sealed with a large meal and the provision of opium to the 
landowner (an opium addict). The landowner was brought out to 
Chamani as Abdulahi's guest, was purposefully deprived of opiuin 
until after the meal, when the two got down to business. No 
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witnesses signed any formal contracts, no documents changed 
hands - The deal was concluded as if the two were the closest 
of friends and an atmosphere of mutual trust was encouraged. 
The eventual limits of Abdulahils rights to the grazing ground 
remained however unspecified, providing opportunity for their 
continued reinterpretation according to circumstances, and for 
the continual negotiation of their content. The language of 
the 'good faith' economy transposed an unequal relationslip into 
a generous exchange and legitimated differential control over 
resources. It binds people together through ties of mutual 
support and trust and perpetuates what Alavi has termed lpri- 
mordial loyalties'; the relationship between patron and client 
is seen as the exchange of equally valuable assets. 
The contracts that Abdulahi traditionally constructed with 
those who worked for him were also largely informal. They were 
couched in mutually supportive terms and involved the distri- 
bution of perbdic gifts- The treatment of his shepherds is 
illustrative onýthis score (see above, Chapter VII). He often 
brought extra food with him and items of clothing when he c-ame 
from Shiraz to the Ayub valley which were distriýuted among his 
workers. He turned a blind eye to their use of his resources 
for personal consumption and kept them and their households 
supplied with flour. At New Year he would distribute new bank- 
notes, and at major festivals he provided the meat for sacri- 
fice. His workers in return were expected to give him personal 
loyalty and provided presents of food at particular family 
gatherings such as weddings and funerals. 
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In Chamani several households were associated with 
Abdulahils work in one form or another. Reference was made in 
Chapter X to those who worked as wage labourers. In Chapter 
VI reference was also made to the wider involvement of villa- 
gers in barley, rice and cotton cultivation. But a number of 
people were permanently dependent with their families on his 
continued support. Most important of these were Ali Naghi (21) 
and his father Abdul Khalogh(22) , Mashd Rahman(19) and his 
brother Namaki(20). In addition, Hosein Khan(30) and ý', qshd 
Hajali(27) were also directly einployed by him. 
Ali Naghi lived, together with his wife and three small 
children in courtyard B, one of the most conjested courtyards 
within the gha'leh of Chamani in which five other domestic 
groups were located. Immediately adjacent to-his two rooms 
was the room in which his ageing parents lived. Ali Naghi 'S 
wife shared the domestic chores with her ageing mother-in-law. 
She was the daughter of Rais Asad, Abdulahils kadkhoda in 
Chamani and a'resident of Buraki. Ali Naghi had two sisters, 
both married, one to the son of Rais Asad's brother, Rais 
Mahmud, also a resident of Buraki, the other to Khan Mirza, 
one of Abdulahi Is tractor drivers who lived in Pol-e-No. Ali 
Naghi was the effective head of the household. His father 
Abdul Khalogh had come to Chamani with the lattert brother, 
Mahd Taghi(23) shortly after the foundation of Chamani as agri- 
cultural labourers, having moved from the village of Garmabad 
near Marvdasht. The two brothers no longer spoke to each other 
and the associated households were located at opposite ends of 
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the ghalleh and had constructed very different sorts of alli- 
ances Mahd Taghi and his sons were loosely affiliated to the 
Rusta Turks whereas Ali Naghi was firmly in Abdulahi's camp and 
allied through marriage to the latter's representative in the 
village. Ali Naghils mother, an Arab, from the Arab Jabbareh 
section of the former Khamseh confederacy of tribes, had a sis- 
ter in Shiraz and her house served as a centre for members of 
the family when visiting Shiraz. The land rover driver who visi- 
ted the village twice daily was also Ali Naghils cousin, which 
also connected him with a wide range of contacts in Marvdasht. 
Ali Naghi worked as Abdulahils housekeeper in Chamani. He 
cooked for Abdulahils employees when temporarily resident in 
the village. For this work he received a salary of 150 Tomans 
per month. He had the keys to the various store-rooms in 
Abdulahils courtyard and he was in charge of the domestic stores. 
Ali was a relatively young man who had learned to cook in the 
army, where he also learned to drive. As part of Abdulahi's 
domestic establishment he was occasionally called away from 
the village, either to help in the kitchens at Ab. dulahi Is house 
in Shiraz, or to work in his house in Mohamadabad. His work 
was not specific, however, and he was called on by Abdulahi to 
do a variety of things, such as driving the tractor or the land 
rover. But, because most of his work was associated with dom- 
estic chores, he was looked on disparagingly by others. 
Ali, like his father, had no rights to land, but he did 
have a number of animals which were herded by Kamar Khan's son, 
for which he paid a monthly fee. He also- owned four cows which 
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were taken out with the village herd and 'housed in Abdulahi's 
cowsheds , together with the latter Is - His job with Abdulahi 
opened up certain privileges. He was able to use the latter's 
well to obtain water for domestic purposes, and was able to 
help himself to grain and flour stored in the compound. When 
Abdulahi was in residence in Chamani Ali was expected to stay 
in the former's courtyard, despite the fact that his wife and 
children were only minutes away and he might not see them for 
days on en. d. From his cash income he had been able to put money 
into a small-scale haulage business in Shiraz controlled by his 
mother's sister's family. 
After an argument with Mashd Ali Khan, who controlled 
Abdulahils production in Chamani after Rais Asad had resigned 
in 1972 (see below, p, 405 ), Ali Naghi left -his job in Chamani 
and took up paid hotel work in Shiraz. This only lasted for a 
short time and he was soon back in Chamani. Unlike other 
villagers who had interests in land and/or animals he was in a 
somewhat precarious position, being dependent on Abdulahi for 
employment. On returning, although he did not obtain an in- 
creased salary, one of the causes of the argument, he was given 
land above the village on which to build and was able to use 
Abdulahils machinery to transport building materials from the 
mountain to the site. He was also allowed to harvest some of 
Abdulahils barley with Mashd Rahman, another of Abdulahi's 
employees. He had a vested interest in making sure that villa- 
gers, animals did not stray on to Abdulahils lands and 
fiercely defended the latter's interests in the village. 
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Ali Naghils wife was a carpet maker and had a loom in the 
courtyard. This provided an additional source of cash. The 
whole household was brought into Abdulahi Is establishment in 
one form or another. His wife baked the bread for the Abdulahi 
house in Chamani and occasionally also cooked. His father 
looked after Abdulahils cows and his mother washed the clothes 
for the single men who were resident in the courtyard. His 
brother sometimes worked as an irrigator on Abdulahils fields. 
Ali Naghi was much more a personal servant of Abdulahils than 
merely a wage labourer. Similarly Mashd Rahman and Namaki 
were very dependent on Abdulahils patronage, although the 
latter had gained a certain amount of independence. 
Mashd Rahman(19) and his brother(20) had no rights to 
land in the village. They were brought to the village from 
Bardej to help in the cultivation of Abdulahils land. Both 
their wives came from Korbal too. Namaki was employed as an 
irrigator on Abdulahils wheat and Mashd Rahman as a pump atten- 
dant. Mashd Rahman continued to work for Abdulahi for which 
he was remunerated in the same way as Ali Naghi. Like the 
latter, he was obliged to do more or less what Abdulahi required 
and his movements away from the village were subject to Abdula- 
hi's approval. Thus, in addition to his tasks associated with 
the pump near the village, he also supervised the weighing of 
the cotton crop and the payment of villagers, acted as cook and 
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housekeeper in Ali Naghi's absence and helped out in the fields 
when required. In addition Mashd Rahman invested some cash in 
things like small cooking utensils, plastic children's toys 
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and chewing gum, boxes of which he occasionally picked up on 
his infrequent visits to the city - non-perishable goods that 
could be stored and sold individually later for a small profit. 
His wife owned the only sewing machine in the village and was 
able to supplement the household income through taking in 
repairs Prior to Mashd Rahman's migration to Chamani he was 
not married and Abdulahi secured a bride for him. The marriage 
was celebrated in Abdulahils house in Shiraz. The bride was 
very reluctant to leave her home village of Bardej. 
Namaki had managed to transfer many of his obligations to 
Abdulahi on to his son, Ahmad, who worked as a wage labourer 
irrigating Abdulahils fields. Namaki supported himself as an 
itinerant merchant, hawking products with a low value and of a 
perishable nature around the villages in the area. He moved 
out from the village with his two laden donkeys in the morning 
and often did not return for a number of days. He sold such 
things as fruit and vegetables, as well as household items 
like brushes. Some items, like potatoes were bought in Shiraz 
for 15 rials per mann, for example, and sold for 20-25 rials 
per mann. Other items were obtained through barter in the 
villages that he visited, so that he might return with a supply 
of grapes for sale to villagers, for example. 
Having initially been allocated two rooms in the Rhalleh 
of Chamani by Abdulahi, Namaki helped Kamar Khan(18) build a 
separate courtyard (J) to which he subsequently moved. There 
he occupied three rooms together with his wife, six unmarriad 
sons and one daughter. Another daughter had married Kamar 
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Khan's son. Despite his separation from Abdulahi through the 
substitution of his son' s labour, he was called out to work for 
the latter at peak times. He also contracted with Abdulahi to 
dry-farm a small area of land above the village on which he 
grew barley on a nim-kar contract. He used his four donkeys 
as draught animals, the landlord provided land and seed, and 
the harvest was divided equally between them. 
Namaki owned five cows in addition to his donkeys. The 
cows were herded with those of the village. The donkeys pro- 
vided transport for his itinerant business interes. ts. His wife 
did not make carpets and the household was reliant on his in- 
come from trading and his son's wages from Abdulahi for any 
available cash that came into the household. Namaki, like 
Javad and Hasanjan did not appear tohave much time to linger 
in front of the village gates with those villagers not working, 
being preoccupied with. his own interests. He did not have 
relatives to stay with on his frequent excursions away from 
Chamani and relied on his trading contacts if he was away over 
night. He visited relations in Bardej very infrequently, as 
did his brother, perhaps once a year. 
At least Ali Naghi and Mashd Rahman, as the ones most dep- 
endent on Abdulahi, had a few outside interests, but people 
like Hosein Khan, the watchman (dashteban) for Abdulahi, 
received no cash. He was charged with the most menial tasks 
and was paid in a similar way to Abdulahils shepherds. He 
received 500 mann of grain per year which was deposited with 
the village shopkeeper who provided him with most of his require- 
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ments. Abdulahi occasionally provided him with a change of 
clothes and giveh (cloth shoes) as well as with surplus food 
from the landlord's table. In addition he received small 
amount of cash from the landlord at New Year and from the sale 
of the landlord's livestock. But money didnot figure promin- 
ently in his income. He was tied to Chamani and rarely man- 
aged to leave. He was a personal servant of Abdulahi's- 
Others of Abdulahi! s employees received negotiated wages 
for partic. plar jobs but their association with Abdulahi always 
appeared to involve more than their specific tasks required, 
and relationships of kinship tied them together in a loose 
enterprise with Abdulahi. The links which connected Mashd 
Rahman with Abdulahils valet have alreadybeen mentioned, as 
have the links connecting Ali Naghi with Abdulahils kadkhoda 
in the village. Similarly, Mashd Ali Khan, the man who succeed- 
ed Rais Asad as Abdulahils village representative in 1972, was 
the cousin of one of Abdulahils tractor drivers, both of whom, 
together with the head of Abdulahils shepherds, were connected 
through marriage to distant kinsmen of Abdulahi in Bardej. 
As changes have taken place in the ways in which land was 
perceived there would appear to have been an increase in more 
formal types of control. This was perhaps more evident in the 
case of newly settled villages in the plain as land was 
brought into cultivation for more explicitly independent com- 
mercial production. But the expectations of both employer and 
empl(yee seem to have been firmly rooted in the traditional 
social relations of production; the status hierarchies of the 
old order were still considerably important as control of land 
was, until land reform, explicitly associated with political 
authority. As an indicator of the continuity with the past 
Abdulahi, his brothers and his sons were still addressed as 
khan by many of the villagers and his enterprise was analagous 
to those of the 'tribal' khavanin. The oulad-e-khavanin or 
close family of the khan, supported by a group of lamaleh 
(servants) around which were the various groups (tireh) over 
which the khdn maintained differing degrees of authority. The 
main difference between Abdulahils enterprise and the 'tribal' 
organisation of the khavanin was not so much in the nature of 
his authority as in his ability to wield such disparate client 
groups into a unified political force given the overarching 
control exercised by the central government, and the physically 
disparate nature of his interests. 
When trust and good faith are deemed to be at a maximum, 
in the household, where it is 'naturally' expected that sons 
and wives will support fathers and husbands, then the time 
spent on the negotiation of 'good faith' relationships can be 
minimised. Relationships of inequality within the household, 
based on age and sex become an integral part of the natural 
moral order. This naturalisation or domestication process 
attempts to ensure the domination of a particular moral order 
and the cultural reproduction of its form. It is extended out 
from the household to the 'taming' of the liý; ildl outside into 
a known and manipulated social universe through means of exten- 
ding familiarity, and the relationships found within the house- 
hold-"fle-et : 6hqf, @ -obtaining in the wider environment. 
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The institution of this domesticated order allowed those 
who were the domesticators to 'take liberties' (i. e. restrict 
freedoms) with (or from) those thereby domesticated. Abdulahi 
maintained an office at the bottom of the courtyard of his 
house in Shiraz, next to the main gate on to the street. This 
office, in which he was never found, served as a filter for 
those who had business with him. It was staffed by his 'sec- 
retary' (nayeb) when the latter was not supervising cultivation 
in the Ayub valley or engaged on other of Abdulahils business. 
There were no formal office hours, which meant that in many 
instances people had to wait around for hours at a time to see 
either the nayeb or Abdulahi himself. Those who were parts of 
the domestic (or domesticated) establishment; family, close 
relatives and servants., by-passed the office-and went straight 
into the house. Others, such as his agricultural supervisors, 
would be shown into Abdulahils personal quarters on the first 
floor of the house, away from both the family rooms and the 
servants' rooms. Those considered socially equal or superior 
would be ushered into the elaborately furnished guest room, to 
be lavishly entertained by his servants. These 
iatter would 
never come uninvited. Those who use the office have thereby 
established an interpretation of their standing with Abdulahi; 
it is the value that they place on the particular transaction 
that is subject to negotiation. The longer they were prepared 
to waitthe more value they were seen to be placing on the 
transaction. This was complemented by Abdulahils reaction - by 
taking their time and giving none of his the difference in status 
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was publicised and perhaps re-assessed. For example, Javad, 
the head of the village council in Chamani, came to engage 
Abdulahils help in the negotiation of a loan from the agricul- 
tural bank. He was kept waiting for two days being fed and 
housed in the servants' quarters where he was asked to help 
out in the kitchen. 
To obtain even small amounts of Abdulahils time might 
therefore involve the considerable expenditure of one's own. 
On visits to the village Abdulahi was often followed by between 
ten and twenty individuals all waiting to talk with him about 
one thing or another. They would wait outside the house until 
such time as he felt willing to see them. During their wait- 
ing periods they were often asked to perform small tasks, such 
as helping with the tea or washing dishes. -Others, such as 
gendarme officers might be more privileged and be allowed to 
sit in the room with him, but he invariab', Iy dictated what 
would be spoken about. As in the bazaar often lengthy periods 
would elapse before the actual nature of the transaction which 
had brought the two people together in the first place would 
be broached. In the bazaar a striking feature oý much activity 
was the length of time it took to establish the price of many 
but the most mundane of goods. The establishment of a formal 
price seemed to mark the end of a process usually preceded by 
often prolonged attempts to establish mutual trust, and the 
transformation of an instrumental interest into something much 
more lasting. Numerous cups of tea and seemingly endless con- 
versation avoided and even repelled for as long as possible 
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discussion of the object of their mutual interest. The value 
of the good does not just lie in the price negotiated, but 
also in the accumulation of symbolic capital and in the rel- 
ationships thus established. One of the fears of villagers 
visiting the town was that they would be cheated and they thus 
invariably tried to incorporate the merchant and the official 
into their own familiar social universe and create regular 
channels that could be trusted. 
The landlord provided a focus for much village activity 
in the city and many villagers came to his house in order to 
obtain his help in negotiating the bureaucracy of the city. 
While formal control remained largely in the hands of 
the landowners of the villages, the institution of this dom- 
esticated order remained largely unthreatened. With changing 
forms of production and social relations of production which 
involved increased involvement of government officials in 
village affairs, expectations and atiitudes were also changing. 
Abdulahi attempted to bring these 'external' agents under his 
control. His father and he, for example, were responsible for 
the provision of capital and labour for the construction of a 
number of gendarme stations on the road between Shiraz and 
Korbal. The public aim of this project was to increase con- 
trol over the unruly Basseri and Kurd Shuli tribes who used 
this land as pasture land and made travel hazardous. The 
actual result was to consolidate his interests in Korbal and 
encourage the opening up of this unirrigated land, as well as 
gain pasture land for his own animals. He regularly enter- 
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tained the gendarme officers at his house in Mohamaddbad and 
indeed whenever he passed the station nearest Mohamadabad a 
gendarme was sent down to the house to see if he required any- 
thing. He also provided the station with periodic gifts of 
food. He was also in close touch with the gendarme head- 
quarters in Shiraz and was able to use them to support his own 
interests in, for example, restricting access to grazing ground 
in both Korbal and Ramjerd. He was at pains to point out that 
they were an independent body and that they maintained the law 
laid down by the state. He could thus distance himself from 
involvement in their affairs and from their often arrogant 
exercise of force, by playing the role of benevolent patron 
and acting as a mediator between these 'impersonal' agents of 
the state and the villagers. They were not hired by him to 
physically assault villagers who allowed their animals to 
stray on his land! 
In a case in which the village cows from Buraki Were found 
to be traspassing on his spring wheat, his secretary (nayeb) 
in the village at that time, Mahmudzadeh, had them rounded up 
by Abdulahils workers and impounded in the nearby gendarme 
station at Kushkak. The owners of the animals had to go to 
the gendarme station to plead for their rekase. But there was 
no further judicial apparatus to which the case could be for- 
warded, the gendarmerie were authorised to settle such cases. 
They informally interpreted what they thought were Mahmudzadeh's 
wishes and imposed a very heavy fine (the cov; s had been allowed 
to stray on a number of occasions previously). It was to Abdulah' 
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that the owners came, on his visit to the village the next day, 
to petition for his intercession and a reduction of the imposed 
fine. Abdulahi made it clear that he was reticent to inter- 
vene and that he wanted the law to take its course, but on his 
way back to town called in at the gendarme station and managed 
to get the fine reduced. In other cases involving conflict 
between his workers and others he used other agents of the cen- 
tral government as representatives of a supposedly neutral body 
to hear the cases. When two of his shepherds were involved in 
a dispute over access to water for their animals in Pol-e-No 
he called in the resident literacy corpsman (sepah danesh) to 
listen to the case with him in the village school. He saw 
both shepherds, one of whom had physically assaulted the other, 
and requested to the corpsman to administer -c. orporal punish- 
ment to the assaulter. 
Despite the foundation of local government in the form 
of the village council and the public election by landholding 
villagers of formal representatives, Abdulahi continued to 
control many of the activities of villagers. His connections 
in the regional political arena, his position on the city 
council and in the then ruling Iran Novin party, enabled him 
to maintain contacts through the city with those in charge of 
the plain's administration and industry. He entertained the 
local bakhshdar and other government officers in Marvdasht, in 
Chamani. He maintained close connections with both the man- 
agers of the dam construction company and the canal construct- 
ion company. The manager of the former, with personal con- 
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nections in the ministry of water and power, managed to secure 
pasture land for him behind the dam. The manager of the latter, 
like Abdulahi, was a member of the Shiraz Lions Club and also 
a major landowner in the plain. He was able to secure the 
employment of a poorer urban relative as personnel officer to 
the company in their headquarters outside Chamani. This gave 
Abdulahi indirect influence over who was to be employed and 
villagers came to him to secure employment with the company. 
He was also able to use their heavy equipment and their 
labourers on occasion for work on his own projects, including 
re-roofing his house in Chamani, installing electricity and 
constructing a large earth dam to collect rain water from the 
mountain. In exchange he allowed them to use the land above 
the village for their buildings. Again the contract was infor- 
mal and gave Abdulahi considerable personal control over cer- 
tain sorts of activities and people in the company. 
With the increased importance being attached to mechanised 
agricultural production in government development schemes, 
Abdulahi was quick to take advantage of the various extension 
facilities being provided and managed to move in familial terms 
with various agricultural engineers in the agricultural office 
in Shiraz. One of these was Dehghan's son who had recently 
returned from Germany. With the creation of the agricultural 
cooperatives in the valley in 1974 he very readily cooperated 
with the technicians who were employed through the agricultural 
office to administer them. The headquarters of the cooperative 
that included the valley was established in Chamani in the 
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buildings abandoned on the completion of the canals for the 
dam. Abdulahi maintained his interests and his position as a 
major share-holder. 
He was still seen as the major mediator between the vill- 
agers and the central government, and his incorporation of those 
agents of the state and of industry into a familial network 
encouraged the maintenance of this perception. Villagers brought 
a variety of problems to him, either in the village or in town; 
from interceding with the gendarmery in the case of the 
enlistment of villagers into the army, to settling marital 
problems, from help in obtaining hospital treatment, to help in 
negotiating ways through government offices. His informal 
intercessions on behalf of the villagers, always predicated in 
terms of the personal favour he was doing them, oiled the wheels 
of a still important personally manipulated patronage network. 
The acceptance of his authority by most villagers maintained 
his continued control over many village activities. 
This control was however beginning to break down. In 
Chamani at least, the Rusta Turks had traditionally little 
involvement with his activities, except that until land reform 
they were formally subject to his authority and that of his 
representatives in the village. The case of the sepdh tarvij 
(agricultural extension corpsman) resident in the village during 
fieldwork serves as an illustration. Abdulahi had applied to 
the headquarters in Shiraz to obtain someone to look after his 
Mexican wheat. A high-school graduate who had undergone six 
months training as part of his national service was seconded to 
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the valley where he lived, firstly in the village school in 
Pol-e-No, and subsequently in the school in Chamani. Abdulahits 
representatives in Chamani, both Mahmudzadeh and Mashd Ali 
Khan saw this young man as one of Abdulahits workers and tried 
to treat him as such. The sepdh saw his work in a much wider 
context, as part of the government's development effort. His 
first task was to clear the village of animal manure and spray 
with DDT- He was very quickly seen as an alternative inter- 
mediary between the government and the villagers in their deal- 
ings with the gendarmery and Abdulahi's establishment. He was 
also brought in to settle marital disputes and the school above 
the village became a centre for village affairs. On many 
nights the room was occupied by important villagers talking 
with him. He became a close personal friend-of Javad's. 
Abdulahils representatives tolerated this man but felt that 
his presence was undermining their authority. Mahmudzadeh 
refused to deal with him directly and the two became very 
visibly hostile; Abdulahi remained above the conflict. 
Direct supervision of Abdulahils estates was in the hands 
of these representatives. Mahmudzadeh, his 'Secretary' or 
nayeb did not live in the village but travelled out-from the 
city, where he was in charge of Abdulahils office. He had 
had a similar job previously with the Ghavam family on their 
land elsewhere in the plain. His brother was one of a number 
of small landowners in the neighbouring village of Uanjan. 
He had no familial links with Abdulahi and was treated by the 
latter as an amployee. Mahmudzadeh's relationships with the 
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villagers was rather high-handed, and he was not liked. He 
felt that authority for village control lay in the hands of the 
landlord, and in the absence of Abdulahi considered himself in 
control. At harvest time he would watch the distribution of 
the crop, ordering the villagers to carry the landlord's share 
up first, refusing to deal with most villagers, for whom he 
showed little respect and always took the best portion of meat 
sacrifiýzed- He did not apparently approve of the building of 
the village school and maintained that Abdulahi himself had 
become a foreigner. He left Abdulahils employment in 1972 
and went into the bazaar as a corn merchant. 
The man brought in to replace him was a very different 
sort of person. Mashd Ali Khan was recruited from Abdulahils 
estates in Korbal. He lived in Abdulahils compound in Chamani, 
being looked after by Abdulahils cook. With the resignation 
of Abdulahils kadkhoda in Chamani, Rais Asad, Mashd Ali Khan 
took over the supervision of labour. He too exercised an auto- 
cratic control, 'considering that he had taken over the mantle 
of the former nayeb, but unlike him, he was a villager. The 
I 
resignation of Rais Asad marked a change in emphasis in the 
ways in which Abdulahils estates were run. He was a Turki- 
speaking villager, resident in Buraki with land in both Chamani 
and Buraki. His family was traditionally an important family 
in that village and his brother once ran a shop in Chamani. 
His son was on the Buraki village council. He had traditionally 
supervised cultivation for Abdulahi on those lands which were 
mechanised before the land reform. His daughter was married 
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to Ali Naghi, and his brother's son was married to Ali Naghils 
sister. Until land reform and the establishment of the village 
council, he was officially responsible through Abdulahi to the 
government agents. With his resignation the links which joined 
the people to Abdulahi's land through traditional relations of 
production were formally broken. From then on Abdulahi relied 
on outsiders to supervise his interests. 
In Korbal on the other hand, because Abdulahi was not 
directly engaged in major cultivation, except in his garden at 
Mohamadabad, he still worked through the kadkhodas of the 
various villages in that valley, who had all been elected as 
heads of village-councils after land reform. They were respon- 
sible for the collection of rent from the villagers. He had 
little direct involvement in village activities in these villages. 
Things appeared to come to a head in the spring of 1972 
when the villagers of Buraki, who had land in Chamani, stopped 
Abdulahils tractor driver from ploughing a stretch of land 
adjacent to the'village on which Abdulahi had installed a 
motor pump. The Buraki residents led by Rais Asad and armed 
with pitch forks, claimed that Abdulahi had illegally taken 
this stretch of land. The gendarmes and the land reform 
officials were brought in, but the villagers were eventually 
overruled. Rais Asad resigned and the rift between landlord 
and villagers widened. 
Abdulahils reaction was to employ more outside labourers 
rather than use 'unreliable' and 'disloyal' villagers. He 
already contracted with outside workers for the cultivation of 
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his melon fields and relationships between some of his lab- 
ourers were becoming much more formal. There were no organised 
labour associations at the time and because of the ready axail- 
ability of wage labourers, employers could pay more or less 
what they wanted. Conflicts over wage rates became more fre- 
quent as more and more individuals were aliena. ted from their 
traditional'means of subsistence, and as the relationship 
between landowner and labourer entered a much more formal phase. 
Even among his own retainers Abdulahi was obliged to give 
land for house-building above the village in lieu of a wage 
increase to both Ali Naghi and Mashd Rahman. 
The personal power which he was still able to manipulate 
was sufficient to ensure acquiescence to his authority at that 
time, but an example from Chamani indicates the growing aware- 
ness of villagers who no longer necessarily considered them- 
selves to be the clients of a generous patron. 
"In the same month as the conflict with the Buraki 
residents, ýbdulahils nayeb in Chamani, resident in 
the village at that time, was confronted by three of 
his regular irrigators , the sons of Namaki (2 0) , Iadullah(2), and Mina(10), who went on strike. They 
said they were overworked and underpaid for 'the day 
and night work they were doing in the fields at that 
time. They said that workers at the canal construct- 
ion company were getting more than they were. The nayeb's 
reaction was to immediately and rather impatiently 
sack them, saying they were bad workers anyway. He 
sent for three replacements from Buraki but after a few 
hours work these too became disatisfied with the con- 
ditions of work and went back to Buraki. The follow- 
ing day Abdulahi came out to the village on one of his 
regular visits, and the three sacked workers came to 
the house dressed in their best clothes. They com- 
plained of the harsh treatment they had been given. 
Ahmad, the son of Namaki, remained in the background 
and did no talking, but left Mansur, the son of Iadullah 
to be the spokesman. Abdulahi rebuked Mansur for being 
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foolish, identified him as the ring leader and com- 
mented disparagingly on the fact that he was a Lur. 
He said that he would support his nayeb. Mansur 
replied that they did not have to work for Abdulahi 
as there was plenty of work elsewhere, but he thought 
they had been treated unfairly. The three were 
summarily and impatiently dismissed from Abdulahi's 
presence. But Ahmad was 'obliged' to remain and con- 
tinue working. The three were sacked in the middle of 
the week and were being paid on a weekly basis. Both 
Mansur and Ali Vez, Mina's son came the next day for 
their outstanding wages but these were denied them 
and an argument followed with the nayeb. The two 
eventually left empty-handed. Mina later tried to 
intercede, but to no avail. Ali Vez eventually 
returned to work with Ahmad but Mansur never worked 
for Abdulahi again. " 
Such a conflict points to a growing recognition by some 
villagers of their changing position vis-A-vis the landlord 
and the polarisation of their separate interests. This would 
seem to suggest the destruction of the 'primordial loyalties' 
associated with the patronage networks of the traditional 
relations of production. But this again is too simple and 
points towards a unilineal picture of development. As indi- 
cated earlier, the affiliations of both the Luri group and 
the Turki group in Chamani were not traditionally focused on 
the villages. 
Public rhetoric and personal power 
The public language of land reform, together with the 
various other measures which were subsumed under 'The White 
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Revolution of the Shah and the People' were aimed at dragging 
Iran out of its 'traditional lethargy') through a programme 
of rapid expansion and modernisation into the twentieth cen- 
tury. (The White Revolution was so called because it was 
supposed to be a peaceful revolution - from the top down rather 
than from the bottom up. It incorporated programmes to 
nationalise forests and pasture lands, encourage profit sharing 
in industry, create universal suffrage, establish various 
development corps within the villages, nationalise water res- 
ources, facilitate urban development and reorganise govern- 
ment. ) 
1 To do this the aim was to cut through the factional 
clusters 
2 built-up through the Imalek-raliyat system' and the 
'feudal' organisation of production, and secure the independent 
loyalty of the peasantry. In this way the personal forms of 
power exercised by the mdlekin and the tribal kh5vanin would 
be destroyed and a rational basis for the development of the 
country's resources would be built, with a peasantry secure 
in its loyalty to the state. 
The public rhetoric of the revolution however disguised 
the personal power struggles which still appeared to be predi- 
cated in factional terms. The government, under the leader- 
ship of the shah, was intent on breaking what Alavi terms 
1. For an account of the White Revolution written by the 
former shah see The White Revolution, Imperial Pahalvi Library, 
Tehran 1967. 
2. 'Factional clusters' is used here in the same way as it is 
used by Alavi; he states that '1political cleavages in peasant 
societies are often vertical cleavages, which run across class 
lines, rather than horizontal cleavages of class conflict" 
(Alavi 1973, p-44) - 
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'primordial loyalties', 1 which appeared to tie people together 
on other than national terms; personal service, tribal affili- 
ation, regional autonomy. And yet the nature of the national 
regime was still apparently dominated by similar sorts of 
loyalties and a complex web of personal networks, now, however, 
transformed into a state ideology. 2 The nature of the shah's 
rule provided the framework in which authority and control 
were to be exercised; the autocratic and often arbitrary 
nature of government regulated by individuals whose authority 
was delegated from the top. Features reminiscent of earlier 
forms of control and legitimation appeared to have been 
maintained. 
Bill sees the 'revolution' as merely at attempt to maintain 
the status quo in the face of threats from what he terms the 
new class of 'professional bureaucratic intelligentsia'. 
4 
Although this threat may have contributed to the form that the 
'revolution' took, other reasons might be pointed to. These 
are complex and'varied and rooted in the nature of the regime's 
authority and in its relationship with the international system. 
It is, for example, not unimportant, that the timing of the 
land reform programme was coincidental with other, similar 
programmes executed elsewhere in the world at that particular 
1. Ibid., p-29 
2. For a discussion of this 'web' system, see Bill 1972 and 1973. 
3. i. e. despite a change in form there were many features of 
control which remained rooted in the traditions established 
through the delegation of authority under the now defunct tax 
farming system. 
4. Bill 1972, p-140. 
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time and supported by U. S. foreign policy. Emphasis in the 
latter was on social development and on redistributivist 
justice in general development programmes. The U. S. disbursed 
large sums of aid to help the Iranian development programme. 
1 
It is not sufficient to see the 'revolution' as a total 
package. The retrospective inclusion of the land reform 
programme, 
2 for example, into the 'White Revolution' seems to 
indicate at leastlwo distinct phases, representing different 
evaluations of the power of various groups by the regime. 
Katouzian and Halliday see the 'revolution' primarily in 
terms of speeding up capitalist penetration of the Iranian 
countryside. 
3 The problems with attributing causes and eval- 
uating effects is that they tend to remove particular features 
being analysed out of their historical contexts. At one level 
the land reform programme was merely a rationalisation and 
extension of earlier developments. 
The first stage of this process, in which land was alien- 
ated from 'traditional' 'communal' access, through a process 
1. In addition to the large amounts of funds devoted to 
building up the armed forces, Iran was the recipi. ent of much 
U. S. aid devoted to social development programmes. Iran was 
one of the major examples of the international community dev- 
elopment programme and provided the basis 
for UNESCO's experiments in the World Literacy Programme (see 
UNESCO 1973). 
2. The original, 'first stage' of the reform was initiated in 
January 1962, but the White Revolution was not proclaimed until 
January of the following year. 
3. Katouzian 1974, and Halliday 1979. 
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of increasing 'individuation' of property rights, was formal- 
ised under Rezd ShAh. The second stage, whereby the landowners 
were freed from their moral ties with village-based production, 
was facilitated by the land reform programme. Although this 
formalisation of rights to land and thus of changes in the 
forms of production were legislated for, it cannot be assumed 
1 
that relations of production changed as rapi ly. This 'gap, 
between, say landownership and landlordship, is reflected in 
the continuing individualistic control of the malek over the 
villages in which he owns land; in the continuing association 
between control of land and the control of public office. 
The contradictions between personal forms of control, and 
the supposed 'neutrality, of the bureaucracy of the nation 
state became increasingly evident. The personal 
forms of 
authority exercised by the shah stood in increasingly marked 
contrast to the supposedly democratically elected national 
assembly. At the reginnal level this oppositinn was reproduced 
between the provincial governor and the local, municipal 
assemblies. And at the local level between the landowner and 
2 
the village counci s. 
Changes in the relationships between landowners and 
villagers have been associated with the transition from 'feudal- 
lism' to 'capitalism', or from 'traditional' to 'modern', 
1. Lambton makes frequent reference to the disparity between 
the public language which legislated reform and the private 
reality which remained unaffected. "The legislative power of 
the present day (early 150s) is ... divorced from reality in 
that it tends to consider the putting on paper of a form of 
words to be an end in itself, while utterly disregarding the 
instruments by which the law is to be put into practice and the 
conditions under which it is to be implemented. " (Lambton 19S3, p-1 
2. Perhaps a third stage in this development might also be recog- 
nised, that is the re-combination of land and control in the 
hands of the statp. 
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accompanied by an increased individualism, the breakdown of 
the extended family, the generalisation of monetary exchange, 
the expansion of commodity production and of much more formal 
and impersonal types of authority. This spread of a rational 
economic logic, linked to western capitalism, is associated 
with the struggle between what are perceived as 'reactionary', 
'backward'' forces and the 'progressive' forces of modernis- 
ation embodied in the expanding state structure. Modernisation 
theory maintains that development moves through the disinte- 
gration of the old, traditional forms of organisation and a 
reintegration of elements of society in changed forms at a 
higher level. 1 Parsons' pattern variables supposedly isolate 
the 'ideal types' of particularistic and universalistic feat- 
ures of Itraclitionall and 'modern' forms of-organisation. 
Critiques of this theory of modernisation point to the com- 
plications of measuring the so-called 'transition' , and depen- 
dency theory in particular has helped in focusing attention on 
the active 'underdevelopment' or Imarginalisation', by the 
'centrel of the 'periphery', and has thus focused attention on 
the particular historical circumstances in which change occurs, 
and on the particular characteristics of the parties to the 
'transition I- 
According to B "dieu, the 'market place, where buyer OAT 
meets seller in an openly and selfishly competitive arena, 
1. For a discussion of the nature of this 'transition', see 
Roxborough 1979. 
2. Parsons, The Social System, London, 1951. 
3. See Frank, A. G., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin 
America, New York 1967. 
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replaces the mutually supportive 'traditional' or 'archaic' 
economy, and naked self-interest replaces cooperative and 
familial partnerships. He talks of this change as a movement 
from a 'good faith' economy to a 'bad faith' economy. In the 
latter,, few attempts are seen to be made to disguise the play 
of self-interest, and most transactions are seen as instrumen- 
tal. 
1 In such a change, the relationships between buyer and 
seller, or between farmer and agricultural labourer become 
formalised and impersonal and governed by contract. 
Such a movement from a 'good faith' economy to a 'bad 
faith' economy cannot however be interpreted as merely an 
historical evolution associated perhaps with the spread of 
capitalism. That is too simplistic. It implies, in an ideal- 
ist sense that all that is 'traditional' is-good and all that 
is 'modern' is bad. This is not only the opposite of what 
the government has maintained in its castigation of 'tradition- 
all as 'feudal' and 'backward', but it also denies that 
villagers, for example, in the nineteenth century were so com- 
mitted to their landlords through moral ties and community 
obligations, as to ignore the self-interest and '. bad faith' 
which many of the landlords exercised. 
IL 
B627dieu comments: 
"the generalisation of monetary exchange, which 
expresses the objective workings of the economy, also 
brings to light the institutional mechanisms proper 
to the archaic economy, which have the function of 
limiting and disguising the play of economic interest 
and calculation. " 
(Ibid. , p. 172) 
Bordieu 1977, p-172. 4 
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The private instrumental ends of individuals are made more 
explicit as the layers are removed from the public language 
of the 'good faith' economy which stresses cooperation and 
mutual support. The movement is then a demystification of 
the established order. 
The demystification of this public language has always 
been one of the major tasks of social anthropology, the child 
of western rationalism, as the spread of capitalism has in- 
volved the demystification of the relations of domination in 
pre-capitalist societies. But the terms in which a new order 
is established also imply the emergence of a new public lang- 
uage which in its turn disguises the new relationships of 
inequality. 
Two processes would appear to be at work to disguise these 
changing relationships of inequality and authority and convert 
private interest into public good. The one disguises self- 
interest by clothing it in the garb of familiarity and trust, 
and approximates, to those ideals of unity and cooperation 
supposedly rooted in the closest of ties - those found within 
the family, and those legitimated by appeals to the Islamic 
community in religious terms. Under such circumstances the 
malek, or the kh9n legitimates his control over the ra'iya, 
his subjects, through paternalistic appeals to moral authority 
and relations of descent. The other disguises self-interest by 
the imposition of a supposedly 'neutral' body, the state, 
which employs functionaries to arbitrate and legitimate the 
exercise of power. In Engels words: 'arisen out of society but 
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placing itself above it', the state appears as neutral. 
1 
Those in power enjoy respect and authority in so far as they 
are seen to be distanced from the ultimate source of power 
- physical coercion. 
The need for a public language of cooperation and trust 
both between landlord and villager, and between villagers 
themselves, would appear to be correlated with the degree of 
mutual interdependence. As that interdependence takes on new 
forms through, for example, the mechanisation of agricultural 
production, and the individuation of property ownership, the 
forms of cooperation and maual support change. The state 
takes on more of. the role of 'mediator', maintaining order 
and alleviating conflict in the name of national harmony. 
The myth of the 'good faith' economy can thus be inter- 
preted as an ideological tool in the hands of the powerful 
used to transpose instrumental transactions into what might 
be termed generous exchanges, and thereby maintain relations 
of inequality. 
It is tempting to treat the activities of landlords and 
peasants as separate because many of their activities occur in 
different social arenas. (The landlords in the Ayub valley, 
like most of the larger landlords in the plain, are urban 
residents. ) But in so doing those who effectively control the 
organisation of production both directly and indirectly, those 
1. Engels, F., 'The origins of the Family, Private Property, 
and the State' (p. 576), in Marx and Engels, Selected Works, 
London 1968. 
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who have been removed from village society by -ý, irtue of their 
superior status can only be brought in both by analysts and 
by villagers as some Ideus ex machinal. There is no recog- 
nition and thus no analysis of the fact that they are both 
the representatives and the products of the established order, 
and it is in their interests that the status quo is maintained 
and the law is interpreted. The formal division of interests 
between large landowner and villager as a result of the land 
reform programme conveniently emphasises their separation, but 
a concentration on this separation leads to a dualistic inter- 
pretation of society. Barth, for example, in his work on the 
Bdsseri, has stressed the 'different worlds' inhabited by the 
'chiefs'. and the lindians'. 
1 Black, on the other hand, in his 
work on the Lurs, while maintaining the division between upper 
and lower strata of society, stresses their interdependence 
and emphasises their occupation of the same social universe. 
The public language of the 'good faith' economy where 
stress is placed on cooperative interdependence between indi- 
viduals and groups, seems to be predicated on an ideal of 
staunch individualism. This stresses personal aýhievement and 
a commitment to freedom of action such as that supposedly 
embodied in the freedom attached to a nomadic existence. 
Villagers in the Ayub valley frequently upheld the superiority 
of nomadic existence and resented the restrictions on their 
1. Barth, 1964. 
2. Black, 1972. 
I 
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freedom associated with sedentary life. The ability to enter 
into cooperative alliances with government or with landlords 
or villagers presumes this freedom of action while disguising 
the difficulties and restrictions often associated with actual 
ability to act independently. 
Through the myth that achievement and success are the 
results of individual initiative (and there are always examples 
to demonstrate this), the fact that those who are already 
privileged still appropriate the bulk of benefits, and that 
opportunities for independent action are being eroded through 
changing relationships to land is disguised. The distribution 
of credit, educational opportunities, agricultural extension, 
access to markets and government officials as well as pastures, 
the benefits of agricultural research and of -land reform all 
appear to be biased against those who do not initially have 
the resources to take advantage of them. It is the wealthier 
members of society who could afford the time to invest in new 
opportunities and new avenues of advancement. 
Changes in the forms of production associated with mech- 
anisation have decreased the dependence of some 
iandlords on 
the labour of villagers, and have subsequently resulted in a 
change in the types of appeals to cooperation and mutual sup- 
port which ensure the latte-es participation. It should not 
however be assumed that all those with privilege saw the changes 
in land tenure associated with the land reform programme, and 
consequent changes in relations of production, as being neces- 
sarily in their interests. Many were opposed to the redistri- 
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bution of land for the same reasons that they resented the 
increasing interference by agents of the state. 
The inhabitants of villages like Hasanlibad and Shul, 
north of Marvdasht, and west of Persepolis, for example, visited 
by Lambton shortly after the execution of the reforms, apparen- 
tly grasped the opportunities presented to them with land 
reform and began a vigorous cooperative enterprise to modern- 
ise village agriculture. 
1 In these villages and other older 
villages in the plain where there had been little modernisation 
of agriculture prior to the reforms, and few attempts had been 
made to increase productivity, the 'traditional' relationship 
between mdlek and ra'iyat was still largely governed by a con- 
cern to extract rents rather than inciease production. It was 
in such villages that the landlords were seen by both villagers 
and land reform officials as the major obstacles to reform. 
Because of their continuing influence over agents of govern- 
ment control, such as the gendarmery, they posed a major threat. 
Thus the processes associated with the changing nature of 
production affected villagers and landowners differently. 
The land reform programme appeared to encourage ý re-alignment 
of interests in favour of those prepared to adopt or expand 
new agricultural techniques. In villages like Hasanabad and 
Shul it was the landlords who were the major opponents of 
reform. In the villages of Chamani and Pol-e-No, on the other 
hand, it was the villagers. The land reform office, together 
1. Lambton, 1969, p-lS2. 
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with the regional office of the ministry of agriculture, and 
the newly established agricultural bank, were interested in 
focusing on those engaged in the development of modern agri- 
culture., and in encouraging the development of cash crop farm- 
ing. The new forms of production served to increase differen- 
tiation both between and within villages and between landlords. 
It was those landlords who had made no efforts to develop modern 
agriculture who appeared to suffer. The interests of govern- 
ment, repr esented by the land reform office (which was charged 
with the settlement of tenurial disputes), were represented as 
cutting across so-called 'traditional vertical fa. ctions' and 
thus helping to eliminate the control of the m5lek over the 
raliyat, itself largely a product of 1930s legislation, and 
helping to polarise production into that which was regarded as 
lprogressivel and that which was 'backward'. In some cases 
this meant support for the villagers, in others it meant support 
for the landlords. The interests of those agencies of govern- 
ment, or of employees within those agencies cannot be seen as 
unified. The land reform office and the ministry of the inter- 
ior, the major agencies involved, were often in 9pposition to 
the more 'conservative' elements in the government regional 
offices, and other ministries, as well as in their cwn offices. 
1 
1. Bill maintains that this should be seen in terms of the 
opposition between the emerginglprofessional-bureaucraticI class 
and the traditional political elite (Bill 1972, p-151), and 
because the White Revolution was intent on Isystem. preservation' 
the latter could not rely on the support of týe former, and the 
only answer they had was to attempt to buy them off (ibid., 
p. 149). 
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The public emphasis 6f the reforms was on the modernis- 
ation of peasant agriculture and the ministry of land reform 
and rural cooperatives (later transformed into the ministry of 
cooperatives and rural development) was seen to champion the 
interestsof the villagers. But it was, however, the larger 
landowners, with their superior resources and their greater 
flexibility in response to changing circumstances, who event- 
ually emerged as the major beneficiaries. The ministry of 
cooperativ. es and rural development encouraged village-based 
agricultural production and supported general social welfare 
programmes and rural industrialisation programmes. The ministry 
of agriculture and natural resources, however, which advocated 
larger commercial enterprises and agri-business increased its 
domination when it incorporated the former ministry into its 
operations in 1976. The incorporation of the Ayub valley, 
and indeed a great part of the plain into large Imechanised 
cooperatives' in 1974 on completion of the irrigation canals 
and the new Dariush Kabir dam, under the management of state- 
employed technocrats, illustrates the consolidation of this 
domination. Villagers became little more than wige labourers, 
and the larger landlords gained seats on the cooperative boards. 
There was a growing recognition by some villagers of their 
changing position vis-A-vis the landlord, and a recognition of 
their separate interests. This would seem to suggest the des- 
truction of 'primordial loyaliies' associated with the patron- 
age networks of the traditional relations governing production 
and the control of surpluses. But this again is too simple and 
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points towards a unilineal picture of development, and to a 
close association between the interests of the mdlek and the 
raliyat. As Ono has implied for Kheyrabad, another village 
in the Marvdasht plain, in which former nomads had settled, 
one of the reactions to land reform was to increase the inten- 
sity of transactions along 'tribal' networks. 
1 
Where the landlords were the major opponents of reform, 
there seems to have been a greater enthusiasm on the part of 
villagers for government-inspired initiatives with development 
projects. This would appear to be partly the result of the 
perceived need to construct political alliances to counteract 
the opposition of the former landlords. These villages became 
the focii for various social welfare programmes and for gov- 
ernment aid. It is in such places that the 'houses of equity' 
(khaneh ensdf) and'houses of culture' (khaneh farhang) 
2 
were 
established. Adult education, involving extension and liter- 
acy programmes were promoted by revolutionary corpsmen who 
were deployed in strength in these villages. Village coopera- 
tives were developed and the agricultural bank provided loans 
for seed, fertilizer, and machinery. Shul, for example, became 
the centre for a chicken-breeding scheme and initiated an 
electrification programme. It became an important stopping 
point on the itinerary of development experts being shown 
1. Ono 1968. 
2. These were features included in the provisions for the 
White Revolution and were aimed at increasing village involve- 
ment in the administration of justice and providing bases for 
increased community participation in the life of the village 
and the nation. 
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round nearby Persepolis. Villagers from these Ifavoured' 
places were recruited to peasant organisations and were active 
in formal local government. 
Under such circumstances the villagers' major allies 
were the young, educated employees who were filling the expand- 
ing numbers of posts being offered in the ministries of land 
reform, agriculture, and the interior, as well as those being 
created through the expansion of the regional offices of the 
plan and budget organisation. Many of these, together with 
the various revolutionary corpsmen, were specifically employed 
at the grass roots level to help carry out the various reforms 
initiated under the 'white revolution', and hasten the approach 
of what was termed 'the great civilization'. Work with rural 
development projects was seen by the political elite as a use- 
ful means of relieving a potentially serious unemployment prob- 
lem, and of redirecting the energies of this group. In 1964, 
for example, a new programme for the training of bakhshdars 
was initiated. The bakhshdar was the local administrative 
officer in charge of the bakhsh or district. Until the formal 
separation of administration from landownership ýhe post was 
normally filled through the patronage network of the locally 
powerful, and Bill states: 
"the position has been a kind of 'booby prize' to 
incompetent and local influentials". 
(Bill 19/12, p. 113) 
With the new programme however, the ministry of the interior 
was intent on filling these posts with young graduates who had 
passed special courses and who achieved their positions through 
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merit rather than influence, i. e. were loyal to the regime 
rather than to local political factions. In the middle 160s 
a 25 year old bakhshddr who had graduated from this course 
was allocated to Marvdasht, and Bill, who travelled with him 
notes that between 1965 and 1967: 
"he initiated 177 development programmes including 
the construction of 63 schools, 20 baths, and 10 
bridges: the repair of 14 schools and 25 baths; the 
construction of 63 kilometres of road; and the instal- 
lation of 3 electrical generators and 3 water systems. " 
(ibid., p-116) 
Bill also adds that: 
"In all these projects, he managed to secure the 
financial and physical participation of the villagers 
who for the first time believed a government official 
was on their side. " 
(ibi-d-, p-116) 
The bakhshdar, together with the revolutionary corpsmen and 
the agents of some other government institutions concerned 
with rural development were strangers to the plain and often 
to the region. Consequently they had little influence with 
the political elite of the region. They were limited therefore 
in their fields of activities to those areas which were not 
considered threatening to this latter group. This included 
the families of the larger landowners in the plain. They 
focused their attentions on the larger villages closer to 
Marvdasht in which one large landowner did not have overall 
control and where the landlord's major interests in the land 
were the collection of rents. But by the late 160s the 
bakhshdar, programme had run into serious problems as the state 
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employees, fired with enthusiasm and idealism, confronted what 
Bill has termed the old 'web' system of traditional control. 
The major effects of their work and of the reforms gener- 
ally has been to enhance the interests of those committed to 
modernisation of agriculture and reduce the influence of those 
still entrenched in 'feudal' relations of production. They 
have encouraged both villagers and landlords in this process. 
Larger farms which were in operation before the reforms and 
which were already mechanised, were allowed, of course, to 
remain intact. The small stretches of land received by the 
peasantry following the reforms have often proved too small 
for personal support and have been taken over by wealthier 
villagers. Land that was not formerly intensively cultivated 
has been rented to tulumbeh kdr operators. Evidence from the 
plain generally suggests that participation in development 
projects by villagers was far from total and was often a way of 
pursuing instrumental and individual ends. Such 'participation' 
was often governed by the more powerful villagers and/or the 
landlords. 
The public language of participation, community enterprise 
and village development, often disguised the self-interest of 
the parties involved. The decisions to build schools or bath 
houses in villages by landowners or rich villagers were more 
often aimed at increasing personal status in an arena that was 
much wider than the particular village. This new language of 
the 'good faith' economy, rooted in the rhetoric of the 1white 
revolution, and liberal democracy, disguised the progressive 
1, ýý It- 
alienation of many villagers from the traditional means of 
livelihood. They became thereby increasingly dependent on 
others for týL- provision of wage labour contracts. The more 
formal nature of these contracts, as well as the associated 
increase in distance between those who owned the land and 
those who worked it, helped to reveal the separation of the 
interests of the landowners from those of the peasantry. The 
new peasant proprietors soon discovered that it was not they 
who controlled the prices of the crops they produced on the 
urban markets. It was not long before many of them were obliged 
to give up their newly-won titles to land in return for shares 
in the 'cooperative' and participate in a reinstated 'communal' 
production system over which they had little control. The 
traditional 'cooperative' system is being resurrected to pro- 
vide the basis for this new cooperative production system. 
1 
Thus to summarise, changing relations of production asso- 
ciated with the spread of a western economic rationale, have 
served to polarise the inteiests of those engaged in agricultural 
production. The land reform programme and the associated 
1white revolution' were instrumental in this proýess- They 
seemed to differentiate between those landlords who were pri- 
marily interested in commercial farming from those who only 
saw the land as a source of rent. Thig process of differen- 
1. See 'Ajami 1974 and Safi Nejad 1972 in which they state 
that the 'traditional' 'communal' work teams (boneh, heraseh) 
should be resurrected to provide the basis for the new cooper- 
ative agriculture. But it should be pointed out that the 
relationships constructed by the villagers with the managers 
of the production cooperatives are very different from those 
implied in the original land reform programme in which vill- 
aRers would retain individual ownership of land. 
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tiation was far from complete in the early 170s, and landlords 
were engaged in a variety of different activities with differ- 
ent relationships to the land. The reforms also served to 
differentiate between the peasantry, not primarily between 
those given land and those not, but between those who were 
confined to production on marginal sections of. village land, 
and those who were able to take advantage of new opportunities, 
such as the tulumbeh karan. 
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APPENDIX 1 
A moral statement as given by a troupe of players at a 
village wedding, Tabor, Kushk-e-mullah, Fars, April 1971. 
_ 
It is unusual to find a troupe of town performers involved 
in village weddings on a professional basis. The troupe con- 
sisted of some nine people brought into the village by the head- 
man (kadkhoda) of the village for his son's wedding and also, 
quite importantly, for the benefit of the landlord, who had said 
that he would come to the village, with guests, especially to 
see the wedding. The troupe initially sang and played their 
musical instruments; the instruments too were not the ones 
usually associated with village music, being more reminiscent, 
as was the troupe, of a low-class urban night club. The instru- 
ments included a set of drums, a clarinet and a violin; 
microphone's and loud-speakers were set up by the performers, 
carpets were also laid down where they could dance and sing. 
The opening item of their performance was in itself very splen- 
did, one of the two female members of the troupe, dressed in 
full village/tribal dress danced on the carpets to the accom- 
paniment of the other musicians, and surrounded by a circle of 
villagers. She was later joined by another dancer of inferior 
calibre. The songs were followed by induced applause; induced 
by the leader of the troupe. Applause had to be induced, not 
so much because the audience were reticent to do so, but rather 
because the villagers were not used to responding in such a 
fashion. 
After an interval of some five or ten minutes, in which 
the musicians continued to play their instruments, one of the 
young ladies came back on to the 'stage' (the circle formed by 
the villagers), but had abandoned her 'traditional' garb in 
favour of a very provocative mini-skirt, short even by Shirazi 
standards. She proceeded to dance as before, interspersing her 
dancing with songs. In the songs she was joined by other mem- 
bers of the troupe. Titis was followed by a similar performance, 
by the other girl in the troupe. The whole of this performance 
was met by the villagers with apparent dis-interest; they con- 
tinued chattering and talking among themselves. This was the 
first part of the performance, the second part involved the 
staging of a play by the troupe. 
All the troupg apart from the drummer, left the stage, 
and the plot of the drama gradually unfolds. We are in the 
house of a lower, middle-class town dweller. The actor who 
takes the role of the head of the household (and who is also 
head of the troupe) is, according to a village informant, a 
Teherani, a man in his early thirties. His accent is not 
Shirazi and his mode of expression is extremely formal. The 
man's wife is the same girl who sang and danced. She is a girl 
of about twenty-three, and liberally dressed, within the con- 
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fines of the 'house', she is wearing a mini-skirt. The third 
member of the household is the comic servant, dressed in a red 
one-piece overall, with his face and hands painted black. He has two hats during the course of the drama, one an 'astrakan', 
the other a black, very battered looking cap. His gestures are 
exaggerated, and his smile gives us a glimpse of a row of gold teeth; he is a little hard of hearing, and this provides a 
major cue for his humour during the course of the drama, in 
that he misinterpretes a great deal of what is said. Approxi- 
mating in appearance and in activity to 'Haji Firuzl, this comic has never entered the scene before, not being involved with the introductory musical performance. In the first part of the drama, the clown occupies quite a central position, and is the 
main source of attraction for the audience; he is involved with 
an interaction with his master over the question of who should 
obey who, and how much servility is expected of a servant by 
the master. The master continually informs the comic that the 
latter is in charge of the security of the wife when the hus- 
band goes out of the house; no one was to be allowed near her, 
whoever it may be. There is also an exchange of dialogue bet- 
ween the husband and wife in which the master states how much 
he trusts her and how she must stay in the house, thereby 
subjecting no one to temptation. 
There is a knock on the door, the comic answers, gets 
the name of the caller wrong, providing amusement for the 
audience, but eventually lets him in. The caller has come to 
talk with the master about buying and selling cars. This man 
appears to be in his thirties, typifying a person who regularly 
inhabits the city tea houses (chai khaneh) or may be a taxi 
driver. All things considered, he does not look too reliable; 
this is the villain of the piece. It is immediately obvious 
to at least some of the audience that his intentions may not 
be honourable. It turns out that he came on honest business 
but was side-tra, cked by the appearance of such a beautiful 
woman in the form of the master's wife. (The drama comes to a 
temporary halt while encroaching children are cleared from the 
'stage' and the chattering audience has been quieýtened-) The 
Ivillain1leaves, the master remembers that he has forgotten 
something and goes out in search of him, not before leaving 
explicit instructions with the comic to let no one in. The 
comic promises to uphold the master's wishes. The onus appears 
to be on the comic for protecting the wife rather than any 
necessary defensive action that the wife herself is able to 
offer. She has remained passive throughout the proceedings so 
far. 
The 'villain' returns, furtively, and by using the ruse 
that he must leave a message for the husband, manages to get 
in to see the wife, while the comic's back is turned. None of 
the comic's entreaties will get the villain away from the 
woman, he therefore resolves to watch their inter-action very 
closely. He pushes himself in between them when the 'villain' 
attempts to steal a kiss from the woman; he continually inter- 
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rupts their conversation, much to the annoyance of the Ivillain'. 
The woman does not really enter into the dialogue at all at this 
stage, again she is the one who is being acted upon rather than 
initiating action herself. Gradually the 'villain' manages to 
seduce the woman and persuades her to come out on a picnic with 
him; the comic has been deceived into leaving the room. The 
comic returns, finds the room empty, becomes extremely dis- 
traught, with great sadness, and with the fear of the consequen- 
ces upon his master's return, he resolves to set out in pursuit 
of the couple. 
The scene shifts to a place in the countryside, the picnic 
spot, another comic provides relief from the rather heavy plot; 
he appears to be a country 'yokel', a servant in char'ge of the 
Ichai khanehl associated with the picnic spot. His manner is 
uncouth, he does not appear to be able to speak properly. The 
cuckold and his 'prize' enter, he lays a rug down for the woman 
to sit down on, he produces a bottle of vodka and obtains a 
bowl of yogurt from theservant. The cuckold pretends that the 
vodka is something other than the intoxicating drink it is, and 
the woman, being unfamiliar with the taste of vodka, drinks 
quite a considerable amount from the bottle. She complains 
about the bitterness of the drink, and the cuckold gives her 
yogurt with the 'aim of taking away that bitter flavour. Very 
soon she becomes drunk and falls into a stupour, much to the 
cuckold's delight. He picks her up and carries her away from 
the picnic area. 
The scene does not shift, but we remain at the picnic 
spot, the comic enters in search of his mistress (master's wife). 
He meets the country servant and a 'slap-stick' comedy scene 
follows in which both enjoy the remains the vodka and the yog- 
urt. The vodka appears as a new phenomenon to them both and 
they very quickly become drunk. This scene is wound up when 
both of them become unconscious. The scene changes back to the 
master's house. The comic enters having found the woman, the 
master has not yet returned home. Both are highly distraught 
and have no suggestions to make as to how they should inform 
the master, on his return, of the proceedings of'the last few 
hours. The master returns and the story of the seduction is 
given very abruptly by the comic. The master responds with a 
lengthy tirade on the gullibility of women, and their ability 
to be so easily corrupted, on the irresponsibility of the ser- 
vant and on the fickleness of friends. The outcome being that 
he throws his wife out of the house, dismisses the servant, and 
vows to take vengeance on the villain. The wife is told that 
if she wishes to take up her relationship with the man she is 
at liberty to do so. (The wife is no longer wearing a mini- 
skirt, but has donned a pair of trousers which are worn under- 
neath the skirt; this may have been the result of a pinch she 
received by one of the villagers when she was making an exit, 
but it appears more to emphasise a change in her nature. ) 
Both the servant and the woman leave the house greatly upset by 
the punishment inflicted upon them. 
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Another scene change occurs, this time we are inside a 
cafe, which the villain has apparently hired for some sort of 
engagement ceremony. In this last part of the drama all the 
troupe of players are involved, and there is a great deal of 
improvisation in the dialogue. Relief is afforded in the per- 
son of the comic who enters the cafe as a travelling priest 
(mullah). The mullah is capable of telling fortunes by reading 
peoples' palms. His activities serve as comic relief rather 
than adding any new factors to the conclusion of the plot. He 
drinks the revellers' beer surrepticiously and tries to flirt 
with one of the girls present (one presumes that this may be 
the villain's intended bride, but this is not clear, the shamed 
woman is not present). The master enters the cafe in disguise, 
he too is a mullah with a long beard and an ankle-length brown 
robe; he approaches the table but does not say very much. He 
moves away from the table, where the guests and the villain are 
seated, and there is some conversation among the guests. 
Suddenly the villain falls down, apparently poisoned. His 
friends carry him from the stage, and the 'master' is left on 
his own to sum up for the audience. This final speech is given 
in very formal language, and the fact that he is in a mullah's 
garb adds more formality to the situation. He talks about the 
evil of drink and the weakness of women, in his capacity as 
mullah rather than as the master. The whole play has thoroughly 
entertained the audience, apart from one or two incidents, the 
pinching and the continual encroachment of the children onto 
the stage. The more traditional musicians take up the enter- 
tainment, with their drums and reed pipe and the wedding takes 
on a more traditional form; the men take up their sticks for 
chub bazi and the women run off to dance another guest into 
the village. 
4 30 
Appendix 2. 
Composition of households in Chamani. 
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GLOSSARY OF PERSIAN TERMS 
dbadeh settlement 
5beru face (as in 'to lose face, ) 
abi irrigated farming 
abidr irrigator 
laghd wedding contract 
ahangar tinker 
5khund religious cleric 
lamaleh servant (also noukar) 
ambar store room 
anjuman council 
arbdb lord, 'squire' 
lashiyer 'tribal' 
ayalat district, province, (no longer in use) 
badi nomad, 'people of the wind' 
bakhsh department 
bakhshddr local administrative officer in charge of 
a bakhsh 
banna builder 
bolo-kh9neh upper room 
boluk district, corresponding to dehestdn (no 
(pl. bolukat) longer used) 
boneh traditional cooperative group for cultivation 
of village lands. See also heraseh, sahra, 
khish. 
daim irrigated farming 
dang one sixth part of any piece of real estate 
dashtebiin village watchman 
deh village 
dehati 'of the countryside', 'peasant', (derogatory) 
dehestiin district 
dehghlin peasant proprietor, head of a village who 
(pl. dehghAnign) held lands and acted as tax collector 
deh neshin village resident 
ehterRm honour, standing, reputation 
farmandar governor of shahrestan 
garmsir 'warm area', winter quarters (Turkish qishlaq) 
ghabileh tribe 
ghalleh fortified settlement 
ghanat underground irrigation channel 
gharieh village (19th century) 
ghesbeh borough, small town, central village of boluk, 
administrative centre 
ghorbat gypsy 
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haji one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca 
haydt courtyard 
heraseh cooperative group working several khish, 
ploughlands 
il (pl. ilat) tribe 
Il khdn leader of tribe, formal title 
imamziideh local shrine to saint 
iqtal land assignment, see also tuyul. 
jajim coarse woven blanket 
j iiii z cucumbers and melons 
kadkhoda village headman, head of a tireh 
kaldntar overseer of city ward, head of tribal sub- 
group (taifeh) , lord mayor kerbald'i one who has made a pilgrimage to Kerbala 
in Iraq 
khiighan title given-to first Qajar monarch; Turkish: 
emperor of China or of Chinese Turkestan 
khaki 'people of the earth', sedentarists 
khaliseh crown land 
khdn chief 
(pl. khavdnin) 
khlineh house, household, home 
khaneh ensdf house of equity 
khaneh farhang house of culture 
khanevadeh household, family, tribe 
khish ploughland 
khordeh mdlek: small landowner 
khorjin saddle bag 
khwushneshin person without rights to land 
kucheh narrow lane 
madrasseh school, now more definitively religious school 
mahallah quarter (of a settlement) 
mahr/mahrieh marriage payment 
majlis council 
malek landowner/landlord 
ýpl. malekin) 
maliat taxes 
mamlekat country, area, as in mamlekat-e-Fars 
mann weight (approx. 3 kilos) 
mashdi one who has made the pilgrimage to the shrine 
of the 6th Imam, Imam Reza at Mashad in N. E. 
Iran 
masjid mosque 
mavdt dead lands 
mazraveh farm (land) 
melk landed property 
mobashir bailiff 
mujtahed religious leader 
(pi. mujtahidin) 
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mullah religious cleric, see akhund 
mustajer rentier 
mutavalli administrator of a vaqf 
na) ar carpenter 
niimzad engaged (to be married) 
nasaq-dar one who holds cultivation rights 
nayeb deputy, assistant 
nimeh kar crop/animal-sharing agreement in which parties 
to agreement receive one and a half shares 
ostan modern province 
ostandar provincial governor, governor-general 
ouldd family, counted through males 
ralis head, leader 
raliyat subject, peasant 
(pl. rali. yal) 
rish sefid elder , lit. 'grey heard' (pl. rish sefiddn) 
rus tii rustic, peasant 
sahra 
saifi 
salmani 
sarhad 
sayyid 
selseleh 
sepah behdosht 
sepah-dRnesh : 
sepah-tarvij : 
shahrak 
shahrestan 
sharl 
shatvi 
sheikh 
shirbahg 
sofreh 
soltan 
soltanat 
open-country 
summer crops 
b arb er 
cool area, summer quarters (Turkish yeylaq) 
descendant of the prophet- 
chain of command 
health corpsman 
literacy corpsman 
extension corpsman 
small town 
district governed from a town 
religious law 
winter crops 
leader (of a religious order) 
bride price; lit. 'milk money' 
spread, table cloth 
ruler (obs. ) 
that area ruled by a soltan - 
(shahr) 
country 
tahjir marking out dead land prior to claiming it 
taifeh group, tribe, larger than tireh 
tarigha mystical path 
tireh group, under leadership of kadkhoda 
tulumbeh-kar one who cultivates with water from a pump 
(tulumbeh) 
tuyul land assignment, see liqta 
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lulama those learned in religious sciences 
lumdeh malek large landowner 
lurf common law 
vaqf religious endowment 
(pl. ouqaf) 
vaqfi lamm charitable vaqf 
vaqfi khass personal vaqf 
vazir minister 
zabet revenue collector, controller, bailiff 
zarleh peasant cultivator 
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